- With Lee in Northern Virginia, 1862 -- the maneuvers on the Rappahannock -- Second Manassas campaign -- battle of Ox Hill.
We left the South Carolinians of the army of Northern Virginia in front of McClellan at Malvern hill, whence the Federal army retreated and took shelter under the guns of the fleet at Harrison's landing. The latter, naturally a strong defensive position, the genius and skill of McClellan and his able engineers made a fortified camp, protected by impracticable swamps and water-courses, and the batteries of the fleet on its flanks. Here the army of McClellan was safe from attack and too much shattered to take the immediate offensive. Meanwhile the corps of McDowell, Banks and Sigel, which had been operating against Jackson in the valley, and in immediate defense of Washington, had been united under Gen. John Pope, and called the ‘army of Virginia.’ This army of Pope was to be reinforced by General McClellan and march on Richmond from the north. Early in July, Pope was on the Rappahannock, with his outposts on the Rapidan. His army was over 45,000 strong, and the only obstacle to his advance was the cavalry under General Stuart. General Lee determined to check Pope's further advance, until he could be satisfied of McClellan's movements, and accordingly ordered Jackson to Gordonsville, and early in August reinforced him with A. P. Hill's division. With characteristic energy, Jackson crossed the Rapidan, and on August 9th, in the battle of Cedar Run, gave Pope's advance on Richmond a telling blow. Gen. Maxcy Gregg's brigade of South  Carolinians was in A. P. Hill's division, with McIntosh's battery, but was not engaged in the battle. Greatly to the disappointment of the Carolinians, they were left behind to guard the passages of the Rapidan. General Burnside, with a strong force, was at Fredericksburg, and McClellan (August 13th) was still in his fortified camp on the James, 30 miles from the city of Richmond. The battle on Cedar run had checked Pope, but he stood over 40,000 strong, in front of Jackson's corps, and was receiving reinforcements from Burnside. On the 14th of August, McClellan began the movement of his army by water to Aquia creek on the Potomac. Anticipating this, on the 13th, General Lee ordered Longstreet, with twelve brigades and their artillery, to move by railroad to Gordonsville, and on the 15th took command in person on the Rapidan. With Longstreet were Rhett's, Bachman's and Garden's South Carolina batteries; Anderson's old brigade, under Brig.-Gen. Micah Jenkins, with Corse's and Hunton's Virginia brigades, forming the division of General Kemper; and the South Carolina brigade of Brig.-Gen. N. G. Evans, which had joined the army in time to be slightly engaged at Malvern hill. This, an independent brigade, included the Seventeenth, Eighteenth, Twenty-second and Twenty-third regiments, the Holcombe legion and the Macbeth artillery, Captain Boyce. Kershaw's brigade in McLaws' division was left in front of Richmond; Hampton's brigade of cavalry, including the legion and Hart's battery, was in McClellan's front. General Lee planned an attack on Pope immediately before his arrival on the Rapidan. R. H. Anderson's division was ordered up from Richmond, and the plan of campaign was to be carried out on the 18th by crossing the Rapidan and turning Pope's left. But a letter from General Lee detailing the movements of the cavalry fell into Pope's hands by the capture of Stuart's adjutant-general, and Pope, thus apprised of the plans of his  adversary, on the 17th fell back behind the Rappahannock to a much stronger position. The lost dispatch had broken up the plans for the expected battle, and Lee put his two corps in position on the south bank of the Rappahannock, Longstreet on the right and Jackson on the left. Now, sure that he could with safety collect all his army on the Rappahannock, General Lee wrote the President for the divisions of D. H. Hill and McLaws, and General Hampton's cavalry. On the 19th, the President, fearing that Richmond would be endangered, telegraphed General Lee that until movements of the enemy were more developed he would retain those commands before the capital. Finally, on the 24th, Lee wrote Mr. Davis that he had intercepted a letter from General Pope to General Halleck (commander-in-chief of the United States armies), dated August 20th, stating his whole force for duty at 45,000, independent of Burnside, and revealing his plan to hold Lee in check until McClellan could come up from the lower Rappahannock. Thus General Lee was put in possession of General Pope's plans and formed his own accordingly. He wrote the President that he wished his whole army immediately, and all available troops, and added: ‘Hampton's cavalry I particularly require.’ Richmond, he wrote, must rely upon her defenses and field batteries. On the 26th, McLaws and D. H. Hill and Hampton were ordered to Lee, and Mr. Davis wrote him: ‘Confidence in you overcomes the view that otherwise would be taken of the exposed condition of Richmond, and the troops retained for the defense of the capital are surrendered to you on a renewed request.’ Neither of these commands was able to reach Lee, however, until immediately after the conflicts on the Rappahannock and the great struggle at Manassas. The fords on the Rappahannock were too full for the crossing of the army, and too strongly defended by Pope's artillery.  Several affairs occurred during the five days Lee was detained on the right bank. In one of these Gregg's brigade was moved up to support a battery, and subjected to a severe shelling from a high hill on the left bank, losing several men killed and wounded. On August 23d a more serious affair occurred, in which the brigade of General Evans and Boyce's battery were engaged. The enemy had fortified a hill near the railroad bridge at Rappahannock Station, and on the right bank. Evans, supported by several batteries, was ordered to attack. The brigade moved up promptly against the fortified position, under a sharp counter fire, but before they reached charging distance the enemy retired, leaving his intrenching tools and other property, but taking guns and troops securely over the railroad bridge, which he fired and destroyed. Evans ordered Boyce to occupy the steep hill with his battery, and that gallant officer at once moved up but was immediately subjected to the fire of four batteries from commanding heights on the north bank. He was compelled immediately to withdraw, losing 8 killed and 14 wounded, and 7 horses killed. Lieut. William Monro of the battery was severely wounded. The brigade lost in this affair 27 killed and 84 wounded, a total of 111. Without waiting for the arrival of the reinforcements from Richmond, General Lee began his movement around the right of General Pope on the 25th of August. Jackson was to move up the right bank of the river beyond the extreme right of Pope, cross beyond Waterloo and move on his railroad communications. Longstreet, after demonstrating in Pope's front, was to follow Jackson. The genius of Lee, Jackson and Longstreet was to determine the precise field and the essential conditions of the battle. Jackson marched early on the 25th, crossed the upper branches of the Rappahannock, and camped at Salem, on the Manassas Gap railroad. On the 26th he turned  due east, passed the Bull Run mountains through Thoroughfare gap, and by sunset was at Bristoe Station in Pope's immediate rear, and on his main railroad communication with Washington. The capture of Bristoe and Manassas Junction, with vast stores, followed. Gregg's brigade, which had been under fire at Rappahannock bridge on the 21st, and further up the river on the Rappahannock hills on the 24th, crossed on the 25th at Henson's mill, and made a forced march of 24 miles that day up the Salem valley, and continued the march on the 26th ‘without wagons or baggage of any kind, turning to the right at Salem, through Thoroughfare gap, and sleeping at night in rear of our artillery in the road near Bristoe Station.’ General McGowan, whose report is quoted, continues:
The next morning we reached Manassas Junction, where the enemy, attempting to recapture it, were scattered with considerable loss. In the afternoon of that day the brigade returned from pursuit, to the junction, where three days rations were issued from the vast supply of captured stores, and the men for a few hours rested and regaled themselves upon delicacies unknown to our commissariat, which they were in good condition to enjoy, having eaten nothing for several days except roasting ears taken from the fields near the road, and what was given by the generous citizens of the Salem valley to the soldiers as they hurried along in their rapid march. At dark on the evening of August 27th (Wednesday), the brigade, in conjunction with that of General Thomas, was thrown out on the south side of Manassas Junction as the rear guard, and formed in line of battle facing the enemy, who had during the evening been fighting General Ewell near Bristoe Station. Standing under arms here we had a fine view of the magnificent conflagration caused by the burning of the sutler's and commissary stores, together with about 100 cars freighted with every article necessary for the outfit of a great army, all of which