Rebellion Record: a Diary of American Events: Documents and Narratives, Volume 11.
Frank Moore, Ed.

On Friday morning, June eleventh, the consolidated commands of Crook and Sullivan — the latter having the old Sigel division — all under Hunter's control — marched out with flying colors and hopeful spirits from Staunton on the road through Middlebrook to Lexington. Three miles from town the rebels were posted behind rail breastworks, apparently intending to make a serious opposition to our progress. As it was, however, our steady advance rapidly dislodged them, and we drove them before us, scarcely allowing them to halt to fire upon us. Seventeen miles from Staunton they managed to kill two and wound two of our men, when a strong force of cavalry was sent forward to charge and route them, which done, they troubled us no more that day. The force in front of us was ascertained to be merely McCausland's brigade, whose only object seemed to be to delay our advance as much as possible. On the morning of the eleventh, General McCook's division, being in the advance, approached Lexington about eleven o'clock, and a heavy cloud of smoke rising in front of us, revealed the destruction of the bridge leading over the James into the town. On the high banks opposite, with glasses, we could easily perceive rebel sharpshooters. The only ford is about a mile above the site of the bridge, and to this ford the Second brigade is sent, while the Thirty-sixth Ohio is placed on the main road to occupy the rebels there. As the Thirty-sixth drew near the banks, a rebel shell was sent so exactly in range of their position as to wound six and kill one. Captain McMullen was ordered up with one section of artillery, and proceeded at once most effectually to silence the rebels. Some of them were on top of the Virginia Military Institute, but a few shells quickly drove them from their high position, and about two o'clock they, fearing the Second brigade's having crossed the ford, rapidly skedaddled, leaving the town to our quiet occupation.

Sunday the Institute buildings and Governor Letcher's house were burned, ten minutes time being given to remove any property from the latter. In the afternoon a contraband brought in word that seven canal boats were hidden nine miles off, deeply laden with stores, etc. To secure these, Captain Blazer with his scouts was sent out, and, skirmishing the whole route, he found the boats as reported. Burning five of them, he dismounted his men and hauled the remaining two to Lexington. In them were six cannons--two six-pounders, one twelve-pounder and three mountain howitzers--nine thousand rounds of artillery ammunition, a ton and a half [528] of powder, and commissary stores in great variety and abundance. General Duffie rejoined us here, having marched through Waynesboroa on to the Charlotteville and Lynchburg railroad, tearing up a small portion of the latter and capturing a good part of Jackson's wagon trains.

Tuesday evening we camped at Buchanan. Averell, coming in before us, captured the Confederate Navy records of 1861 and 1862, together with twelve more canal boats heavily laden with provisions.

On the fifteenth, while we were halting at the base of the Peaks of Otter, information was received that Breckinridge with ten thousand men was at Balcony Falls, intending to attack us on our flanks. In a good position for defence, General Crook awaited General Hunter's and the other division. The whole command then being assembled, and no foe appearing, we once more marched forward, stopping for the night at Taney Farm, almost at the base of the Peaks of Otter.

Thursday noon we entered Liberty, with bands playing “Hail Columbia,” “Yankee Doodle,” &c. Halting, the whole command proceeded to tear up and demolish the railroad, including a bridge seven hundred feet long. For seven miles the work is maintained, and night closed in upon a scene of smouldering timbers, ties, and hopelessly bent and twisted rails.

In Liberty were five or six rebel hospitals, in which were a large number of sick and wounded from Lee's army. We learn here that the rebels are rapidly moving all their stores from Lynchburg to Danville, anticipating the at least possible capture of the former place.

Early on the morning of the seventeenth, having heard from Averell that the enemy were drawn up in good number in front of him at New London, we marched Crook's division in advance, by a road not laid down on maps, along the north of the railroad, crossing at James Church. This movement tending to bring us in the rebel rear, caused them to retire toward Lynchburg. Cutting across the country we endeavored to intercept their retreat, but arrived just too late on the main road. Stopping here for dinner we were within about seven miles of the city, on the road to New London. The pickets of the two parties were so close, that various uncomplimentary remarks were passed quite freely from one to the other. At four o'clock, with the Ninety-first Ohio, Second brigade of Crook's division, in advance, we moved out on the road, and in about two miles the rapid firing in front told us that we were near the enemy's first position. They opened on us with a vigorous cannonade, having evidently obtained the range of all prominent points in our lines by previous practice. The Third brigade being placed on the left of the road, the Second on the right, the order to charge was given. The main opposition was found on our right, the Ninety-first and Twelfth Ohio suffering most severely. The Third brigade having little but skirmishing, as it was, on the first charge, the rebels were driven back fully two miles to their line of breastworks, the Ninety-first Ohio gallantly capturing and bringing off the field a rifled gun made in Liverpool, a Blakeley's patent. I heard also that three other guns were captured in this charge, or rather series of charges, but have only been able to verify hearing by sight in the case of this one. During this attack both sides maintained a furious fire of shell, grape and canister, the rebel gunners evidently being skilful hands in the management of their pieces. Our loss was rather large here, especially in the Ninety-first and Twelfth, Colonel Turley of the former having his right thigh fractured.

