Col. John M. Harrell, Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 10.2, Arkansas
Clement Anselm Evans, Ed.

Chapter 8:

• Schofield returns to Federal command
-- Cooper and Cabell in the northwest -- Actions near Honey Springs and Backbone mountain -- proposition to abandon Arkansas -- Federal expedition against Little Rock -- action on the Fourche -- duel between Marmaduke and Walker -- evacuation of Little Rock.

On the same date of this letter, General Halleck had notified Maj.-Gen. John A. Schofield, at Murfreesboro, Tenn., that the latter had been assigned to the command of the department of Missouri. General Schofield assumed command of the department of Missouri on the 24th of May. President Lincoln declared that this change was made on account of a ‘factional quarrel’ among the [195] Union men of Missouri, in which Curtis and Governor Gamble were opposing leaders. As he could not remove Gamble, he had to remove Curtis. General Halleck gave another reason, which throws light on the subsequent campaign in Arkansas, namely: ‘Although Curtis had been repeatedly instructed to push his entire force from the Mississippi river and White river to Little Rock, he had, instead, brought troops from Helena to operate in Missouri from Pilot Knob, and pushed forward his column again into western Arkansas, under a fear of insurrection in the State of Missouri, and fears of threatened movements into that State by General Price.’ Halleck also said, that ‘Those in Missouri who, at the outset, sided with Price and his rebel gang, but were permitted to return and settle down as quiet and peaceable citizens, are now treated as enemies. No worse policy could possibly be adopted.’

In this correspondence, Schofield was sustained in the acrimonious controversy which had arisen between him and Curtis in regard to the Prairie Grove (Ark.) engagement. Schofield had written to Curtis: ‘At Prairie Grove, Blunt and Herron were badly beaten, and owed their escape to a false report of my arrival with reinforcements.’ To this Curtis had replied that he ‘did not see the necessity of Schofield's anticipating the reports of these generals of their own affairs.’ Herron, now put in command of the army of the Frontier, protested against serving under Schofield, and was informed by Stanton that if he should tender his resignation it would be accepted. After recovering from a dangerous illness at Springfield, Mo., he was sent to assist in the attack on Vicksburg.

General Schofield, in a statement of his operations from May 24 to December 10, 1863, says that the capture of Vicksburg and Port Hudson permitted the return to him of the troops he had sent to Grant to aid in these achievements, and opened the way for active operations in [196] Arkansas. From Grant he received (including the troops already at Helena) ‘a force of about 8,000 infantry and five batteries, to form, with troops to be sent from Missouri, an expedition against the enemy in Arkansas.’ Maj.-Gen. Frederick Steele was sent to command this force. At the same time, the cavalry division under Brigadier-General Davidson, at Pilot Knob, Mo., was ordered to move south, through the eastern part of Arkansas, and effect a junction with the force at Helena for the expedition against Little Rock. Davidson reached Wittsburg on the St. Francis river July 28th, and opened communication with the Federals at Helena.

In northwest Arkansas, meanwhile, the situation was disturbed and threatening, on account of the movements of Blunt and his Federal Indian allies and the despondency of the people, caused by the ravages and ruin they had suffered, and the news of continued disaster to the armies of the South. The tyrannies of the military rule on both sides had brought the people to a state of detestation of war and of soldiers in any uniform. Yet the great bulk of the population was true to the Southern cause. Gen. William Steele had been commended to General Holmes as a suitable commanding officer for the Indian Territory and superintendent of Indian affairs, and in May had been assigned to duty as such. He was an old army officer, residing at San Antonio, Tex., had served in the Mexican war, was with May in the charge at Palo Alto, and commanded a regiment at the close of that war. But he was severely afflicted with rheumatism, which almost incapacitated him. General Cooper, commanding the Indian allies, since the defeat of Maysville, seemed to have fallen into a state of torpor. While Steele was placed in command of the Territory, General Cabell commanded in northwestern Arkansas.

On repairing to Fort Smith, General Steele found there Col. A. S. Morgan's regiment of infantry and some cavalry. Colonel Morgan had the sick and wounded of Prairie [197] Grove in hospitals there, in a condition he reported as ‘wretched.’ Morgan was a veteran soldier, captain of Company A, First Arkansas Confederate infantry; had returned to the Trans-Mississippi department and was appointed colonel of the regiment by Hindman. He had raised and organized Company A of the regiment at Eldorado, Union county, and had led the regiment at the battle of Prairie Grove. Lieut. William Smith became captain, by promotion of Morgan, of Company A. The other captains appointed were Samuel Gibson, W. S. Otey, A. H. Holiday, J. R. Stanley, Jesse Bland, J. S. Brooks, J. W. May, J. R. Maxwell and W. A. Bull. The clamor for election of officers had been yielded to by the Confederate Congress, and the regiment insisted upon a reorganization under the law. Colonel Morgan was the reliance of General Steele, as long as he was content to serve under the many annoyances and privations of the post. When an election was ordered, he declined to be a candidate, and was appointed inspector of field transportation, in which capacity he served to the close of the war. Upon the reorganization of his regiment, Maj. Pitts Yell was elected colonel; Capt J. S. Brooks, lieutenant-colonel, and Capt. Sam Gibson, major. After serving for months at Fort Smith, the regiment was ordered to Louisiana, where Colonel Yell was killed at the battle of Mansfield, and Brooks became colonel. When General Steele assumed command, as successor to Generals Pike and Cooper, he had, in addition to Morgan's regiment, 100 men of Monroe's regiment, and Lane's Texas partisan rangers, under Lieut.-Col. R. P. Crump, numbering about 150 men. He was charged with the control of the hospitals at Fort Smith, then containing about 1,500 patients, in a wretched condition. He reported the quartermaster and commissary departments in a state of great confusion. The continuance since the organization of Hindman's camp there in 1862 of large Confederate forces, had exhausted supplies of every kind, and the people, abandoned by their defenders, [198] were hopeless, and with a few honorable exceptions almost completely demoralized. Corn could only be obtained by boating it up the river under convoy of cavalry along the river banks. Bass' regiment of Texans was employed in this duty, and for the defense of Fort Smith. The rest of Spaight's brigade he was ordered to send to Red river. General Cooper had adopted the system of ‘general furlough’ for his Indians, which many of the regiments in his command adopted. But there were others which refused, and, of course, had to be fed. It being impossible to subsist them on the line of the Arkansas river, they were ordered southward.

