First Maryland campaign.
In the
Century for June, 1886,
General Longstreet has an article on the
Maryland campaign of 1862, which is remarkable for its ill-natured allusions to
General Jackson, as well as for its partial view of the campaign and its severe and unfair criticism of
General Lee's strategy.
General Longstreet leads us to infer that he prevailed over
Lee's hesitancy to go into
Maryland at all by reminding him of his (
Longstreet's) ‘experiences in
Mexico, where, on several occasions, we had to live two or three days on green corn.’
As
Jackson's corps certainly, and
Longstreet's probably, had to live on green corn for some days before the
second battle of Manassas, it was hardly necessary in
General Longstreet to recur to
Mexican experiences in order to overcome the hesitancy of
Lee. But however much
Lee yielded to the influence of
Longstreet in crossing the
Potomac, it is evident from
General Longstreet's article that
Lee unfortunately refused to be guided by the wisdom of his lieutenant when he had once entered upon the campaign.
General Longstreet thinks that
Lee ought not to have attempted the reduction of
Harper's Ferry.
Longstreet is careful to throw all blame for this movement off his own shoulders, for he tells us that when
Lee proposed to him to undertake it he objected, and urged that ‘our troops were worn with marching,’ &c. He thinks, too, that the fight at
South Mountain was a mistake, and that the stand ought to have been made at
Sharpsburg, and not at the
Mountain, though he does not frankly admit that this would have involved the failure of
Lee's plans for the reduction of
Harper's Ferry.
After
South Mountain he criticises the
battle of Sharpsburg—thinks it should not have been fought
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—but that the Confederate army ought to have yielded the moral effects of victory without further struggle by retiring at once to the south side of the
Potomac.
After defending
General D. H. Hill from some imaginary assailant for the loss of the captured dispatch, he adopts, more or less,
General Hill's idiosyncrasy in regard to the value of that dispatch to
McClellan and its effect upon the fortunes of the campaign.
He thinks it did
McClellan little good, and that it contributed in no considerable degree to
General Lee's failure.
The animus of the article is unfair to the
Confederate leader, but makes up for this by being very complimentary to
General Longstreet himself.
If the author looks back with distorted vision upon
Lee and his deeds in this campaign, his bile is evidently deeply stirred when the vision of
Jackson passes before his mind.
Speaking of the results of the campaign, he says: ‘
Jackson was quite satisfied with the campaign, as the
Virginia papers made him the hero of
Harper's Ferry, although the greater danger was with
McLaws, and his was the severer and more important service.’
Again: ‘
Jackson made a wide, sweeping march around the
Ferry, passing the
Potomac at
Williamsport, and moving from there on towards
Martinsburg, and turning thence upon
Harper's Ferry to make his attack by Bolivar Heights.
McLaws made a hurried march to reach
Maryland Heights before
Jackson could get into position, and succeeded in doing so. With
Maryland Heights in our possession the
Federals could not hold their position there.
McLaws put two or three hundred men to each piece of his artillery, and carried it up the
Heights, and was in position before
Jackson came on the
Heights opposite.
Simultaneously
Walker appeared upon
Loudoun Heights, south of the
Potomac and east of the
Shenandoah, thus completing the combination against the
Federal garrison.’
In the description of the
battle of Sharpsburg but a very meagre allusion is made to the tremendous struggle which took place on
Jackson's line, and which was the heaviest attack made by
McClellan during the day; and only the obscurest mention is made of the magnificent blow struck by
A. P. Hill in the afternoon, which relieved
Longstreet's own line from overwhelming pressure, and sent
Burnside's corps broken and bleeding back to the
Antietam.
The purpose and plans of this
Maryland campaign are not hard to understand.
Lee had just defeated one-half of the
Federal troops in
Virginia, and driven them to the fortifications of
Washington.
He could not get at his foe in that position, and to remain idle at
Manassas was to give the enemy an opportunity to recover from the blow
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he had struck.
He, therefore, (after, it would seem, being satisfied by
General Longstreet that his army might live on green corn!) crossed into
Maryland for he purpose of drawing the
Federal army away from
Washington in order to defend the
North from invasion.
His movement was immediately successful.
McClellan, without waiting to reorganize his disjointed forces, set forth from
Washington towards Frederick city, that he might cover
Baltimore as well as the
Federal capital.
His movements were necessarily slow, and this slowness was increased by his cautious temperament and the panic fears of the
National Administration, which, but a few days before, had looked upon the fall of the capital as certain.
McClellan crept slowly up the
Potomac, carrying on his work of reorganization as he went, stretching his army from the
Potomac to the
Patapsco, so as to cover the great cities upon those rivers.
His force was large, from 80,000 to 90,000 effective men, but his army was not in good condition.
