Latest from the North.
further Yankee Accounts of the Fredericksburg battle.
We have received Northern papers of the 18th instant.
They contain a very interesting account of the battle of Fredericksburg and some highly interesting comments of the press on the same.
We give below some extracts from them:
An interesting account — a failure Acknowledged.
A correspondent of the New York Tribune, under date of ‘" Fredericksburg, December 14th 11 P. M,"’ thus writes: It is no pleasant task to cool ardent hopes-- disappoint high expectations — predict the unfulfilling of fond wishes. Yet stern realities can never be recognized too soon in order to enable us to prepare for their possible consequences; and hence I trust I will not be blamed for the revelation of the discouraging facts pertaining to the condition in which the Army of the Potomac is on this morning, after yesterday's sanguinary, all but fruitless, struggle Undertakings of any kind are measured by the power employed to carry them out and the result realized by it. This rule applied to yesterday's bloody work of our arms, one cannot help coming to the conclusion that they came short of success. The main object of their efforts was the dislodgement of the rebels from their entrenched position on the heights, the possession of which gave them control of all the roads leading southward from the Rappahannock. But although every means of which the character of the task admitted was used neither the whole nor any portion of the line occupied by the enemy at the opening of the battle is to day in our hands. The causes of our failure are so plain that they cannot be mistaken by even the most unprofessional of observers. We had for the attack superiority of numbers and armament. The former war not only more than balanced by the strength of the enemy's position, but also as available to its full extent of momentum, owing to the unfavorable ground from which we moved to the attack.--An individual, however strong in muscle, cannot successfully contend with an adversary if confined with an adversary if confined to space so narrow as to prevent the free use of his arms. Our right, although sufficiently powerful in point of numbers for the work assigned to it, was precluded from a full and simultaneous display of us strength by being crammed into the streets of Fredericksburg. I doubt whether the history of wars affords another instance of an army attempting to combat from within a town with another enjoying the full freedom of motion given by abundance of space. The six divisions of the Right Grand Division were crowded into these streets so thickly that during Saturday night there troops had hardly sleeping room. The corps of the Centre Grand Division, acting as their reserve, was separated from them soon after the battle by the Rappahannock — another remarkable-- emittance bearing destructively upon the operations of the day. As to our preponderance in artillery, the impracticability of making it tell upon the fortunes of the day deprived as almost wholly of the benefit of it on the right. During the entire struggle on that portion of the lines all but two of the batteries attached to the Right Crand Division and Butler-field's corps stood unemployed on the lower streets of the town. Our batteries on the heights on the right bank of the river could also render no protection to our infantry, as their fire would have done as much damage to our own troops as to the enemy after the former had moved to the attack. Our left did not suffer like the right from the drawback of want of space, as it manœuvred on a high place and bottom. Yet, both wings labored under the disadvantage of righting from low against the enemy on high ground. The obstructions of the sense of the action on our right, in the form of walls, fences and houses, unavoidably confined the movement of our troops, as they successively advanced to the front, to the streets, which were so constantly and completely blocked up during the afternoon that it was impossible for the ammunition trains to reach the divisions of French and Hancock, after they were relieved by others, and supply them with cartridges. They were there by virtually placed hors de combat greatly weakening the force of our attack. Whatever the results of the battle may be termed — check or repulse-- it is certain that the failure to accomplish what we attempted is not the only evil fruit of yesterday. I have spent several hours this morning in visiting the field and the positions held by our troops, and I found the most unmistakable evidence everywhere that the expenditure of strength has been so great as to produce exhaustion to a degree that will render the resumption of the offensive on our part impossible, not only for to day, but for several days to come. The extent of our loss in killed and wounded is not ascertained as yet with anything like definiteness. I have seen enough, however, to satisfy me that will be even greater than it was supposed last night. If 6,000 will cover that of the Right Grand Division I shall be gratefully disappointed. The fact that many of our men have been taken prisoners has only become known this evening. But it is not in the casualties alone that the army has been weakened. The fatigue and exposure of the soldiers for the last three days has been very