The organization of Steele's division, on April 30th, was reported as follows:

Brigade of Brig.-Gen. D. H. Cooper: First Cherokee, Col. Stand Watie; Second Cherokee, Col. W. P. Adair; First Choctaw and Chickasaw, Col. Tandy Walker; First Creek, Col. D. N. McIntosh; Second Creek, Col. Chilly McIntosh; First Chickasaw battalion, Lieut.-Col. L. M. Reynolds; Osage battalion, Major Broke Arm; Seminole battalion, Lieut.-Col. John Jumper; Texas partisan rangers, Col. L. M. Martin; Twenty-ninth Texas cavalry, Col. Charles De Morse; Scanland's squadron, Capt. John Scanland; cavalry company, Capt. L. E. Gillett; Howell's Texas battery; Lee's light battery. Brigade of Brig.-Gen. W. L. Cabell: Carroll's Arkansas cavalry, Lieut.-Col. Lee L. Thompson; Dorsey's squadron, Col. John Scott; Hill's Arkansas cavalry, Col. John F. Hill; Monroe's Arkansas cavalry, Col. J. C. Monroe; Bass' Texas cavalry, Lieut.-Col. T. D. Taliaferro; Texas cavalry company, Capt. W. J. Coggins; Crawford's Arkansas cavalry, W. A. Crawford, organizing officer, Maj. John M. Harrell commanding; Hughey's Arkansas battery.

Fort Smith was the strategic key to Indian Territory, and Steele, determined to hold it, applied to General Holmes for Monroe's regiment and Carroll's, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson, at Roseville, Ark. General Holmes sent Monroe's regiment, about 400 strong, which, with Carroll's, was soon after ordered to report to [199] Gen. W. L. Cabell in northwest Arkansas. Notwithstanding the failure to increase his command, and its depletion by the withdrawal of Spaight and Monroe, General Steele ordered Cooper to advance to the Arkansas river and compel Blunt and Phillips to release their hold on the upper Arkansas. In obedience to this order, Cooper, with two regiments of Texas cavalry and some of the Indian troops, a battery of three howitzers and one small rifle gun, advanced toward Fort Gibson, which was now strengthened by the earthworks of ‘Colonel’ Phillips. At the same time, General Cabell, with a considerable cavalry force, made a bold movement beyond Fayetteville to Cowskin prairie, in Missouri, operating upon the enemy's rear and lines of communication in that quarter. Cooper was instructed to avoid a general action and operate from the west. Col. D. N. McIntosh, with his Indian regiment, was sent forward, and Stand Watie was ordered to attack a large train of the enemy, going from Fort Scott to Gibson. He did attack, but Cabell did not cooperate, having been informed that McIntosh had been withdrawn, being ignorant of the substitution of Stand Watie's command, and impeded by the high waters of the June rains. Thus Stand Watie was repulsed, and the enemy's immense train of supplies and munitions was suffered to reach Fort Gibson, near the banks of the upper Arkansas, in safety.

General Cabell, now having recruited his force to 3,000 or 4,000 men, was summoned to Fort Smith to make a campaign against Blunt's forces by advancing up the Arkansas on the south side and forming a junction with Cooper in front of Fort Gibson. With his force, well mounted and composed of young men chiefly, but poorly armed, Cabell entered the Territory by the old Pacific mail route, the bridges of which, in some places, were still standing in the uninhabited prairies. The desert, wild prairies, dismal post-oak barrens, and the direction they were taking, produced a demoralizing effect upon [200] the men who lived where fertile mountain valleys, threaded by crystal streams, alternating with rich, populous prairie meadows, had inspired that local attachment characteristic of mountaineers. They began to desert by companies. The rumor that they were nearing the enemy did not put a stop to it altogether, although pride of character prevented many from taking leave at such a juncture.

Scouts came with reports of a large force of Federal infantry, artillery and cavalry, in long columns, heading for the Arkansas river. Their numbers seemed greater as they were seen moving over the open, rolling prairies, and their glitter and banners more imposing in the June sunshine than if viewed from some height or obscured by obstacles. The command of Cabell was disposed for battle, and the troops hurried forward with the ordnance wagons, while the subsistence train proceeded slowly, and by a night march was left behind. Early next morning the booming of cannon ahead announced a conflict; ammunition was served out and the march resumed. The brigade pushed on without dinner, while the sounds of the artillery firing and the rattle of small arms were borne on the wind. Before night the reinforcement came up with Cooper's force, camped in a skirt of timber, in apparently fine spirits. Cabell moved forward to the scene of battle, but the enemy had retreated. There in the prairie lea, upon a bed of rails, under a bank of earth recently thrown up, were thirty or forty lifeless forms, whose straight, black hair protruding in tufts from the newly-made grave indicated their race. It was the 18th of July, and the temperature was about 95 degrees. The dead bodies had to be buried. Dotted over the prairie were graves with headboards designating the killed of Blunt's command.

It was the field near Honey Springs, where Blunt had surprised Cooper on the 17th of July before Cabell could come up. Blunt's command was composed of the Second [201] Colorado infantry, First Kansas, colored, First, Second and Third Indian home guards, Sixth Kansas and Third Wisconsin cavalry, and 12 pieces of artillery. On the night of July 15th the Federal commander had forded 250 cavalry across the Arkansas river, crossing his 2,500 infantry in boats, and at daylight attacked the Confederate camp at Honey Springs. Then moving up with massed columns, he deployed his lines suddenly, and after a brief conflict drove the Confederates back. Blunt captured one piece of artillery, one stand of Cherokee colors, some small-arms and wagons, but as Cabell came in sight, several miles distant, he retired across the Arkansas, leaving the field to the vanquished. He confessed to 17 killed and 60 wounded. Cooper reported his loss as 134 killed and wounded and 47 captured. The Confederates remained for several days on the ground, and were entertained at night by the corn-dance, or sun-dance of the Indians, a diversion consisting in stamping around in a circle with monotonous chants, broken at intervals by loud cries or grunts, to time kept by beating a hollow log for a drum.