By the time our men were safely posted, and rested from their arduous three hours work, the moon had long been shining, and the thick darkness of the woods in our front, and the unknown character of the ground, forbade any further operations for the night. By this time the three brigades of Crook's division being encamped in line of battle, in the advance, were relieved by the First division, and the men camped and passed the night quietly enough, save occasional shots, as some incautious man of either party exposed himself too openly.

Although but two regiments of our command, the Twelfth and Ninety-first Ohio, had been engaged to any great extent, the fighting this first day was remarkable, both for the rapidity of firing, and the steady perseverance of our men. It was confidently believed that had we arrived but a few hours earlier, we would have driven the enemy through Lynchburg that night. As it was we were compelled to halt, and during the whole night the locomotive whistle told us of the rapid arrival of heavy reinforcements, that were greeted with continual cheers of welcome by the foe in our front. Saturday morning came bright and clear, and after an early breakfast I rode out to a temporary hospital on the roadside, expecting every minute to hear a renewal of the battle. While talking to the wounded, the battery right in front of the hostal sent a few shells over into the rebel line, that were immediately replied to, their shells going over and around the building, though none struck it. Save this, no firing of any consequence happened during the entire morning, the time being occupied in changing the position of our various brigades, so as best to use them against the enemy's rapidly extending line. All this time a sharp skirmishing fire was kept up in our immediate front and centre, while a louder report, followed by the ominous whistle, told of the rapid flight of shot or shell. The First division occupied the advance line, while General Crook's division was sent off to the right, but returned almost immediately. As the General's practised eye saw that the enemy were massing for an attack on our centre, he advised the Commanding General of the fact, and recalled his division. It arrived not a minute too soon. Having seen the weakening of our centre, and not knowing of the return of [529] the Kanawha division, the rebels came on in perfect confidence of victory. There they come, old veterans of the famous Ewell corps, practised in the hundred battles of tile Potomac army, rank after rank. Will our men resist and repel this almost irresistible torrent of steel, lead and iron, rushing on to overwhelm them? We wait but a few minutes. Grape, canister, shell, are hurled on them from our batteries, while regiment after regiment pours in its effective fire at short range. They waver, halt, turn, when, with a cheer, our men are up and after them, driving them clear into and behind their breastworks. These being completely commanded by works in the rear, our men reluctantly retired, bringing with them numerous guns, dropped by the rebels in their hurried flight. In this charge the Fifth Virginia infantry by some misunderstanding got into the front ranks, although they, with the whole Second division, were only used as reserves. As it was, they rushed on with the advance occupying the left, and suffered severely, losing about thirty men.

With this charge, repulse and charge, ended the second day's work before Lynchburg. We had tested the enemy's position and numbers, and found both too great for our army, with limited rations, to overcome. Before us was a strongly-fortified town, that if taken by us at all, could only be taken by surprise. In it were troops far surpassing ours in numbers and freshness, fighting behind breastworks.

So, quietly, on the night of the eighteenth, the wagon and ambulance trains were started; in the afternoon and about nine o'clock the troops were withdrawn, and our journey home was commenced, General Crook's division bringing up and guarding the rear.

On Saturday evening, Colonel Powell, Second Virginia cavalry, with the First and Second Virginia cavalry regiments and two guns, marched around by the right, to cut the railroad east of Lynchburg, and surprise a fort about two miles from the city. By some over-sight, the guide missed the road and led them ten miles out of the way, to Campbell Court-house. After a slight skirmish, in which they killed two and captured six, a messenger arrived from Averell, informing the Colonel of our withdrawal, and he was compelled to rejoin the main column without doing much injury to the railroad.

