The repulse at Corinth — Incompetence of the commanders.
The Mobile
Advertiser, of the 10th, has obtained an account of the repulse at
Corinth, from a Colonel who was wounded in the engagement.
Our forces numbered about 20,000 fighting men. The
Advertiser says:
‘
It now appears that our
Generals, or at least the
General in command, were terribly deceived, having been lured by the enemy into a trap carefully prepared for them, and made to fight against heavy odds without the hope of any substantial advantage for this waste of blood and life.
The movement on
Corinth was made from the
West, the enemy withdrawing his pickets at our approach, destroying camps, strewing the way with knapsacks, guns, clothing, &c., until he reached his first line of entrenchments, where he made a resolute stand.--Our men rapidly pursued what they supposed a flying enemy, counting on a bloodless victory, some of the
Generals even expecting to obtain possession of the town without firing a gun. Their eyes were opened when they saw the serried ranks of the enemy prepared to receive them, and then they knew that a hard and bloody fight was at hand.
Moore's brigade, of
Maury's division, lead the advance, and the battle soon raged hot and furiously.
The enemy fought well — better, it is said, than ever before in the
West--but they could not withstand the furious charges of our gallant men, who steadily gained upon them, driving them from entrenchment to entrenchment until night closed upon the scene.
The next day the fight was resumed, the enemy meantime having been heavily reinforced, but our troops again pressed forward, gaining the town of
Corinth, and the gallant 42d Alabama planting its colors within a square of the
Tishomingo Hotel.
It became evident, however, that the struggle was too unequal to be continued to any advantage by our forces, whose ranks were becoming fearfully thinned and worn down by fatigue and hunger, while the enemy were being continually reinforced.
The order was then given to fall back, and our troops withdrew from the field, leaving many of our dead and some of our wounded in the possession of the enemy.
Meanwhile the
Federal had thrown a heavy force (estimated at 20,000 men) from
Bolivar to the
South of
Corinth, with the design to cut off our retreat and bag our whole army.
These fresh troops were met with unexampled bravery and vigor by our jaded men in the sanguinary engagement of Sunday at
Pocahontas, which resulted in the discomfiture of the foe, and, thanks to the genius and experience of
Gen. Price, in the escape of our army by an improvised road to a point west of
Ripley, where they made a stand.
The battle on Friday is said to have been the hottest and most desperate of all. Soldiers who were in the
battle of Shiloh say it was more terrible than that memorable conflict.
The enemy appear to have been thoroughly posted with regard to all our movements.
They knew when a given division passed a given point, what was its strength, the direction of its march, how, when, and where the attack was to be made; in short, everything they wished to know, and of course could make all the preparations they desired to meet us.
We have not been able to obtain particulars of the casualties, but the record, we fear, will be sad enough.
The Forty-second Alabama went into the fight of Friday five hundred and thirty strong.
On Saturday it mustered about three hundred, and on Sunday evening a staff officer met the
Major, who had been wounded in the breast, with only eight or ten men, who were all, he said, he had been able together of the regiment.
The rest were either killed, wounded, prisoners, or had fallen by the way from weakness.
On Sunday an order was sent to
Gen. Maury to make a charge with his division, but this gallant officer was forced to reply that he had scarcely two regiments left for duty.
Senstak's artillery was badly cut up, being at one time nearly surrounded by the enemy.
Doudell's (35th Alabama) regiment was also roughly handled, but nobly sustained the reputation of
Alabama in the unequal strife.
Such is a brief, but we believe in the main a truthful, narrative of our recent movement towards
Corinth.
It is not our purpose here to comment upon the facts related.
They are too painful to dwell upon, and call loudly for prompt and searching investigation by the
Government.
If it shall be found that our gallant little army has been led into the ‘"jaws of death,"’ and thus cut up by the ignorance, stupidity, and mismanagement of commanders, the country will demand that an example be made that shall prove at once an assurance to the people and a warning to incompetent or self sufficient
Generals.
’