The native Indian soldiers were subjects of curious contemplation. Nearly all the infantry were barefooted, dressed in coarse shirts and loose cotton trousers, and many with heads protected from the sun's rays only by their matted hair. An Indian infantry soldier, with gun on shoulder, would walk up to General Cooper, anywhere, at any time, and holding up his five fingers would say: ‘Cooper! me go home to see wife and baby. Mebbe so, come back five days—mebbe so, ten. Goodbye, Cooper.’ Thus they granted themselves furloughs, which they never broke; but it was a small matter if they did. ‘Perhaps,’ said General Cooper, ‘if they were all furloughed, it would be as well.’

Finding coal, General Cabell put his blacksmiths to work shoeing the horses of the command, until he was ordered to return to Fort Smith, keeping out scouting parties in front, at the river opposite Fort Gibson, and on [202] both flanks. The enemy made no attempt to recross the river to the south bank during the stay of Cabell's brigade. Cooper's and Cabell's brigades were concentrated July 22d, 25 miles in rear of the battle ground, and by the 25th had been placed in position at Prairie Springs, 15 miles from Gibson, to await the arrival of Bankhead from Texas. But it was discovered that the powder sent the Confederates from Texas was worthless. A night's heavy dew would convert it, when exposed, to a paste. Moving to Honey Springs, Cabell's brigade remained a few days, then fell back to Soda Springs, and thence was ordered to old Camp Pike. The enemy was reported as crossing the Arkansas to attack Cabell, when Steele, with Cooper's command, joined him on the march to Camp Pike. There remaining a few days, a position was taken for a week on the San Bois, where the Beale road crosses it, expecting an attack. The brigade was then ordered to fall back to Scullyville, near Fort Smith, and if attacked take the road leading to Riddle's Station, where there were commissary stores.

On August 21st, General Cabell was ordered to ascertain the enemy's strength in northwestern Arkansas, and assume direction of the forces about Fort Smith. He concentrated his regiments at McLean's crossing of the Poteau, and removed all the public property at Fort Smith to a place of safety.

The enemy pursued General Steele to Perryville with a force of 2,000 cavalry, and 3,000 infantry hauled in wagons, before which Steele evacuated Perryville, which the enemy burned, and turned toward Fort Smith. General Blunt's advance, striking Cabell's scouts two miles west of the San Bois, skirmished with them until within twelve miles of Scullyville, within four miles of Cabell's pickets. At 2 o'clock on August 31st, General Cloud attacked the Confederate pickets and skirmished with them to a field near the Poteau bottom. The powder used by the Confederate pickets would knock up the dust in the [203] road, only 60 or 70 feet ahead, when aimed to strike 100 yards ahead. Here the Federal cavalry waited for the wagon brigade, and knowing Cabell's position, sent a strong force of infantry and artillery to attack him and drive him from the Poteau. Thompson's regiment and Harrell's battalion engaged them beyond the bottom, and falling back, crossed and formed line of battle on the east side of the Poteau, repulsing the enemy about dark. By order of General Cabell, Hughey opened upon them effectively with grape and canister.

That night Cabell determined to fall back to the mountains by the road to Waldron, and terminate his Indian campaign, being separated from Steele by Cloud's division. Early in the morning he started his baggage trains to Jenny Lind, thence to cross the mountain. Blunt sent Cloud with cavalry, 40 wagons loaded with infantry, and 6 pieces of artillery, on Cabell's trail, and struck him at the foot of Backbone mountain, while the train was not yet across, on September 1st. But the Confederates, having taken a position which had the enemy close under fire while unseen themselves, fired into the Federal advance guard and killed the commander, Captain Lyon, and 20, of his men. The enemy in force advanced against the strong position held by Cabell, but after a three hours engagement was repulsed with considerable loss. The Confederate loss was 5 killed and 12 wounded.

The Confederate infantry regiment and some of the mounted men refused to stand fire, and retreated into the ravines and behind the rocks. But the train was protected, and the brigade that crossed the mountain southward to the valley of the Ouachita numbered about 1,500. The men that ran, deserted—but not to the enemy; they went back north of the Boston mountains to their unprotected families, leaving word that as soon as they could do something to protect the folks at home they would return, which was regarded as a contemptuous farewell by the enraged commander. But they did return, and, though [204] decimated in subsequent victories, constituted a splendidly armed and mounted brigade of nearly 3,000 at the surrender. After the capture of General Cabell on the Little Osage river, Kansas, six months before the close of the war, Colonel Harrell was in command.

The situation in the Trans-Mississippi department now deterred the boldest, and caused those in exalted positions to take a view of affairs similar to that of the humbler soldiers. Gen. Kirby Smith, on July 10, 1863, wrote to General Holmes, from Shreveport: ‘I can now give you no assistance. You must make the best disposition you can with the troops at your disposal for the defense of the Arkansas valley. In the event of being driven from Arkansas valley by overwhelming numbers, the concentration must be in this direction. Quietly establish depots for provisions and forage along the line of your probable march.’ As early as May 9th, before the capitulation at Vicksburg, Smith had given similar advice, suggesting a concentration in the Red river valley against Banks.

To the same purpose General Smith issued a circular letter, containing advice to citizens in regard to destruction of cotton and means of embarrassing the invader, and calling a meeting of citizens at Marshall, Tex. This brought forth a vigorous protest from Geo. C. Watkins, former chief-justice of Arkansas, and member of the military court; C. C. Danley, member of the military board, and R. W. Johnson and A. H. Garland, Confederate States senators. Their address to Governor Flanagin, dated at Little Rock, July 25th, contained the following, among other vigorous paragraphs:

We are opposed to any policy of abandoning Arkansas to the enemy, and remonstrate against it as ruinous to our people and greatly injurious to the cause. It is less difficult to hold the country than it will be to regain it. If Arkansas is given up, we lose the Indian country, west, which must share the same fate. . . .

The Trans-Mississippi has given up vast numbers of its [205] soldiers, and what arms it could spare. They have been sent to fight the battles of our country, east of the Mississippi; they went with promise of return; they have never been sent back; there is now little hope of that. They, as a general rule, comprised our best men, spirited and devoted to the cause. Those remaining are less reliable. The question is, Can Texas furnish men enough to defend herself and maintain her independence, much less reconquer the vast area that would separate her from the Mississippi and the Confederacy? The danger is, that Texas may seek to make terms for her own safety, in a revival of her favorite and ancient idea of separate nationality.

