Harper's Encyclopedia of United States History
Benson Lossing, Ed.

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Johnson, Andrew 1808-

Seventeenth President of the United States; born in Raleigh, N. C., Dec. 29, 1808. He learned the trade of a tailor, and taught himself to read. After working as a journeyman in South Carolina, he went to Greenville, Tenn., taking with him his mother, who was dependent on him. There he worked [155] at his trade, married, and was taught by his wife to write; became alderman and mayor; a member of the legislature (1832-33 and 1839); presidential elector (1840); State Senator in 1841; and member of Congress from 1843 to 1853. From 1853 to 1857 he was governor of Tennessee, and from 1857 to 1863 United States Senator. In 1862 he was appointed military governor of Tennessee, and in 1864 was elected Vice-President of the United States. On the death of President Lincoin he succeeded to the office, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. On the morning of the death of Mr. Lincoln, April 15, 1865, the cabinet officers, excepting Mr. Seward, who was suffering from a murderous assault, addressed a note to the Vice-President, officially notifying him of the decease of the President, and that the emergency of the government demanded that he should immediately enter upon the duties of the Presidency. Mr. Johnson appointed ten o'clock that morning, when he would be ready to take the oath of office. That oath was administered by Chief-Justice Chase, in the presence of the cabinet officers and several members of Congress. Then the President delivered a brief speech to the gentlemen present. There, in the midst of universal and unparalleled excitement, the authority of the nation was quietly transferred to other hands a few hours after the death of President Lincoln. Mr. Johnson requested Mr. Lincoln's cabinet to remain, and the government went on without a shock to its steady movement. See cabinet, President's.

On Aug. 14, 1866, a convention was held in Philadelphia, composed largely of Confederate leaders and their sympathizers in the North, for the purpose of organizing a new political party, with President Johnson as its standard-bearer. Whereupon Johnson and a part of his cabinet made a circuitous journey to Chicago, ostensibly for the purpose of being present at the dedication of a monument to Senator Douglas. He harangued the people on the way in language so unbecoming the dignity of a chief magistrate of the republic that the nation felt a relief from mortification after his return in September. He had denounced Congress as an illegal body, deserving of no respect. The tour, made wholly for political effect, extended to St. Louis. His conduct at Cleveland and St. Louis was so offensive that the common councils of Cincinnati and Pittsburg refused to accord him a public reception. The attempt to establish a new party with President Johnson as a leader was a failure.

When the cabinet of President Johnson resigned, the friends of Mr. Stanton, Secretary of War, urged him to retain the office, for it was believed the chief magistrate was contemplating some revolutionary movement. The tenure of office act seemed to guarantee Mr. Stanton against removal. The Fortieth Congress met immediately after the adjournment of the Thirty-ninth, and adjourned March 31, 1867, to meet on the first Wednesday in July following, for the express purpose of preventing the President from doing serious mischief. After removing obstructions cast in the way of reorganization by the President, Congress adjourned, July 20, to meet Nov. 21, hoping the President would no longer disturb the public peace by his conduct. They were mistaken. As soon as Congress adjourned, in violation of the tenure of office act he proceeded to remove Mr. Stanton from office. He first asked him, Aug. 5, to resign. “Grave public considerations,” he said, “constrain me to request your resignation as Secretary of War.” Stanton replied, “Grave public considerations constrain me to continue in the office of Secretary of War until the next meeting of Congress.” He shared in the general suspicion that Johnson was contemplating a revolutionary movement in favor of the Confederates. A week later the President directed General Grant to assume the position and duties of Secretary of War. As a dutiful soldier, he obeyed his commander-inchief. Stanton, knowing the firmness and incorruptible patriotism of Grant, withdrew under protest. This change was followed by such arbitrary acts on the part of the President that the country was thoroughly alarmed. Even the President's private friends were amazed and mortified by his conduct. He gave unsatisfactory reasons for dismissing [156] Stanton. On Jan. 13, 1868, the Senate reinstated Stanton, when Grant quietly withdrew. The enraged President reproached the latter for yielding to the Senate, charged him with having broken his promises, and tried to injure his reputation as a citizen and a soldier. A question of veracity between them arose, when the general-in-chief felt compelled to say, in a letter to the President: “When my honor as a soldier and my integrity as a man have been so violently assailed, pardon me for saying that I can but regard this whole matter, from beginning to end, as an attempt to involve me in the resistance of law for which you have hesitated to assume the responsibility in orders, and thus to destroy my character before the country.” The President's conduct concerning Stanton led immediately to his impeachment.

On Feb. 22, 1868, the House of Representatives, by a vote of 126 to 47, “Resolved, that Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, be impeached of high crimes and misdemeanors.” A committee presented nine articles of impeachment (see below). Managers were appointed, and on March 3 they presented two other charges. The Senate organized as a high court of impeachment, with Chief-Justice Chase presiding, on the 5th; the President was summoned to the bar on the 7th, and appeared by counsel on the 13th; and the trial was begun on the 30th. The examination of witnesses ended April 22; the arguments of counsel were concluded May 6; and twenty days were consumed in debates in the Senate. The votes of fifty-four Senators present were taken on the verdict on May 26, when thirty-five were for conviction, and nineteen for acquittal. As two-thirds of the votes were necessary for conviction, the President was acquitted by one vote.

Soon after the expiration of his term as President, he was an unsuccessful candidate for the United States Senate; in 1872 he was defeated for Congressmanat-Large; and in January, 1875, he was elected a United States Senator. He died near Carter's Station, Tenn., July 31, 1875.

Impeachment proceedings.—Articles exhibited by the House of Representatives of the United States, in the name of themselves and all the people of the United States, against Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, in maintenance and support of their impeachment against him for high crimes and misdemeanors.

Article I:

That said Andrew Johnson, President. of the United States, on the 21st day of February, in the year of our Lord 1868, at Washington, in the District of Columbia, unmindful of the high duties of his office, of his oath of office, and of the requirement of the Constitution that he should take care that the laws be faithfully executed, did unlawfully, and in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States, issue an order in writing for the removal of Edwin M. Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department of War, said Edwin M. Stanton having been theretofore duly appointed and commissioned, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, as such Secretary, and said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, on the 12th day of August, in the year of our Lord 1867, and during the recess of said Senate, having suspended by his order Edwin M. Stanton from said office; and within twenty days after the first day of the next meeting of said Senate—that is to say, on the 12th day of December, in the year last aforesaid— having reported to said Senate such suspension, with the evidence and reasons for his action in the case, and the name of the person designated to perform the duties of such office temporarily until the next meeting of the Senate, and said Senate thereafterward, on the 13th day of January, in the year of our Lord 1868, having duly considered the evidence and reasons reported by said Andrew Johnson for said suspension and having refused to concur in said suspension, whereby, and by force of the provisions of an act entitled “An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices.” passed March 2, 1867, said Edwin M. Stanton did forthwith resume the functions of his office, whereof the said Andrew Johnson had then and there due notice, and said Edwin M. Stanton, by reason of the premises, on said 21st day of February, being lawfully entitled to [157] hold said office as Secretary for the Department of War, which said order for the removal of said Edwin M. Stanton is, in substance, as follows—that is to say:

Which order was unlawfully issued, with intent then and there to violate the act entitled “An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices,” passed March 2, 1867; and, with the further intent, contrary to the provisions of said act, in violation thereof, and contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and without the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, the said Senate then and there being in session, to remove said Edwin M. Stanton from the office of Secretary of the Department of War, the said Edwin M. Stanton being then and there Secretary of War, and being then and there in due and lawful execution and discharge of the duties of said office, whereby said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, did then and there commit and was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

Article II:

That on the said 21st day of February, in the year of our Lord 1868, at Washington, in the District of Columbia, said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, unmindful of the high duties of his office, of his oath of office, and in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and contrary to the provisions of an act entitled “An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices,” passed March 2, 1867, without the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, said Senate then and there being in session, and without authority of law, did, with intent to violate the Constitution of the United States and the act aforesaid, issue and deliver to one Lorenzo Thomas a letter of authority, in substance as follows, that is to say:

then and there being no vacancy in said office of Secretary for the Department of War; whereby said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, did then and there commit and was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

Article III:

That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, on the 21st day of February, in the year of our Lord 1868, at Washington, in the District of Columbia, did commit and was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office, in this, that, without authority of law, while the Senate of the United States was then and there in session, he did appoint one Lorenzo Thomas to be Secretary for the Department of War, Ad interim, without the advice and consent of the Senate, and with intent to violate the Constitution of the United States, no vacancy having happened in said office of Secretary for the Department of War during the recess of the Senate, and no vacancy existing in said office at the time, and which said appointment, so made by said Andrew Johnson, of said Lorenzo Thomas, is in substance as follows, that is to say:

(Same as in Article II.)

Article IV:

That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, unmindful of the [158] high duties of his office, and of his oath of office, in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States, on the 21st day of February, in the year of our Lord 1868, at Washington, in the District of Columbia, did unlawfully conspire with one Lorenzo Thomas, and with other persons, to the House of Representatives unknown, with intent by intimidation and threats unlawfully to hinder and prevent Edwin M. Stanton, then and there the Secretary for the Department of War, duly appointed under the laws of the United States, from holding said office of Secretary for the Department of War, contrary to and in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and of the provisions of an act entitled “An act to define and punish certain conspiracies,” approved July 31, 1861, whereby said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, did then and there commit and was guilty of a high crime in office.

Article V: That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, unmindful of the high duties of his office, and of his oath of office, on the 21st day of February, in the year of our Lord 1868, and on divers other days and times in said year, before the 2d day of March, A. D. 1868, at Washington, in the District of Columbia, did unlawfully conspire with one Lorenzo Thomas, and with other persons to the House of Representatives unknown, to prevent and hinder the execution of an act entitled “An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices,” passed March 2, 1867, and in pursuance of said conspiracy did unlawfully attempt to prevent Edwin M. Stanton, then and there being Secretary for the Department of War, duly appointed and commissioned under the laws of the United States, from holding said office, whereby the said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, did then and there commit and was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

Article VI:

That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, unmindful of the high duties of his office and of his oath of office, on the 21st day of February, in the year of our Lord 1868, at Washington, in the District of Columbia, did unlawfully conspire with one Lorenzo Thomas by force to seize, take, and possess the property of the United States in the Department of War, then and there in the custody and charge of Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary for said Department, contrary to the provisions of an act entitled “An act to define and punish certain conspiracies,” approved July 31, 1861, and with intent to violate and disregard an act entitled “An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices,” passed March 2, 1867, whereby said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, did then and there commit a high crime in office.

Article VII:

That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, unmindful of the high duties of his office and of his oath of office, on the 21st day of February, in the year of our Lord 1868, at Washington, in the District of Columbia, did unlawfully conspire with one Lorenzo Thomas with intent unlawfully to seize, take, and possess the property of the United States in the Department of War, in the custody and charge of Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of said department, with intent to violate and disregard the act entitled “An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices,” passed March 2, 1867, whereby said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, did then and there commit a high misdemeanor in office.

Article VIII:

That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, unmindful of the high duties of his office and of his oath of office, with intent unlawfully to control the disbursement of the moneys appropriated for the military service and for the Department of War, on the 21st day of February, in the year of our Lord 1868, at Washington, in the District of Columbia, did unlawfully and contrary to the provisions of an act entitled “An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices,” passed March 2, 1867, and in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and without the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, and while the Senate was then and there in session, [159] there being no vacancy in the office of Seeretary for the Department of War, with intent to violate and disregard the act aforesaid, then and there issue and deliver to one Lorenzo Thomas a letter of authority in writing, in substance as follows, that is to say:

(Same as in Article II.)

Whereby said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, did then and there commit and was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

Article IX:

That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, on the 22d day of February, in the year of our Lord 1868, at Washington, in the District of Columbia, in disregard of the Constitution and the laws of the United States, duly enacted, as commander-in-chief of the army of the United States, did bring before himself then and there William H. Emory, a major-general by brevet in the army of the United States, actually in command of the Department of Washington and the military forces thereof, and did then and there, as such commander-in-chief, declare to and instruct said Emory that part of a law of the United States, passed March 2, 1867, entitled “An act making appropriations for the support of the army for the year ending June 30, 1868, and for other purposes,” especially the second section thereof, which provides, among other things, that “all orders and instructions, relating to military operations, issued by the President or Secretary of War, shall be issued through the general of the army, and, in case of his inability, through the next in rank,” was unconstitutional, and in contravention of the commission of said Emory, and which said provisions of law had been theretofore duly and legally promulgated by general order for the government and direction of the army of the United States, as the said Andrew Johnson then and there well knew, with intent thereby to induce said Emory, in his official capacity as commander of the Department of Washington, to violate the provisions of said act, and to take and receive, act upon, and obey such orders as he, the said Andrew Johnson, might make and give, and which should not be issued through the general of the army of the United States, according to the provisions of said act, and with the further intent thereby to enable him, the said Andrew Johnson, to prevent the execution of an act entitled “An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices,” passed March 2, 1867, and to unlawfully prevent Edwin M. Stanton, then being Secretary for the Department of War, from holding said office and discharging the duties thereof, whereby said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, did then and there commit and was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

Article X:

That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, on the 22d day of That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, unmindful of the high duties of his office and the dignity and proprieties thereof, and of the harmony and courtesies which ought to exist and be maintained between the executive and legislative branches of the government of the United States, designing and intending to set aside the rightful authority and powers of Congress, did attempt to bring into disgrace, ridicule, hatred, contempt, and reproach the Congress of the United States and the several branches thereof, to impair and destroy the regard and respect of all the good people of the United States for the Congress and legislative power thereof (which all officers of the government ought inviolably to preserve and maintain), and to excite the odium and resentment of all the good people of the United States against Congress and the laws by it duly and constitutionally enacted; and, in pursuance of said design and intent, openly and publicly, and before divers assemblages of the citizens of the United States convened in divers parts thereof to meet and receive said Andrew Johnson, as the chief magistrate of the United States, did, on the 18th day of August, in the year of our Lord 1866, and on divers other days and times, as well before as afterwards, make and deliver, with a loud voice, certain intemperate, inflammatory, and scandalous harangues, and did therein utter loud threats and bitter menaces as well against Congress as the laws of the United States duly enacted thereby, amid the cries, jeers, and laughter of the multitudes then assembled and within hearing, which are [160] set forth in the several specifications hereinafter written, in substance and effect, that is to say:

[Here are set out three specifications, quoting parts of speeches alleged to have been made by the President, Aug. 15, Sept. 3, and Sept. 8, 1866.]

