previous next

Chapter 18: Dana in the War Department

  • Conferences with Lincoln and Stanton
  • -- plan of campaign in Alabama -- letters to Wilson -- extraordinary capacity for work -- supervision of army contractors -- Grant Lieutenant-General -- Rawlins chief of staff -- estimate of Lincoln

Dana arrived at Washington about the middle of December. On the 19th he informed me that as yet he had seen no one in authority, and I reported the fact to General Grant, who had gone to Nashville on the 18th for the purpose of completing arrangements for pushing the campaign in east Tennessee. Rawlins had gone North to be married. On December 21, 1863, at 6 P. M., Dana telegraphed General Grant in substance that after a detailed explanation the President, the Secretary of War, and General Halleck had fully approved his project of a winter campaign in Alabama, not only because it would keep the army active during the rainy season, but because it appears to have been well conceived and certain of producing the desired effect. “If it succeeds,” said the Secretary of War, “Bragg's army will become prisoners of war without our having the trouble of providing for them.” The execution of this plan would have been authorized at once but for the anxiety which existed in reference to Longstreet's continued presence in east Tennessee. With him expelled from that region, Grant could start for Mobile at once. The difficulty seemed to have been that Halleck could not understand where an army was to be got large enough to make Longstreet's [299] dislodgement certain, or even to provide against his seizure of Knoxville, Cumberland Gap, or some other controlling point in our possession, while Grant might be operating with the bulk of his forces against Mobile. This view of the case was confirmed by a despatch from Halleck to Grant the next day. It fully justified the further suggestion contained in Dana's despatch that “the surest means of getting the rebels altogether out of east Tennessee is to be found in the Army of the Potomac.” To this Halleck replied, “That is true, but from that army nothing is to be hoped under its present commander.” This gave Dana the opportunity to present Grant's second proposition, which was that “either Sherman or W. F. Smith should be put in command of that army.” Halleck's reply to this left but little doubt that Smith would be called to the place, and this was based upon the distinct declaration that, as long as a fortnight before Dana's return to Washington, both the Secretary of War and General Halleck “had come to the conclusion that when a change should be made General W. F. Smith would be the best person to try.” While they entertained some doubts “respecting Smith's disposition and personal character,” which Dana thought he had cleared up, they promised to promote him to the first vacancy in the list of major-generals, and all agreed with Grant “in thinking that it would be on the whole much better to select him than Sherman.” Realizing how uncertain action was at that time in any given case, or in any given direction with the powers in Washington, Dana prudently closed his despatch with the following sentences:
... As yet, however, nothing has been decided upon, and you will understand that I have somewhat exceeded my instructions from the Secretary of War in this communication, especially in the second branch of it, but it seems to me [300] necessary that you should know all these particulars. I leave for New York to-night to remain until after New Year's. Dana to Grant, December 21, 1863-6 P. M.

This was one of the most interesting despatches Dana ever sent, for it not only shows that the President, the Secretary of War, tie General-in-Chief, and General Grant were at that time in accord with reference to several of the leading generals and their employment, but that they all favored Grant's suggestion as submitted by Dana for a campaign against Mobile. This plan was originally brought forward by W. F. Smith, and as it promised to keep a great part of Grant's army usefully employed in cleaning up the Confederate forces and capturing the Confederate strongholds in the Middle South, it received Grant's entire approval. It is believed that this plan of operations contained the germ of the “March to the Sea,” as it would cut that part of the Confederacy east of the Mississippi in two again, and, if followed by a vigorous campaign from central Alabama, would have taken Atlanta in the rear, compelled the abandonment of northern Georgia, and rendered the Chattanooga-Atlanta campaign of the next year unnecessary. It is important because it also shows, when taken with Halleck's despatch of the next day to Grant,1 that Halleck would not permit Grant to carry out his plan for a campaign in Alabama till Longstreet was driven entirely from east Tennessee. As Longstreet was an able and very deliberate man, slow to move and hard to beat, he took his own time to get out of east Tennessee. Even then he retired only in the face of overwhelming numbers. Sherman and Thomas, who took no part in the campaign north of Knoxville, gathered their forces deliberately into a powerful. army in front of Chattanooga. [301]

Dana was greatly disappointed at the outcome. He had great confidence in Grant's skill and energy, and felt that with the forces at his disposal he could have cleaned up Alabama in three months. But this was not to be. It will be remembered that Grant, instead, went to Knoxville, where he arrived on the last day of the year. After four days, which he spent in studying the situation and in giving detailed instructions for the campaign against Longstreet, he left for Nashville. The entire journey, which took seven days, was made on horseback from Moundsville, through Cumberland Gap, Barboursville, London, and Frankfort, to Lexington. The journey from Lexington through Louisville to Nashville was made by rail. Grant's headquarters were established at the last-mentioned place about the middle of January, 1864, and remained there till he was called East to take general command of all the National armies.