The thought of our being cut off from the Confederacy and our subjugation to Northern domination, degrading and ruinous, is insupportable. If any such army as the enemy can bring against us shall be permitted, quietly and without meeting resolute resistance, to march through and occupy so extensive a country as Arkansas, in view of the resources of this whole department, of which Arkansas is now the key, and involving such mighty and disastrous consequences, it must become a sad reflection upon those in authority.

In the way of advice, we offer the following suggestions, and hope General Smith will find something in them worthy of consideration: To make all our people and slaves retire from the banks of the Mississippi. Let that region become waste. To prevent all illicit traffic with the enemy at the various points on the river. That has been vastly injurious to us, and is what we have most to dread. To break up all planting operations attempted under Federal license or control. To allow no cotton to be raised, and destroy what is on hand. . . . Our opinion is against calling out the State militia. General Smith should rigidly enforce the Confederate conscription while and wherever he has an opportunity, throughout his department.

Thus they depended upon maintaining Little Rock as a strategic center; not upon ‘the best and spirited’ soldiers who had been sent to fight battles east of the Mississippi and would not return, but upon those ‘remaining and less reliable.’ [206]

One of these gentlemen voluntarily addressed to Mr. Davis his individual suggestions:

Mr. President: . . . I believe a thorough reorganization of our army there (district of Arkansas) would be productive of good results. Both Generals Holmes and Price have their friends and their enemies there, but they themselves do not agree. The good of the service requires the removal at least of one or the other of these generals. Which one ought to be removed, I will not undertake to say at all. I would suggest that the general commanding the department say which one should be removed. This being done, send General Hood, when he is ready for duty, there in place of the one removed. . . . Recommend that Congress pass a law authorizing the President to appoint persons {say inspectors) to visit that department and investigate the management of the quartermaster and commissary departments, etc.

Thus the non-military element saw the way clear to redeem the State from military mal-administration in all its branches. The obvious truth was, that with well-equipped armies of sufficient strength, Generals Price, Holmes, Kirby Smith or Robert Lee could win victories. Success attends upon the heavier battalions, and these they did not have. Circumstances over which he had no control prevented General Smith from making Little Rock the center, and Arkansas the granary, of the department. Those circumstances were the swarms of soldiers in blue uniforms, recruited from every land and every race, which swelled the ranks of the enemy, while sheer exhaustion of resources was rapidly diminishing the armies of the Confederacy. The regions of the State which were engaged in planting sent their soldiers to aid the cause. The little county of Phillips, of which Helena is the county seat, furnished the Confederate army seven generals before the termination of hostilities. They were Brig.-Gens. Archibald Dobbin, Charles W. Adams, D. C. Govan, J. C. Tappan, Lucius E. Polk and MajorGen-erals Hindman and P. R. Cleburne. [207]

The Federal army was getting ready, in July, to occupy the Arkansas valley and march upon Little Rock. On the 27th, by special orders of General Grant, Maj.-Gen. Frederick Steele was assigned to the command of the army, to take the field from Helena, and on August 11th he assumed command of ‘all of Arkansas north of Arkansas river.’ His military force included the infantry divisions of Col. W. E. McLean and Gen. S. A. Rice, present for duty, 4,493; cavalry under Gen. J. W. Davidson and Colonel Clayton, present for duty, 4,652; and artillery, total present for duty, 9,433; aggregate present, 13, 207. The field artillery included 49 pieces. With this strong force the Federal movement began on August 11th, the infantry marching from Helena by easy stages, with complete supply trains. The estimate of Confederate troops present for duty in the district of Arkansas, exclusive of Steele's division, and not allowing for the losses at Helena, was as follows: Price's division, Arkansas brigades of Fagan, McRae and Tappan, and Missouri brigade of Parsons, 5,500; Marmaduke's Missouri division, 3,000; Frost's brigade, 1,800; Dobbin's and other commands, 900. The return for September showed 8,532 present for duty; aggregate present, 10,665; field artillery, 32 pieces.

On April 1, 1863, General Frost had been assigned to command of Hindman's division. On March 2d he was relieved and ordered to Day's Bluff to his brigade,¹ and Gen. Sterling Price was given the division. In his orders assuming command, General Price announced his staff as follows: Maj. Thos. L. Snead and Maj. L. A. McLean, assistant adjutant-generals; Maj. Isaac Bunker, [208] assistant quartermaster; Maj. John Reid, assistant commissary; Maj. Ed. C. Cabell, paymaster; Maj. Wm. E. Woodruff, Jr., acting chief of artillery; Lieut. John Moon, engineer and ordnance officer; Thos. D. Wooten, M. D., chief surgeon; Wm. McPhetters, medical inspector; Lieuts. Robert C. Wood and R. T. Morrison, aidesde-camp; Maj. Celsus Price and John Tyler, Jr., volunteer aides.

On the 23d of July, Lieutenant-General Holmes was seized with an illness which grew so pronounced that he ordered General Price, then with his division at Des Arc, to assume command of the district. Assuming this duty immediately, Price left his division under General Fagan, whose headquarters were at Searcy, near the Little Red, a branch of White river.

Being satisfied that the Federal army at Helena was about to advance against Little Rock, Price ordered Gen. D. M. Frost, commanding the defenses of the lower Arkansas near Pine Bluff, to move at once with his infantry and artillery to Little Rock, and Fagan's division, camped at Des Arc and Searcy, to take position upon Bayou Meto, 12 miles northeast of Little Rock, at the crossing of the Memphis & Little Rock road. General Marmaduke, near Jacksonport, was directed to dispose his command so as to retard as much as possible the advance of the enemy, and keep in his front until he should be compelled to fall back upon Bayou Meto. Brigadier-General Walker's division—brigades of Carter and Dobbin—remained in the vicinity of Helena to check the enemy's advance; his position became hazardous and he was ordered (August 2d) across that stream. When the enemy crossed White river, the commands of Walker and Marmaduke, united, were kept at the front. Tappan's brigade, which had been detached from Price's division several months before for duty in Louisiana, was now returned, and held in reserve on the south side of the Arkansas river, at Little Rock. [209]

Rifle-pits and redoubts were constructed on the north of the river, near Little Rock, for occupation by the infantry, should the position at Bayou Meto be turned by the enemy. This was a danger to be apprehended for the bayou line of defense, and, in fact, for the rifle-pits, as the river was fordable in a great many places, and the enemy could cross east of the city. General Price ordered the removal of all public stores in the city to Arkadelphia, in order to be prepared to evacuate Little Rock; but he still strengthened his defenses in front, and perfected the means of transit so as to be able to throw forces from one side to the other, and particularly, to secure the withdrawal of the army to the south side in the event of defeat. Then came information from General Cabell of the retreat of Gen. William Steele in the Indian country, the defeat of Cabell near Fort Smith, and that the Arkansas river above was exposed at all points, all pointing to the inevitable abandonment of the Arkansas valley.

