From Meadow Bluff.
probable advance of the enemy to Greenbrier and Jackson's river.[Correspondence of the Richmond Dispatch.]
Camp at Meadow Bluffs. November 16, 1861.
There are some facts that ought to be brought to the attention of those in authority in connexion with this section of the State.
It would seem that there is no apprehension of a further advance on the part of the Yankees in the direction of Lewisburg before spring exists at Richmond; and yet there is, in my opinion, nothing more reasonable or probable than that such an advance should and will be made, especially if our forces be withdrawn.
Who should we not expect an advance?
Is it not to their interest to overrun as much of Western Virginia as possible, and to do it in the shortest period of time?
Have the rich counties of Greenbrier and Monroe no attractions for an army of plunderers and robbers?
Would it not be worth something to the Lincoln Government to get hold of the western end of the Central Railroad?
Has not Rosencranz repeatedly expressed a determination to winter in Lewisburg, and is he not urged to advance by the Northwestern people and their press?
And has he not recently telegraphed to Washington that his arrangements for such an advance would soon be complete?
Sir, an hundred reasons can be given why such a movement should be made by the enemy, and not one why it should not. Would we not advance into the Kanawha Valley if the enemy were to withdraw from it?
Then, why would be not advance to Lewisburg and to Jackson's river were we to withdraw our troops?
Now, mark the prediction!
Rosencranz will invade Greenbrier and occupy Lewisburg, and perhaps advance to Jackson's river before Christmas, should the troops now here be withdrawn; or even if they remain here and are not reinforced, he will probably attempt it. Surely it would be good policy on the part of the enemy to get possession of this region and draw his supplies from the Secessionists rather than transport them 150 miles in wagons over bad roads!
These things should be well considered, and it were well if they were considered before it be too late.
It will not do to rely upon Gen. Floyd, and he on the south side of New river or the Kanawha.
Three hundred men at Bowyer's, Richmond's, Pack's, or any other Ferry, with one or two pieces of artillery, might hold him in check, while Rosencranz, with the main body of his army, could move forward unresisted.
Nor would it be good policy in Floyd to go into the Kanawha valley with a force of less than 20,000 men, leaving Rosencranz in his rear, and the Kanawha river in fine boating condition, by means of which any quantity of Ohio troops might be sent up in front in a few hours.
The great need of Western Virginia is troops, and if over the Pierpont Government is to be overthrown, we must have them.
We need 25,000 effective men in the direction of Cheat Mountain, and 25,000 on the James River and Kanawha Turnpike. Had such a force been furnished in the summer, there would not have been a Yankee nor an avowed tory this side of the Ohio river.
Instead of this, however, the Kanawha Valley and the Northwest are completely overrun, good Southern men driven from their once peaceful and prosperous homes, their property destroyed or confiscated, and their wives and children left behind to freeze, to starve, or drag out mouths of misery, subject to the insults of ruffian enemies.
I very much fear some people will not awaken to the importance of more vigorous and offensive ... 