Which said utterances, declarations, threats, and harangues, highly censurable in any, are peculiarly indecent and unbecoming to the chief magistrate of the United States, by means whereof said Andrew Johnson has brought the high office of the President of the United States into contempt, ridicule, and disgrace, to the great scandal of all good citizens, whereby said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, did commit and was then and there guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

Article XI:

That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, unmindful of the high duties of his office and of his oath of office, and in disregard of the Constitution and laws of the United States, did heretofore, to wit: on the 18th day of August, 1866, at the city of Washington, in the District of Columbia, by public speech, declare and affirm in substance that the Thirty-ninth Congress of the United States was not a Congress of the United States authorized by the Constitution to exercise legislative power under the same, but, on the contrary, was a Congress of only part of the States, thereby denying and intending to deny that the legislation of said Congress was valid or obligatory upon him, the said Andrew Johnson, except in so far as he saw fit to approve the same, and also thereby denying and intending to deny the power of said Thirty-ninth Congress to propose amendments to the Constitution of the United States; and, in pursuance of said declaration, the said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, afterwards, to wit: on the 21st day of February, 1868, at the city of Washington, in the District of Columbia, did unlawfully and in disregard of the requirements of the Constitution, that he should take care that the laws be faithfully executed, attempt to prevent the execution of an act entitled “An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices,” passed March 2, 1867, by unlawfully devising and contriving, and attempting to devise and contrive, means by which he should prevent Edwin M. Stanton from forthwith resuming the functions of the office of Secretary for the Department of War, notwithstanding the refusal of the Senate to concur in the suspension theretofore made by Andrew Johnson of said Edwin M. Stanton from said office of Secretary for the Department of War, and also by further unlawfully devising and contriving, and attempting to devise and contrive, means then and there to prevent the execution of an act entitled “An act making appropriations for the support of the army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1868, and for other purposes,” approved March 2, 1867, and also to prevent the execution of an act entitled “An act to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel States,” passed March 2, 1867; weherby the said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, did then, to wit: on the 21st day of February, 1868, at the city of Washington, commit and was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

And the House of Representatives by protestation, saving to themselves the liberty of exhibiting at any time hereafter any further articles or other accusation, or impeachment against the said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, and also of replying to his answers which he shall make unto the articles herein preferred against him, and of offering proof to the same and every part thereof, and to all and every other article, accusation, or impeachment which shall be exhibited by them, as the case shall require, do demand that the said Andrew Johnson may be put to answer the high crimes and misdemeanors in office herein charged against him, and that such proceedings, examinations, trials, and judgments may be thereupon had and given as may be agreeable to law and justice.

Senate of the United States, sitting as a court of impeachment for the trial of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States.

The answer of the said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, to [161] the articles of impeachment exhibited against him by the House of Representatives of the United States.

answer to article I.

For answer to the first article he says: that Edwin M. Stanton was appointed Secretary for the Department of War on the 15th day of January, A. D. 1862, by Abraham Lincoln, then President of the United States, during the first term of his Presidency, and was commissioned, according to the Constitution and laws of the United States, to hold the said office during the pleasure of the President; that the office of Secretary for the Department of War was created by an act of the First Congress, in its first session, passed on the 7th day of August, A. D. 1789, and in and by that act it was provided and enacted that the said Secretary for the Department of War shall perform and execute such duties as shall from time to time be enjoined on and intrusted to him by the President of the United States, agreeably to the Constitution, relative to the subjects within the scope of the said department; and furthermore, that the said Secretary shall conduct the business of the said department in such a manner as the President of the United States shall, from time to time, order and instruct.

And this respondent, further answering, says that, by force of the act aforesaid, and by reason of his appointment aforesaid, the said Stanton became the principal officer in one of the executive departments of the government within the true intent and meaning of the second section of the second article of the Constitution of the United States, and according to the true intent and meaning of that provision of the Constitution of the United States; and in accordance with the settled and uniform practice of each and every President of the United States, the said Stanton then became, and, so long as he should continue to hold the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, must continue to be, one of the advisers of the President of the United States, as well as the person intrusted to act for and represent the President in matters enjoined upon him or intrusted to him by the President, touching the department aforesaid, and for whose conduct in such capacity, subordinate to the President, the President is, by the Constitution and laws of the United States, made responsible. And this respondent, further answering, says he succeeded to the office of President of the United States upon, and by reason of, the death of Abraham Lincoln, then President of the United States, on the 15th day of April, 1865, and the said Stanton was then holding the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, under and by reason of the appointment and commission aforesaid; and, not having been removed from the said office by this respondent, the said Stanton continued to hold the same under the appointment and commission aforesaid, at the pleasure of the President, until the time hereinafter particularly mentioned; and at no time received any appointment or commission save as above detailed.

And this respondent, further answering, says that on and prior to the 5th day of August, A. D. 1867, this respondent, the President of the United States, responsible for the conduct of the Secretary for the Department of War, and having the constitutional right to resort to and rely upon the person holding that office for advice concerning the great and difficult public duties enjoined on the President by the Constitution and laws of the United States, became satisfied that he could not allow the said Stanton to continue to hold the office of Secretary for the Department of War, without hazard of the public interest; that the relations between the said Stanton and the President no longer permitted the President to resort to him for advice, or to be, in the judgment of the President, safely responsible for his conduct of the affairs of the Department of War, as by law required, in accordance with the orders and instructions of the President; and thereupon, by force of the Constitution and laws of the United States, which devolve on the President the power and the duty to control the conduct of the business of that executive department of the government, and by reason of the constitutional duty of the President to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, this respondent did necessarily [162] consider, and did determine, that the said Stanton ought no longer to hold the said office of Secretary for the Department of War. And this respondent, by virtue of the power and authority vested in him as President of the United States, by the Constitution and laws of the United States, to give effect to such his decision and determination, did, on the 5th day of August, A. D. 1867, address to the said Stanton a note, of which the following is a true copy:

Sir,—Public considerations of a high character constrain me to say that your resignation as Secretary of War will be accepted.

To which note the said Stanton made the following reply:

This respondent, as President of the United States, was thereon of opinion that, having regard to the necessary official relations and duties of the Secretary for the Department of War to the President of the United States, according to the Constitution and laws of the United States, and having regard to the responsibility of the President for the conduct of the said Secretary, and having regard to the paramount executive authority of the office which the respondent holds under the Constitution and laws of the United States, it was impossible, consistently with the public interests, to allow the said Stanton to continue to hold the said office of Secretary for the Department of War; and it then became the official duty of the respondent, as President of the United States, to consider and decide what act or acts should and might lawfully be done by him, as President of the United States, to cause the said Stanton to surrender the said office.