great, as they have been standing under arms in the mud and cold. Upon the whole, it is my deliberate opinion — and I know it is shared by many of the general officers I have seen — that the army is not fit for the immediate renewal of hostilities, and that it requires rest imperatively. It is likewise evident that the unsuccessful fighting of yesterday, and the hardships endured, have not only affected the bodies, but also the spirits of both officers and men, and time for mental recuperation seems also to be required. No one would be gladder to reflect the bright sides of the situation and prospect of the Army of the Potomac than myself; yet a sense of truth compels me to state that it is not by any means encouraging. To renew an attack on the enemy's position during the night, strengthened, as it has been ascertained this morning, by new batteries, with weakened numbers, would probably result in no better success than that of yesterday. To continue in the position now held cannot be thought of. An attempt to retreat to this side of the river by the precarious means of passage, over a few frail bridges, would undoubtedly bring the victorious hosts of the enemy at once to the attack, and might result in the worst calamity of the war. How the army is to be extricated from these predicaments, I am unable to devise. I trust that those entrusted with its fortunes have the ability to do it. Among the officers reported as killed at the battle of Fredericksburg are Gen. Bayard, of the cavalry; Gen. Jackson, of the Pennsylvania Reserves; Col. Zinn, 132d Pennsylvania; Lt-Col. Dickinson, 4th U. S. artillery; Lt. Col. Curtis, 4th Rhode Island; Lt. Col. Sayles, 7th Rhode Island; Major Horgan, 88th New York: Capt. Kelly, 14th Indiana, and Capt Meagher, 7th New York. Amongst the wounded are the names of Gens. Vinton, Gibbon, Kimball, Caldwell, and Campbell none of them dangerously. Cols Sinclair, 5th Pa; N H Nugent, 69th N Y; Wiseman, 28th N J; Snyder, 7th Va; Miles, 61st N Y; Andrews, 1st Delaware; McGregor, 10th Mass; Hatch, 4th N J. Lt. Cols Geo Dane, 6th Pa; Goodman, 4th Ohio. Majors Goebel, 7th New York; C. C Knight, L19th Pennsylvania; Jennings, 26th New York; O'Nell, 63d New York. Bardwell, of Pennsylvania; Cavanaugh, 69th New York; Philbrook, 16th Massachuset is. Captains Cameroon, 9th New York; Carpenter, 91st New York; Hart, Assistant Adjutant General to Gen. Tyler; Andrew Mahoney. 19th Massachusetts; M. Dunn, 19th Massachusetts, Hendrickson, 9th New York, G. G. Weymonth and J. R. Smith, 136th Pennsylvania; Slater, 15th N York; Leddy, 69th New York; Houghton; 14th Indiana; Burke, 88th New York; Donnovan, 69th New York; Cartwright, 63d New York. Our total loss in officers and men is variously stated at from five to ten thousand.The plan of the battle.
A correspondent of the New York Times concludes a description of the battle of Saturday with the following reflections: Shall we say, then it was a defeat? Certainly. If to have started out to accomplish a certain object, and to have failed in doing so, be a defeat, you can apply no other term to the upshot of to day's battle. In spite of all the glosses of official dispatches which you may receive, it seems here to night that we have suffered a defeat. Let us hope that, when fully prepared, the assault may be renewed with new tactical combination, the position carried, and the day retrieved. If it be not so, the 13th day of December must be accounted a black day in the calendar of the Republic. If you are disposed to indulge in criticism on the plan of the battle of Fredericksburg it will not be difficult to point out its great and radical defects.--To have hurled forward masses of men against the fortified works of those terraces was certainly a manifestation of daring, untempered by the slights prudence. Was it not also a fatal error to have risked the whole success of the plan on the accomplishment of a certain manœuvre, (Franklin's ability to swing round on the rebel flanks, namely,) where all the elements of the problem were completely wanting! What a fearful fatality, too, that our accumulation of artillery was all but entirely unless to us, owing to the distance of the range and the exposure of our own troops. And what a misfortune, equally lamentable, that the approach to the rebel positions back of Fredericksburg was as area so restricted that our field batteries were almost equally useless, owing to the impossibility of manœuvering In the course of this correspondence, from the time of our first occupation of Falmouth; I have informed you of the gradual development of the rebel position, from an absolutely defenceless condition to the time that it became another Gibraltar. Never for a moment did we, who watched this progress, suppose that it would ever be attempted to be taken by hurling masses of men against those works. We had supposed that the resources of strategy would assuredly afford other means of accomplishing the desired end. Regarded as a position of defence, that which the rebel leaders have taken up on the Rappahannock, and which we have been pleased to assail in the manner indicated and with the result known, none could possibly be more magnificent or more nearly impregnable. With fifty thousand men they should easily hold it with three times that number of assailants. And, indeed, they appear