[From the London Times, Feb. 7.]
A comparison between
America in August, 1861, and
America in February, 1862, will simply show that the citizens of the Great Republic have contrived to spend more money in a shorter time, and to less purpose, than any people who ever lived on the face of the earth.
That is literately all that has been done in the States of the
Union from the last rising of Parliament up to the present day. The
North cannot invade the
South; the
South can do no more than keep the
North at bay. For the more purpose of this mutual checkmate, a sum of money has been expended of such incredible magnitude that all similar charges appear insignificant in comparison.
We only know the coat in curred by one of the two belligerents upon his armaments, but these probably exceed the coats of all the armies and navies of all the States of
Europe put together.
At any rate, they are about six times as heavy as those of our own estimates, though these have been inflaters to unusual dimensions by the necessities of the period.
The actual expenditure of the
Federal States upon their land and sea forces it at the rate of £162,000,000 a year.
If we are to suppose that the forces which are a match for these in the field march also in cost, we shall arrive at the conclusion that the two sections of the
Union must be spending between them nearly £1,000,000 sterling a day.
What has been done for this stupendous outlay would puzzle anybody to discover.--The Southerners, it is true, have achieved a certain success, but by virtue of their position only.
As they have not been subdued, nor compelled to abandon their pretensions to independence, they may claim a species of victory; but their triumph is due to their ation, and not to their military power.--From the tone of their journals, which are written with far greater freedom than those of the
North, we infer that the Confederate army is strong in numbers, but indifferently equipped, and less carefully disciplined than inst.
under
Gen. McClellan.
The relative advantages of the rival forces have been not unfairly contrasted by Southern critics.
The Confederates have the advantage in the individual excellence of their troops, in the military aptitudes of their population, in the number of well-trained officers, and probably in the more resolute determination of the men. The Federal, on the other hand, are superior in artillery, in supplies, and in materials generally; they have larger resources to back them, and
Gen. McClellan, with a clear perception of what was lacking, has labored incessantly to give his army that mechanical power which springs from discipline and drill.
His efforts can hardly have been thrown away, but his troops, after all, are but soldiers of six months standing, so that, if discipline is to be their chief reliance, they can have but little to depends upon.--There is probably not a battalion in his army which would be considered in this country as qualified for active service.
These accounts give a sufficient explanation of the military inaction which is at once so costly and so unpopular.
General Beau regard is not strong enough to advance against the entrenchments by which
Washington is protected, and behind which the
Federal troops would fight to great advantage.
Gen. McClellan dares not invade a country impassable for his artillery and baggage, and occupied by a wary enemy who has twice taken him at a disadvantage, and who could probably perplex him more than ever by retreating before him without a blow.
In the remote districts the successes of the belligerents are pretty evenly balanced.
Against the
Federal victory at
Somerset the
Confederates now claim to set off the news of a victory received at
St. Louis; out in no district whatever — neither in the interior nor on the coast — has such superiority been displayed as would give any prospect of the termination of the strife.
Of the contrary, if we are to draw any conclusion at all from the barren History of the campaign, it is that each party is powerful enough to arrest the progress of the other, but powerless for any thing beyond.
The one great fact established by the events of the last six months is the genuine and complete unanimity of the
South.
The Confederates were either all of one mind at first, or they have become so under the influence of the contest itself.
The Federal have had ample opportunities of tasting the temper of the Seceders and of liberating the sentiment of ‘"loyalty, "’ if it was anywhere kept down by violences; but in these trials they have never found the slightest encouragement.
Even the slave population of the
South has rejected their advances, and their successive lodgments at Hatter as and
Port Royal have not been attended with the least profit to their cause.
This fact alone ought to be decisive of the hopelessness of the war. Nine millions of people, inhabiting a territory of 900,000 square miles, and animated by one spirit of resistance, can never be subdued.
The hatred existing between North and South becomes more manifest day after day. A Southern journal of good repute argues that the
Confederate States ought, on pure principles of policy, to abstain from all intercourse with the
Federal States, even after the conclusion of peace, and to treat the
Yankees exactly as the Japanese treat Europeans.
It is remarkable that, while the
Confederates appear so resolute and so united, the rumors of treason on the
Federal side should be so serious and constant.
We never hear that the Unionists get any aid or encouragement from anybody in the opposite camp or any inhabitant of Southern territory, whereas we are told by every mail that in the
Federal camp, the
Federal capital, and even the very offices of the
Federal Government, there are men who wish well to the Seceders.
In more than one of the chief towns of the
North there is a Salt-disguised leaning to the
Confederate cause; in fact, the principles of the Unionists have only been maintained in supremacy by espionage and terrorism.
There is far more reason to suppose that the
South has allies in the
North than that the
North can fled any adherents in the
South.
The true desire of the
North is empire at any price.
‘"One power on this continent, one Government, and one alone; let it be
Jeff. Davis's, or
Abe Lincoln's, or --."’ These terms, in which our special correspondent expresses ‘"Democratic ideas,"’ represent probably the dominant feeling of those who are struggling for Union.
But that Union has become an impossibility.--The Southerners would now refuse to live under the same Government with the
Yankees on any condition whatever, and there are Abolitionists enough in the
New England States and pure Republicans enough in the
Northwest to forbid any convention in the interests of Slavery.
While the object of the war is thus unattainable, its cost is absolutely marvellous.
Nothing in the familiar examples of Transatlantic exaggeration approaches to the dimensions of this reality.
The Federal army costs about as much in one month as our army cost in the whole year of 1854, though that was the first year of the
Crimean War. The charge of a battalion of infantry, 1,000 strong, in
General McClellan's force, all military costs included, would be 200,000l, or at the rate of 200l a head.
By this reckoning an American volunteer costs within a pound or two as much as the pay of an English captain, and there are 650,000 of them.
These brief statements will enable us to understand how the
Federal army is more likely to be the rain of the
North than of the
South.
It cannot advance, but its expenses are going on. Nine months of a war without a campaign, and almost without a movement, have brought an opulent and powerful country to the extremities of pecuniary need; nor is there in this respect any prospect of improvement.
If the
Federal commander should be compelled by pressure from without to advance into the enemy's country, he may, indeed, increase the charges of the war, but he is not likely to quicken the approach of peace.
That is the position to which American affairs have now been brought, and in the meantime the industry of the civilized world is paralyzed by the effects of this hopeless struggle.