One part of it had but recently returned from the unsuccessful Peninsula campaign, another part under
Pope had been dreadfully beaten at
Manassas.
Gaps had been filled by new troops not yet inured to service.
With his usual tendency to exaggerate the strength of his foes,
McClellan believed that the veteran and victorious army in his front was at least equal in strength to his own. Add to these considerations the fact that
General Halleck, the
Federal commander-in-chief, had not recovered from the nightmare induced by
Pope's disasters, and seemed possessed of but one idea, which was, that
Lee's object was to draw off the
Federal army from
Washington, and then suddenly cross to the
Virginia side of the
Potomac and attack that city.
Halleck was therefore constantly warning
McClellan against such a movement.
Halleck says on the 9th: ‘We must be very cautious about stripping too much the forts on the
Washington side.
It may be the enemy's object to draw off the mass of our forces, and then attempt to attack from the
Virginia side of the
Potomac.’
On the 12th
President Lincoln telegraphs: ‘I have advices that
Jackson is crossing the
Potomac at
Williamsport, and probably the whole Rebel army will be drawn from
Maryland.’
On the 13th
Halleck says: ‘Until you know more certainly the enemy's forces south of the
Potomac you are wrong in thus uncovering the capital.
I am of the opinion that the enemy will send a small column towards
Pennsylvania and draw your forces in that direction, then suddenly move on
Washington with the forces south of the
Potomac, and those he might cross over.’
This was the very day on which
McClellan obtained the lost dispatch.
On
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the 14th
Halleck says: ‘I fear you are exposing your left and rear.’
And even as late as the 16th he urges the same idea upon
McClellan.
Now, if we put together the condition of
McClellan's army, his slowness and caution as a commander, which was so fully evidenced in the
Peninsula campaign, and the apprehension with which the
Federal Administration viewed his increasing distance from
Washington, is it not evident that
McClellan's progress must have been slow, and as he approached the mountains slower still?
In estimating
McClellan's progress,
General Lee could not have known fully of
Halleck's fears, and of the constant pulling back exercised upon Mc-Clellan from
Washington, but he knew the sensitiveness of the
Federal Government in regard to that city, he knew
McClellan's cautious character as a commander thoroughly, he knew the disordered condition of his army—indeed, probably underrated the rapidity with which it was recuperating—and from these data he estimated, fairly and justly, we believe, the length of time it would take
McClellan to reach the
South Mountain.
General Lee expected, of course, when he entered
Maryland that the garrison at
Harper's Ferry would leave the place and escape to the
North.
Finding that it continued there, he determined, while watching and waiting for
McClellan, to capture this garrison and the large amount of ordnance and other supplies which had been collected at
Harper's Ferry.
He proposed to
General Longstreet, it seems, to carry out this plan, but finding his senior lieutenant unable to appreciate the opportunity, he turned to
Jackson, whose vigor and boldness better suited the enterprise.
On the 10th of September the army left
Frederick.
Jackson, as
General Longstreet states, was to make a sweeping march by way of
Williamsport and
Martinsburg, and, driving the
Federal troops at the latter place towards
Harper's Ferry, close all the avenues of escape in the angle between the
Shenandoah and the
Potomac.
At the same time
McLaws, with his own and
Anderson's divisions, was sent into
Pleasant Valley, with instructions to take
Maryland Heights, and hedge in the garrison on the north side of the
Potomac.
J. G. Walker, with two brigades, was ordered from the mouth of the
Monocacy to cross the
Potomac, move towards
Harper's Ferry, and, seizing the
Loudoun Heights, to shut up the eastern angle formed by the
Shenandoah and the
Potomac.
Longstreet was sent to
Hagerstown to look after some supplies and reported movements of troops from
Pennsylvania, while
D. H. Hill was left at Boonesboroa to be ready to support
Stuart's cavalry and to guard the mountainpass
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which led to
McLaws's rear until
Harper's Ferry should fall.
It was not
General Lee's original intention to dispute the passage of
South Mountain with
McClellan.
His design, on the other hand, was to induce the
Federal army, if possible, to cross that range into the
Hagerstown Valley, and when this army had thus gotten fairly out of the reach of
Washington the
Confederate commander expected to give it battle upon his own terms.
And, judging from
McClellan's character and movements,
Lee believed he would have ample time for the reduction of
Harper's Ferry and the reunion of his divided army in the neighborhood of
Hagerstown before
McClellan would be ready to cross the mountain.
Consequently D. H. Hill and
Stuart were expected to delay
McClellan's march until the operations at
Harper's Ferry should be completed.
On the 13th of September a copy of
General Lee's order, giving the proposed movements of every division in his army until it should be reunited after the capture of
Harper's Ferry, fell into the hands of
General McClellan at
Frederick.
The copy so captured was the one sent from
General Lee's headquarters addressed to
General D. H. Hill.
