The campaign in Virginia.
Revelations from the
Federal War Department--attack on
Gen. McClellan--Development of the great man
Hitchcock —
Banks Fremont,
McDowell, &c., &c.
[from the Boston Transcript, June 2.]
When two influential newspapers of this city, claiming to be friendly to the present administration, in utter ignorance of the great facts indispensable to correct judgment, have seen fit to call for the removal of
Mr. Stanton, and when one of those journals the
Daily Advertiser, had been for weeks joining with the New York
Herald and the Boston
Courier, and with everything bitter, factious, and treasonable, in ignorant abuse of that eminent person, it becomes a matter of simple justice that he should have the public benefit of some of the great facts of record in his favor.
We propose, by a simple exhibition of authoritative facts, and in no spirit of mere partisan attack and defence, to show that it is to him, whom the
Daily Advertiser charges with all which it regards as error, while it credits to others all which it regards as wisdom in the central conduct of this war — to him whom so many newspapers have attacked because in the interest of his country and with the thanks of all their readers he stopped their longer doing the work of spies in conveying information to our enemies — to him, whose noble self-abnegation and stern patriotism have closed his mouth from answering a series of falsehoods, beginning with the charge of his diverting troops from
Gen. McClellan, and ending with the charge of his diverting them from
Gen. Banks, to gratify personal jealousy and ambition — that it is to him, next certainly to the
President, that this country owes more to-day than to any other man in it.
To do this we must go back to the condition of affairs when he first took office.
In what we have to say of
General McClellan, we shall draw a clear line between his plans and acts as
Commander-in-Chief, and his ability as a General at the head of an army in the field.
We believe him to be fully competent where he is, and we shall not cease to believe in his eminent fitness and to hope for his triumphant success in his present campaign, unless forced by events and by authoritative military criticism to another conclusion.
It is clear that when the main direction of this war was left to a commander-in-Chief, that more than purely military calculations must occupy his mind; that he must see the value of time in relation to national finances, to a democratic form of Government, and to foreign intervention; in short, that he must have some of the qualities of a great statesman, as well as all of the qualities of a great General.
When
Mr. Stanton became
Secretary of War, what was the posture of affairs under
General McClellan's plan and direction?
The country was under lasting obligations to his demonstrated faculty for organization.
But it becomes necessary to state how little else had been done, why so little had been done, and to whom the country is indebted for what was done in February and March, and to its position before the world to-day.
Whether more could not have been accomplished in
Kentucky, nearly all of whose strategic posts were occupied by the enemy, we are not competent to judge.
But it is clear to military authorities and to the country that
Eastern Tennessee, whose people are the most loyal and the most distressed of the border States, might have been relieved,
Knoxville taken, and the great northern line of communication between
Virginia and the great sources of her supplies broken, weeks or months before
General McClellan ceased to be
Commander-in-Chief.
The country patiently waited, because we believed it bore wise relation to some great military plan.
The country saw the great Baltimore and Ohio Railroad not only abandoned to the enemy, but its rolling stock neither removed nor destroyed, but given up to him to whom its value was immense. --The responsibility for this loss we do not impute to
General McClellan.
The road remained in the enemy's possession.
Still patient, but in deep humiliation, the country saw a blockade of the
Potomac quietly allowed, which cost this country millions of dollars, by reducing our immense transportation to one railroad, with a single track, and which placed our Government before the world as besieged in its own Capital.
We know whereof we affirm when we say that five months ago our Navy Department begged to be allowed to remove that blockade.
They demonstrated its removal to be a simple certainty, and an eminent general was anxious to aid by landing troops, confident that he could capture the batteries and the men who manned them.
Their repeated requests were peremptorily refused by the
Commander-in-Chief.
The plan of the
Hatteras expedition contemplated nothing more than the destruction of the forts and sinking obstructions in the channel, and the occupation of the forts was a wise transcending of instructions.
In this
Gen. McClellan may, perhaps, have had no responsibility.
But the instructions for the
Burnside expedition were substantially his, and by them
Gen. Burnside was limited to perfecting the blockade, and prevented from striking at vital points and cutting important lines of railroad.
Over all this the country wondered, believed, and waited.
We know that, beginning more than five months ago,
Gen. Wool and the Navy Department joined in urgent and repeated applications to be allowed to take
Norfolk, which they demonstrated to be a military and naval certainty.