Immediately after the holidays Dana returned to the War Department, where he not only participated in the multifarious duties connected with the administration and maintenance of the army, but for the first time had an opportunity to observe and study the great secretary as he showed himself in the midst of his daily and nightly work. On January 11, 1864, he wrote to me from his desk in the department. Omitting purely personal passages, the letter runs as follows:

... Yesterday I had the happiness of sending the general a despatch much more important because more decisive than that referred to in yours of the 24th.... The general is authorized to go ahead according to his own judgment.

There are very great complaints here in the quartermaster-general's office respecting the impossibility of getting supplies for General Banks down the Mississippi. Coal, hay, horses — everything is seized at Memphis,Vicksburg, or Natchez. One cargo of one hundred and twenty-five horses arrived at [302] New Orleans with twenty-seven of the animals of which it was originally composed, all the others having been exchanged for worthless or broken-down creatures. The Secretary of War and general-in-chief having declined long since to interfere with General Grant in the form of orders, the quartermaster's department have resorted to the expensive plan of shipping supplies for Banks by way of the seaboard. Hay, for instance, has been bought for him in Illinois and sent by way of Baltimore to save it from the grip of Hurlbut. I believe, however, that General Halleck sent an order on the subject to General Sherman last week.

I saw Porter the other day at his office, where he sits with Mr. Lyford on the other side of the same table. Porter wears a “biled shirt ” with great effect, and otherwise is spruce and handsome. He was not in uniform, and it seems to be the dodge at the ordnance office to dress en pekin.

... About Porter's promotion — I made up my mind that no officer in the ordnance department could be promoted, except in his own branch of the service, as soon as I got here and studied the ground. They tell me that there are few ordnance officers, that every man of them is kept at work on important duty, and that all are indispensable. Besides, so I am told, none of them can pass the examination required for promotion unless he devote himself assiduously to learning his duty by a regular course of service alternately in field, bureau, and arsenal. This seems to be as fixed as the laws of the Medes and Persians, and I do not now see any way in which Porter can be extricated from the operation of the rule. He has himself renounced the idea, and contents himself, as well he may, with the fulness of conjugal bliss and the daily routine of clerical duty at his desk.

Mrs. Rawlins I had no opportunity of seeing, but I hope she will add nothing but happiness to the life of her excellent husband. His appearance made me anew anxious about him. I fear that his lungs may be seriously affected. His loss would be a great misfortune, not only for his friends, but still more for the country. Public servants of his quality will always be few; and there are plenty of men whose names [303] will flourish largely in history without having rendered a tithe of his unostentatious and invaluable contribution to the great work of the nation.

You ask about General Meigs. I will tell you as a secret, which you may tell General Grant and Rawlins, that the affairs under charge of that officer are in a condition of much disorder and frightful waste. He may yet prove an able commander in the field, but as an administrative officer he is a most expensive failure.

You are aware, of course, that Steele with Arkansas has been added to the command of U. S. G. Stoneman has been sent to Steele. Stoneman is another expensive failure. He is not worth a continental. Out of twenty-four thousand cavalry horses bought here under his supervision, less than four thousand are reported as effective for service. This is a fact not to be repeated, but I tell it to you for the general, who may have to decide how or when to use him, or not to use him.

I had a delightful fortnight in New York, and would have been glad to remain there a month longer. My family I found and left in good health, though not well pleased at my long absence. If I remain here, as I fear I may, they may possibly come here ....

It looks now as if A. L. would certainly be re-elected president. It is also probable that U. S. G. will be made lieutenant-general.

The reform and revivification of the Army of the Potomac is a very slow and hard job. It depends on the President, and he is not easy to move. ... I see no prospect of any legislation getting rid of useless generals. Each has friends, and these friends are loud and energetic.

Please remember me affectionately to W. F. Smith and General Brannan.

