[
376]
Strategic points.
Their value in the war between the States, 1861-1861, and how fiercely they were fought for.
In reasoning from cause to effect we must not conclude that accident was the reason why great battles were more than once fought over the same fields during the great civil war in this country.
Examining carefully for the cause, we arrive at the conclusion that such points must have had within them some special value, and an analysis of this, deducts the conclusion that these places were ‘Strategic Points.’
There are several objective points, in the Old Dominion, over whose bosom the pendulum of war oscillated for four cruel years, where the contending armies crashed, that had in them this strategic value, and the fact that battles were fought more than once on these fields proves that the armies did not collide upon them by accident.
Gettysburg was a battle-field of accident.
Had
Stuart been in touch with
Lee, and the
Confederate commander furnished with the information the cavalry are supposed to acquire, it is now considered more than doubtful that this little
Pennsylvania town would have assumed conspicuous prominence in American history.
But strategic points is the subject of this paper, and it will be best to treat them in the order of their dates.
Beauregard's selection of
Bull Run as his line defence showed his wisdom as an engineer.
His outposts extended from
Leesburg, through Drainesville,
Fairfax and
Wolf Run Shoals, to
Acquia creek, with reserves at
Centreville.
This was in the early summer of 1861.
McDowell was organizing the
Grand Army around a splendid nucleus of regulars.
This army was not for the defence of
Washington solely, but also for aggressive purposes.
There was a supreme authority in the
Federal States which became director general, which gave orders to commanders and moved armies.
This power was public clamor, and all through the four
[
377]
years of carnage this influence was dominant.
McDowell moved out of
Washington under its orders.
Burnside assaulted
Lee's line at
Fredericksburg under its arbitrary demand.
Meade moved upon the Army of Northern Virginia at
Mine Run at the dictation of this same power.
But pardon this digression, and go back to strategic points.
McDowell moved out of
Washington with the
Grand Army, and developing
Beauregard's outposts, soon pressed them back upon the reserves and precipitated the indecisive battle, 18th of July, 1861.
Pausing then,
McDowell took advantage of his information to study the situation and plan accordingly.
Beauregard, finding his force inadequate, appealed to
Johnston, then at
Winchester, for assistance.
His prompt response is too well known to detail here; how
Bee and
Bartow died; how
Kirby Smith, coming into line almost on the run upon
McDowell's flank, and ‘
Jackson standing like a stone wall,’ snatched victory from defeat, and turned the triumph of the foe into an utter rout.
The plains of
Manassas drank in the best blood of the
South, but victory laid her crown of immortelles upon ‘the banner of the stars and bars.’
Manassas, heretofore an insignificant railroad crossing, became the base of the Confederate army.
Roads, both dirt and rail, radiated and crossed here, and its strategic worth, and the fierceness for which its possession was contended, demonstrated its value.
After
McClellan had been paralyzed before
Richmond, a year later, a new and powerful Federal army was being massed in
Northern Virginia, causing concern to the Confederate government.
To check further advance,
Lee transported his army from its intrenchments before
Richmond, first to the line of the
Rapidan, then to the banks of the
Rappahannock.
The summer rains had swollen the river, and thus gave the
Federal commander a strong position.
The fords were unavailable, and
Pope held the key to the situation.
But the genius of
Lee could not be neutralized by an obstacle like the roaring
Rappahannock.
He sent the energetic and phenomenal
Jackson to secure
Manassas in
Pope's rear.
Silently and steadily the
Stonewall corps tramped by a circuitous route, and before the
Federal commander was aware of his absence from his front,
Lee's great lieutenant had seized
Manassas with its
[
378]
vast stores of food, clothing, and ammunition.
These were utilized to the extent of
Jackson's ability, the excess given to the flames.
He knew that
Pope would resent this poaching upon his preserves, so after applying the torch he moved from the
Junction to the neighborhood of the old battle-field, where a year before he had won his title and his spurs.
He wanted elbow room, space to manoeuvre, and as he had to call upon
Pope, he determined to select his own battle-ground.
The desperate battles of the 28th, 29th and 30th of August testify of
Pope's anxiety to retain and
Lee's determination to wrest from him this stragetic point.
Forty-nine thousand and seventy-seven worn but superb Confederates, after days of battle, defeated
Pope's army, which, with
McClellan's reinforcements, numbered 120,000, and forced them back into the works around
Washington.
Thus the stragetic value of
Manassas, drinking to satiety the blood of brave men, assumed conspicuous prominence in American annals.
In the late spring of 1862
McClellan environed
Richmond with an army of 115,000 men. His immense works are monuments to his genius as an engineer.
Of the points fortified by him Cold Harbor was the key to his right.