Steele's army advanced slowly. Davidson, reaching Clarendon, August 15th, reported to Steele that the expedition which he had sent up White river had captured the two Confederate steamers Kaskaskia and Tom Suggs, in the Little Red, and had destroyed the bridge of flatboats over which the ‘ubiquitous Marmaduke’ had crossed his cavalry to the south side; losing 2 men killed in the expedition, and 5 wounded. It was rumored among the Federals that Kirby Smith was in command at Little Rock.

On the 23d, Steele, occupying Devall's Bluff, reported that he should operate from that base, with two gunboats there to defend his flanks; that his sick list was frightful, including many officers, and if reinforcements were not sent him, he should very likely meet with disaster; that his army was the poorest command, excepting the cavalry, he had ever seen; more than 1,000 reported unfit for duty, and he asked for ‘more gunboats.’

General Davidson's cavalry force met with its first [210] resistance at Bayou Two Prairies, a small stream in the skirting of timber between the two prairies. West of this stream, across the second prairie, he was confronted by the Confederate cavalry of Marmaduke and Walker.

The action which followed is described by General Marmaduke in the following official report:

August 23d, I received orders from Major-General Price to march my brigade to Brownsville and report to Brigadier-General Walker.² On the morning of August 24th, I reported to General Walker, who ordered Shelby's brigade to report to me, and ordered me to hold my force in the vicinity of Brownsville to guard the main approach (Wire road) to Little Rock. The next morning at sunrise the enemy were reported advancing in force. I moved my two brigades, about 1,300 effective men, with two pieces of artillery, forward to engage the enemy, Shelby in advance. At this time Walker's brigade, commanded by Col. Archibald S. Dobbin, was encamped some 10 miles south of Brownsville, guarding another important approach from Devall's Bluff to Little Rock [Shallow ford road]. A sharp engagement ensued between the Federal force and my division. The Federals were under command of Gen. J. W. Davidson, and consisted of about 6,000 cavalry and sixteen pieces of artillery. Being unable to meet the enemy's forces in a general engagement, I withdrew my command, retiring slowly through Brownsville toward Little Rock. The Yankees were exceedingly cautious in their pursuit. . . . After retiring some 4 miles, my division was ordered into position by Brigadier-General Walker, commanding the cavalry. At this time I was with my rear guard. Upon my [211] arrival at my new line of battle, I made all necessary preparations to check the enemy's advance. This was an important point, and absolutely necessary to hold, as Walker's brigade, troops and trains, would come into the main road at this place, and they had not yet reached the junction. The enemy came upon me, and were handsomely repulsed. They then commenced pushing their forces on my right and left, which forced me to retire. No further pursuit was made. I received orders to encamp my division on and in the vicinity of Bayou Meto. The next day I withdrew my whole force, except scouts and pickets, to the south side of Bayou Meto.

On the morning of the 27th, I advanced a light force, engaged the enemy's advance, and after brisk skirmishing my troops fell back to the main force. My troops were disposed as follows: Shelby's brigade . . . in line of battle above the bridge; Marmaduke's brigade . . . below the bridge; Bledsoe's battery on the main road commanding the bridge, and Bell's section of artillery near the main road below the bridge. . . .Immediately below the bridge, and between my two brigades, was formed Dobbin's regiment. The whole force, except Preston's regiment [in reserve], was dismounted. Davidson advanced his troops—cavalry and artillery, a part mounted, part dismounted—and came dashing toward the bridge (which Lieutenant Moon, of the engineer corps, had prepared for, and was now handsomely burning) and toward the bayou. Suddenly, artillery and small arms opened upon them with deadly effect, and caused a precipitate retreat. Soon the enemy formed their lines, brought up their artillery, and the fight continued until sunset, when the enemy, failing to occupy the bayou, retired after a heavy loss, leaving a number of their dead on the ground. I was ordered to retire at dark within 5 miles of Little Rock. My troops, until after the evacuation of Little Rock by our forces, were engaged in scouting and picketing.

The following report by Col. R. C. Newton, Fifth Arkansas cavalry, will perpetuate names of places and positions, and will be of especial interest to Arkansans. The officer was a native of Little Rock, and familiar with the country and the names of the inhabitants:

The engagement at Brownsville occurred on the 25th [212] of August. Col. A. S. Dobbin's brigade, composed of Dobbin's and R. C. Newton's regiments, was camped at Legate's bridge, on Bayou Meto. About 7 a. m. scouts reported the enemy moving upon Brownsville and near the town. By Colonel Dobbin's order I moved my regiment in rear of his, out into the prairie, about a mile from Legate's, the brigade trains being sent on the prairie road to get upon the main military road at Baker's. About 9 a. m. scouts sent by Colonel Dobbin toward Brownsville reported that the enemy was in town and General Marmaduke retiring on the military road (or Wire road) toward Little Rock. We accordingly retired on the prairie road to the Wire road at Baker's, where General Marmaduke's command was formed, and thence down Wire road to Long Prairie, where we formed to cover retirement of General Marmaduke's forces. Remained there an hour or so, and then, by order of Brigadier-General Walker (commanding cavalry at that time), we moved on to Bayou Meto at Reed's bridge. My regiment was immediately to the right of the bridge. We remained there all night. The next morning (the 26th) my regiment was detached by General Walker and ordered to Shallow ford, to cover that crossing of Bayou Meto. I moved from Reed's bridge about 9 a. m. and reached Shallow ford at 3:30 p. m. Learning from citizens that a party of Federals had been there the day before, I immediately, upon my arrival there, and after posting my pickets to guard against surprise, sent out small scouts upon all the roads on the eastside of the bayou leading to the ford. Lieut. J. C. Barnes of Company A, whom I sent with 8 men upon the road leading from Shallow ford to Long's stage stand on the Wire road, encountered a party of 10 or 12 Federals about 2 miles beyond the bayou, who fled precipitately upon his approach. He pursued them some distance, but was unable to overtake them. Being satisfied from the result of the reconnoissance of the different roads that no force of the enemy was in the neighborhood of the ford, I encamped on the bayou near Mrs. Ewell's, and about a mile above the ford, picketing carefully toward Brownsville and other points from which an attack was possible. Here I remained all night.