How it was lost, and where, are not definitely known.
General Hill states that he never received this copy of the order, and consequently it must have been lost through the carelessness of some one else, but we believe no means exist of tracing the history of this accident further.
General Longstreet thinks that
McClellan might have gotten through his own agencies all the information the order gave him; but such a supposition is at variance with all the facts of the case.
As
Halleck's dispatches show, the movement of Confederate troops to the south side of the
Potomac was interpreted as a menace to
Washington, and served simply to hamper
McClellan.
Nor could any agencies, even had they been vastly more efficient than usual, have revealed to
McClellan the position for days to come of every part of
Lee's army as well as the designs of its commander.
McClellan, it is certain, valued the importance of the order infinitely higher than
General Longstreet does.
He gave vent to demonstrations of joy when he read it, and at once comprehended the opportunity presented for striking his adversary a tremendous blow.
By a prompt movement forward he might expect to overwhelm the small part of
Lee's army in his front, and, turning down upon the rear of
McLaws, might raise the siege of
Harper's Ferry, and perhaps destroy a portion of the troops engaged in conducting it.
At once orders were issued to every part of the
Federal army for a vigorous forward movement.
Stuart found his cavalry pickets
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attacked and pressed back with unusual vigor.
Everything on the evening of September 13th gave indications of a change in the mode of movement of the
Federal army.
Some one who had been a witness of the scene at
McClellan's headquarters when the lost dispatch was brought to him came through the lines and informed
Stuart, who then understood the cause of the
Federal activity.
Stuart sent in turn, the information to
General Lee at
Hagerstown.
Lee received it some time during the night of the 13th, and at once ordered
Longstreet back to Boonesboroa to support
Hill.
General Longstreet says that he urged
Lee not to make a stand at Boonesboroa, but to bring
D. H. Hill back to
Sharpsburg.
General Longstreet leaves us in doubt as to his opinion of the effect of this movement on the
Harper's Ferry enterprise, but as such a movement would have uncovered
McLaws's rear, there is no doubt that it would have cost the failure of the plan for the reduction of
Harper's Ferry.
General Lee was not prepared to yield so much to his enemy.
Nor is it certain that the line of the
Antietam presented any better opportunity for opposing
McClellan than did
South Mountain, where greatly inferior forces could, if well handled, keep back, for a time at least, the
Federal army.
It is not our purpose to discuss the
battle of South Mountain, about which much might be said.
General D. H. Hill, aided later in the day by
General Longstreet, was able to hold the mountain passes at Turner's Gap all day of September 14th.
Their commands suffered heavily, however, and such positions were won by the
Federal army as to insure their possession of the mountain next day. Meantime the
Federals had gained possession of Crampton's Gap, but not until too late to press
McLaws on the 14th.
Hence
Lee withdrew towards
Sharpsburg next morning.
While this movement was in progress he learned of the fall of
Harper's Ferry, and ordered the concentration of his whole army behind the
Antietam.
Let us turn now to operations about
Harper's Ferry.
According to
General Lee's captured order
McLaws was to possess himself of
Maryland Heights by Friday morning, September 12th;
Walker, at the same time, was, if practicable, to be in possession of
Loudoun Heights;
Jackson, by Friday night, September 12th, was expected to be in possession of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and ‘of such of the enemy as may be at
Martinsburg.’
Jackson had by far the longest march to make to reach
Harper's Ferry; it amounted to about fifty miles. He was at
Martinsburg, according to orders, on the night of the 12th, and had driven the
Federal troops from that place towards
Harper's Ferry.
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About 11 o'clock on the morning of the 13th the head of his column came in sight of the enemy drawn up on Bolivar Heights, the southwestern suburb of
Harper's Ferry.
Thus
Jackson was fully on time.
McLaws, who had not half the distance of
Jackson to march, entered
Pleasant Valley on the 11th, and on the 12th proceeded towards
Maryland Heights.
The way was rough.
The
Heights themselves were not strongly guarded—by a small force, I think, of two regiments.
It was about half-past 4 on Saturday evening, the 13th, when
General Kershaw succeeded in carrying the
Heights.
The Confederate loss in this operation was slight, which shows that the resistance was not very determined.
It was difficult to get artillery upon the mountain from the
Pleasant Valley side and
General McLaws had to haul them up by hand, and it was 2 o'clock P. M. Sunday, 14th, before
McLaws's guns were in position to cooperate with
Jackson's in the reduction of
Harper's Ferry.
Thus the capture of
Maryland Heights was accomplished, not on Friday morning, but some thirty hours later, on Saturday evening, and when
McLaws got possession of the
Heights,
Jackson had been for some hours at
Bolivar.