never to have employed more than about than about that number. Every time we poured forward fresh men they had ready reinforcements to match. From prisoners taken I learn that on the right, commanded by Jackson, half of the force only (and chiefly the division of A P Hill and Farly's brigade) was engaged. I take it that they had along the line of the Rappahannock about one hundred thousand men, and that 50,000, more or less, were actually engaged in the contest. The Confederate loaders have acted with their usual wiliness in this whole matter. They did well to let us easily into Fredericksburg, firing but a half dozen guns., when they could have brought a hundred to bear upon us. The city itself was the veriest trap that ever was laid — and we have walked into it. Is it any wonder, that with such a position-- on the inside of an are of a circle of batteries-- ‘"Mid upper, nether and surrounding fires,"’Our troops were over and over again broken and shattered in the attempt to take it? The wonder is that such admirable pluck was shown. It is a hopeless task now to go back over the series of blunders that have made this disaster forcible — to inquire, for instance, who is responsible for the delaying of the pontoon bridges ten days beyond the time promised Gen. Burnside, thus enabling the rebels to render their position impregnable. Enough that the inquisition will come by and by. At the close of the battle to night, Gen. Burnside declared that he would renew the contest in the morning. There is, to my mind however, little probability that this will be done, or can be done. It is likely that the council of Generals-- composed of Burnside, Summer, Hooker, and Franklin — now meeting at this house, will shake this determination, as I know they are all opposed to the measure. Indeed, one has only to go over to Fredericksburg, where the army is now huddled, and see its shattered and broken condition — regiments scattered, disorganized, &c.,--to see that a renewal of the fight in the morning or even for some time, is wholly impossible. What the upshot of the whole affair is destined to be, it is of course fruitless to conjecture. We can, no doubt, by the adoption of the right plan, force their position. Their right is really their weak point, and that, by the way, they are now busily engaged in strengthening to- night. The line of the river is, however, entirely too long to be guarded against enterprising attacks, and with the proper dispositions their position can readily by flanked. The situation of our army, however, in cheval of a river — is a perilous one--one of the most demoralizing known; and it may be the dictate of prudence to withdraw the army as soon as possible to the North bank of the Rappahannock.
Particulars of the crossing of the Rappahannock.
Headq's Army of the Potomac, December 17, 1862.
Yesterday morning, when daylight appeared, the enemy seemed to be, as they no doubt were, perfectly astonished that our army had succeeded in returning to this side of the Rappahannock.
We returned, as already stated, without losing a single man or a gun in the retrograde movement.
A few soldiers who had straggled off made their appearance on the river bank after the pontoon bridges had been removed, but they were brought over in small boats, and a few cavalrymen who were guarding a house inhabited by a private family were not during the night aware of our crossing, but only became aware of it in the morning, safely swam the river.
The pickets of the contending armies being separated by a few yards of space only, rendered it necessary that everything on our part should be conducted with the utmost caution.
Those of our troops on the outposts were unaware of the movement until just before day light, when an officer went to each individual man and, in a low tone, ordered him to full back.
After they got sufficiently far to be out of danger they were ordered to quicken their pace and reach the bridges.
About 9 o'clock yesterday morning the enemy advanced their skirmishers along the entire line, and by noon had established their pickets near the river bank.
We had a large number of dead on what was regarded as neutral ground, and as soon as it was known that our forces had evacuated, the soldiers of the enemy commenced robbing the life less bodies.
This was plainly seen through a field-glass, as well as distinctly with the naked eye.
About 10 or 11 o'clk females, neatly dressed, were seen walking the streets of Fredericksburg.
They had doubtless, been concealed in their houses during the time the city was occupied by our troops, and had availed themselves of the first opportunity to make their reappearance.
On Monday the pickets in front of the left wing agreed upon an armistices among themselves, and freely intermingled, exchanging their deed comrades, who lay upon their neutral ground.
During this time a General of our army rode by and put an end to these proceedings.
The result was that both parties immediately commenced firing, when nine of our men were killed.
After the General had left the locality the friendly intercourse was renewed, and butternuts and blue uniforms freely mingled.
About this time Gen. Franklin dispatched a flag of truce, which the enemy immediately recognized, and the exchange of the dead bodies was resumed and continued until completed.
