Negro soldiers.
When young
John Laurens, then in the
camp of Washington, heard of the
British invasion of his State, early in 1779, he felt anxious to fly to its defence.
He proposed to gather a regiment of negroes.
Alexander Hamilton recommended the measure to the president of Congress.
He was favorable to the plan of emancipation undertaken in
Rhode Island, by allowing every ablebodied slave who should enlist for the war his personal freedom.
He argued that they would make good soldiers; that their natural faculties were as good as those of white people; that giving them freedom with their muskets would insure their fidelity, animate their courage, and have a good influence on those who should remain, by opening a door for their emancipation.
Two days afterwards the elder
Laurens wrote to
Washington on the subject, saying: “If we had arms for 3,000 such black men as I could enlist in
Carolina, I should have no doubt of success in driving the
British out of
Georgia and subduing
East Florida before the end of
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July.”
Washington, guided by prudence and common-sense, replied that the policy was a questionable one, “for, should we begin to form battalions of them [negroes], I have not the smallest doubt, if the war is to be prosecuted, of their [the
British] following us in it, and justifying the measure upon our own ground.
The contest, then, must be, who can arm fastest?
And where are our arms?”
Colonel Huger, of
South Carolina, proposed that the two southernmost of the thirteen States should detach the most vigorous and enterprising negroes from the rest by arming 3,000 of them under white officers.
He explained that his State was weak, because many of its citizens must remain at home to prevent revolt among the slaves, or their desertion to the enemy.
Congress recommended the measure of arming the negroes.
These appeals for help against the invaders met no other response.
The
Carolinian planters were irritated by the proposition to emancipate and arm their slaves, and the executive council was induced (as
Prevost and a British army were then besieging
Charleston) to ask of the invading general his terms for a capitulation.
Prevost offered peace and protection to those who would accept them; to others, to be prisoners of war The executive council debated the surrender of the town, and, in defiance of remonstrances from
Moultrie, young
Laurens (who was in
Charleston), and others, they proposed “a neutrality during the war between
Great Britain and
America, the question whether the
State shall belong to
Great Britain or remain one of the
United States to be determined by the treaty of peace between the two powers.”
Laurens was requested to carry this proposition to
Prevost, but he scornfully refused, and another took it.
Prevost refused to treat, and demanded the surrender of the troops as prisoners of war. “Then we will fight it out,” exclaimed
Moultrie, and left the tent of the governor and council.
Gadsden followed him out and said, “Act according to your judgment, and we will support you.”
The
British fell back towards
Georgia that night.
During the intense excitement following the attack on
Fort Sumter (April, 1861), a few colored men in New York, inspired by military movements around them, met in a hired room and began to drill, thinking their services might be wanted.
They were threatened by sympathizers with the
Confederates, and the superintendent of the police deemed it prudent to order the colored men to desist More than a year later,
Gen. David Hunter (q. v.) directed the organization of colored troops in his Department of the South.
It raised a storm of indignation in Congress, and that body, by resolution, inquired whether these were military organizations of fugitive slaves; and if so, whether they were authorized by the government.
General Hunter answered that there was no regiment of “fugitive” slaves, but there was “a fine regiment of men whose late masters are fugitive rebels—men who everywhere fly before the appearance of the national flag, leaving their servants behind them to shift as best they can for themselves.”
A few weeks later (Aug. 25, 1862) the
Secretary of War directed the
military governor of the coast islands of
South Carolina to “arm, uniform, equip, and receive into the service of the
United States such number of volunteers of
African descent, not exceeding 5,000,” as he might deem expedient to guard that region from harm “by the public enemy.”
Just before,
General Phelps recommended to
General Butler the arming of negroes; and not long afterwards the former, impressed with the perils of his isolated situation in New Orleans, called for volunteers from the free colored men of that city.
Not long afterwards three regiments of colored troops were organized there.
Another year passed by, and yet there were very few colored troops in the service.
There was universal prejudice against them.
When a draft for soldiers appeared inevitable, that prejudice gave way; and when
Lee invaded
Pennsylvania (June, 1863) the government authorized the enlistment of colored troops in the free-labor States.
Congress authorized (July 16, 1863) the
President to accept them as volunteers, and prescribed the enrolment of the militia, which should in all cases “include all able-bodied citizens,” without distinction of color.
Yet so strong remained the prejudice against
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the enlistment of negroes that in May, 1863,
Colonel Shaw's Massachusetts regiment was warned that it could not be protected from insult in the
city of New York if it should attempt to pass through it, and it sailed from
Boston for
Port Royal A few months later a regiment of colored troops, bearing a flag wrought by women of the
city of New York, marched through its streets for the battle-field, cheered by thousands of citizens.
From that time colored troops were freely enlisted everywhere.
Adjutant-General Thomas went to the
Mississippi Valley (March, 1863) for the express purpose of promoting such enlistments, and was successful