Walker, who crossed to the
Virginia side at the
Point of Rocks, reached the foot of
Loudoun Heights by 10 o'clock on the 13th (Saturday), and took possession of them without opposition by 2 P. M. of that day. By 8 o'clock on the morning of the 14th his artillery was up and ready for action.
It thus appears that
McLaws and
Walker were each more than a day late in reaching their positions and about two days late in getting their artillery into place for effective co-operation in the reduction of the garrison.
Hence the statement by
General Longstreet that
McLaws made a hurried march to reach
Maryland Heights before
Jackson could get in position, and succeeded in doing so, gives an entirely erroneous impression.
We have nothing to say in derogation of the brave and skillful part performed by
General McLaws and
General Walker in the reduction of
Harper's Ferry—all honor to them for what they did—but it is evident that if
McLaws made a hurried march,
Jackson must have made one more than twice as much hurried, since in the same time he marched about fifty miles to
McLaws's twenty.
Nor is it true that
McLaws reached
Maryland Heights before
Jackson got in position.
It was
General Lee's intention, evidently, from his order, that both
McLaws and
Walker should be in position before
Jackson, as it was likely that the enemy, when alarmed, would attempt to escape through the avenues to be guarded by their commands, but
Jackson, as we have seen, was in front of
Bolivar before either
Maryland or
Loudoun Heights were occupied.
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After the various commands were in position the intervention of the rivers between
Jackson and his colleagues made it difficult to communicate with them.
The only means of communication was by signals, and some hours were consumed in learning the condition of affairs and transmitting the orders for attack.
General Walker opened fire from his guns on the afternoon of the 14th.
Jackson then followed suit, and
McLaws joined in a little later in the afternoon.
The fire from
Walker's guns was effective, as it was a plunging fire at no great distance.
McLaws was too far off to accomplish as much, but the moral effect of his shells, plunging from the mountain tops, was no doubt great.
Jackson's troops were the only ones who could come in contact with the garrison since the
Potomac separated the
Federals from
McLaws, and the
Shenandoah separated them from
Walker.
Jackson made disposition therefore to attack the
Federal works.
General Walker, in his interesting article in the June
Century, says that as late as midday on the 14th
Jackson had no knowledge of the important events transpiring at the
South Mountain passes, and thought the fight going on there was simply a cavalry affair.
He therefore spoke at that time of regularly summoning the garrison to surrender, and of giving time for the removal of non-combatants before opening his batteries.
Later in the day
Jackson learned from
General Lee of the great danger threatened by
McClellan's unexpectedly rapid advance, and was informed of the urgent necessity for completing the operations at
Harper's Ferry.
Jackson set to work with all his energy on the night of the 14th, and accomplished the object in view.
During that night
A. P. Hill, who was next the
Shenandoah, was thrown forward, until some of his troops were on the right and in the rear of the
Federal line of defence.
Jones's division, near the
Potomac, was thrown forward to attack the portion of the
Federal line in its front.
Ewell's division was moved forward on the turnpike between the two.
During the night
Colonel Crutchfield took ten guns over the
Shenandoah, and established them near the foot of
Loudoun Heights, so as to attack the formidable fortifications of the
Federals in reverse.
Colonel Lindsay Walker, and his gallant adjutant,
Ham.
Chamberlayne, brought up a large number of
Hill's batteries to a position which a portion of
Hill's infantry had gained.
The greatest activity prevailed in
Jackson's command during the night.
The General himself took little if any rest, and soon after daylight mounted his horse and rode to the front.
Fire was opened from all of
Jackson's batteries that were in position at an early hour.
This fire was
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seconded by
McLaws's and
Walker's guns from the mountain tops.
‘In an hour,’ says
Jackson, ‘the enemy's fire seemed to be silenced, and the batteries of
General Hill were ordered to cease their fire, which was the signal for storming the works.’
Again, however, the enemy opened, drawing a rapid fire from
Hill's batteries at close quarters.
At 8 o'clock, as
Jackson's lines were about moving forward to the attack, the white flag was hoisted, and the garrison surrendered.
The captures amounted to over 1,000 men, 73 pieces of artillery, 13,000 stand of small arms, and other stores.
During the 14th
McClellan had thrown forward
Franklin to
Cramp ton's Gap, through which
McLaws had entered
Pleasant Valley.
After a spirited resistance by
Colonel Munford's cavalry and Mc-Laws's rear guard, the mountain pass was forced, and at nightfall
Franklin had full possession of the road to
McLaws's rear.
But a day had been gained, and this was enough to insure the fall of
Harper's Ferry.
During the evening and night of the 14th
McLaws moved back a large part of his troops, and drew them up across the
Valley in so strong a position, and so skillfully, that
Franklin next morning declined to attack.
After the surrender of
Harper's Ferry,
McLaws who, on the morning of the 15th, was hedged in by the garrison at the one end of
Pleasant Valley, and by
Franklin at the other, was relieved from his unpleasant position.