On Monday afternoon Gen. Lee sent a flag of truce to Gen. Burnside, asking him to detail men to bury his dead in front of Gen Sumner's grand division.
This was done.
The wounded, with the exception of those the enemy obtained, have all been brought to this side of the Rappahannock, and as rapidly as possible are being sent to Washington.
The loss in Franklin's grand division, which in- cluded two divisions of Stoneman's corps, is. In killed, 443; wounded, 3,343; missing, 1,900.
There is reason to believe that the greater portion of the wounded are made prisoners.
The loss in Gen. Sumner's and Hooker's grand divisions, which made the assault upon the enemy's works, cannot be fully ascertained as yet but sufficient is known to justify the assertion that our loss in killed and wounded will reach ten to twelve thousand in the battle of Saturday.
During the flag of truce Gen Stuart, of the rebel army, stated that Banks's expedition had gone South but he did not seem to know exactly where.
The entire army is now encamped on the same ground which they previously occupied, and are as comfortable as they can be made in shelter tents.
Our army has been considerably reinforced since the battle, and no danger whatever need be apprehended in their present position.
It is the opinion of military men that had we even succeeded in taking the first range of works, the opportunity of slaughter by the enemy would have been far greater than in assaulting the first line.
Our men it may be repeated, behaved with the greatest gallantry, but no troops in the world could withstand such a concentrated fire of heavy ordnance and musketry under cover of fortifications.
The weather is cold to-day, with a Northeast wind.
Last night the enemy increased their entrenchments on the hills in rear of Fredericksburg and threw up rifle pits near the river on the left of the city.
To-day their battalion drills are visible to the naked eye on the plain.
No movement of importance has taken place to-day.
Our troops are in excellent condition, and as enthusiastic as previous to the last engagement.
The Second report of Burnside.
Headq's Army of the Potomac, December 16, 1862. 6 o'clock P. M.
Major-General Halleck.
The army was withdrawn to this side of the river because I felt the position in front could not be carried, and it was a military necessity either to attack or retire.
A repulse would have been disastrous to us. The army was withdrawn at night, without the knowledge of the enemy, and without loss either of property or men.
Gen. Burnside, with military frankness and brevity, explains the reason of the retreat of the Army of the Potomac to the north side of the Rappahannock ‘"He felt that the position of the rebels could not be carried, and it was a military necessity to attack or retire. A repulse would have been disastrous to us."’ The return to this side of the river, he says, was accomplished without the loss of either men or property. A press dispatch from headquarters gives a full account of the retrograde movement of the army. Even the stragglers and outlying pickets were brought off in small boats.--The army has been considerably reinforced since the battle, and is now comfortable and ‘"safe"’ on the same camping ground it occupied before the advance. The dead have been harried under flags up truce, and the wounded are being sent to Washington as fast as possible. A large portion of the latter, however, fell into the bands of the enemy. The total loss in killed and wounded, it is estimated, will be from 10,000 to 12,000. In the attack of Gen Franklin on the left we had 443 killed, 3,343 wounded, and 1,900 missing. The only redeeming feature in the sad and fruitless loss of life and limb is the bravery and coolness of the men, who, with trifling exceptions, never flinched in the vain attempt to take positions that were impregnable to assault. The successive charges made up the crest of the hill, which was the key to the enemy's position, are described by all the correspondents as magnificent. Both the New York Herald and the World assert that the advance movement upon Fredericksburg was not undertaken in accordance with General Burnside's own judgment, but was peremptorily ordered by the military authorities in Washington. The World makes the following remarkable statement: We have no words of unkindness for Gen Burnside. He is a very different style of man from the braggart Pope, and deserves commiseration rather than censure in his heavy misfortune. Gen Burnside acted under strict orders; he was complies to move upon Fredericksburg by peremptory directions from Washington, which domineered over his judgment and extorted his obedience. Whembe was ordered to Fredericksburg he had the promise of Gen. Halleck that this pontoons should meet him there Gen. Halleck forgot to give the order, and they were delayed so long that the enemy occupied the heights. In this emergency a council of war was held; all the corps commanders opposed an advance; but Burnside said, in conclusion, that he was compelled to advance by orders from Washington. The reported wounding of Gen. Meagher is a mistake. His horse fell upon him, but he was only slightly injured, and is still in command of what remains of his brigade.