Flying rumors, and false rumors, too, passed from one end of our column to the other, as to the number and designs of the enemy following in our rear. The event proved their only object to be to harass, as much as fifteen hundred men could, our army, and pick up stragglers. Early's division could not be spared from Richmond longer than absolutely necessary for Lynchburg's safety, so McCausland followed us with his brigade. It was galling to our brave soldiers to retire thus in the guise of retreat before the men they had so often overcome and routed. To give them a battle, if they really wished it, at Buford's Gap, General Crook drew up his division in line and awaited their onset. The men were fairly longing for one more chance to punish the wolves hovering in our rear, but they came not, and after waiting a couple of hours, once more we marched on, and once more they followed. All night of the twentieth we marched along the line of the railroad, and every bridge or culvert that was burnable was burned, so that through the whole country for miles shone the light of these traces of our devastating march.

As the command was at breakfast on the morning of the twenty-first, in and around Salem, the rebels made a fierce attack on the rear, with both musketry and shells. A brigade being sent back to assist in covering the retreat into the valley at the foot of the Catawba Mountain, the trains were hurried on. For a few moments it was very difficult to decide whether we were not going to have a regular stampede, such a panic seemed to possess the inevitable teamsters. The trains passed on in safety, and were followed by Carlin's and Stone's batteries, that by some strange neglect, were left unguarded by any except the artillerists, they having neither revolvers nor sabres. Passing into a defile, a party of one hundred and fifty to two hundred rebels rushed down on them, drove them off, and proceeded leisurely to chop up the spokes of the wheels and cut the traces, and lead off the horses, and all, too, without firing a single shot. So quietly was it all done, that persons accompanying the line, quietly resting in a wood near by, heard or knew nothing of it, until a score or two of frightened artillerists rushed up to tell of their loss. The remaining command coming up were astonished to find the ruins of two splendid batteries standing in the road a desolate monument to somebody's inexperience and guilt. An effort was made to haul off the pieces in wagons, but it was found possible to carry but four; the remaining six, spiked, and with trunnions knocked off, were hidden. The ten carriages and ten caissons were then, by some brilliant orders, fired and left to burn by the roadside, over which almost our whole column has still to pass. The result may easily be imagined, and the folly and stupidity of the morning's work culminated in the killing of six men and wounding ten of the Second Virginia cavalry. Our loss, then, by this sole disaster of our retreat, is six cannon, ten carriages, ten caissons, one hundred and twenty horses, six men killed and ten wounded.

It is entirely owing to the policy maintained in the First division, of carrying the batteries as trains separated from the column. Unarmed as the men are, we can readily perceive what an easy matter it would be for any enterprising rebel with a small command to dash in and destroy and capture, as was done Tuesday morning. Attempts had been made to induce General Crook to place his batteries in the same position in our columns, but he steadily refused, [530] and the good results of his persistence became evident on Tuesday, when a similar attack was made upon Captain McMullen's battery, when the rebels were driven off, with a number killed and wounded.

On the evening of the twenty-first, General Crook, growing tired of the incessant skirmishing in our rear, determined to give the rebels a lesson, and, concealing the Thirty-third regiment on each side of the road, marched on. The over-confident bushwhackers — for such alone they are — followed, and, as usual, fired on our rear. A return fire from the infantry from the roadside greeted them, and killed fifteen and wounded several. Since then they have been very cautious of any too near approach to our columns.

At Salem we turned north on the road over Catawba Mountain to Newcastle, and on the night of the twenty-third we encamped at Sweet Springs, in whose beautiful grounds of old the chivalry were wont to assemble and disport themselves. Passing the night of the twenty-fourth at White Sulphur, we reached Meadow Bluffs on the twenty-fifth, without incident, save the great need of rations, which began to be felt so pressingly in the ranks. On the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh the march continued; on the latter day the command meeting wagons with abundant rations. Once more rest and quiet await us, and in a short time the army will be ready for another expedition, with, let us hope, better auspices.

After a highly mythical account of Saturday's skirmishing — which the distorted rebel imagination magnified into an immense battle over miles of country, and in which I learn that four thousand of our cavalry unsuccessfully charged on men behind rifle-pits and breastworks — certainly a new method of warfare — we read that:

The battle ended on Saturday afternoon, and the enemy retreated in great haste on Saturday night. Had they remained until the next day, we are satisfied, from the dispositions that had been made by General------, that they would have been captured. Their safety is not now an assured fact by any means.

The fearful mystery involved in the blank where the general's name should be, is truly appalling, and well designed to strike terror to the heart of any impudent raider. On a par with this is the doubt in which our safety was still involved. Certainly, the men in our gallant army will be surprised to learn that their enemies were so much more concerned about our safety than we ourselves.

“In many localities, on both the Salem and Forest roads, trees were felled and blockades of fence-rails and stones were made to impede pursuit. In removing these some hours were lost by our men.”