When the signal gun from the left of the
Confederate fortifications announced the assault upon
McClellan's lines, the brunt of the attack was upon his right.
Fierce assaults followed and some of the strongholds yielded, but Cold Harbor, naturally strong and intensified by splendid works, resisted fiercely.
Southern blood flowed like water, but as long as this point held out,
McClellan maintained his right in tact.
Jackson sent imperative order to storm the works, and though fourteen heavy field guns and three lines of battles hurled shot, shell and bullets upon them, the gallant
Hood with his splendid Texans finally carried the fort by storm, and doubled
McClellan's right back upon his centre.
Successively,
Mechanicsville, Ellerson's Mills, Cold Harbor,
Gaines' Mill, Frazer's Farm, Savage Station, and
White Oak Swamp were torn from
McClellan's group, and these names blazoned in martial glory upon the star crossed flag, while
McClellan's beaten army sought protection under the guns of the Federal fleet in
James river.
[
379]
A lapse of two years brings us back to historic Cold Harbor.
The war had now progressed more than three years. Other commanders had failed and public clamor was demanding better results for the money and blood so liberally and lavishly spent in the Old Dominion.
Grant was summoned from his successes in the
West, and the government assigned him this terrible task.
Unlimited resources were placed at his disposal; when he broke camp early in May, 1864, 141, 160 splendidly equipped and veteran soldiers followed his standard.
Against this host
Lee could oppose but 52,625 ill-fed and poorly-clad, yet superb troops.
Then followed the Spotsylvania, the
North Anna, written in the blood of thousands of brave men. A month of almost incessant battle followed, the two armies gravitating toward
Richmond.
In June, in the course of these side movements, Cold Harbor was again reached, but circumstances and positions reversed.
Lee now held the entrenchments and acted on the defensive.
Grant massed his army for the assault.
Up to this time the genius of the great Confederate commander had everywhere matched the enormous preponderance of the enemy.
Grant made three desperate assaults on
Lee's works; the attack was made in the forenoon.
Each attack was repelled with appalling slaughter.
So terrific had been the
Confederate fire that in one hour
Grant's losses had amounted to more than 13,000, while he inflicted a loss of but 1,200 upon
Lee.
History records
General Grant as a man of great determination and tenacity.
He was unwilling to yield his point, so determined was he to renew the assault in the afternoon.
The order for attack descended in proper gradation from the lieutenant-general down to regimental commanders; but when the bugles sounded the onset, there was no forward movement, and the immoble lines of the army of the Potomac thus silently rebuked its commander for his butchery.
Its inactive attitude spoke plainer than words:‘Show us a possibility and no troops will more loyally and promptly respond, but to again hurl us against certain defeat and direful slaughter, we must refuse to obey.’
Thus for the second time Cold Harbor became the scene of the fiercest of conflicts, and established its value as a strategic point.
It is worthy of note to mention the great disparity of numbers
[
380]
engaged, and how, in the two battles, conditions were reversed.
In the battles of
Richmond,
McClellan's army numbered 115,102 men, and, in this engagement, fought on the defensive Cold Harbor, next to
Malvern Hill—the strongest position in his line.
Lee's forces were 69,762, and in this, as in others of the
Richmond battles, were the aggressors, yet he wrested this stronghold by one of the most daring assaults history records.
In the second
battle of Cold Harbor conditions were reversed—
Lee was behind the defenses, his army about 49,000.
Grant was to attack with 140,000 men. He hurled his immense weight upon
Lee, but with no effect, except to destroy his men. This leads up to the inquiry, ‘Was either the better soldier?’
The spring of 1863 found
Lee's army at
Fredericksburg watching his powerful antagonist across the
Rappahannock.
Longstreet had been detached for service near
Suffolk, and the Army of Northern Virginia thus weakened.
Hooker had succeeded
Burnside in command of the Army of the Potomac.
New hopes inspired the
Federal army.
Hooker was jubilant; he announced to the world ‘the finest army on the planet’ was about to exterminate its enemies.
So sure was he of this, he dispatched to
General Hallock at
Washington:
‘The rebel army is now the legitimate property of the Army of the Potomac.’
Rejecting
Burnside's plan of direct assault, he divided his army of 132,000 men; 40,000 under
Sedgwick crossed the
Rappahannock on pontoons below
Fredericksburg and threatened
Lee's right; with the remainder
Hooker crossed the upper fords and menaced the
Confederate left.
Lee's army numbered 57,117.
Matters to others than his master mind would have seemed gravely critical.
Leaving
Early with 9,000 muskets to hold his works behind
Fredericksburg, with the remainder he moved out to give battle to
Hooker.