This respondent was informed and verily believed that it was practically settled by the First Congress of the United States, and had been so considered and, uniformly and in great numbers of instances, acted on by each Congress and President of the United States, in succession, from President Washington to and including President Lincoln, and from the First Congress to the Thirty-ninth Congress, that the Constitution of the United States conferred on the President, as part of the executive power, and as one of the necessary means and instruments of performing the executive duty expressly imposed on him by the Constitution, of taking care that the laws be faithfully executed, the power at any and all times of removing from office all executive officers, for cause, to be judged by the President alone. This respondent had, in pursuance of the Constitution, required the opinion of each principal officer of the executive departments, upon this question of constitutional executive power and duty, and had been advised by each of them, including the said Stanton, Secretary for the Department of War, that under the Constitution of the United States this power was lodged by the Constitution in the President of the United States, and that, consequently, it could be lawfully exercised by him, and the Congress could not deprive him thereof; and this respondent, in his capacity of President of the United States, and because in that capacity he was both enabled and bound to use his best judgment upon this question, did, in good faith, and with an earnest desire to arrive at the truth, come to the conclusion and opinion, and did make the same known to the honorable the Senate of the United States, by a message dated on the 2d day of March, 1867 (a true copy whereof is hereunto annexed and marked A), that the power last mentioned was conferred and the duty of exercising it, in fit cases, was imposed on the President by the Constitution of the United States, and that the President could not be deprived of this power or relieved of this duty, nor could the same be vested by law in the President and the Senate jointly, either in part or whole; and this has ever since remained, and was the opinion of this respondent at the time when he was forced, as aforesaid, to consider and decide what [163] act or acts should and might lawfully be done by this respondent, as President of the United States, to cause the said Stanton to surrender the said office.

This respondent was also then aware that by the first section of “An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices” passed March 2, 1867, by a constitutional majority of both Houses of Congress, it was enacted as follows:

That every person holding any civil office to which he has been appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and every person who shall hereafter be appointed to any such office, and shall become duly qualified to act therein, is and shall be entitled to hold such office until a successor shall have been in like manner appointed and duly qualified, except as herein otherwise provided; Provided, that the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, of the Navy, and of the Interior, the Postmaster-General, and the Attorney-General, shall hold their offices respectively for and during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed, and one month thereafter, subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

This respondent was also aware that this act was understood and intended to be an expression of the opinion of the Congress by which that act was passed, that the power to remove executive officers for cause might, by law, be taken from the President and vested in him and the Senate jointly; and although this respondent had arrived at and still retained the opinion above expressed and verily believed, as he still believes, that the said first section of the last-mentioned act was and is wholly inoperative and void by reason of its conflict with the Constitution of the United States, yet, inasmuch as the same had been enacted by the constitutional majority in each of the two Houses of that Congress, this respondent considered it to be proper to examine and decide whether the particular case of the said Stanton, on which it was this respondent's duty to act, was within or without the terms of that first section of the act; or, if within it, whether the President had not the power, according to the terms of the act, to remove the said Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department of War, and having, in his capacity of President of the United States, so examined and considered, did form the opinion that the case of said Stanton and his tenure of office were not affected by the section of the last-named act.

And this respondent, further answering, says that, although a case thus existed which, in his judgment as President of the United States, called for the exercise of the executive power to remove the said Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department of War, and although this respondent was of opinion, as is above shown, that under the Constitution of the United States the power to remove the said Stanton from the said office was vested in the President of the United States; and although this respondent was also of the same opinion, as is above shown, that the case of the said Stanton was not affected by the first section of the last-named act; and although each of the said opinions had been formed by this respondent upon an actual case, requiring him, in his capacity of President of the United States, to come to some judgment and determination thereon, yet this respondent, as President of the United States, desired and determined to avoid, if possible, any question of the construction and effect of the said first section of the last-named act, and also the broader question of the executive power conferred on the President of the United States by the Constitution of the United States to remove one of the principal officers of one of the executive departments for cause seeming to him sufficient; and this respondent also desired and determined that if, from causes over which he could exert no control, it should become absolutely necessary to raise and have in some way determined either or both of the said lastnamed questions, it was in accordance with the Constitution of the United States, and was required of the President thereby, that questions of so much gravity and importance, upon which the legislative and executive departments of the government had disagreed, which involved powers considered by all branches of the government, during its entire history down to the year 1867, to have been confided by the Constitution of the United States to the President and to be [164] necessary for the complete and proper execution of his constitutional duties, should be in some proper way submitted to that judicial department of the government intrusted by the Constitution with the power, and subjected by it to the duty, not only of determining finally the construction and effect of all acts of Congress, but of comparing them with the Constitution of the United States, and pronouncing them inoperative when found in conflict with that fundamental law which the people have enacted for the government of all their servants. And to these ends, first, that, through the action of the Senate of the United States, the absolute duty of the President to substitute some fit person in place of Mr. Stanton as one of his advisers, and as a principal subordinate officer whose official conduct he was responsible for, and had lawful right to control, might, if possible, be accomplished without the necessity of raising any one of the questions aforesaid; and, second, if this duty could not be so performed, then that these questions, or such of them as might necessarily arise, should be judicially determined in manner aforesaid, and for no other end or purpose, this respondent, as President of the United States, on the 12th day of August, 1867, seven days after the reception of the letter of the said Stanton, of the 5th of August, hereinbefore stated, did issue to the said Stanton the order following, namely:

To which said order the said Stanton made the following reply:

And this respondent, further answering, says, that it is provided, in and by the second section of “An act to regulate the tenure of certain civil offices,” that the President may suspend an officer from the performance of the duties of the office held by him, for certain causes therein designated, until the next meeting of the Senate, and until the case shall be acted on by the Senate; that this respondent, as President of the United States, was advised, and he verily believed and still believes, that the executive power of removal from office, confided to him by the Constitution aforesaid, includes the power of suspension from office at the pleasure of the President, and this respondent, by the order aforesaid, did suspend the said Stanton from office, not until the next meeting of the Senate, or until the Senate should have acted upon the case, but by force of the power and authority vested in him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, indefinitely, and at the pleasure of the President, and the order, in form aforesaid, was made known to the Senate of the United States on the 12th day of December, A. D. 1867, as will be more fully hereinafter stated.

And this respondent, further answering, says that, in and by the act of Feb. 13, 1795, it was, among other things, provided and enacted that, in case of vacancy in the office of Secretary for the Department of War, it shall be lawful for the [165] President, in case he shall think it necessary, to authorize any person to perform the duties of that office until a successor be appointed or such vacancy filled, but not exceeding the term of six months; and this respondent, being advised and believing that such law was in full force and not repealed, by an order dated Aug. 12, 1867, did authorize and empower Ulysses S. Grant, general of the armies of the United States, to act as Secretary for the Department of War, ad interim, in the form in which similar authority had theretofore been given, not until the next meeting of the Senate, and until the Senate should act on the case, but at the pleasure of the President, subject only to the limitation of six months, in the said last-mentioned act contained; and a copy of the last-named order was made known to the Senate of the United States, on the 12th day of December, A. D. 1867, as will be hereinafter more fully stated; and, in pursuance of the design and intention aforesaid, if it should become necessary, to submit the said questions to a judicial determination, this respondent, at or near the date of the last-mentioned order, did make known such his purpose to obtain a judicial decision of the said questions, or such of them as might be necessary.

And this respondent, further answering, says that, in further pursuance of his intentions and design, if possible, to perform what he judged to be his imperative duty, to prevent the said Stanton from longer holding the office of Secretary for the Department of War, and at the same time avoiding, if possible, any question respecting the extent of the power of removal from executive office confided to the President, by the Constitution of the United States, and any question respecting the construction and effect of the first section of the said “act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices,” while he should not, by any act of his, abandon and relinquish, either a power which he believed the Constitution had conferred on the President of the United States, to enable him to perform the duties of his office, or a power designedly left to him by the first section of the act of Congress last aforesaid, this respondent did, on the 12th day of December, 1867, transmit to the Senate of the United States a message, a copy whereof is hereunto annexed and marked B, wherein he made known the orders aforesaid, and the reasons which had induced the same, so far as this respondent then considered it material and necessary that the same should be set forth, and reiterated his views concerning the constitutional power of removal vested in the President, and also expressed his views concerning the construction of the said first section of the last-mentioned act, as respected the power of the President to remove the said Stanton from the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, well hoping that this respondent could thus perform what he then believed, and still believes, to be his imperative duty in reference to the said Stanton, without derogating from the powers which this respondent believed were confided to the President, by the Constitution and laws, and without the necessity of raising, judicially, any question concerning the same.