This is simply false. “Some hours were lost by their men,” but they were lost — when General Crook's division lay in line of battle, waiting for these eager pursuers, hoping, longing for their approach. But, no!--they halted just outside of range and continued there, until, tired of waiting, our men once more resumed their march. Do they forget — or perhaps it were contraband to mention it — the lesson taught their valiant bushwhackers by the Twenty-third Ohio at Buford's gap?

“Hunter reached Liberty on his retreat Sunday about two o'clock, our forces but a short distance behind. His rear-guard was overtaken about two miles west of Liberty, on the road to Buchanan, and a sharp skirmish ensued, in which we are reported to have captured about one hundred prisoners, besides killing and wounding several.”

One would scarcely imagine from the above that our whole command remained in and about Liberty for dinner and rest nearly. the whole afternoon, from two o'clock till dark. The prisoners taken must be the few wounded left in Liberty under the charge of the three surgeons with the rebel hospitals.

But why pursue this veracious account further? The attempt was most industriously made to convey the idea that our army was disgracefully routed, and that our return was a retreat, and not simply a homeward march from a raid. And as we of Hunter's army draw nearer the Northern world — from the wilderness of mountains and valleys in which for four weeks we have been wandering — we find the same idea prevalent among our own people. Our gallant young General, Crook, was reported killed; five hundred only of his command were returning, the rest in Libby, or their last resting-place, from life's wearisome toils. Such reports, of course, have been most easily dispelled, but there still linger in many minds distressing doubts and fears of disasters most dire. These found partial expression in a despatch published in your city that seven thousand rebels had occupied LeWisburg, which, of course, was untrue. In the valley, no little surprise was manifested when they witnessed our quiet settling into camp life, with no fortifications, no alarms, or undignified hurry. Here they soon learned our true condition; but with you it may be more difficult to see why we failed to take Lynchburg, and why this failure does not constitute a defeat.

But we didn't take Lynchburg, and why? Simply because Major-General Hunter allowed a failure in the first, most important element of [531] a raid-celerity of movement. A raid is an advance far into an enemy's country, where, at very short notice, vastly superior forces can be hurled against the invading party. The only hope for success in such a movement depends upon the surprise of the invaded, the suddenness of the blow, and ere he has time to recover and collect his forces, the rapidity of return to the original base, where the parties are on a nearly equal footing. Now, did General Hunter move in accordance with this requisite? General Crook, with his command, joined him at Staunton, Wednesday noon, June eighth, where he had been resting his men two days. Already, among the rebels, it was believed that Lynchburg was the point at which we were aiming. Yet we lay at Staunton until Friday morning, the tenth, and by short, easy marches, entered Lexington on the evening of the eleventh, and rested here until Tuesday morning, the fourteenth. By this time belief in the rebel mind had become certainty, and we heard that they were taking the Lynchburg stores to Danville, and making preparations to resist us at Lynchburg. Lexington is only forty-one miles distant from Lynchburg by the direct route. General Crook here implored permission to march his own gallant Kanawha division by this road, and surprise and take Lynchburg, in accordance with his own raid-like custom; but he was refused, and compelled to march with what he knew was almost fatal slowness.

Instead of taking the direct route, General Hunter leads us off to Liberty, by way of Buchanan, both trifling places, in neither of which did we gain any peculiar advantage, taking us by two sides of a triangle instead of the shorter line.

Now, notice the result of all this delay of four days, and how it defeated our design against Lynchburg. We arrived at Lynchburg Friday afternoon, attacked and drove the rebels two miles, and only halted with the coming night. During the night the heavy reinforcements. from Richmond, a division under Early, arrived in Lynchburg, having been just five days on the way. This latter fact we have ascertained from undoubted testimony. With these reinforcements, the army in Lynchburg far outnumbered ours, and that too, with the addition of strong breastworks, rifle-pits and forts. In such a situation but one course is left, and that is, speedy and cautious retreat.

Well, the retreat is begun, and certainly no complaint can be made of delay or idling in this part of the march.

Then, furthermore, look at the disgraceful loss of artillery to a paltry pack of guerrillas, not quite two hundred in all, what more, or rather less, could be expected than that such a loss would of necessity follow from the disposition made of the batteries, in what seemed to be more especially Hunter's command, of the First division. They were made a separate train, just as our wagons. Attempts had been made to induce General Crook, to run the same risk with his batteries, but in the absence of any positive orders, he managed to avoid it.

Such, then, seems to me to be the cause of our failure to take Lynchburg. General Hunter, although a good officer of high education, is not the man to “go on a raid.”