Besides its immense importance otherwise, the
Merrimac would have been taken while building, the
Cumberland and the
Congress would have been saved, and the
James as well as the
York river would have been open for
Gen. McClellan's march upon
Richmond.
Their request was peremptorily refused by the
Commander-in-Chief.
We know that while
Gen. McClellan was still
Commander-in-Chief,
Gen. Sherman reported that he was prepared and anxious to be allowed to take
Savannah; that it was a military certainty, and that it could be done with very little loss of life.
This, too, was forbidden by the
Commander- in-Chief.
We have given these great selected facts, derived from central and authoritative sources, to indicate the whole circle which the people supposed bore relation to some sufficient and entirely justifying plan in the mind of the
Commander-in-Chief.
We will add, without assuming to pass judgment, that, while in great
European wars, the spy system has often been such as to tap the very centre of military counsel, while there never was a war offering better opportunity for such a system than this, and while our enemy has notoriously been in possession of nearly all our plans as soon as made, we have lamentably failed in detecting his.
We will not stop to conjecture what
Gen. McClellan's plan was, and we have no right to state such facts bearing upon it as are within our knowledge.
Nobody questioned his loyalty and his faculty for organization, and we shall now show that it becomes entirely unnecessary to discuss his plan; for the plan itself becomes unimportant in the light of the facts we shall now state, some of which are already partially before the country.
Mr. Stanton came into power when foreign intervention seemed imminent, with no one great military advantage yet followed up, and with capital distrusting the national finances, on which all depended.
With the breadth and vision of a statesman, and with the terrible earnestness and force of will of a Cromwellian, he brought into the national councils, for the first time since the war began, comprehensiveness, decisiveness, and a thorough realization of the value of time to this nation.
For the first time the national will found expression.
Some minor mistakes, like his letter to the New York
Tribune, sprung naturally from his being thoroughly in earnest.
Of great mistakes he made none.
He found
General McClellan virtually directing the whole war; responsible that no more had been done, and fixed in his determination that no advance should be made until April.
In this determination
General McClellan still further fortified himself by a vote of eight of his
Generals against four.
Mr. Stanton saw at once that no advance until April involved national despondency, a tax levied upon a people for an immense debt which had borne no fruit in victories, hot weather, and a full campaign, distrust, and a great fall in national stocks, and a possible if not probable foreign intervention.
Then, through him, was issued the
President's Order No. 1, over
Gen. McClellan's head, and against his protest, peremptorily commanding an advance at all points on the 23d of February.
Gen. McClellan was placed at the head of the Army of the Potomac, and ceased to be
Commander-in-Chief Mr. Stanton simply became a real
Secretary of War.
taking into his capable hands the reins which
Mr. Cameron had either necessarily given to others or misused himself.
The President had, at last, a great right arm to lean on, and each was strengthened and greater for the other.
The movements in the
West under
Commodore Foote, which sent joy and hope through the nation were made without regard to
General McClellan's plan, and sprang directly from
Commodore Foote's communications and requests to the Navy Department and its orders to him; and without further enumeration, it is only necessary to say that the series of brilliant successes during February and March, which threw new life into the nation, which gave us
Fort Henry,
Bowling Green,
Columbus,
Donelson,
Island No.10, and
Nashville, which brought national stocks to par, and which forced respect for us abroad if it did not prevent intervention, was in direct contravention of the plan of the
commander-in-Chief, and against his protest.
What that plan was, were it proper to disease it, becomes of little consequence when we know that no advance was to be made under it until April, and when it was found that the
Commander-in-Chief had communicated none to the other
Major Generals.
While expressing, as we have, our faith in
General McClellan as the commander of an army — all the more because, as civilians, we are entirely incompetent to form a judgement of his military acts since he was placed at the head of the Army of the Potomac--we are free to say, and we think all candid men will agree with us, that, in the light of the trust worthy acts we have given, it was the most fortunate event in the history of the war when
Edwin M. Stanton became
Secretary of War, and
General McClellan was placed where nothing more than purely military ability was wanting.
We have reason to believe that nobody regretted more than
Mr. Stanton that the New York
Tribune attacked
General McClellan.
It is almost the only newspaper on our whole seaboard which has attacked nine and since he has left for
Yorktown even the
Tribune's complaints have mainly ceased.
