The National Crisis.
letter from vice President Breckinridge--letter from Judge A. B. Longstreet--military movements in Charleston — county Meetings in Virginia — the southern Confederacy — the defences of Charleston harbor--Fort Pulaski--the Servants in the field, &c., &c.Letter from vice President Breckinridge.
Hon. John C. Breckinridge has written a letter to Gov. Magoffin, of Ky. in which, while favoring the compromise propositions of Mr. Crittenden, he expresses himself as utterly hopeless of their being adopted. He concludes as follows: ‘ The immediate question now presented is, peace or war. Whether the right of a State or States to dissolve connection with the federal system be a reserved right, or one growing out of the Constitution, or the right of revolution; the great fact lies before us, that the act has been done; and we are not permitted to doubt that in a few weeks seven or eight States, containing a larger population than the thirteen Colonies at the epoch of the Revolution, will have withdrawn from the Union and declared their independence. Under whatever name disguised, a collision of arms with them will be war. ’ The dominant party here, rejecting everything, proposing nothing, are pursuing a policy which under the name of "enforcing the laws" and "punishing traitors," threatens to plunge the country into all the calamities of civil war. The Federal Union cannot be preserved by arms. The attempt would unite the Southern States in resistance, while in the North a great multitude of true and loyal men never would consent to shed the blood of our people in the name and under the authority of a violated compact. A serious collision upon existing issues would destroy whatever hope may yet remain of preserving or restoring the Union. An attempt to hold it together by the bayonet would exceed any thing yet recorded in the annals of human madness and folly. It would bring on a war of unexampled ferocity, in which every vital principle of the Union would disappear forever. If the South should succeed in maintaining her independence, the fends and animosities engendered by the contest between the sections would be transmitted to succeeding generations, while, if she should be subjugated, the Government would become in form and in fact consolidated, and would soon reach the usual historical termination in a military despotism. But her subjugation is impossible without extermination; and that is impossible. And yet the danger of civil war is imminent, unless it shall be arrested by prompt and energetic action. If, before the passions of men become aroused, and a series of untoward events drift us into strife, Kentucky and the other border States shall calmly and firmly present a united front against it, I believe it may be arrested. Fifteen States are potent to prevent war. This, too, would strengthen all the true men in the Northern States who resist the atrocious policy. Upon this question let us annihilate party. The force party believe that Kentucky and other Southern States are seriously divided on this subject.--Unless this can be quickly shown to be a delusion, it may become the parent of a brood of woes. The wisdom of the Legislature will doubtless provide whatever is needful; yet, at a time like this, it becomes the duty, as it is the right, of every man to express his opinions; and, as one citizen of the Commonwealth, I give my voice for a State Convention. It is only by the direct action of the several States, in their sovereign capacity, that anything effectual can now be done; and, for one, I desire that Kentucky may have an opportunity to determine, in the most solemn manner, her judgment of her rights, and her attitude in the present condition of affairs. She has not been an inactive nor inglorious member of the Confederacy; she is in the presence of great and startling events, and it is not her nature to sit in listless apathy, borne along by rapid currents, without the power to direct her course. Let her have the opportunity, through her chosen representatives, of deciding upon the prospect of reuniting all the States in a constitutional Union, or, if that shall be impossible, let her be in a position to determine her own destiny. This letter has grown longer than I intended, although I have adhered pretty closely to my original purpose, rather to present facts, and my impressions of them, from this standpoint, than to enter upon elaborate discussion. I need not say to you, my dear sir, that I have uttered nothing in an obtrusive spirit, but rather, reluctantly and sorrowfully. My suggestions in regard to the action of Kentucky are offered in a spirit of loyally to the State I love and will ever obey. They are clearly right, or very wrong. If right, the pleasure will be mine to have said a timely word; if wrong, I will know how to bear without a murmur all the consequences of an honest but terrible mistake.The letter from President Longstreet
The following is the letter written by Judge Longstreet, President of the College of South Carolina, and published in the Charleston papers. The "calamity" of which he speaks — firing the first gun — has already occurred: ‘ I pray the authorities and people of South Carolina to put aside passion, and hear patiently and thoughtfully what I have to say upon the present critical position of our beloved State. The chances are that I am wrong in my views; for, so far as I have been enabled to collect the popular sentiment in this quarter, at least eight out of ten of the wisest heads of the land are against me, and I have reached that period of life when the wisdom of age begins to give place to its weaknesses. But the correctness of opinions is not to be estimated by number, or by age, but by the standard of reason; and to this standard I would respectfully invite all who differ with me. This much is certain, that almost every man with whom I have conversed upon the points of difference between us, shows manifest excitement — the poorest accompaniment of reason and argument that could be selected from the armory of mind. ’ It seems to be generally understood (and approved of,) that if the Harriet Lane attempts to enter this port she will be fired into; and, if rumor is to be credited, this is to be done without parley or explanations. If I have not lost my senses, this is the most dangerous, useless, ill-advised measure which could possibly be adopted just at this time. Thus far the war between South Carolina and the Federal Government has been constructive; the first gun fired makes it actual. Thus far South Carolina has maintained a purely defensive position; this measure is openly aggressive, and is to draw the first blood from a citizen of the United States; and, for aught that we know, from some champion of the cause of South Carolina. The character in which the Harriet Lane approaches us, we do not know, and cannot know, if she comes with sealed instructions. This thing is to be done just as four States are hastening to our embrace as fast as they can come, and when it is almost certain that all the slave States will be united with us in one grand Confederacy in less than three months; and after our warmest supporters among them have implored us to wait for concert of action with them, when the Northern States are still obedient to the Federal Government, and likely to be while Buchanan remains in office; when that Government is reeling, and in two months time may become impotent for good or evil, when South Carolina is the peculiar object of Black Republican vengeance, and when they want only a tolerable pretext to visit her with a war of extermination before the other States can in due form come to her help; when all the help she can hope for is impotent at sea.--Her aggressive step will alarm the States which are at the point of secession, and perchance kindle dissension in their bosoms; certainly enkindle their ire against her. It will unite the North and the world against her. It will verity the dismal predictions of the submissionists, and blast the reputation of the secessionists. It will precipitate South Carolina from the highest pinnacle of fame to the lowest depth of humiliation. When I think of the probability of it, my soul is so heavily burdened with the awful responsibility of the act, that I can hardly bring my thoughts to decent order, or my pen to decent style. If nothing else would stay the act, I would cheerfully surrender the power of speech and of hearing for the balance of my life to avert it. What do the advocates of this desperate measure promise themselves from it? "It will unite the Southern States." Are they not united already? Do not the rankest cowards say there must be resistance? Does one of them disapprove of the step which South Carolina has taken, save as to time? And has she not, up to this time, repelled the objections to her haste? Her people forced her to quick secession; and here they were satisfied with dispatch, and perfectly willing to await the action of her sister States. Their representatives have been in no hurry. Why, then, just as we are about to reap the best fruits of our labors, are we going to become rash indeed, and fling them away for the apples of Sodom? May God save us from this measure! Take away the apology of "uniting the South," and the act stands before the world without excuse. You cannot say that the Harriet Lane comes with a warlike intent; and if you could, firing into her is not going to defeat her intent, or advance the independence of South Carolina the thousandth part of a hair's breadth. But it will furnish your enemy with an admirable apology for filling your harbor with armed ships, turning Sumter upon Moultrie, laying waste your city, and lining your coast with Republican hirelings. Hirelings! Aye, when the war opens, it is to be between the bright and gallant sons of South Carolina and these hirelings. Woe to the people who bring on such a conflict, but from dire necessity!--Is it necessary? No, no, no! It is not only bootless, desperate, but wholly unnecessary. Mr. Buchanan says he does not mean to attack any State for seceding. All the Black Republican presses say the same thing. But they mean to collect the revenues. This, to be sure, is war in disguise, but practically it is harmless, and we will be able to keep it in disguise until the proper time for us to strip the monster of its veil. The Black Republicans think and hope that when their Collector is sent here, the State will deal with him in some way that will justify open war upon her. To fire into the vessel that brings him is exactly the thing which they want. Hence the vessel that is coming is named, her dispatches are hid from public view — they may be peaceful or belligerent (something seemingly peaceful will be put into them for future uses.) the Collector is named. Now, for God's sake, people of South Carolina, do not fall into this trap. Let the Collector come, let him land, treat him politely, introduce him to Mr. Colcock, and tell him you hope the Collectors of the two sovereignties will settle their respective claims in the spirit of courtesy and kindness. Do this, and the President of the Republicans will be beautifully check-mated. All the time consumed in these courtesies will be bringing on your allies. The end of it will be that the revenues will be collected out at sea. Be it so: let them have them; let your commerce go on until our Confederacy is formed. Before that time, floating custom-houses will be strung all along our Southern coast, and we will have a Confederacy of the cotton-growing States. Even then, I would not precipitate a war. The new Confederacy will certainly be acknowledged by France and England, and they will enter into treaties of commerce with us, by which they will obligate themselves to push the floating custom houses aside, and open a glorious traffic with us.--Thus, by a little delay, and the forfeiture of the customs for a few months, we gain everything we desire, without the loss of one drop of blood — without spoiling our harbors, and without interrupting our commerce for a single hour. And now for the ticklish point: Suppose they come to strengthen the posts? --If the salvation of the world depended upon it, could you prevent them from so doing? If you could not, why would you waste blood and treasure in attempting to do it? Is it any disgrace not to initiate a hopeless conflict?--Any nation would be excused for declining such a conflict; but no nation could be excused for beginning it. What must be thought of the nation who would begin it on the water, without a gun-boat or a sailor to sustain it? And what sort of a beginning of it will it be, to fire a few useless shots at a mere Government cutter? Provoke open and unequal war to prevent the strengthening of a fort which is already too strong for us! Here is the beginning and the end of the plan proposed: Fire a few worthless shots at a vessel — set Sumpter to firing upon Moultrie — hold Moultrie till some hundreds of our sons are buried in its ruins — then desert it, and wait the wrath of the United States upon our devoted city! If all the forts were crammed full of men, they would not attack the city unless first attacked. If we were sure they would, we cannot prevent it; why, then, in the name of God, bring on a war of such fearful consequences? If you mean to hold Fort Moultrie, I implore you to let the first shot come from the enemy. Burn that precept into your hearts, if you despise all else that I have written. But I would abandon it now, if demanded, putting it just as Anderson left it.--But no, it must be held, desperate as is the tenure, or we shall be called cowards. Fools may so call you — no wise man will. "It must end in a war," says one, "and we'd as well bring it on at once." It never will end in a war, if the South will be prudent, and we must let no Southern State begin it. And if a Southern State is to begin it, let her not begin it on the water.Correspondence between Secretary
Thompson and President Buchanan.
The following is the correspondence which passed between President Buchanan and Secretary Thompson, on the resignation of the latter:
Washington, Jan. 8, 1861.
Sir:
It is with extreme regret I have just learned that additional troops have been ordered to Charleston.
This subject has been frequently discussed in Cabinet Council; and when on Monday night, 31st of December ultimo, the orders for reinforcements to Fort Sumter were countermanded, I distinctly understood from you that no order of the kind would be made without being previously considered and decided in Cabinet.
It is true that on Wednesday, January 2d, this subject was again discussed in Cabinet, but certainly no conclusion was reached, and the War Department was not justified in ordering reinforcements without something more than was then said.
I learn, however, this morning, for the first time, that the steamer Star of the West sailed from New York last Saturday night with two hundred and fifty men, under Lieutenant Bartlett, bound for Fort Sumter.
Under these circumstances I feel myself bound to resign my commission, as one of your constitutional advisers, into your hands. Sir:
With high respect, your ob't serv't,
J. Thompson.
His Excellency James Buchanan,
President of the United States.
J. Thompson.
His Excellency James Buchanan,
President of the United States.
Washington, Jan. 9, 1861.
Sir:
I have received and accepted your resignation, on yesterday, of the office of Secretary of the Interior.
On Monday evening, 31st December, 1860, I suspended the orders which had been issued by the War and Navy Departments, to send the Brooklyn with reinforcements to Fort Sumter.
Of this I informed you on the same evening.
I stated to you my reason for this suspension, which you knew, from its nature, would be speedily removed.
In consequence of your request, however, I promised that these orders should not be renewed "without being previously considered and decided in Cabinet." This promise was faithfully observed on my part.
In order to carry it into effect, I called a special Cabinet meeting on Wednesday, 2d January, 1861, in which the question of sending reinforcements to Fort Sumter was amply discussed both by yourself and others.
The decided majority of opinions was against you.--At this moment the answer of the South Carolina "Commissioners" to my communication to them of 31st December was received and read.
It produced much indignation among the members of the Cabinet.
After a further brief conversation I employed the following language: ‘"It is now all over, and reinforcements must be sent"’ Judge Black said, at the moment of my decision, that after this letter the Cabinet would be unanimous, and I heard no dissenting voice.
Indeed, the spirit and tone of the letter left no doubt on my mind that Fort Sumter would be immediately attacked, and hence the necessity of sending reinforcements there without delay.
Whilst you admit "that on Wednesday, January 2d, this subject was again discussed in Cabinet," you say, "but certainly no conclusion was reached, and the War Department was not justified in ordering reinforcements without something more than was then said." You are certainly mistaken in alleging that "no conclusion was reached." In this your recollection is entirely different from that of your four oldest colleagues in the Cabinet, Indeed, my language was so unmistakable that the Secretaries of War and the Navy proceeded to act upon it without any further intercourse with myself than what you heard, or might have heard me say. You had been so emphatic in opposing these reinforcements that I thought you would resign in consequence of my decision.
I deeply regret that you have been mistaken in point of fact though I firmly believe honestly mistaken.
Still it is certain you have not the less been mistaken.
Sir:
