Appendix Q: newspaper article, attack on General Meade, mentioned in letter of October 23, 1864.
see page 236, Vol.
II (New York independent, October 13, 1864）
The military news of the week covers a wide field.
Dispatches of considerable interest have been received from the
James River, from the Shenandoah Valley, from
Georgia, from
Kentucky, and from
Missouri.
The operations in all quarters are important, but the public attention, as usual, is concentrated upon
Virginia, and the movements near
Richmond have again attracted that regard which the brilliancy of
Sheridan's victories for the moment diverted to the
Shenandoah.
We are obliged to reverse the opinion of last week as to the operations of the Army of the Potomac under
Gen. Meade, southwest of
Petersburg.
The twofold movement which
Gen. Grant planned, and which
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ought to have been even a more complete success than we had reckoned it, now turns out to have failed from lack of generalship on the left wing.
North of the
James,
Gen. Butler carried out his part of the programme promptly and thoroughly.
South of it ‘somebody blundered’—
Gen. Meade, to wit: and the Army of the Potomac, which he is still permitted to command, instead of carrying the Southside railroad, as was expected, gave up its great opportunity to the clumsiness of its leader.
The old, old blunder was once more repeated.
The Executive
Officer of that army could not control its maneuvers.
The Ninth Corps, proverbially tardy, was far behind when the Fifth, under
Warren, had reached its appointed ground, and between the two occurred that fatal gap, into which the enemy again struck with all his force, rolled up an exposed division, captured a brigade or two, and then hurried off with his prizes.
The advance was arrested, the whole movement interrupted, the safety of an army imperiled, the plans of the campaign frustrated—and all because one general, whose incompetence, indecision, half-heartedness in the war have again and again been demonstrated, is still unaccountably to hamper and hamstring the purposes of the
lieutenant-general.
Let us chasten our impatient hope of victory so long as
Gen. Meade retains his hold on the gallant Army of the Potomac; but let us tell the truth of him.
He is the general who at
Gettysburg bore off the laurels which belonged to
Howard and to
Hancock; who at
Williamsport suffered a beaten army to escape him; who, when holding the line of the
Rapidan, fled before
Lee without a battle to the gates of the capital; who at
Mine Run drew back in dismay from a conflict which he had invited and which his army longed to convert into triumph; who, in the campaign from the
Rapidan to the
James under
Grant, annulled the genius of his chief by his own executive incapacity; who lost the prize of
Petersburg by martinet delay on the south bank of the
James; who lost it again in succeeding contests by tactical incompetence; who lost it again by inconceivable follies of military administration when the mine was exploded; who insulted his corps commanders and his army by attributing to them that inability to co-operate with each other which was traceable solely to the unmilitary slovenliness of their general; who, in a word, holds his place by virtue of no personal qualification, but in deference to a presumed, fictitious, perverted, political necessity, and who hangs upon the neck of
Gen. Grant like an Old Man of the
Sea whom he longs to be rid of, and whom he retains solely in deference to the weak complaisance of his constitutional
Commander-in-Chief.
Be other voices muzzled, if they must be, ours, at least, shall speak out on this question of enforced military subservience to political, to partisan, to personal requisitions.
We, at least, if no other, may declare in the name of a wronged, baffled, indignant army, that its nominal commander is unfit, or unwilling, or incapable to lead it to victory, and we ask that
Grant's hands may be strengthened by the removal of
Meade.
The dispatches of
Gen. Butler, wholly confirmed by one from
Gen. Grant, show that he has maintained the line heretofore gained on the north of the
James.
Lee assaulted in force on Friday last, and carried a
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picket defended only by cavalry, but was utterly repulsed and driven off with heavy loss in attempting to recover the position held by
Butler's infantry.
The loss on our side was one-eighth that of the enemy, and the gain to us was greater than can be numerically stated; for the assault proves two things.
First, that the line
Butler has occupied is a severe loss to the enemy; and, second, that, although
Lee is forced to assume the offensive with his attenuated army in order to regain this line, he cannot carry the coveted position.
Butler is within four miles of
Richmond.
We privately hear the rebel works which he now holds described as more formidable than any before taken from them; and they are held in an iron grasp!
The truth is,
Grant presses with irresistible steadiness toward the rebel capital.
Richmond is undergoing a relentless siege.
Attacks from our side and sallies from theirs meet with varying fortune, but the advance, the pressure, the average of advantage is wholly with
Gen. Grant, and he has never once relinquished a foot of ground gained, nor even for a moment halted in his movement for the final capture of
Richmond.
And to-day he is nearer than ever to his goal; to-morrow he will have taken still another step.
We must add one word, to say that
Gen. Sheridan has won another fight in the
Shenandoah.
He fell back from
Harrisonburg to
Strasburg, and, as the enemy's cavalry under
Rosser followed,
Sheridan improved the opportunity to show that he had not forgotten his experience as a cavalry leader.
He attacked
Rosser, and drove him pell mell up the valley for 26 miles, with loss of 11 guns and 330 prisoners. ‘I thought I would delay one day to settle this new cavalry general,’ says
Phil. Sheridan.