And this respondent, further answering, says that, this hope not having been realized, the President was compelled either to allow the said Stanton to resume the said office and remain therein contrary to the settled convictions of the President, formed as aforesaid, respecting the powers confided to him, and the duties required of him by the Constitution of the United States, and contrary to the opinion formed as aforesaid, that the first section of the last-mentioned act did not affect the case of the said Stanton, and contrary to the fixed belief of the President that he could no longer advise with or trust or be responsible for the said Stanton, in the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, or else he was compelled to take such steps as might, in the judgment of the President, be lawful and necessary to raise, for a judicial decison, the questions affecting the lawful right of the said Stanton to resume the said office, or the power of the said Stanton to persist in refusing to quit the said office, if he should persist in actually refusing to quit the same; and to this end, and to this end only, this respondent did, on the 21st day of February, 1868, issue the order for the removal of the said Stanton, in the said first article mentioned and set forth, and the order authorizing [166] the said Lorenzo Thomas to act as Secretary of War, ad interim, in the said second article set forth.

And this respondent, proceeding to answer specifically each substantial allegation in the said first article, says: He denies that the said Stanton, on the 21st day of February, 1868, was lawfully in possession of the said office of Secretary for the Department of War. He denies that the said Stanton, on the day last mentioned, was lawfully entitled to hold the said office against the will of the President of the United States. He denies that the said order for the removal of the said Stanton was unlawfully issued. He denies that said order was issued with intent to violate the act entitled, “An act to regulate the tenure of certain civil offices.” He denies that the said order was a violation of the lastmentioned act. He denies that the said order was a violation of the Constitution of the United States, or of any law thereof, or of his oath of office. He denies that the said order was issued with an intent to violate the Constitution of the United States, or any law thereof, or this respondent's oath of office; and he respectfully, but earnestly, insists that not only was it issued by him in the performance of what he believed to be an imperative official duty, but in the performance of what this honorable court will consider was, in point of fact, an imperative official duty. And he denies that any and all substantive matters, in the said first article contained, in manner and form as the same are therein stated and set forth, do, by law, constitute a high misdemeanor in office, within the true intent and meaning of the Constitution of the United States.

answer to article II.

And for answer to the second article, this respondent says that he admits he did issue and deliver to said Lorenzo Thomas the said writing set forth in said second article, bearing date at Washington, District of Columbia, Feb. 21, 1868, addressed to Brevet Maj.-Gen. Lorenzo Thomas, adjutant-general United States army, Washington, District of Columbia; and he further admits that the same was so issued without the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, then in session; but he denies that he thereby violated the Constitution of the United States, or any law thereof, or that he did thereby intend to violate the Constitution of the United States, or the provisions of any act of Congress; and this respondent refers to his answer to said first article for a full statement of the purposes and intentions with which said order was issued, and adopts the same as part of his answer to this article; and he further denies that there was then and there no vacancy in the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, or that he did then and there commit, or was guilty of, a high misdemeanor in office; and this respondent maintains and will insist:

1. That at the date and delivery of said writing there was a vacancy existing in the said office of Secretary for the Department of War.

2. That, notwithstanding the Senate of the United States was then in session, it was lawful and according to long and wellestablished usage to empower and authorize the said Thomas to act as Secretary of War, Ad interim.

3. That, if the said act regulating the tenure of civil offices be held to be a valid law, no provision of the same was violated by the issuing of said order, or by the designation of said Thomas to act as Secretary of War, ad interim.

answer to article III.

And for answer to said third article, this respondent says that he abides by his answer to said first and second articles, in so far as the same are responsive to the allegations contained in the said third article, and, without here again repeating the same answer, prays the same be taken as an answer to this third article as fully as if here again set out at length; and as to the new allegation contained in said third article, that this respondent did appoint the said Thomas to be Secretary for the Department of War, ad interim, this respondent denies that he gave any other authority to said Thomas than such as appears in said written authority, set out in said article, by which he authorized and empowered said Thomas to act as [167] Secretary for the Department of War, ad interim; and he denies that the same amounts to an appointment, and insists that it is only a designation of an officer of that department to act temporarily as Secretary for the Department of War, ad interim, until an appointment should be made. But, whether the said written authority amounts to an appointment, or to a temporary authority or designation, this respondent denies that in any sense he did thereby intend to violate the Constitution of the United States, or that he thereby intended to give the said order the character or effect of an appointment in the constitutional or legal sense of that term. He further denies that there was no vacancy in said office of Secretary for the Department of War existing at the date of said written authority.

answer to article IV.

And for answer to said fourth article this respondent denies that on the said 21st day of February, 1868, at Washington aforesaid, or at any other time or place, he did unlawfully conspire with the said Lorenzo Thomas, or with the said Thomas and any other person or persons, with intent by intimidations and threats unlawfully to hinder and prevent the said Stanton from holding said office of Secretary for the Department of War, in violation of the Constitution of the United States or of the provisions of the said act of Congress in said article mentioned, or that he did then and there commit or was guilty of a high crime in office. On the contrary thereof, protesting that the said Stanton was not then and there lawfully the Secretary for the Department of War, this respondent states that his sole purpose in authorizing the said Thomas to act as Secretary for the Department of War, Ad interim was, as is fully stated in his answer to the said first article, to bring the question of the right of the said Stanton to hold said office, notwithstanding his said suspension, and notwithstanding the said order of removal, and notwithstanding the said authority of the said Thomas to act as Secretary of War, Ad interim, to the test of a final decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in the earliest practicable mode by which the question could be brought before that tribunal.

This respondent did not conspire or agree with the said Thomas or any other person or persons, to use intimidation or threats to hinder or prevent the said Stanton from holding the said office of Secretary for the Department of War, nor did this respondent at any time command or advise the said Thomas or any other person or persons to resort to or use either threats or intimidation for that purpose. The only means in the contemplation of purpose of respondent to be used are set forth fully in the said orders of Feb. 21, the first addressed to Mr. Stanton, and the second to the said Thomas. By the first order the respondent notified Mr. Stanton that he was removed from the said office, and that his functions as Secretary for the Department of War were to terminate upon the receipt of that order, and he also thereby notified the said Stanton that the said Thomas had been authorized to act as Secretary for the Department of War Ad interim, and ordered the said Stanton to transfer to him all the records, books, papers, and other public property in his custody and charge; and by the second order this respondent notified the said Thomas of the removal from office of the said Stanton, and authorized him to act as Secretary for the department, Ad interim, and directed him to immediately enter upon the discharge of the duties pertaining to that office, and to receive the transfer of all the records, books, papers, and other public property from Mr. Stanton, then in his custody and charge.