One of the first matters of importance connected with the operation of the War Department to which Dana's attention was called by the secretary, was the unsatisfactory condition of the Cavalry Bureau, which had to do [304] with the organization, inspection, remount, and equipment of the mounted troops. It had been for several months under the charge of General Stoneman, who had been succeeded recently by General Garrard, both of whom were old and experienced officers, but much too deliberate to suit the impatient secretary. He could not wait a day, but decided to reorganize the bureau at once, and directed Dana to take the matter in hand. The latter thereupon suggested my detail for the work, and, in pursuance of the secretary's authority, issued the necessary orders directing me to report at the War Department for duty as soon as I could settle my business as a member of General Grant's staff. I was notified at the time that my new assignment would last till spring only. I arrived at Washington January 24th, and after taking charge of my office at once resumed my relations with Dana. We had rooms together, boarded at the same house, and were closely associated till the spring campaign of the Army of the Potomac began, when we both returned to the field, he to become again “the eyes of the government” at Grant's headquarters, and I to command a division of cavalry under Sheridan.

During our stay in Washington it was our custom to get to work at nine o'clock and close our desks at five o'clock. What business I had higher up was, as a rule, done through Dana, and this gave me the opportunity of seeing him frequently, and always at the close of the day, when it was our custom to go on horseback to the cavalry depot at Giesboro, or to ride about the defences and the suburbs of the city. I generally found him at his desk, and was greatly impressed by the rapidity with which he mastered each case, and put it in train for settlement. In the morning he always had a great pile of papers before him, and it was his rule to dispose of them before closing for the day. He worked like a skilful bricklayer. As [305] soon as one paper was disposed of, he took another in hand, and thus without losing a minute from hour to hour kept at his task till it was completed. Untiring, methodical, and possessed of an infallible memory, I have never met a man in any walk of life who concentrated himself more completely upon his work, or got through it with less friction or greater rapidity than he did. In this respect he was the admiration of the department. As he was uniformly self-contained and courteous, never impatient nor violent, every one, civilian and soldier alike, having business with any of the bureaus, took it by preference to him, and never by any chance to the secretary, if he could be avoided. Thus it will be seen that Dana was at once the breakwater and the channel to that imperious official; but with all Dana's suavity and skill, it will be readily perceived that his position was by no means an enviable one.

It was to this five months tour of duty in the War Department, during the winter of 1863-64, that Dana was indebted for his intimate acquaintance with Stanton. Previously their meetings were casual, but now official business brought them daily and sometimes hourly in contact with each other. As the assistant secretary was always master over his own temper, and never overawed or confused by the furious outbursts which at times so sadly marred the secretary's behavior, these frequent meetings gave Dana an opportunity to study the character and idiosyncrasies of his chief under conditions which were open to but few others. Judged by his work, and the success which crowned it, it must be admitted that Stanton was one of the strongest and greatest men of his time, but Dana, not only that winter but afterwards, admitted that had the secretary known how to control his temper, and to act with common courtesy, he would have been a still greater man, and might well have been called upon [306] to succeed Andrew Johnson as president. In this respect Dana was vastly his superior, and there can be but little doubt, had occasion required it, that he could have filled the office of secretary with great advantage to the army as well as to the country at large. No civilian till the end of the war had been so constantly with the army, or had become so intimately acquainted with the active generals in the field as Dana had, and no one can read his despatches without perceiving that he had many qualities and much information which would have been most useful in the higher position.

Stanton was undoubtedly a true patriot and a great worker as well as a man of imperious will. The burden of administering the affairs of the army fell mainly upon his shoulders, and necessarily tried his temper as well as his strength. At times he was on the verge of collapse, and when it is considered that he had only two civil assistants, it can be well understood that he must have been frequently almost distracted.

It was the duty of Watson and Dana to supervise the contracts for horses, mules, wagons, harness, tents, clothing, camp equipage, arms, ammunition, drums, fifes, flags, and every other article used by the army. Fraud was everywhere rampant, and everywhere those engaged in it had their friends among the governors of the States, the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives. Many of these gentlemen were almost as impatient and overbearing as the secretary himself, but fortunately most of them stood in wholesome awe of his authority, and gave him a wide berth in their effort to serve their friends.