Early next morning (August 27th) heavy cannonading commenced at Reed's bridge, indicating an engagement there. The firing in that direction increasing, I pushed [213] out small scouts upon all the roads leading from the ford toward the Wire road, and satisfying myself that the enemy were making no demonstrations against me, I left Maj. John P. Bull, with the bulk of my force, to hold the crossing at Shallow ford, and keep up communication with General Walker at Reed's bridge; and with about 80 men I crossed the bayou and moved toward the Wire road. Reaching Baker's place on that road, about 4 or 5 miles from Shallow ford, I encountered a small Federal picket, which my advance, under Lieutenant Barnes, attacked and scattered, some of them going in the direction of Brownsville and the others toward Reed's bridge. Pushing off down the Wire road toward Little Rock, I ran off one company of Federals picketing at Long's stage stand. They left in great confusion, without firing upon me. I pressed on in pursuit, some 2 or 3 miles beyond Long's, whence I returned to that place, and from there by the direct road, made my way back to Shallow ford. Soon afterward the firing ceased at Reed's bridge. About 8 o'clock that night, got a note from General Walker's adjutant-general, informing me that he was withdrawing from Reed's bridge, and directing me to retire on the direct road leading from Shallow ford to the point where that road intersects the Wire road, about 4 miles from the river, opposite Little Rock, and to move at once, sending a few trusty scouts across the bayou to get upon the Wire road in rear of Davidson, and report in the morning what should transpire there during the night.

I withdrew my pickets and commenced the retrograde movement in obedience to General Walker's order; reached the point designated about 12 p. m., and bivouacked there for the remainder of the night. About 8:30 a. m. the next day (August 28th), received an order from General Walker to move to English's on the Shallow ford road, about 2 1/2 miles from its intersection with Wire road, camp there, and picket 6 or 8 miles in front of me, which order I obeyed, and remained in camp there that night; sent Capt. L. D. Bryant with his company to Shallow ford. Next morning (August 29th) Bryant returned with no news of the enemy. About 3 p. m., by General Walker's direction, I moved toward Shallow ford to take position there; camped for the night at Hicks' plantation; sent Capt. John H. Dye with his company to [214] Legate's bridge, on lower road, scouting. The next morning, August 30th, moved from Hicks' at sunrise, in the direction of Shallow ford, and just beyond Greenwood's met a small party of Federals; advanced Major Bull with 15 men to ascertain enemy's strength; Federals fled at his approach. He pursued them rapidly to Mrs. Ewell's, where he learned a considerable body of the enemy had been in the morning. Arriving there, I placed 40 men under command of Major Bull and sent him forward to ascertain enemy's whereabouts and strength. About half a mile beyond we found some little force of the enemy. I retired to the [Memphis & Little Rock] railroad, where a heavy force of dismounted cavalry was lying concealed behind the railroad embankment. In a short time, the enemy being reinforced from Shallow ford by cavalry and artillery, the force behind the railroad embankment commenced advancing, resisted at every step by Major Bull and his men with admirable courage and steadiness. I immediately ordered forward all the men with long-range guns in the command, and made my preparations to retire before the vastly-superior force of the enemy, fighting as I fell back. He now commenced using his artillery upon me very freely, and although I had none to reply with, I continued the fight with small arms at every available point, dispatching a courier to General Walker with information of the enemy's movements, and suggesting that more force be sent upon the Shallow ford road. The fighting, which commenced a little before 9 o'clock, had now continued with but short intermissions, until 2 o'clock, when, being forced back to Martin's place, I took position there, for the purpose of delaying the enemy as long as possible, and giving the reinforcements to me, if any should be sent, time to come up, as Ashley's mills and the crossing of the Arkansas river at Terry's ferry would be left entirely exposed should I be forced back a mile farther. About 3 o'clock the enemy advanced to the attack. I had concealed Companies B and E, under the command of Capt. P. J. Rollow, on the edge of Hicks' field, in front of which was an open clearing, and cautioned my men to let the enemy get well into the clearing before they fired, and then to rake them with their shotguns. Displaying a few scouts on the road, the enemy in line pushed rapidly on, and Companies E and B delivered a volley into him when he was not expecting [215] any resistance whatever. Recovering from his confusion, the enemy commenced sending heavy bodies of dismounted cavalry to my right and left. The nature of the country permitting this double flank movement, and my force being wholly inadequate to prevent it (as I had but 180 fighting men), I retired slowly to Hicks', threequar-ters of a mile distant, leaving a rear guard to observe the enemy and resist any further advance, should he attempt it At Hicks' I put my little force into position to meet him again; but he advanced upon me no further.

On August 15th, General Fagan had been relieved of the command of Price's division, and Gen. D. M. Frost placed in command of the infantry, consisting of his own brigade, Fagan's, Parsons' and McRae's, occupying the intrenchments on Bayou Meto, northeast of Little Rock. A week later, General Frost, fearing to bring Tappan north of the river on account of the unguarded fords, disposed Clark's brigade to cover the road by Shallow ford, and withdrew his advanced brigades to the rifle-pits (in their incomplete condition hardly worthy of the name).