Respondent gave no instructions to the said Thomas to use intimidation or threats to enforce obedience to these orders. He gave him no authority to call in the aid of the military, or any other force to enable him to obtain possession of the office, or of the books, papers, records, or property thereof. The only agency resorted to or intended to be resorted to was by means of the said executive orders requiring obedience. But the Secretary for the Department of War refused to obey these orders, and still holds undisturbed possession and custody of that department, and of the records, books, papers, and other public property [168] therein. Respondent further states that, in execution of the orders so by this respondent given to the said Thomas, he, the said Thomas, proceeded in a peaceful manner to demand of the said Stanton a surrender to him of the public property in the said department, and to vacate the possession of the same, and to allow him, the said Thomas, peaceably to exercise the duties devolved upon him by authority of the President. That, as this respondent has been informed and believes, the said Stanton peremptorily refused obedience to the orders so issued. Upon each refusal no force or threat of force was used by the said Thomas, on authority of the President, or otherwise, to enforce obedience, either then or at any subsequent time.

This respondent doth here except to the sufficiency of the allegations contained in said fourth article, and states for ground of exception that it was not stated that there was any agreement between this respondent and the said Thomas, or any other person or persons, to use intimidation and threats, nor is there any allegation as to the nature of said intimidation and threats, or that there was any agreement to carry them into execution, or that any step was taken or agreed to be taken to carry them into execution, and that the allegation in said article that the intent of said conspiracy was to use intimidation and threats is wholly insufficient, inasmuch as it is not alleged that the said intent formed the basis or became a part of any agreement between the said alleged conspirators, and, furthermore, that there is no allegation of any conspiracy or agreement to use intimidation or threats.

answer to article V.

And for answer to said fifth article, this respondent denies that on said 21st day of February, 1868, or at any other time or times, in the same year, before the said 2d day of March, 1868, or at any prior or subsequent time, at Washington aforesaid, or at any other place, this respondent did unlawfully conspire with the said Thomas, or with any other person or persons, to prevent or hinder the execution of the said act entitled “An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices,” or that, in pursuance of said alleged conspiracy, he did unlawfully attempt to prevent the said Edwin M. Stanton from holding said office of Secretary for the Department of War, or that he was thereby guilty of a high misdemeanor in office. Respondent, protesting that said Stanton was not then and there Secretary for the Department of War, begs leave to refer to his answer given to the fourth article and to his answer given to the first article as to his intent and purpose in issuing the orders for the removal of Mr. Stanton, and the authority given to the said Thomas, and prays equal benefit therefrom as if the same were here again repeated and fully set forth.

And this respondent excepts to the sufficiency of the said fifth article, and states his ground for such exception, that it is not alleged to what means or by what agreement the said alleged conspiracy was formed or agreed to be carried out, or in what way the same was attempted to be carried out, or what were the acts done in pursuance thereof.

answer to article VI.

And for answer to the said sixth article, this respondent denies that on the said 21st day of February, 1868, at Washington aforesaid, or at any other time or place, he did unlawfully conspire with the said Thomas by force to seize, take, or possess, the property of the United States in the Department of War, contrary to the provisions of the said acts referred to in the said article, or either of them, or with intent to violate either of them. Respondent, protesting that said Stanton was not then and there Secretary for the Department of War, not only denies the said conspiracy as charged, but also denies unlawful intent in reference to the custody and charge of the property of the United States in the said Department of War, and again refers to his former answers for a full statement of his intent and purpose in the premises.

answer to article VII.

And for answer to the said seventh article, respondent denies that on the said 21st day of February, 1868, at Washington aforesaid, or at any other time and place, he did unlawfully conspire with the [169] said Thomas with intent unlawfully to seize, take, or possess the property of the United States in the Department of War, with intent to violate or disregard the said act in the said seventh article referred to, or that he did then and there commit a high misdemeanor in office. Respondent, protesting that the said Stanton was not then and there Secretary for the Department of War, again refers to his former answers, in so far as they are applicable, to show the intent with which he proceeded in the premises, and prays equal benefit therefrom as if the same were here again fully repeated. Respondent further takes exception to the sufficiency of the allegations of this article as to the conspiracy alleged, upon the same ground as stated in the exceptions set forth in his answer to said article fourth.

answer to article VIII. And for answer to said eighth article, this respondent denies that on the 21st day of February, 1868, at Washington aforesaid, or at any other time or place, he did issue and deliver to the said Thomas the said letter of authority set forth in the said eighth article, with the intent unlawfully to control the disbursements of the money appropriated for the military service and for the Department of War. This respondent, protesting that there was a vacancy in the office of Secretary for the Department of War, admits that he did issue the said letter of authority, and he denies that the same was with any unlawful intent whatever, either to violate the Constitution of the United States or any act of Congress. On the contrary, this respondent again affirms that his sole intent was to vindicate his authority as President of the United States, and by peaceful means to bring the question of the right of the said Stanton to continue to hold the office of Secretary of War to a final decision before the Supreme Court of the United States, as has been hereinbefore set forth: and he prays the same benefit from his answer in the premises as if the same were here again repeated at length.

answer to article IX.

And for answer to the said ninth article, the respondent states that on the said 22d day of February, 1868, the following note was addressed to the said Emory by the private secretary of the respondent:

General Emory called at the Executive Mansion according to this request. The object of respondent was to be advised by General Emory, as commander of the Department of Washington, what changes had been made in the military affairs of the department. Respondent had been informed that various changes had been made which in nowise had been brought to his notice or reported to him from the Department of War, or from any other quarter, and desired to ascertain the facts. After the said Emory had explained in detail the changes which had taken place, said Emory called the attention of respondent to a general order which he referred to and which this respondent then sent for, when it was produced. It is as follows:

General Emory not only called the attention of respondent to this order, but to the fact that it was in conformity with a section contained in an appropriation act passed by Congress. Respondent, after reading the order, observed, “This is not in accordance with the Constitution of the United States, which makes me Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, nor with the language of the commission which you hold.” General Emory then stated that this order had met respondent's approval. Respondent then said in reply, in substance, “Am I to understand that the President of the United States cannot give an order but through the general-in-chief?” General Emory again reiterated the statement that it had met respondent's approval, and that it was the opinion of some of the leading lawyers of the country that this order was constitutional. With some further conversation, respondent then required the names of the lawyers who had given the opinion, and he mentioned the names of two. Respondent then said that the object of the law was very evident, referring to the clause in the appropriation act upon which the order purported to be based. This, according to respondent's recollection, was the substance of the conversation held with General Emory.

Respondent denies that any allegations in the said article of any instructions or declarations given to the said Emory, then or at any other time, contrary to or in addition to what is hereinbefore set forth, are true. Respondent denies that, in said conversation with said Emory, he had any other intent than to express the opinions then given to the said Emory, nor did he then nor at any other time request or order the said Emory to disobey any law or any order issued in conformity with any law, or intend to offer any inducement to the said Emory to violate any law. What this respondent then said to General Emory was simply the expression of an opinion which he then fully believed to be sound, and which he yet believes to be so, and that is that, by the express provisions of the Constitution, this respondent, as President, is made the commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States, and as such he is to be respected, and that his orders, whether issued through the War Department or through the general-in-chief, or by other channels of communication, are entitled to respect and obedience, and that such constitutional power cannot be taken from him by virtue of any act of Congress. Respondent doth therefore deny that by the expression of such opinion he did commit or was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office; and this respondent doth further say that the said article nine lays no foundations whatever for the conclusion stated in the said article, that the respondent, by reason of the allegations therein contained, was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

In reference to the statement made by General Emory, that this respondent had approved of said act of Congress containing the section referred to, the respondent admits that his formal approval was given to said act, but accompanied the same by the following message, addressed and sent with the act to the House of Representatives, in which House the said act originated, and from which it came to respondent:

Respondent, therefore, did no more than to express to said Emory the same opinion which he had so expressed to the House of Representatives.

answer to article X.