It was my duty, as chief of the Cavalry Bureau, to supervise the contracts for cavalry arms, equipments, and remounts. For the first and second the Ordnance Bureau was mainly responsible, but the cavalry horses, of which [307] great numbers were needed, were purchased by a quartermaster assigned to the bureau. The inspections were, however, under the control of the purchasing quartermasters, many of whom were from civil life and without adequate experience, in consequence of which the quality of the horses had steadily declined, and many of those received were entirely unfit for service. This was the condition of affairs when I took charge of the bureau. Obviously, the first thing to do was to arrange for better inspections, and this was done by organizing a board of three inspectors for each horse-market, composed of two cavalry officers and one civilian, and issuing stringent orders for their guidance. Dana, who was himself a good horseman, took a lively interest in the details. The next thing was to notify all bidders that the horses furnished by them must conform to the specifications, and that under the law no contractor would be permitted to transfer his contract, but would be required to fill it in person.

Within a few days tenders for eleven thousand horses were opened and awarded to the various bidders according to law. The horses were to be delivered at St. Louis, Indianapolis, Columbus, St. Paul, Chicago, Elmira, Albany, and Giesboro, but the only contractor of the lot that complied with the requirements of the government was the one at St. Louis. Fortunately he had already furnished a thousand horses for which he had not been paid, and recognizing that these were good security, he loyally and honestly furnished twenty-five hundred head more in strict accordance with his tender. All the rest of the successful bidders, at one stage or another of the business, failed to furnish the horses which had been awarded to them. The law was at that time quite precise and severe in its provisions. The penalties prescribed were fine and imprisonment, but they had not hitherto been enforced. Dana had been kept carefully informed of every stage in [308] the business, and recognizing that an example must be made, when the last day of grace expired he put the machinery of the law in motion, and within twenty-four hours arrested each of the defaulters, and started him on the way to Washington for trial by a military commission. Seven contractors were caught and confined in military prison. Most of them were tried, convicted, fined, and sentenced to the penitentiary, where the worst of them were held till after the end of the war. Of course the proceedings were arbitrary and unusual, and were followed by a great outcry of the politicians high and low, but both Dana ad the secretary stood firm; the law and the revised regulations were enforced to the letter, and although one case was afterwards carried to the Supreme Court, the new system was upheld in all its parts. The result was that the business of the bureau was put on a sound basis, the remounts purchased thereafter were good and serviceable, and although the prices paid soon adjusted themselves to the new standard, the measures resorted to were successful in putting an end to the frauds which had come to be the rule rather than the exception in that branch of army business.

But this was not the only case of the kind. Nearly every other branch of the army supply business was permeated by fraud, and what made it more difficult to deal with was the fact that some of the most competent and most energetic contractors were the most dishonest. Not content with a fair profit, they sought those contracts in which “the tricks of the trade” could be most easily practised, and their capital most rapidly turned over. In tents, a lighter cloth or a few inches off of the size; in harness, split leather; in saddles, inferior materials and workmanship; in shoes, paper soles; in clothing, shoddy; in mixed horse-feed, chaff and a larger proportion of the cheaper grain; in hay, straw and weeds; in fuel, inferior grades of [309] coal or wood, and so on, through the entire list, nearly every article presented its chance for sophistication and dishonest profit. Every contractor had to be watched, and when it is remembered that the quartermasters and inspectors were not always honest, but frequently stood in for a share of the profit, it will be readily understood that Dana's time, as well as that of the first assistant secretary, was constantly employed. A system of detection had to be organized and carried into effect, and the more successful it was the greater the outcry and the harder the pressure from the politicians. War governors, representatives, senators, and even the President himself were pressed into the service of the “best citizens” who were caught cheating the government; but withal Dana pursued the noiseless tenor of his way, sure always of Stanton's support, and that the interests of the army and of the country would be promoted by a rigid enforcement of the laws and the regulations in regard to army contracts.

On the whole this work was carried on with increasing success, so that long before the end of the war supplies of all classes were secured fully up to contract and specifications, and the wants of the army were filled with promptitude and liberality never surpassed in any country. This was by no means a pleasant or popular service. It was seldom if ever praised by the newspapers, but the men who managed it are certainly entitled to as much praise as those who faced the enemy in the field. The cooperation of all was necessary to success, and the work of Stanton and his assistants, it must be admitted, was not less necessary than that of the soldiers themselves.