On September 2d, the entire Federal force was concentrated at Brownsville, and Steele set about finding a line of approach to Little Rock. He discovered that the military road on the south side of Bayou Meto was impracticable, and a reconnoissance in force against the Confederate left (up the river), covered by a demonstration at Bayou Meto, decided the Federal commander to take the road leading by Shallow ford to Terry's ferry on the Arkansas. From Brownsville west to Little Rock, the old stage (Wire) road, almost impassable in winter, but dry and comparatively firm in summer, skirted the hills adjacent on the northwest, crossing Bayou Meto at Shallow ford, and then winding through the bottoms amid a network of lakes and bayous, by way of Ashley's mills, to Terry's ferry over the Arkansas river, 8 miles below Little Rock, thence along the river up to the city. The road along the south bank is the chord of a circle, while that along the north bank leads around the arc into the upper [216] road in front of the city. By this route Steele reached the river September 7th, his advance skirmishing sharply. His plan was to follow up the south bank and enter the city from the east and south, attacking the Confederates in their right flank and rear. He had pontoons, which were convenient but not necessary, as the Arkansas river was then very low. From Terry's ferry, besides the road leading to the city along the river front, a second road runs along the Fourche bayou, which flows from the southern suburb of the city into the river, 4 miles below. Davidson was to occupy both roads, but throw his force into the Fourche road, while Steele, with the infantry, would proceed along the north bank of the Arkansas to the city's front. There was a loop in the river at Terry's ferry on the river below, enclosing several hundred acres, connected with the mainland by a neck or isthmus, not over 500 yards across. By sweeping this neck with artillery, Davidson was enabled to cross over to the peninsula without resistance. General Churchill's plantation was opposite this peninsula on the north bank. The land in the peninsula was owned by Mrs. Harrell.

On August 31st General Price ordered General Walker to move his headquarters south of the river, and concentrate all the cavalry south of the river and east of the city. For an account of the subsequent operations, we return to the report of Colonel Newton, who, after discovering that the enemy had crossed Bayou Meto at Shallow ford, remained in camp at Hicks' on August 31st and September 1st, skirmishing with the Federal pickets between Ashley's mills and Terry's ferry, September 3d and 4th; and on the road to Little Rock north of the river, September 5th and 6th.

About dark [September 6th] I received an order from General Price's headquarters, directing Colonel Dobbin to assume command of Walker's division, and for me to assume command of Dobbin's brigade. Dobbin's regiment [217] (which with my regiment composed that brigade) was encamped on the south bank of the river at Buck's ford, headquarters at (Col. F. A.) Terry's house near the ferry. The next morning (September 7th) I went to the brigade headquarters, leaving Major Bull in command of my regiment. About 8:30 a. m. Major Bull reported the enemy rapidly advancing upon him from Shallow ford, and that skirmishing was going forward at Ashley's bayou, in front of his camp. I sent him orders to resist with obstinacy and retire, when forced to the Adamson plantation, on the Arkansas river, and cross by the ford at that place. I, at the same time, sent directions to Maj. S. Corley, commanding Dobbin's regiment, to have his command well in hand to resist the enemy at Buck's, if he should attempt to cross at that place. I . . . found Bull making a most gallant resistance against overwhelming odds, and causing the enemy to pay dearly for every inch of ground he gained upon him. . . . Returning to Terry's, I learned that the enemy were driving Lawler before them and would soon be at the ferry, as well as upon the river at Adamson's, toward which point they were forcing Bull, notwithstanding his stubborn resistance. . . . Found Bull crossing in safety, and without molestation. . . . Encamped Bull's regiment just below Temple's, on the river opposite Adamson's, to guard the ford there, leaving Corley at the ford at Badgett's, just above Buck's, keeping a strong picket at Terry's ferry. September 8th, considerable firing all day across the river, but [river-bed being a mile wide there] no damage done. Etter's battery was put in position at Bull's camp. On the next day (September 9th), considerable activity observed among the enemy. Bodies of cavalry moved up the river and returned. About dark my pickets reported that the enemy was hauling timber to near the ford in the point of the bend, half a mile above Terry's ferry, and putting batteries into position. Heavy knocking heard during the night; enemy evidently preparing to construct bridge across the river.

A little before daylight, September 10th, by direction of Colonel Dobbin, commanding division, I moved a section of Etter's battery into the bend opposite to where the bridge was being constructed. At daylight could see workmen constructing the bridge, which was one-fourth the way across the river. Sent Major Bull with a party [218] of sharpshooters to support Etter. A little after daylight Etter opened upon the bridge. His second shot took effect, clearing the bridge of workmen. Immediately the enemy opened with three batteries, so posted as to pour a murdering cross-fire upon Etter, which soon silenced him and drove him out. The sharpshooters kept up a desultory fire without much, if any, effect. About o a. m., the enemy having completed his bridge, threw forward two regiments of infantry, and crossed them over onto the bar, on this side, his batteries keeping up a continuous and well-directed fire upon the road leading up the river on the south side, and upon the woods in front of his bridge, and above it. I withdrew Major Corley to a point above the bridge, and sent Etter up the river with instructions to halt at Fourche, whither I also sent Corley with his regiment in a few minutes. The enemy now commenced pouring their troops across the bridge in large numbers.

By Colonel Dobbin's directions, I left Bull with his regiment to resist the enemy's advance and retard him as much as possible, and went in person to put the other troops in position at Fourche. Brigadier-General Marmaduke arrived with orders to assume command of all the cavalry. Colonel Dobbin being placed in arrest by General Marmaduke's directions, I assumed command of all of Dobbin's forces, which included my own brigade, W. B. Denson's Louisiana cavalry company, C. L. Morgan's Texas squadron, and J. H. Pratt's and C. B. Etter's batteries. Major Corley's regiment, being dismounted, was sent (with Etter's battery) to where the road leading to the mouth of old Fourche and the road leading across the dam diverge at the corer of Vaughn's field. Pratt's battery was placed in Vaughn's field, opposite the dam, and Bull's regiment, Denson's company and Morgan's squadron along the bayou on the right and left of the battery in such manner as to support it, and at the same time to be used to our right, should the enemy attempt to cross the bayou above us. The battle opened on our left. The enemy, in small parties, came up in my front so as to be distinctly visible between my position and Fletcher's house, but I directed Pratt to reserve his fire until they advanced in some force and came within easy range, when he was to ply them vigorously with grape and canister. It was not until after their repulse by Jeffers' brigade, [219] on our left, that they advanced upon me, when Pratt opened with his two guns and quickly drove them back. Moving to our right, they attempted to force a crossing of the bayou, but were met and handsomely driven back by Bull's command, assisted by Pratt's trusty guns, which continued to rake them with canister and grape until Fletcher's field, immediately in my front, was entirely cleared of them. I earnestly commend Captain Pratt for the skill and bravery displayed here, as he has displayed them on every field where I have had occasion to observe him.