He withdrew through
Harper's Ferry, and returned to the army by the route taken by
Jackson.
Jackson, many of whose men had had little rest on the night of the 14th, left
A. P. Hill to dispose of the prisoners and stores at
Harper's Ferry, and on the evening of the 15th set out to rejoin his chief.
By a severe night-march he reached the
Potomac at
Shepherdstown, and on the morning of the 16th crossed the river and rejoined
Lee.
Walker followed him closely, and reached the battlefield at about the same time.
McLaws rested for some time near
Harper's Ferry, and then moved towards
Sharpsburg, which he did not reach until about 9 o'clock on the 17th.
Of the soldiers of the
Federal garrison cooped up in
Harper's Ferry none escaped except about 1,300 cavalry under
Colonel Davis.
They silently made their way up the north bank of the
Potomac at the foot of
Maryland Heights during the night of the 14th.
Next morning in their retreat they ran foul of some of
Longstreet's trains near
Sharpsburg and did some damage.
The road by which these soldiers escaped was on
General McLaws's line.
Stuart had suggested to
McLaws the propriety of guarding it, and
Jackson had cautioned him against the danger of the garrison's attempting
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to escape into
Maryland, but
McLaws, no doubt, thought his troops on
Maryland Heights sufficiently blocked the road at its base, and the consequence was the escape of the
Federal cavalry.
The operations of
Harper's Ferry were under
Jackson's control as the
senior officer.
There was, we believe, no disposition on the part of the
Virginia papers, nor of anyone else, to make
Jackson the ‘hero of
Harper's Ferry’ to the disparagement of any of his colleagues, but it probably never occurred to any one but
General Longstreet that
Jackson's was not the leading part in this brilliant operation.
All honor to
General McLaws for what he did, but his was not the ‘severer and more important service.’
Creditable as was the part he played, it has no claim either from its intrinsic importance, or from the manner in which he discharged the duties assigned him, to be classed with
Jackson's achievements on the same occasion.
Though
McClellan, after the capture of the lost dispatch, was no longer perplexed as to his adversary's designs, but was free to devote all of his energies to the relief of
Harper's Ferry and the crushing of that part of the Confederate army which was nearest to him before the other portion could rejoin it, the habitual caution and slowness of the
Federal commander prevented him from reaping the full advantage of his good fortune.
As we have seen,
Lee was able to hold him back at the
South Mountain passes until nightfall on the 14th of September, and the time thus gained was sufficient to insure the fall of
Harper's Ferry early next morning.
This disaster to the
Federal army was known to
McClellan as soon as it was to
Lee, and thenceforward the former's only object must have been to exact as severe a penalty as possible from his adversary for this success.
When
Lee took position behind the
Antietam, on September 15th, he had but
Longstreet and
D. H. Hill with him, and as this fact was known to
McClellan, it is difficult to account for the deliberation of his movements.
Lee, it is true, disposed of his troops and batteries so as to show as formidable a front as possible Imposed upon to some extent by this, and slow at best,
McClellan not only did not attack on the afternoon of the 15th, but was not ready to do so until nightfall of the 16th.
It was Wednesday morning, the 17th of September, before the
Federal commander was able to deliver battle.
Lee used every hour of his time in energetic efforts to re-unite his army.
The troops about
Harper's Ferry were recalled to
Sharpsburg by orders suitable to the urgency of the occasion.
Jackson, leaving
A. P. Hill's division, marched back on the evening and night
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of the 15th.
J. G. Walker was close behind him. These two reached
Sharpsburg during the forenoon of the 16th.
McLaws and
Anderson were a day later, and arrived on the morning of the 17th after the battle had been some hours in progress.
A. P. Hill was sent for on the night of the 16th, and, leaving early on the 17th, reached the field, as we shall see, in time to snatch victory from
Burnside's corps.
Thus,
Lee, by great effort, concentrated all his army in time for participation in the battle.
This concentration was, however, effected by exhausting marches and at the price of much straggling.
On the 16th the two armies were separated by
Antietam creek,
Lee occupying the hills west of the stream, which offered a fine commanding position.
His right rested at the
Burnside bridge-the lower one of the three which were used in the battle.
His right centre faced towards the bridge on the turnpike leading from
Sharpsburg to Boonesboroa.
His left centre and left extended northward, gradually receding from the creek and finally resting upon the
Hagerstown turnpike some two miles or so north of
Sharpsburg.
Cavalry continued the line thence to the
Potomac.
Jackson's—two divisions held the left, supported by
Hood.
In the centre was
D. H. Hill.
Beyond him, towards the right, was
Evans and
D. R. Jones's division of
Longstreet's command.
A part of
Toombs's brigade held the bridge on the right.