No one can trace to
Mr. Stanton complaints against
General McClellan as the head of an army, and it is simply cruel to connect him with the random and ill-considered criticisms of others.
What
ever his opinions may for he is too wise and too just to complain of a General as long as he is kept at the hand of a great army in the face of his enemy.
And now what are the facts as to the charges of diversion of troops facts
General McClellan which have taken contradictory and absurd shapes, which have had the support of some letters written by a few honest officers in the field, with only special and limited knowledge as well as those of omniscient newspaper correspondents, of newspapers which have merited suppression for early treason and persistent factiousness and even of a few Republican newspapers like the
Daily Advertiser which, instead of going to the proper sources for full knowledge, have been as dogmatic as they have been ignorant.
In the first place let it not be forgotten that the
President and Cabinet have at their side a special military adviser
Gen. Hitchcock, who has been called the Cæser of our army, and whose skill as a strategist and whose powers of combination are commensurate, (on the highest military authority) with his general courage and comprehensiveness.
And he is not the only General eminent by nature, culture and experience, who is called into consultation.
The idea that
Mr. Stanton alone interferes with or changes military plans is simply absurd.
No agreement was ever made by the
President of the War Department with
General McClellan to send to the peninsula the whole of
McDowell's corps.
For reasons no doubt sufficient to his mind, with reference to his position upon the peninsula, he desired the whole, which would have left not a national soldier between the forts across the
Potomac and
Richmond by way of
Fredericksburg.--A large part of
McDowell's command was, however, sent to him, which was so much in excess of agreement; and when the correspondence of the War Department on that subject sees the light, it will be found that the
President himself interfered to prevent the 23,000 men left to
Gen. McDowell from being further sent in excess of original agreement.
But for the
President wisely insisting, that both for the safety of
Washington, and that
Gen. McClellan might be aided by a flank movement under
Gen. McDowell, these 23,000 men should make a part of a sufficient force, all of
General McDowell's army would have gone to the peninsula.
And yet
Mr. Stanton has been charged with diverting troops from
Gen. McClellan, in violation of original agreement, and with his having prevented this very flank movement upon
Richmond, which was long delayed because more men had been sent to
Gen. McClellan than he was entitled to by agreement.
The simple truth is, that the reduction of
Gen. McDowell's command by sending so large a portion of it to
Gen. McClellan, beyond agreement, if not in full compliance with his wishes, caused the very derangement of original plans which has been wickedly charged upon
Mr. Stanton.
Until
Gen. McDowell's force was increased and the disposition of troops changed, these facts could not be publicly stated.
In regard to the withdrawal of troops from
Gen. Banks it would have simply been decent for the
Daily Advertiser, before attacking the
Government it nominally supports, and before relying on the statements of an excited officer, who only knew certain facts in relation to his own column, to have waited to learn the overruling military reason and necessity for the withdrawal — of which that officer and the
Daily Advertiser knew literally nothing.--
General Banks is not in the habit of communicating to his subordinates the important plans or the necessities for changes of plan of a campaign.
We are at liberty to say as much as this; that
General Banks, on a full understanding of the military necessity, cheerfully acquiesced in the temporary and necessary abandonment of a plan in whose original conception and partial execution he had the most cordial and effective support of the
Secretary of War.
And we know further that
Mr. Stanton was among the last to yield to the necessity, and that the
President himself intervened and wisely decided that the troops should be withdrawn.
It is, moreover, the fact that the necessity for the diversion of troops from
Gen. Banks grew out of and was in aid of,
Gen. McClellan's wishes and his call for more troops.
Further than this we have no right to speak.
We have only to say further, that the major part of the facts stated in this article, have been for weeks in our possession, and that their publication has been made proper and necessary by the lapse of time, and by the most ignorant, virulent, and persistent attacks upon a Government whose lips have been closed against saying a word which might, even by implication, injure one of its own
Generals or the cause in which we are all engaged.
We have said that we know these facts.
We say this deliberately and on our responsibility as journalists and as gentlemen.
If it be objected that the facts stand unsupported by the names of the sources of information, we can only add that the assumption of knowledge of plans and changes of plans in the many newspapers, which have for two months violently attacked the
Secretary of War and the
Government, rests on no exhibition of authority whatever.
It will be time to name sources of information when any respectable authority, so situated as to know governing facts, is produced.
In due time the whole truth will see the light.