was set on fire about midnight and consumed. About 2 o'clock in the morning of Thursday, the 28th, we silently retired from our picket lines in front of the  enemy, and by the light of the smoldering ruins followed the division across Bull run at Blackburn's ford to Centreville. Here we rested a short time, and thence turned back toward Bull run, and moving by the Warrenton pike crossed the run again near the stone bridge. At this critical moment the enemy, falling back from the Rappahannock, caused doubtless by our flank movement, were coming down the turnpike from Warrenton, meeting us. We turned to the right, leaving the turnpike, and after going up the run a short distance, changed front and were drawn up in battle array along the line of the unfinished Independent railroad track, facing the turnpike along which the enemy was moving.As Gregg's brigade took this position, brisk firing was heard upon the right, where the divisions of Taliaferro and Ewell were thrown by Jackson against the column of Pope's army coming up the Warrenton pike, expecting to find Jackson at Centreville. A severe engagement followed, the battle of Groveton, in which Ewell and Taliaferro were both wounded. About dark Gregg's brigade was hurried to the scene of action, but the firing soon after ceased. Jackson resumed his place behind the railroad and lay the night of the 28th in perfect silence, doubtless to create the impression that he had retreated. Capt. J. F. J. Caldwell, of the First South Carolina, Gregg's brigade, who has written an admirable history of his brigade, and was himself a gallant participant in all of its hardships and glories, thus describes the night of the 28th of August:
We were placed in columns of regiments and lay during the night in the open field. The night before a battle is never a pleasant one, but this was peculiarly trying. Strict silence was enjoined on every man. We had three divisions, which, in all, would not sum up 20,000 men. Before us was Pope with at least the bulk of the Federal army, which, of course, was magnified by many thousands; behind us was no base, no subsistence, no reinforcement! Longstreet with three divisions was beyond Pope, and must be some time in reaching us. God, Jackson and our own hearts were our dependence. But Longstreet was not ‘beyond Pope,’ for he had that day forced the passage of Thoroughfare gap, after a sharp conflict in which Drayton's brigade (which included the Fifteenth South Carolina) took part, and that night his command camped in the gap and west of the mountain. Daybreak of August 29th, upon the great battle plains of Manassas, found Jackson in his well-chosen position behind the railroad cut, Longstreet descending the east slope of the gap he had won, and the forces of General Pope forming for battle in Jackson's front. The plan of the Federal commander was to attack and crush Jackson before Longstreet could reach him. The battle opened by an artillery attack in force on Jackson's right, which was promptly met. This failing to move Jackson, an equally galling fire of artillery was delivered against his left, and this also was replied to effectively. At 2 p. m. the infantry battle opened against A. P. Hill on Jackson's left, and raged until 9 o'clock at night. Hill repulsed six separate assaults, the forces against him being the commands, in whole or in part, of the Federal generals Hooker, Kearney, Sigel and Stearns. Gregg's brigade,1 after sleeping on their arms on Ewell's battlefield, had returned to their first position on the left at early dawn of the 29th, and were put in line on the extreme left of the army, near Catharpin run, occupying a small, rocky, wooded knoll, having a railroad excavation bending around the east and north fronts, and a cleared field on the northwest. This position was slightly in advance of the general line, and besides being on the extreme left, was considered important because of its command of the Sudley Ford road. The brigade line made an obtuse angle toward the enemy, one side nearly parallel to the railroad cut and the other along the fence of the cleared field on the  northwest, and enclosed the knoll, which they were ordered to hold at all hazards. On this spot, barely large enough to hold the brigade, they stood and fought from 8 o'clock in the morning until dark. The regiments of the brigade were posted from right to left in the following order: The Thirteenth, Col. O. E. Edwards; the First, Maj. Edward McCrady; the Twelfth, Col. Dixon Barnes; the Fourteenth, Col. Samuel Mc-Gowan; Orr's Rifles, Col. J. Foster Marshall, in reserve. Early in the morning, the enemy's advance being reported, General