J. G. Walker's brigades had been sent to this flank on the 16th, but early on the 17th were ordered to the other wing to help
Jackson.
Stuart's cavalry was mainly on
Jackson's left guarding that flank.
A number of batteries had been sent to assist him.
McClellan's plan was to throw the corps of
Hooker,
Mansfield, and
Sumner, supported by
Franklin if necessary, against the
Confederate left wing, and, as soon as matters looked favorable there, to move
Burnside's corps against the
Confederate right wing.
Whenever either of these attacks were successful, he intended to advance his centre with all the forces then disposable.
It thus appears that
McClellan intended to throw the half of his army upon
Lee's left and support it if necessary by
Franklin in addition.
His other operations were to be in concert with this, but subsidiary.
At daylight on the 17th,
Hooker opened the battle by fiercely attacking
Jackson.
After a terrible struggle,
Jackson's two weak divisions were forced back, when
Hood's veteran brigades and part of
D. H. Hill's brave men came to the rescue, and
Hooker's corps was broken in pieces.
Mansfield, who was close
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behind
Hooker, came to his assistance, and once more ensued a struggle of the fiercest and bloodiest character.
Gradually
Jackson and
Hood yielded to the pressure and were forced to the west side of the
Hagerstown turnpike, while
Hill's men were driven back upon the remainder of his division along the ‘Bloody Lane.’
The Federals got for a time a foothold near the Dunker church; but if the
Confederates on
Jackson's wing had been forced to yield ground, they had exacted a fearful price for it, and at 9 o'clock in the morning
Mansfield's corps was fought out. There was nothing left of it but a few fragments, in no condition of themselves to renew the attack.
Mansfield had fallen and
Hooker had been borne wounded from the field.
Now it was that
McClellan threw in
Sumner, whose corps made the
Federal force that had been launched against the left of the Confederate army, in all 40,000 men.
Sumner's corps became divided in moving to the attack.
Sumner himself, leading
Sedgwick's division, followed the track of
Hooker and
Mansfield and moved against
Jackson's weak lines in the woods north of the Dunker church.
Sumner found that at this time
Hooker's corps was not only repulsed but dispersed.
He says: ‘I saw nothing of his corps at all as I was advancing with my command on the field.
There were some troops lying down on the left which I took to belong to
Mansfield's command.
General Hooker's corps was dispersed.
There is no question about that.’
Though it is plain from this that
Jackson had nothing to fear from
Hooker and
Mansfield, the advance of
Sedgwick's five or six thousand fresh men threatened to overwhelm the weak Confederate line.
But one brigade (
Early's) of
Jackson's command had not been seriously engaged.
Early was instructed (in conjunction with the other forces at hand) to hold the enemy in check if possible until reinforcements could arrive.
Fortunately
McLaws and
J. G. Walker were rapidly approaching.
Stuart, with his artillery, and
Grigsby, with a handful of
Jackson's old division, clung tenaciously to some ground in
Sedgwick's front, while
Hood, in the woods near the church, fiercely contested every inch he was forced to yield.
A bold and skillful move of
Early defeated and drove back some of
Mansfield's men, who were pressing
Hood, and opened the way for a crushing flank attack upon
Sedgwick.
In a few moments this attack was made by
McLaws,
Walker, and
Early, all in conjunction, and in twenty minutes two fifths of
Sedgwick's men were
hors de combat, and the remainder were driven in confusion to the refuge of the
Federal batteries from the line of which they had advanced.
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This ended the serious fighting on the
Confederate left.
McClellan's attack had failed, and
Jackson and his gallant colleagues held the field.
When
Sumner was leading
Sedgwick to the attack the other two divisions of his corps, under French and
Richardson, turned southward, and soon found themselves face to face with the centre of the army along the
Bloody Lane.
This position was held at first by two of
D. H. Hill's brigades and some fragments of the others.
A little later
R. H. Anderson's division reinforced it.
Sumner, when
Sedgwick was being pressed, ordered French and
Richardson to attack the troops in their front in order to make a diversion.
After a most gallant resistance
Hill was driven from the
Bloody Lane.
Anderson was involved in the defeat, and it looked as if the enemy was about to pierce the
Confederate centre.
The noble efforts of many brave men prevented this result.
The artillery was managed and served with a skill and gallantry never surpassed.
Fragments of commands fought with a splendid determination.
As
General Longstreet says, the brave
Colonel J. R. Cooke showed front to the enemy when he no longer had a cartridge.
Such instances of courage and gallantry as
General Longstreet relates of his own staff did much to encourage our men. The manner in which
Longstreet,
D. H. Hill, and other officers of high rank exposed themselves contributed to the result, and though, as
General Longstreet says, some ground was gained and held at this point by the
Federals, the attempt to break through the centre failed.