The enemy being driven from my front, I reported the fact by a staff officer to the brigadier-general commanding. The firing in the meantime grew hotter on our left, and indicated that we were retiring there. [The enemy had left the road leading up the river, and crossing the bayou above Newton with a very large force, passed by his right, up behind his line, toward the city. ] In a short time I received an order to withdraw through Vaughn's field and get upon the river road near Keatt's [2 miles below town], which I did. I received an order to report to Colonel Dobbin [released from arrest], and, by his direction, moved through Little Rock and upon the southern road to Ayliff's [15 miles south], where the command encamped for the night. . . .

In closing his report, Colonel Newton warmly commended the bravery and dash of Maj. John P. Bull and the valuable services of Lieut. J. C. Barnes, Capt. W. N. Portis, Newton's regiment. Others named as particularly distinguished were Lieut. John Bradley, Sergts. C. D. England and B. F. Rodgers, Corp. John Hinkle, and Privates A. Bradley, S. H. Bradley, John Griggs, C. C. Rodgers and James Woddel. ‘In the engagement at Fourche, the brave Maj. Samuel Corley, commanding Dobbin's regiment, was killed while fighting in gallant style. To that command it was an irreparable loss, and in his death the country was deprived of the services of one of its bravest and most devoted officers. To an unflinching courage was added a sincere piety, and in him was furnished as noble a specimen of the Christian soldier [220] as any our cause can boast.’ In the same regiment, Lieut. W. H. Bowers was killed, Capt. W. H. Crawford and Lieut. David Morgan wounded.

On the morning of September 6th, a lamentable tragedy occurred in the vicinity of the cavalry camp. Evading arrest, which had been attempted, the general then commanding the cavalry and his next in command met in personal encounter, by appointment, attended by friends, and the senior in rank fell at the first fire. Both were officers of experience, bred to arms, of handsome presence and distinguished address, and chivalrous lovers of their native South. It was one of the incidents of army life, in which a high sense of honor forbids a stain or offers to efface it with blood. As gallant a soldier and kindly a gentleman as ever fought for the defense of his home here lost his life, and the Confederacy was deprived of one of its most accomplished defenders through the officious partisanship of over-zealous friends. Generals Walker and Marmaduke were educated in the military academy at West Point. The first named was a brother of J. Knox and Samuel Walker, bankers and business men of Memphis, Tenn. J. Knox Walker had been private secretary of James K. Polk, his uncle, when President of the United States. Marmaduke was the son of a former governor of Missouri. He forever sincerely deplored the unhappy altercation. To a gentleman with whom, as a member of General Hindman's staff, he had been associated, but who was absent at the time of the duel, he said: ‘How I prayed for you to be here. If you had been present, that meeting would never have taken place.’ This friend says the meeting was brought about by misinterpretations. Generous and full of dash, Walker, when told that a movement of his command had been censured, only laughed. When persuaded that the charge was having an injurious effect, he grew serious, then angry and demanded an apology. Marmaduke, to whom the criticism was attributed—cool, precise and unyielding [221] —declined to apologize for words not written by him. Explanations could not be made, and in the whirl of the pressing moments Walker challenged, through Colonel Crockett; Marmaduke accepted, through Maj. Henry Ewing. Then, in the edge of the prairie, on the morning of the 6th of September, the principals exchanged shots with revolvers, at a few paces, and Walker fell, mortally wounded. There was much bitterness of feeling over the event. Walker's friends were slow to be appeased. More trouble would have arisen, but the messengers of death flew about them too swiftly from other hands—those of the enemy—for private animosities to take much depth. Excitement of the hour and the assuaging effect of time cured or alleviated the resentment.

Gen. Sterling Price, in a note to Colonel Dobbin, wrote as follows, in relation to this event:

Having been informed, toward midnight of September 5th, that a duel was pending between Brig.-Gens. L. M. Walker and Marmaduke, I sent to each of them an order to remain closely at his headquarters for twentyfour hours. This order did not reach General Walker, but did reach General Marmaduke. The duel took place, nevertheless, the next morning, and General Walker was mortally wounded. I immediately ordered General Marmaduke and the seconds of both parties in arrest. Feeling, however, the great inconvenience and danger of an entire change of cavalry commanders in the very presence of the enemy, and when a general engagement was imminent, I yielded to the urgent and almost unanimous request of the officers of General Marmaduke's division, and his own appeal, suspended his arrest, and ordered him to resume his command during the pending operations. I did this in spite of the apprehension that such leniency toward General Marmaduke might intensify the bitter feelings which had been already aroused in General Walker's division by the result of the duel. When the enemy had forced the passage of the Arkansas on September 10th, and youth were falling back before their overwhelming numbers (the command of Walker's division having devolved upon you by [222] his death), I sent General Marmaduke with his division to reinforce you, ordering him, of course, to assume command as senior officer of all the cavalry. You reported to me a few hours later, in arrest, as you informed me, by order of Brigadier-General Marmaduke for disobedience of orders. I at once suspended your arrest for reasons similar to those governing in General Marmaduke's case, and ordered you to resume your command during the pending operations. When, about a fortnight later, I turned over the command of the district to Lieutenant-General Holmes, I communicated the above facts to him.

By General Price's order, the infantry north of Little Rock began to leave their intrenchments about 11 a. m., September 10th, crossing on the pontoon bridge, followed by the artillery and later by the cavalry, a continuous procession for hours—the pageant of an evacuation. The bridge of boats was then broken up, some of them set afire. Some river craft and an ironclad gunboat, rendered useless by the low water, were also given to the flames, sending up black signals of retreat and defiance, which threw a veil over the scene and darkened the fiery September sun. The booming of cannon down the river, the neighing of horses, and soon the shouting of the Federal army, moving up to the city's front, the crowds of excited and hurrying citizens, was a mise en scene preceding the fall of the curtain, which could not have been better arranged for dramatic effect. The last Confederate left by 5 o'clock that evening. There was no pursuit

The beautiful little city, seat of refinement and hospitality, and center of the hopes of a State which longed to be ‘free’ and ‘sovereign’ as a birthright, saw its defenders retiring; its homes, its helpless women and children, its lares et penates, abandoned to ‘the insolent foe.’ The ruin was as great as its statesmen had predicted. The carpet-bagger trailed in behind the conquer-ing army. [223]