And in answer to the tenth article and specifications thereof, the respondent says that, on the 14th and 15th days of August, in the year 1866, a political convention of delegates from all, or most, of the States and Territories of the Union was held in the city of Philadelphia, under the name and style of the National Union Convention, for the purpose of maintaining and advancing certain political views and opinions before the people of the United States, and for their support and adoption in the exercise of the constitutional suffrage in the election of representatives and delegates in Congress, which were soon to occur in many of the States and Territories of the Union; which said convention, in the course of its proceedings, and in furtherance of the objects of the same, adopted a “declaration of principles” and “an address to the people of the United States,” and appointed a committee of two of its members from each State, and of one from each Territory, and one from the District of Columbia, to wait upon the President of the United States and present to him a copy of the proceedings of the convention; that, on the 18th day of the said month of August, this committee waited upon the President of the United States, at the Executive Mansion, and was received by him in one of the rooms thereof, and by their chairman, Hon. Reverdy Johnson, then and now a Senator of the United States, acting and speaking in their behalf, presented a copy of the proceedings of the convention, and addressed the President of the United States in a speech, of which a copy (according to a published report of the same, and as the respondent believes substantially a correct report) is hereto annexed as part of this answer, and marked Exhibit C.

That, thereupon, and in reply to the address of said committee by their chairman, this respondent addressed the said committee so waiting upon him in one of the rooms of the Executive Mansion; and this respondent believes that this, his address to said committee, is the occasion referred to in the first specification of the tenth article; but this respondent does not admit that the passage therein set forth, as if extracts from a speech or address of this respondent upon said occasion, correctly or justly present his speech or address upon said occasion; but, on the contrary, this respondent demands and insists that if this honorable court shall deem the said article and the said first specification thereof to contain allegation of matter cognizable by this honorable court as a high misdemeanor in office, within the intent and meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and shall receive or allow proof in support of the same, that proof shall be required to be made of the actual speech and address of this respondent on said occasion, which this respondent denies that said article and specification contain or correctly or justly represent.

And this respondent, further answering the tenth article and specifications thereof, says that at Cleveland, in the State of Ohio, and on the 3d day of September, in the year 1866, he was attended by a large assembly of his fellow-citizens, and, in deference and obedience to their call and demand, he addressed them upon matters of public and political consideration; and this respondent believes that said occasion and address are referred to in the second specification of the tenth article; but this respondent does not admit that the passages therein set forth as if extracts from a speech of this respondent on said occasion, correctly or justly present his speech or address upon said occasion; but, on the contrary, this respondent demands and insists that, if this honorable court shall deem the said article and the said second specification thereof to contain allegation of matter cognizable by this honorable court as a [172] high misdemeanor in office, within the intent and meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and shall receive or allow proof in support of the same, that proof shall be required to be made of the actual speech and address of this respondent on said occasion, which this respondent denies that said article and specification contain or correctly or justly represent.

And this respondent, further answering the tenth article and the specifications thereof, says that at St. Louis, in the State of Missouri, and on the 8th day of September, in the year 1866, he was attended by a numerous assemblage of his fellow-citizens, and in deference and obedience to their call and demand he addressed them upon matters of public and political consideration; and this respondent believes that said occasion and address are referred to in the third specification of the tenth article; but this respondent does not admit that the passages therein set forth, as if extracts from a speech of this respondent on said occasion, correctly or justly present his speech or address upon said occasion; but, on the contrary, this respondent demands and insists that if this honorable court shall deem the said article and the said third specification thereof to contain allegation of matter cognizable by this honorable court as a high misdemeanor in office, within the intent and meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and shall receive or allow proof in support of the same, that proof shall be required to be made of the actual speech and address of this respondent on said occasion, which this respondent denies that the said article and specification contain or correctly or justly represent.

And this respondent, further answering the tenth article, protesting that he has not been unmindful of the high duties of his office, or of the harmony or courtesies which ought to exist and be maintained between the executive and legislative branches of the government of the United States, denies that he has ever intended or designed to set aside the rightful authority or powers of Congress, or attempted to bring into disgrace, rdicule, hatred, contempt, or reproach, the Congress of the United States, or either branch thereof, or to impair or destroy the regard or respect of all or any of the good people of the United States for the Congress or the rightful legislative power thereof, or to excite the odium or resentment of all or any of the good people of the United States, against Congress, and the laws by it duly and constitutionally enacted. This respondent further says that at all times he has, in his official acts as President, recognized the authority of the several Congresses of the United States, as constituted and organized during his administration of the office of President of the United States.

And this respondent, further answering, says that he has, from time to time, under his constitutional right and duty as President of the United States, communicated to Congress his views and opinions in regard to such acts or resolutions thereof, as, being submitted to him as President of the United States, in pursuance of the Constitution, seemed to this respondent to require such communications; and he has, from time to time, in the exercise of that freedom of speech which belongs to him as a citizen of the United States, and, in his political relations as President of the United States, to the people of the United States, is upon fit occasions a duty of the highest obligation, expressed to his fellow-citizens his views and opinions respecting the measures and proceedings of Congress; and that in such addresses to his fellow-citizens, and in such his communications to Congress, he has expressed his views, opinions, and judgment of and concerning the actual constitution of the two Houses of Congress without representation therein of certain States of the Union, and of the effect that in wisdom and justice, in the opinion and judgment of this respondent, Congress in its legislation and proceedings shall give to this political circumstance; and whatsoever he has thus communicated to Congress or addressed to his fellow-citizens or any assemblage thereof, this respondent says was and is within and according to his right and privilege as an American citizen, and his right and duty as President of the United States.

And this respondent not waiving or at all disparaging his right of freedom of opinion and of freedom of speech, as hereinbefore or hereinafter more [173] particularly set forth, but claiming and insisting upon the same, further answering the said tenth article, says that the views and opinions expressed by this respondent in his said addresses to the assemblages of his fellow-citizens, as in said article or in this answer thereto mentioned, are not and were not intended to be other or different from those expressed by him in his communications to Congress—that the eleven States lately in insurrection never had ceased to be States of the Union, and that they were then entitled to representation in Congress by local Representatives and Senators as fully as the other States of the Union, and that, consequently, the Congress, as then constituted, was not, in fact, a Congress of all the States, but a Congress of only a part of the States. This respondent always protesting against the unauthorized exclusion therefrom of the said eleven States, nevertheless gave his assent to all laws passed by said Congress, which did not, in his opinion and judgment, violate the Constitution, exercising his constitutional authority of returning bills to said Congress with his objections when they appeared to him to be unconstitutional or inexpedient.

And, further, this respondent has also expressed the opinion, both in his communications to Congress, and in his addresses to the people, that the policy adopted by Congress in reference to the States lately in insurrection did not tend to peace, harmony, and union, but, on the contrary, did tend to disunion and the permanent disruption of the States, and that, in following its said policy, laws had been passed by Congress in violation of the fundamental principles of the government, and which tended to consolidation and despotism; and, such being his deliberate opinions, he would have felt himself unmindful of the high duties of his office if he had failed to express them in his communications to Congress or in his addresses to the people when called upon by them to express his opinions on matters of public and political consideration.