General Longstreet's article would lead one to infer that this attack of French and
Richardson was the leading event of the day on the field north of
Sharpsburg.
It does not, however, deserve this distinction, having been subsidiary to the efforts made early in the morning further to the
Confederate left.
Let us see how the battle seemed to the people who were making the attacks up to this time.
General Palfrey, a gallant officer of
Sedgwick's division, who has given us the best account so far written of this campaign, says: ‘The right attack spent its force when
Sedgwick was repulsed.
Up to that time there had been close connection of place and some connection of time between the movements of the First (
Hooker's), Twelfth (
Mansfield's), and Second (
Sumner's) corps, but after that the attacks were successive, both in time and place; and good as were some of the troops engaged, and gallant as some of the fighting, the movements of French and
Richardson excite but a languid interest, for such use as was made of these troops was not of the kind to drive
Hill,
Hood,
Jackson,
Longstreet, and
Lee from a strong position,
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from which six divisions of the
Federal army had already recoiled, and recoiled in a condition which left them for the moment almost incapable of further service.’
The fighting on the
Confederate left and left centre was over by one o'clock in the day. Here
McClellan's heaviest blows had been delivered, and they had been foiled with such fearful loss to the
Federal army, that when
Franklin reached the field about midday
Sumner would not permit him to resume the offensive lest the repulse of this last body of fresh men might lead to overwhelming disaster.
It would be difficult to gather from
General Longstreet's article that
Jackson and his men had much to do with this tremendous struggle on the
Confederate left, though they received the first and most terrible blows delivered that morning against the Confederate army.
McClellan's plan of throwing
Burnside forward against the
Confederate right flank at the same time that his main attack was being made on their left failed of execution
Toombs, with a handful of Georgians, held the bridge over the
Antietam for hours against all efforts of
Burnside to cross it. No more gallant thing was done that day than the defence of this bridge, and it was taken only when
Burnside had found his way across the creek at a ford below, and threatened to envelop
Toombs.
Though forced from his position at last, the time
Toombs had gained was invaluable to the
Confederates.
The fighting on
Jackson's and
D. H. Hill's line had been over some hours before
Burnside was ready to advance.
When the advance did come, however, it was in such overwhelming force that
D. R. Jones's division was gradually driven back from point to point, until, by the middle of the afternoon, the
Federal troops were in the very suburbs of
Sharpsburg, and the day that
McClellan had lost on his right seemed about to be won by
Burnside on his left.
It was at this critical moment that
A. P. Hill, who had marched seventeen miles from
Harper's Ferry that morning, and had waded the
Potomac, reached the field upon the flank of
Burnside's victorious column.
With a skill, vigor and promptness, which cannot be too highly praised,
A. P. Hill formed his men in line, and threw them upon
Burnside's flank.
Toombs, and the other brigades of
D. R. Jones's division, gave such aid as they were able.
The Confederate artillery was used with the greatest courage and determination to check the enemy, but it was mainly
A. P. Hill's attack which decided the day at this point, and drove
Burnside in confusion and dismay back to the bridge.
There is no part of
General Longstreet's article more unworthy than the single line in which he obscurely refers to
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the splendid achievement of a dead comrade, whose battles, like
Ney's, were all for his country, and none against it, and who crowned a brilliant career by shedding his life's blood to avert the crowning disaster.
A. P. Hill's march was a splendid one.
He left
Harper's Ferry sixteen hours after
McLaws, but reached the battle-field only five hours behind him.
McLaws had, however, the night to contend with.
The vigor of
Hill's attack, with hungry and march worn men, is shown by the fact that he completely overthrew forces twice as numerous as his own. Though his force of from two thousand to three thousand five hundred men was too small to permit of an extended aggressive, his arrival was not less opportune to
Lee than was that of
Blucher to
Wellington at
Waterloo, nor was his action when on the field in any way inferior to that of the Prussian field marshal.
The
battle of Sharpsburg was a very bloody one, and a very exhausting one to the Confederate army.
As
General Longstreet says: ‘Nearly one-fourth of
Lee's men were killed and wounded,’ but they had met and defeated all the attempts of an army more than twice as numerous as themselves to drive them from their position.
We think
General Longstreet must have forgotten much of the battle when he says that ‘at the close of the day 10,000 fresh troops could have come in and taken
Lee's army and everything he had.’
A fact or two will show how wide he is of the mark.
In the afternoon
McClellan visited the right of his lines, where the main battle had taken place.
Sumner had refused permission to
Franklin, with more than ‘1,000 fresh men,’ to resume the attack.
Sumner declared that these troops were the only ones available for any effective resistance in case of attack; that
Hooker's,
Mansfield's, and his own corps had suffered so heavily that they could not be counted on, and that it was not safe to risk in fight the last body of fresh troops that was within reach.