Gregg sent forward McCrady to skirmish with it. The enemy lay in force in a wooded hollow in front, and McCrady's advance drew the fire of his line, front and flank. A sharp musketry contest followed and Gregg sent up the Twelfth on McCrady's left. The two regiments charged and gained ground forward, but on the right the enemy held his ground and fired on McCrady's flank. Barnes had passed on beyond, and McCrady's position was critical. Edwards, with the Thirteenth, came to his support, but met such resistance that he had to fight independently. Meanwhile Marshall, with the Rifles, had gone to Barnes' support, and those two regiments were driving victoriously forward. McCrady, fighting front and flank, was stubbornly holding his ground, and Edwards was stemming the tide against his regiment. At this juncture Gregg recalled the four regiments to the railroad position, as his orders were to act on the defensive and not to bring on a general engagement. Time was everything to Jackson, who knew his enemy was in his front with superior numbers, and he did not risk a battle until Longstreet was reported to be on his right. The affair of the four regiments had checked the arrangements for assault in Gregg's front, and he was in solid line awaiting the next move. It soon came. Pressing on through the thick growth of bushes along Gregg's front, the attack drove in his skirmishers, and the  infantry of the enemy poured in volley after volley as they advanced to the railroad. It was a close fight of infantry, across the cut, and ended in a repulse of the attack Reinforced, he came for a second battle with Gregg, and was repulsed. A third and a fourth assault were met, and a third and fourth battle fought with the same result. Gregg's brigade had now nearly exhausted its ammunition, and most of the field officers were killed or wounded, with many most active and gallant subordinates. Now came the critical hour of Jackson's battle. Coming up the railroad cut from the left and right, and screened by its high banks and the thick brush on both sides of it, the enemy massed on Gregg's right, opposite a thick wood. In this wood were Edwards and McCrady, forming the right of Gregg, McCrady supporting Edwards. Beyond Gregg's right was the left of Thomas' Georgia brigade, quite an interval being between the two brigades. The fifth grand assault fell on Thomas' and Gregg's right, and easily filled the wooded interval between them, flanking both Thomas and Gregg. The moment was most critical. Edwards and McCrady changed front to face the woods filled with Federal troops, and fought desperately. Barnes came up to their help, while Marshall's Rifles heroically held Gregg's left. But the right was about to be overpowered and crushed, when Gregg sent in McGowan, his only reserve. The Fourteenth rushed upon the crowded ranks of intruders in the wood, delivered their volleys at close range, and shouting, charged the mass. At the instant Thomas attacked from his side with the Forty-ninth Georgia, and the victory was gallantly won. The whole assaulting force was driven by Gregg's and Thomas' forces back across the railroad, and into the woods beyond. Almost exhausted by such terrible work, the cartridge boxes reduced to two or three rounds, Gregg held his railroad line with a fixed determination never to yield.  In this resolve he was supported by every officer and man of his brigade. When General Hill sent to ask if he could hold out, says McGowan, ‘he replied modestly he thought he could, adding, as if casually, that his ammunition was about expended, but he still had the bayonet.’ And on the bayonet the brigade was now to rely, as the most desperate assault from fresh forces in its front was about to come. The rush and noise of the advance were heard, the volleys of musketry swept over and through the thinned ranks of Gregg, and in another moment the charging lines of the enemy were mounting the banks of the railroad cut and rushing upon him. Meeting this heaviest assault of the day, and fighting, first with their last cartridges, and then with the bayonet, the men of the brigade gave slowly back. They were not driven far from their battle line, when Gregg's call for help was answered by General Hill. Branch and Field were sent in, and with portions of their brigades met and turned the tide of assault. Gregg's men were rallied by their commanders, and the Virginians, North Carolinians and South Carolinians drove back the great assault across and beyond the railroad, and again Gregg's line was formed. But the brigade, after fighting for several hours, was worn out and its last round of ammunition expended. The gallant and heroic Marshall fell in this last conflict, as well as his able lieutenant-colonel, D. A. Ledbetter. Colonels McGowan and Barnes, Lieutenant-Colonel Farrow, and Majors Brockman and McCorkle were wounded and borne from the field. Captains and lieutenants and their brave men lay dead in every part of the field. It was evident that another grand assault must be met. ‘Casting about for help,’ says General Hill, ‘fortunately it was here reported to me that the brigades of Generals Lawton and Early were near by, and sending to them, they promptly moved to my front at the most  opportune moment.’ Gregg was relieved, and Lawton and Early, now, late in the afternoon, advanced beyond the railroad, met the last assault of the day, and drove the Federals in confusion to the rear. Night had come, and with it rest for Gregg's heroic brigade. Jackson held his field, and the effort to crush him before Longstreet came up had disastrously failed. The losses in Gregg's brigade were as follows: Orr's Rifles, 19 killed, 97 wounded, total 116; First, 24 killed, 119 wounded, total 143; Twelfth, 24 killed, 121 wounded, total 145; Thirteenth, 26 killed, 118 wounded, total 144; Fourteenth, 8 killed, 57 wounded, total 65; aggregate for the brigade, 613. On this bloody day McIntosh did not have an opportunity to use his guns. At Manassas Junction on the 27th, he had done effective work and aided in silencing the enemy's battery and driving off his infantry. The brigade was not in action on the next day, the 30th, but took position under fire. While forming his command, Major McCrady received a severe wound in the head, after passing through the storm of battle on the 29th unhurt. McIntosh's battery, posted on Gregg's left, on the 30th, did splendid service in shelling the enemy's masses in front, and in breaking his advances against Gregg's position. The following officers are mentioned among the killed and wounded in the reports of McGowan and McCrady, the former reporting for the brigade:
Killed: Orr's Rifles—Col. J. Foster Marshall, Lieut.-Col. D. A. Ledbetter, Capt. M. M. Norton and Lieut. W. C. Davis. First—Capt. C. D. Barksdale, Lieuts. John Monro and John C. McLemore, Sergeants Lowrimore, Darby and Smith. Twelfth-Lieuts. J. A. May and J. R. Hunnicutt. Thirteenth-Capt. A. K. Smith and Adjt. W. D. Goggans. Wounded: Orr's Rifles—Lieut. J. S. Cothran. First— Major McCrady, Capts. T. P. Alston and M. P. Parker, Lieuts. T. H. Lyles, G. R. Congdon, John H. King, Z. B. Smith and Thomas McCrady. Twelfth—Maj. W. H. McCorkle, Capts. E. F. Bookter and L. M. Grist;  Lieuts. W. S. Dunlop, M. K. Sharp, J. H. Bigham, M. V. Darwin, L. A. Garvin, T. A. White, H. P. Thode, J. M. Hencken and J. C. Rollings. Thirteenth—Col. O. E. Edwards, Lieut.-Col. T. S. Farrow, Maj. B. T. Brockman, Capts. R. L. Bowden, P. A. Eichelberger, G. W. Meetze; Lieuts. J. D. Copeland, R. M. Crocker, S. J. Greer, W. T. Thom and J. B. Fellers. Fourteenth— Col. Samuel McGowan, Capts. C. M. Stuckey and J. N. Brown; Lieuts. W. J. Robertson, W. J. Carter and J. H. Allen. A total of 12 commissioned officers killed and 37 wounded in the brigade.Major McCrady mentions in his report for distinguished conduct on the field, Color-bearer Spellman and Sergeant Matthews, Sergeants Lorrimore, Smith, Darby, Kelley, Gore and Miller, Color Corporal Owens, Corporals Wigg and Larkin, Privates Ruff, Holloran and Carroll, Sergeant Ragan, Corporal Brereton, Privates Lyles and Duff. Capts. W. T. Haskell, M. P. Parker, W. P. Shooter, Barksdale and T. P. Alston, and Lieuts. James Armstrong, John C. McLemore, Thomas McCrady, Hewetson, Brailsford, McIntire, Congdon, John Monro, Wiborn, Seabrook and Hamilton were distinguished on the field. The great issue of battle between Pope and Lee was to be determined on the 30th. Longstreet was in battle array on Jackson's right, with a front of seven brigades: First Hood, with his brigades, supported by Evans; then Kemper, with two brigades in his front line, Jenkins and Hunter, supported by Corse; then D. R. Jones, with three brigades in echelon, on the extreme right, reaching the Manassas Gap railroad. Wilcox, with three brigades, in column, was in close supporting distance, behind Hood and Evans. R. H. Anderson with three brigades was on the march for the field, moving from the direction of Warrenton. The brigades of Evans and Jenkins were composed of South Carolina troops; the Fifteenth South Carolina was in Drayton's brigade, with D. R. Jones on the right, and the Hampton legion infantry was in Wofford's brigade, with Hood on the left.  