And this respondent, further answering the tenth article, says that he has always claimed and insisted, and now claims and insists, that both in his personal and private capacity of a citizen of the United States, and in the political relations of the President of the United States, to the people of the United States, whose servant, under the duties and responsibilities of the Constitution of the United States, the President of the United States is and should always remain, this respondent had and has the full right, and in his office of President of the United States is held to the high duty, of forming, and on fit occasions expressing, opinions of and concerning the legislation of Congress, proposed or completed, in respect of its wisdom, expediency, justice, worthiness, objects, purposes, and public and political motives and tendencies; and within and as a part of such right and duty to form, and on fit occasions to express, opinions of and concerning the public character and conduct, views, purposes, objects, motives, and tendencies of all men engaged in the public service, as well in Congress as otherwise, and under no other rules or limits upon this right of freedom of opinion and of freedom of speech, or of responsibility and amenability for the actual exercise of such freedom of opinion and freedom of speech than attend upon such rights and their exercise on the part of all other citizens of the United States and on the part of all their public servants.

And this respondent, further answering said tenth article, says that the several occasions on which, as is alleged in the several specifications of said article, this respondent addressed his fellow-citizens on subjects of public and political considerations were not, nor was any one of them, sought or planned by this respondent; but, on the contrary, each of said occasions arose upon the exercise of a lawful and accustomed right of the people of the United States to call upon their public servants, and express to them their opinions, wishes, and feelings upon matters of public and political consideration, and to invite from such, their public servants, an expression of their opinions, views, and feelings on matters of public and political consideration; and this respondent claims and insists before this honorable court, and before all the people of the United States, that of or concerning this his right of freedom of opinion, and of freedom of speech, and this his exercise of such right on all matters of [174] public and political consideration, and in respect of all public servants, or persons whatsoever engaged in or connected therewith, this respondent, as a citizen, or as President of the United States, is not subject to question, inquisition, impeachment, or inculpation, in any form or manner whatsoever.

And this respondent says that neither the said tenth article, nor any specification thereof, nor any allegation therein contained, touches or relates to any official act or doing of this respondent in the office of President of the United States, or in the discharge of any of its constitutional or legal duties or responsibilities; but said article and the specifications and allegations thereof, wholly and in every part thereof, question only the discretion or propriety of freedom of opinion or freedom of speech, as exercised by this respondent as a citizen of the United States in his personal right and capacity, and without allegation or imputation against this respondent of the violation of any law of the United States, touching or relating to freedom of speech or its exercise by the citizens of the United States, or by this respondent as one of the said citizens or otherwise; and he denies that, by reason of any matter in said article or its specifications alleged, he has said or done anything indecent or unbecoming in the chief magistrate of the United States, or that he has brought the high office of the President of the United States into contempt, ridicule, or disgrace, or that he has committed or has been guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

answer to article XI.

And in answer to the eleventh article this respondent denies that on the 18th day of August, in the year 1866, at the city of Washington, in the District of Columbia, he did, by public speech or otherwise, declare or affirm, in substance or at all, that the Thirty-ninth Congress of the United States was not a Congress of the United States authorized by the Constitution to exercise legislative power under the same, or that he did then and there declare or affirm that the said Thirty-ninth Congress was a Congress of only part of the States in any sense or meaning other than that ten States of the Union were denied representation therein; or that he made any or either of the declarations or affirmations in this behalf, in the said article alleged, as denying or intending to deny that the legislation of said Thirty-ninth Congress was valid or obligatory upon this respondent, except so far as this respondent saw fit to approve the same; and as to the allegation in said article, that he did thereby intend or mean to be understood that the said Congress had not power to propose amendments to the Constitution, this respondent says that in said address he said nothing in reference to the subject of amendments of the Constitution, nor was the question of the competency of the said Congress to propose such amendments, without the participation of said excluded States, at the time of said address, in any way mentioned or considered or referred to by this respondent, nor in what he did say had he any intent regarding the same, and he denies the allegation so made to the contrary thereof. But this respondent, in further answer to, and in respect of the said allegations of the said eleventh article hereinbefore traversed and denied, claims and insists upon his personal and official right of freedom of opinion and freedom of speech, and his duty in his political relations as President of the United States, to the people of the United States, in the exercise of such freedom of opinion and freedom of speech, in the same manner, form, and effect as he has in his behalf stated the same in his answer to the said tenth article, and with the same effect as if he here repeated the same; and he further claims and insists, as in said answer to said tenth article he has claimed and insisted, that he is not subject to question, inquisition, impeachment, or inculpation, in any form or manner, of or concerning such rights of freedom of opinion or freedom of speech, or his said alleged exercise thereof.

And this respondent further denies that, on the 21st day of February, in the year 1868, or at any other time, at the city of Washington, in the District of Columbia, in pursuance of any such declaration as is in that behalf in said eleventh article alleged, or otherwise, he did unlawfully, and in disregard of the [175] requirement of the Constitution that he should take care that the laws should be faithfully executed, attempt to prevent the execution of an act entitled “An act regulating the tenure of certain civil offices,” passed March 2, 1867, by unlawfully devising or contriving, or attempting to devise or contrive, means by which he should prevent Edwin M. Stanton from forthwith resuming the functions of Secretary for the Department of War; or by unlawfully devising or contriving, or attempting to devise or contrive, means to prevent the execution of an act entitled, “An act making appropriations for the support of the army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1868, and for other purposes,” approved March 2, 1867, or to prevent the execution of an act entitled, “An act to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel States,” passed March 2, 1867.

And this respondent, further answering the said eleventh article, says that he has, in answer to the first article, set forth in detail the acts, steps, and proceedings done and taken by this respondent to and towards or in the matter of the suspension or removal of the said Edwin M. Stanton in or from the office of Secretary for the Department of War, with the times, modes, circumstances, intents, views, purposes, and opinions of official obligation and duty under and with which such acts, steps, and proceedings were done and taken; and he makes answer to this eleventh article, of the matters in his answer to the first article, pertaining to the suspension or removal of said Edwin M. Stanton, to the same intent and effect as if they were here repeated and set forth.

And this respondent further answering the said eleventh article denies that by means or reason of anything in said article alleged this respondent, as President of the United States, did on the 21st day of February, 1868, or at any other day or time, commit or that he was guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

And this respondent, further answering the said eleventh article, says that the same and the matters therein contained do not charge or allege the commission of any act whatever by this respondent, in his office of President of the United States, nor the omission by this respondent of any act of official obligation or duty in his office of President of the United States; nor does the said article nor the matters therein contained name, designate, describe, or define any act or mode or form of attempt, device, contrivance, or means, or of attempt at device, contrivance, or means, whereby this respondent can know or understand what act or mode or form of attempt, device, contrivance, or means, or of attempt at device, contrivance, or means, are imputed to or charged against this respondent in his office of President of the United States, or intended so to be, or whereby this respondent can more fully or definitely make answer unto the said article than he hereby does.

And this respondent, in submitting to this honorable court this his answer to the articles of impeachment exhibited against him, respectfully reserves leave to amend and add to the same from time to time, as may become necessary or proper, and when and as such necessity and propriety shall appear.

Andrew Johnson.

Henry Stanbery,

B. R. Curtis,

Thomas A. R. Nelson,

William M. Evarts,

W. S. Groesbeck,

Of Counsel.