This opinion of one of the bravest of his subordinates, of the man who had had charge for hours of that part of the battle-field, and who had been in the midst of the battle himself, was approved by
McClellan.
About the same time, or somewhat before it,
Jackson, under
Lee's direction, was trying to organize a force of 4,000 or 5,000 men from his meagre lines with which to move out and attack the right flank of the
Federal army.
A little later
Longstreet himself was ordering
J. G. Walker, near the Dunker church, to resume the offensive.
Stuart went out in advance of
Jackson to feel the way for his movements.
He found the enemy commanding, with a great
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mass of artillery in good position, the country extending all the way to the
Potomac, and
Jackson reluctantly concluded that the movement was impracticable with the forces he had at hand.
Thus, while
McClellan and his lieutenants were husbanding a fresh corps of 12,000 men because the 40,000 men who had been engaged on the
Federal right were deemed incapable of even holding their own lines in case of a counter attack,
Lee and his subordinates were planning such a counter attack to be made, not by fresh troops, but by regiments every one of which had been engaged in the morning struggle.
Note another fact:
General Lee held his position all next day, and no attempt was made upon it by the
Federal army.
McClellan was unwilling to risk further battle without reinforcements, and these were on their way to him.
Lee, on the other hand, offered battle all day on the 18th.
He was ready and willing to meet the army he had repulsed on the 17th.
But he could expect no reinforcements to offset those which were about to join
McClellan, and he, therefore, withdrew his forces across the
Potomac on the night of the 18th.
It seems to me very clear that there were no 10,000 soldiers in
McClellan's army (and he had more than that number of fresh troops) who could have overwhelmed
Lee. The truth of the matter is that the Confederate army was better off at the close of
Sharpsburg than the
Federal army, and it is far more likely that
Jackson with ‘10,000 fresh men’ would have driven the latter into the
Antietam than have been driven from his own position.
It is certain at any rate that
Lee and
Jackson and
Sumner and
McClellan thought so, and their views may be taken as a fair offset to
General Longstreet's.
When
General Lee undertook the reduction of
Harper's Ferry, he expected to accomplish it and to reunite his army in the
Hagerstown Valley before having to deal with
McClellan.
We have seen that this expectation was justified by the condition of the
Federal army, by
McClellan's character as a commander, and by the sensitiveness of the
Federal Government in regard to
Washington.
This expectation was defeated by the loss of the dispatch containing
General Lee's plans, and, we believe, by this alone.
General Longstreet seems to think that only Virginian writers consider this dispatch of great importance.
We believe that
Generals Longstreet and
D. H. Hill are the only two people who refuse to see the decisive importance of the lost dispatch upon the campaign.
(See
Swinton,
Comte de Paris,
Palfrey, &c.)
General Lee, we know, thought it the most important factor in the campaign.
It changed all his plans and, as he believed, the result.
A single day of delay on
McClellan's part
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at
South Mountain would probably have rendered the battle at this barrier unnecessary.
Two days delay would certainly have relieved
Lee from all necessity of defending the passes, and would have rendered possible the concentration of his army anywhere in the
Hagerstown Valley in time for battle.
There seems to us no reasonable room for doubt that the lost dispatch cost
Lee these days, and perhaps several others.
The rapid advance of
McClellan threw
Lee on the defensive, forced him to fight at
South Mountain or permit
Harper's Ferry to be relieved, and compelled him either to give
battle at Sharpsburg with a march-worn and depleted army or to yield the prestige of victory without a struggle.
He succeeded in capturing
Harper's Ferry and all it contained, but a few days' delay would have enabled him to concentrate his army without forced marches and the straggling produced by them, and would have placed him in condition to give
McClellan battle instead of receiving it. He might even then have failed, for, as
General Lee once said, ‘no man can predict the result of a battle.’
But does not the wonderful skill, ability, and courage with which the
Confederate commander extricated himself from the dangers that threatened him after the capture of the lost dispatch show what might have been expected had not an untoward accident prevented the execution of his original plans?
We regret the tone in which
General Longstreet speaks of
Virginians, of the great leader under whom he served, of the gallant colleagues by whose side he fought.
Virginians can never forget on how many of their fields
General Longstreet won imperishable laurels.
They can never forget the true, brave, skilful soldier who shed his blood upon Virginian soil.
They will ever gladly turn away from his carping criticisms to recall the leader who, in conjunction with
A. P. Hill, struck so splendidly at Frazier's Farm, whose ability was so conspicuous in seconding
Jackson at
Second Manassas, whose name is indissolubly associated with
Sharpsburg, Marye's Hill, the
Wilderness, and many other noted fields; who was ever ready to strike great blows alongside of his Virginian colleagues and under the leadership of his great Virginian commander.
McDonough, Maryland, July 26, 1886.