Bachman's and Garden's batteries were in Major Frobel's battalion, and Rhett's was in S. D. Lee's battalion. Pope massed against Jackson, and after assailing him with a heavy fire of artillery, attacked his whole line with all the aggressive power he could command. Porter's corps assailed his right and center, and Heintzelman's and Reno's corps attacked his left and left flank. These three corps were supported by the divisions of King and Ricketts. Jackson stood against this combination with his three divisions, and made desperate resistance. For three hours, from 1 to 4 p. m., his battle was purely defensive and held back the surging columns of attack, but he saw that his limit of resistance had been reached and sent to General Lee for a division. At that moment General Longstreet, riding out to a commanding position on Jackson's right, saw the whole field of attack and seized the opportunity to enfilade the line. Chapman's Virginia, Boyce's South Carolina and Reilly's North Carolina batteries were called up at a run, and fully appreciating the situation, went into telling action. The assaulting lines were broken in ten minutes, rallied, returned, and were again broken. Rallying a third time, they were a third time staggered by the fire of Boyce, Chapman and Reilly, and Jackson's line was given a breathing spell. S. D. Lee now put his battalion into action, and his guns swept the field and ‘tore the line to pieces,’ says General Longstreet. Rhett's South Carolina battery, commanded by Lieut. William Elliott, with Lee's battalion, shared the honors of this grand assault of artillery in aid of Jackson's heroic battle. The moment had come for Longstreet to move, and as the commanding general rode on the field and ordered the grand assault, he was sending the order to his division commanders to advance. It was now late in the afternoon, but before night had settled down on that great field of strife, Hood and Evans and Kemper and D. R. Jones and R. H. Anderson had  carried the battle beyond the Chinn house and to the base of the great plateau at the Henry house, which commanded the enemy's line of retreat over Bull run. But night had come and saved the plateau to Pope's army and his retreat was secured to him. Lee's victory was complete. But it had been won by a mighty sacrifice of human life. South Carolina had laid down her noble sons in costly sacrifice. Her brigades and regiments in that great battle had given their very best. Among the gallant dead, and those who received mortal wounds, at Manassas, on the two days of heroic strife, were the following distinguished officers: Col. J. F. Marshall and Lieut.-Col. D. A. Ledbetter, of Orr's Rifles; Col. Thomas J. Glover, of the First South Carolina battalion; Col. John V. Moore, of the Second Rifles; Col. John H. Means, of the Seventeenth; Col. J. M. Gadberry, Eighteenth; Lieut.-Col. Francis G. Palmer, of the Holcombe legion, and many other gallant spirits. Brigadier-General Jenkins was wounded at the head of his brigade and over 400 of his officers and men killed and wounded. Col. H. L. Benbow, Twenty-third South Carolina; Maj. W. J. Crawley, of the Holcombe legion, and other field, staff and company officers of the South Carolina commands were wounded on the field. It is greatly to be regretted that there are no reports from General Jenkins of record, or any one of his regimental commanders, respecting the operations of the 29th and 30th. As Hood's right swept on in its battle, Jenkins and Hunton kept abreast of it, and Evans, in supporting Hood, came into battle connection with Jenkins. This was particularly the case when the guns were captured at the Chinn house. Colonel Corse in his report gives the line of program which Jenkins observed, as passing beyond the Chinn house and south of it, while Evans, who supported Hood's two brigades, passed beyond and north of it. Wofford, who commanded Hood's right brigade,  refers to his advance against a battery at or east of the Chinn house, when the Holcombe legion (of Evans' brigade) came up to his support and fought ‘with much spirit and gallantry.’ Colonel Gary, the commander of the Hampton legion infantry, in his report says: ‘We were then [Wofford's brigade] hotly engaged around the Chinn house, where the brigade captured several pieces of artillery. At this place the brigade of General Evans came up in gallant style and relieved us.’ Evidently the Chinn house, which stood about one mile southwest of Groveton, formed the center of the theater of battle for the brigades of Jenkins and Evans and the Hampton legion infantry, under Colonel Gary. These commands carried their battle for a half mile east of the Chinn house, when darkness checked and ended their advance. Over the space indicated the South Carolinians fought with steady courage, attesting their devotion by the sacrifices of the day. In this advance fell the noble-hearted Governor Means, at the head of the Seventeenth; the accomplished and gallant Glover, at the head of Hagood's First; the brave Gadberry, leading the Eighteenth; the dashing Moore, commanding the Second rifles; the heroic Palmer, urging the Holcombe legion to the charge, and Henry Stevens, aide to Col. P. F. Stevens, falling with five wounds. A single shell bursting in front of Company K, Palmetto sharpshooters, killed five young men—Theodotus L. Capers, James Palmer, Whiteford Smith, Bearden and McSwain—graduates and undergraduates of college, the very best Carolina could give for her cause. It is particularly noted, that these were representative young men, sons of men of prominence in the church and in the State. Never did one shell destroy more of the beauty and promise of life, or carry more sorrow to human hearts. The Fifteenth South Carolina operated on the extreme right in support of cavalry, and is reported as losing 21  in killed and wounded. General Longstreet complained that Drayton was sent to the right without his knowledge, and expressed his regret that he could not command his aid when he needed it to reinforce the battle. Major Frobel reported that on Friday morning he took Bachman's battery, by General Hood's order, to the extreme right on the Orange & Alexandria railroad, where Stuart's cavalry was operating. Here Bachman opened on a column marching to the Confederate right. Fifteen rounds were so well directed that the column halted and then disappeared toward the left. Later, Bachman and Garden took post on the Warrenton pike, and for two hours engaged the batteries of the enemy at the Groveton house, and silenced them. On the 30th, in the afternoon, following Hood's advance, Bachman and Garden advanced down the Warrenton pike, Bachman taking position on the right of the road and Garden on the left, both well out, and opened on the enemy's guns at the Dogan house. Again the batteries engaged and drove the enemy's guns away from the house, and prepared the way for Colonel Law's brigade to carry the position. Bachman had exhausted his ammunition, and Garden moved on until night stopped his progress. Major Frobel reported that Bachman and Garden handled their guns with great skill and effect. Lieutenant Siegling, a gallant officer of Bachman's battery, was struck from his horse by a fragment of shell, and seeing the exposed position of his mounted men, as he was falling gave the command, ‘Cannoneers, dismount.’ His wound was through the stomach, and was supposed to be mortal, but his cheerful resolution and strong physique, with skillful surgical attention, carried him through the ordeal, and he rejoined his command. The following are the returns of casualties from the several South Carolina commands engaged at Manassas on the 29th and 30th. Except from Boyce's battery there are no reports of casualties in the artillery: Gregg's  brigade—Orr's Rifles, 116; First, 143; Twelfth, 145; Thirteenth, 144; Fourteenth, 65. Jenkins' brigade— First (Hagood's), 124; Second Rifles, 58; Fifth, 39; Sixth, 115; Sharpshooters, 68. Drayton's brigade, Fifteenth, 21. Wofford's brigade, Hampton's legion, 74. Evans' brigade, Holcombe legion, 155; Seventeenth, 179; Eighteenth, 113; Twenty-second,—; Twenty-third, 149; Boyce's battery, 6. The grand total is 1,714, and of these, 281 are given as killed on the field. Many of those reported wounded had received mortal hurt. The morning of Sunday, August 31, 1862, dawned upon the plains and hills and valleys of Manassas to find them covered with the dead, the dying and the wounded of both armies. The trophies of victory cheered the awful prospect, but the sight of the great battlefield filled every manly heart with feelings of reverence for the dead and sympathy for the wounded, both friend and foe. Ten thousand wounded Union soldiers, 30 pieces of artillery, many stand of colors, and 7,000 prisoners bore witness to the steady courage and the heroic endurance of Jackson's three divisions on the 29th, and the gallant charge of Longstreet's wing on the 30th. Pope retreated after nightfall on the 30th and put his rear guard in the Confederate defenses at Centreville. He reported that he had been driven in perfect order from the field, by overwhelming numbers; that the fight had been an unequal one; that Longstreet had crushed his left with great masses of Confederates, pouring down in a stream of reinforcements from the Bull Run mountains. ‘. . At no time could I have hoped to fight a successful battle with the immensely superior force of the enemy which confronted me, and which was able at any time to outflank me and bear my small army to the dust.’ But the official records show beyond question that on the field of Manassas he had under his command 10,000 more men than Lee commanded in his front on the 30th. Jackson's corps numbered scarcely 20,000 men of all  arms. Pope assailed it all day on the 29th, and made desperate attempts to destroy it on the 30th, and not a man reinforced Jackson on the 29th or the 30th; and the ‘superior forces’ that assaulted General Pope's right on the 30th were just the corps of General Jackson after all its losses and work on the 27th, 28th and 29th of August. General Longstreet tells us that on the morning of Sunday, the 31st, General Lee called General Jackson to his headquarters and gave him instructions to cross Bull run at Sudley's ford, march by Little River turnpike, and intercept the enemy's retreat. On receiving these instructions, says Longstreet, Jackson said, ‘Good!’ and away he went without another word. He marched on the morning of the 31st, struck the Little River turnpike at Wykoop's, turned toward Fairfax Court House, and camped for the night at Pleasant valley. On September 1st he continued his march, passed Chantilly, and came upon Pope's forces at Ox hill, just south of the turnpike, and about halfway between Chantilly and Germantown. General Pope had due notice of the advance on his right, and early on the 1st formed a determination, as he reports, to fight a battle between the roads which come together at Fairfax, on one of which he was stationed, Jackson, followed by Longstreet, marching on the other. Reinforced by Sumner's and Franklin's corps, General Pope arranged for battle on the 1st of September with a force of 57,000. The corps of Heintzelman, Reno and McDowell were in position south of the Little River turnpike, facing almost north. Against these corps General Jackson attacked on the afternoon of the 1st, the battle being fought during a storm of rain and wind, which blew directly in the faces of the Confederates. Jackson put his corps on right into line of battle, Hill, Lawton and Starke from right to left. Jackson attacked by Hill's division, and a severe battle followed until night. During the battle a portion of Ewell's division, commanded  by Lawton, supported General Hill, but the battle was mainly fought by Hill, the brigades of Branch, Gregg and Pender bearing the brunt of the fight. General Hill says that the enemy stubbornly contested the ground, but on the fall of the two prominent commanders on the field, Generals Kearny and Stevens, the enemy was driven back, but not far, retreating entirely after night. The battle was aggressive on Jackson's part, and as it progressed pushed the Federal forces back, but night coming on both sides ceased from conflict. In this battle Gregg's brigade, leading Hill's division, came first into line by its right, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth in the front line, Orr's Rifles, the Twelfth and the First supporting. As the battle progressed, the Rifles and the Twelfth were advanced to the front line of battle, the First remaining in support, under command of Capt. C. W. McCreary. Lieut.-Col. W. D. Simpson commanded the Fourteenth, and Capt. James Perrin the Rifles. The losses in Gregg's brigade at Ox Hill were reported as follows: Orr's Rifles, 5 killed, 25 wounded, total 30; First South Carolina, 1 killed, 7 wounded, total 8; Twelfth, 1 killed, o wounded, total 11; Thirteenth, 5 killed, 24 wounded, total 29; Fourteenth, 3 killed, 23 wounded, total 26; total, 15 killed, 89 wounded. Lieut. W. C. Leppard, of the Thirteenth, and Adjt. W. C. Buchanan, of the Twelfth, were killed on the field after being distinguished in the action. Captain West and Lieutenant Youngblood of the Fourteenth, and Lieutenant Jenkins of the Rifles, were wounded. We call the battle of Ox Hill a battle with Pope's rear guard, for such it was. Though his army was in position to give battle to General Lee on the 2d of September, his forces were arranged so as to secure his retreat, and this he actually made on the night of the 1st and the morning of the 2d, falling back on the defenses of Washington. General Pope seems to have regarded his army at Centreville on the morning of September 1st, though  numbering 62,000, including Banks, near at hand, no match for that of General Lee, which was not a man over 40,000, if so strong. If he had only known the actual strength of General Lee's army, the question arises, Would it have made any difference in the results of the Rappahannock-Manassas campaigns?