During this winter Dana saw much of the leading men at Washington. As a trusted agent of the War Department, who had been through both the Vicksburg and Chattanooga campaigns, it was correctly assumed that he [310] must know all about Grant and his leading officers. The war in the East had come to a stand-still, and consequently a deep feeling of anxiety had taken possession not only of the administration, but of Congress and the country at large. As Dana wrote me shortly after his return from the West, the suggestion that Grant should be made a lieutenant-general, and placed in command of all our armies, was under consideration, and seemed to have taken hold of the public mind. The country had been eagerly seeking for some one to lead it to victory. It had hailed McClellan as the “Young Napoleon” and Halleck as the “Old brains” of the army. It had had its “Fighting Joe,” its respectable but incompetent Burnside, and its worthy but unsuccessful Meade. It had lavished its men and money without stint upon the Army of the Potomac, and that army had won a partial success at Antietam, and a still more substantial one at Gettysburg, but as yet it had not gained a complete victory. Lee and his veterans, with their “tattered uniforms and bright bayonets,” still kept the field and barred the way to Richmond. So long as this continued to be the case, and the Confederacy remained unconquered and defiant, the constant question of the government was, necessarily: Where is the man who can finish the task before us? Grant was the only general that had so far made a clean job of his campaigns, and his name was naturally uppermost in the public mind, but there were many doubters, especially in the Army of the Potomac--many who thought that Grant's successes were due rather to good-fortune than to good management; many who contended that he had not yet fought either the best leaders or the best troops of the Confederacy, and many who openly expressed the fear that when he met Lee and his army he would prove unequal to the task before him.

The only member of either branch of Congress who [311] seemed confident that Grant was the man was E. B. Washburne, Republican member of Congress from the Galena district, but his advocacy was regarded as not entirely disinterested. Dana had corresponded with him in the early days of the antislavery movement, and also from Cairo, and now found himself at the same boarding-house with him. Eliot, of Massachusetts, and Sedgwick, of New York, were also there, and this constituted a coterie with whom Dana was in constant communication. The movement spread from them to others. The Secretary of War himself was won over, and finally the President, but withal it did not spread like wildfire. Many senators and representatives sought out Dana, and plied him with questions about Grant's habits, his character, and his fitness for command. I was present at many of the interviews, and assisted as fully as I could in helping on the measure, which slowly but surely gained headway, and was finally adopted. Washburne's earnestness and force gradually swept aside all opposition in the House, while Dana's advocacy, although less vehement, was regarded not only as far better informed but much more disinterested. It was particularly effective with the cabinet and the Senate. Curiously enough, there is reason to believe that the question of Grant's political ambitions was an important factor in the settlement of the case. It is known that shortly after the Vicksburg campaign Lincoln sent for his old friend Russell Jones, of Galena, then United States marshal at Chicago, afterwards minister at Brussels, and asked him if “that man Grant” wanted to be president. Fortunately Jones was able, from information received in a late personal interview, to give the most positive and satisfactory assurances on that point. But with the Chattanooga campaign added to his credit, the question now came up again, and fortunately Dana felt fully justified in saying that Grant's only ambition was to help put [312] down the Rebellion, and that he was not only not a candidate for the presidency, but was in favor of Lincoln's re-election to that great office when the time came around.

How much influence the information and assurances given by Washburne, Jones, and Dana may have exerted upon Lincoln, Stanton, and the Congress in the final determination of the matter can never be precisely known, but that they were important if not controlling factors there can be no doubt. While each of them knew all of Grant's weak points, as well as his strong ones, all felt confident that he could be trusted hereafter as heretofore, and would prove equal to the great task before him, either with or without the rank of lieutenant-general. They had all been as close to Grant as any one else except Rawlins, and as they knew the latter had absolute confidence in him, they exerted themselves to their utmost in his behalf, and fortunately for the country never had the slightest cause, to regret it.

It should be remembered that a new office was created for Rawlins as well as for Grant. Hitherto he had been only Grant's adjutant-general, with the incidental duties of chief of staff, but henceforth he was to have that title by law, and while he never laid claim to the technical knowledge of a Berthier or a Jomini, it is concealed by all who knew him that he had a breath of view and a force of character which, through his personal relations with his chief, male him far more important than any purely professional chief of staff could ever have been. In short, Rawlins was regarded as one with Grant — as an essential part of his great chief-and this fact was never lost sight of for a minute by the mien who were at that time in actual charge of the government and were all-powerful in legislation. It was but natural that Dana, who had been designated “the eyes of the government,” should have seen more and come to know more about Grant and his surroundings than any [313] other civilian at Washington. It was but natural, therefore, that he should have had a greater influence with the men inside of the government, with whom he was on the closest terms, than any one else. While it is not known that he ever made any claim on this account, and indeed was entitled to no especial reward for doing what he conceived to be his duty, one cannot suppress the reflection that it all might have turned out quite differently had Washburne or he taken another course. The world readily adjusts itself to accomplished facts, and takes but little account of what might have been the result had this or that man taken a different course at this or that crisis, but it is at least interesting to note that Dana, although filling a subordinate position, had many opportunities to exert upon those highest in authority whatever influence was due to the information he had gathered, and was fortunate enough throughout the great conflict to exert it always for the advancement of the public interests. He seems never to have asked for anything personal, but to have considered himself amply repaid for his services in Washington and in the field by the consideration he received from the great characters with which they brought him in contact, rather than by the pay he got or the rewards bestowed upon him.

