The spade and mattock.
Hannibal, the Carthaginian, stood on the field of Cannon, surrounded the dead bodies of eighty thousand
Rome who had fallen in that unheard of bat was advised by his master of the horse once upon
Rome, and settle the the capture of that city.
But, although as man never toiled before for the attainment of that it was at last come within the magnitude of his own success . He hesitated, Delibes . His enemy recovered their ernation--he gave them time and to recruit — they soon had new in the field — his victory turned to ashes he found that he had now to do who had profited by defeat, wisdom, and gathered safety, catastrophe which was to over forever.
In the end he lost everything by his hesitation.
His repu. --
Italy, his own country very paid the forfeit of his want of
Confederate army gained at
Manassas almost as decided as that gained by . The number of the enemy was not great, it is true, but it was their whole army had been . They were thoroughly demurral --indeed they may be said to have been . For weeks, in
Washington, they were leaving on every train by about leave given or asked.
It the newspapers that for one after the battle, the number that through
Baltimore, going North, ex the recruits passing South to join the army by fourteen thousand men. Even the of
Patterson, which was not in the fight, the panic.
Within three weeks af the battle.
Washington city might have by five thousand men. The connect would have been incalculable.
We have had
Baltimore, Maryland, the city of
Washington.
We should, these sources alone, have had rein to the amount of fifty thousand men. We should have had pos of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, would thus have soon cleared the
Yankees of
Western Virginia.
Had we then push for
Philadelphia, it would have a blow.
Had we then proceeded the same vigor which has been man since the fall of
Fort Donelson, we have poured into Yankeedom as many
Napoleon carried to
Moscow.
Ken would then have acceded to the Southern Confederacy, and we should have pre the war in the
West, where the enemy fighting men lie. "Never," as the the other day, "did Pro such an opportunity into the of man" and never let us add, did man abuse the free gifts of Pro
What did we gain by the battle of Man as . The liberty to indulge in our favorite of ditching, without let or hin for three or four weeks. And we did the time.
The counties of Fair William, turned up almost in from their clay foundation, will evince, to the latest hour of history, the vigor with we and dug. "Spades were as we heard a very witty lady re the other night, and pick-axes and fight cards of different suits.
We did We advanced to the
Potomac, ditching way at the rate of about a quarter a mile we came back without ditching at all. a great General was understood to man who made masterly combinations obtained great results.
Now a great General was who was most dexterous in the of the spade.
An Irish "
canawler" would the description as well as anybody else we ever heard of.
In the meantime, what was the enemy do Rendering his fortifications around impregnable; pouring two hundred thousand men into
Maryland and the accumulating enormous stores of and munitions of war; drilling his into good soldiers; turning to account skill of the most mechanical on the face of the earth; building in iron steamers to penetrate our wherever a river or a creek presented the opportunity.
He had taken the measure the
Southern foot completely.
He knew in certain quarters, for ditches and he resolved to take advantage of it. What was it to him that the
Southern works were impregnable in front?
he not go around them?
Did he not correctly?
The spade and mattock have been to the Southern Confederacy what
Capua was to The latter neutralized the of Connie, the former has converted the of
Manassas into an absolute misfortune.
The boasted "defensive policy" which is nothing, and gives up everything, can judged of by its fruits.
It has been a source of unalloyed, unmitigated, unredeemed Confederacy.
It has caused the operation of our army over a tract of country which it would require three millions of men to defend.
It has exposed us to be in flank everywhere, and to be cut to places in detail.
It has thrown the lead into the hands of the enemy, and compelled us to wherever he may choose to lead the way. Concentrate to fight, disperse to sub Such was the maxim of
Napoleon, and it is founded on common sense.
This indecorously styled, "defensive pol renders concentration impossible.--We have so many points to defend, and the having the advantage in his navy, can from the one to the other with so much that we cannot possibly oppose his columns except in detachments.
Be above all, it has given foreign countries a opinion of our vigor and ener seeing us sink into utter apathy after the great victory at
Manassas, what conclusion could they draw except that which they did draw, viz: That we were victorious by accident, and are altogether unworthy of the that smiled upon us there?
Had we acted was the least show of vigor after that victory, we should have been recognized long ago. But who is going to help a man, that will not help himself?
We have no apprehension that the same realize will follow from neglecting the advantage which might have been derived from
Manassas that followed from neglect to prosecute the victory of Cannie.
But the mischief that has resulted from inaugurating the policy of over a country embracing a million of square miles has already been incalculable, and my prove even worse, if persisted includes, the very examples offered to us for , prove that it is fraught with mischief While we were fresh from the slaughter of
Manassas, for instance, we were told in periodical that we ought to imitate is example of La Vendee; that is, we ought give up our cannon, our muskets, and or rifles — abandon all organization — see our fields devastated, our cities burnt, our women subjected to every manner of outrage, our tillers of the earth slaughtered in the fields by the thousands--and betake ourselves to scythes, pitchforks, club, pikes, and such other weapons of rural warfare ! For to such a condition must we be reduced before we can resemble La Vendee, which, after all, was conquered, and became as quiet as any department of the
Republic or Empire.
We must for the present, it is true, act on the defensive; but if we strike a blow, we must derive some benefit from the victory.
We must abandon, in a word the system which has brought us to the verge of ruin.