Before developing the
Federal battle line, for the protection of his flank and rear, he detached
Wilcox with 6,000 men to guard the fords behind him.
Just as he struck
Hooker's line, he detached
Jackson with about 24,000 men, to place himself upon
Hooker's right and rear.
[
381]
Silently and swiftly the old foot cavalry of the
Stonewall corps traversed the secret by-paths of the wilderness, and late in the afternoon of the 3d of May he stealthily approached the unsuspecting Federals.
With a rush and a roar the
Stonewall corps broke cover, and with one crash of musketry, then with the bayonet, swept the works.
Howard's Eleventh corps was just partaking of its evening meal when the storm swept upon it.
Hooker's left wing was thrown into utter rout and rushed in confusion upon the centre.
Night alone saved it from destruction.
But details are too volumnious.
The world knows of
Hooker's terrible punishment and defeat.
How
Lee, with one-third of
Hooker's forces, crushed the
Federal army and threw it beyond the
Rappahannock.
Just one year later, on a balmy day in early May, 1864,
Grant broke camp at
Culpeper with the finest army ever organized upon the
Western Continent.
Without hinderance he placed 141,160 soldiers on the south bank of the
Rapidan, and threw himself across
Lee's road to
Richmond.
It must have been apparent to the eye of the most ordinary soldier in
Grant's army that his commander had blundered.
He saw at a glance how impossible to manoeuvre 141,000 men in the dense jungles and scrubs of the wilderness.
Therefore it is not to be wondered that the genius of the great Confederate chieftain mastered the situation.
He broke cover with 52,626 ragged but veteran troops, and not waiting to be attacked, moved at once upon
Grant's battle line and for three days fiercely assailed his overwhelming antagonist.
Finding it impossible to make any impression upon
Lee's line, the night of the third day's fight the
Federal commander silently moved his army by the left flank, trusting with the morning sun to envelope the right and rear of
Lee's depleted army.
The genius of
Lee seemed to have been inspired, for by some means he divined his adversary's plans and moved parallel to him, and as
Grant changed from flank to front and moved forward, the battered but defiant Army of Northern Virginia was before him.
[
382]
Thence followed the fierce battles around
Spotsylvania,
North Anna and Cold Harbor.
So ended the terrible
Battle of the Wilderness.
On nearly the same ground
Lee and
Hooker had fought two years before, and now the first captain in the
Federal army was sent with the finest army to crush
Lee, yet he failed, and
Chancellorsville and the
Wilderness became famous in history as stragetic spots.
Here in each battle genius and unsurpassed courage more than matched numbers and splendid appointments.
Thus, in succession,
Manassas, Cold Harbor, and
Chancellorsville and the
Wilderness, heretofore unknown, became luminous in history, and the terrific battle fought on these fields demonstrated their value as strategic points.
Less only in the number of troops engaged,
Winchester, in the lower Valley, became conspicuous in Confederate annals as a strategic point.
Early in 1861
Johnston recognized its value and so held it. Later
Jackson made a vigorous attack on
Shields at
Kernstown for its recovery, but for paucity of numbers and exhaustion of his troops from rapid and severe marching would have wrested it from Federal grasp.
In the spring of 1862 this same Stonewall made a sudden rush upon
Banks and drove him from the town and across the
Potomac.
So greatly did the
Federal government appreciate its worth that two armies were dispatched, one under
McDowell from
Fredericksburg, and the other under Freemont from
Franklin, each largely superior to
Jackson, to drive him from
Winchester.
Again the town became headquarters for Federal occupation of the Valley district, and again after
Second Manassas was evacuated.
On the retirement of
Lee's army to
Fredericksburg in the fall of 1862, again the town became the
Federal headquarters for that section of
Virginia.
After
Chancellorsville, in the order of
Lee's combinations,
Ewell burst through the gaps of the
Blue mountains, and suddenly swooping down upon the little city, threw
Milroy and the remnant of his garrison across the
Potomac.
After
Gettysburg,
Winchester again fell to the
Federal occupation.
General Jubal Early once again wrested it from the troops of the
United States and again forced back, Federal occupation followed, and once more partial success almost
[
383]
put it again in his possession.
Thence to the close of the war, it remained in possession of the
Federal troops.
No other place of similar importance so often changed hands as did the little city of
Winchester; and while not contended for by so large forces as the other points mentioned, yet the frequency with which its occupation was fought for, testifies its value in the estimation, both of the
Confederate and Federal forces.
The places enumerated are points, which should the blasting misfortunes of war ever oscillate over the Old Dominion again, will become the scenes of similar battles.
Let us trust no more in the history of this country, this curse shall ever again come upon this fair land, and pray that ‘men may learn to war no more.’
[
384]