It was a never-ceasing source of satisfaction to Dana that his residence in Washington brought him constantly in contact with the President and his cabinet. This is abundantly shown in his masterly sketch of Lincoln,2 whom he regarded as a very great man, full of gentle kindness and amiable sincerity, treating his cabinet, several of whom were men of extraordinary force and self-assertion, with unvarying candor and respect, and yet never failing to impress them one and all with the fact “that he was the [314] master and they the subordinates.” When he yielded to them, it was because they convinced him that they were right-never because he wished to avoid responsibility. In their judgment much was imperfect in the administration. They were frequently impatient with the President, but he was never so with them. Calm, equable, and uncomplaining, he was always considerate, pleasant, and cordial. He was never in a hurry, and never tried to hurry any one else. In every discussion, even in every joke, he showed the profoundest thought and the most matured wisdom. It was his word that went at last, and his decision that closed every argument. His authority, his reserve force, and his gigantic frame were most impressive. There was nothing flabby or feeble about him. With tremendous powers of endurance, he worked every day, and every night when necessary, as though he had done nothing the day before. With a smile as engaging as that of a woman, there was such a charm and beauty about his expression, such good-humor and friendly spirit looking from his eyes, that you never thought whether he was awkward or graceful; you thought of nothing except what a kindly character this man has-how benevolence and benignity were combined in his appearance-how intelligence and goodness were combined in his character. You felt that here was a man who saw through things, who understood things, and was entitled to your respect accordingly.

This is in substance Dana's estimate of Lincoln as a president and as a man, but, high as it is, he thought him still higher as a politician. Indeed, he regarded him as easily the first American in that class, and mainly because he had an extraordinary knowledge of human nature. He appears to have taken Dana into his inmost confidence in such matters during the earlier months of 1864, and to have consulted him fully about the amendment to the [315] Constitution to legalize the abolition of slavery, about the admission of Nevada as a State, and generally about where to get the necessary votes in Congress to carry through the various policies of his administration. It was a matter of prime importance that the leading newspapers should give him their support, that Greeley and Bennett especially should not oppose his measures; and to this end he frequently consulted Dana, who was a newspaper man himself, and knew them well. In his capacity to control men, or to neutralize their opposition, Lincoln was without a rival, and made no mistakes. The unerring judgment, and the consummate patience with which he acted when the time arrived, constituted a quality which, so far as Dana knew, had not been exhibited to a higher degree by any other man in history, and which proved him to have been intellectually one of the greatest of rulers.

Another interesting fact which Dana was among the first to mention was that Lincoln had finally developed into a great military man — that is, into a man of supreme military judgment. This conclusion he supported by the following statement:

... I do not risk anything in saying that if one will study the records of the war ... and the writings relating to it, he will agree with me that the greatest general we had, greater than Grant or Thomas, was Abraham Lincoln. It was not so at the beginning; but after three or four years of constant practice in the science and art of war, he arrived at this extraordinary knowledge of it, so that Von Moltke was not a better general or an abler planner or expounder of a campaign than President Lincoln. To sum it up, he was a born leader of men. He knew human nature; he knew what chord to strike, and was never afraid to strike when he believed that the time had arrived.

Dana, Recollections of the Civil War, p. 181.

1 Official Records, Serial No. 56, p. 458, Halleck to Grant, December 21, 1863.

2 See Dana, Recollections of the Civil War, p. 171 et seq.

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.

An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.

hide Dates (automatically extracted)
Sort dates alphabetically, as they appear on the page, by frequency
Click on a date to search for it in this document.
December 21st, 1863 AD (3)
1864 AD (2)
January 11th, 1864 AD (1)
January, 1864 AD (1)
1863 AD (1)
December (1)
January 24th (1)
January 1st (1)
19th (1)
hide Display Preferences
Greek Display:
Arabic Display:
View by Default:
Browse Bar: