We copy the following highly interesting article from the London Inder:
The case for the Defendants.
Lord Russell is neither distinguished by administrative capacity nor by diplomatic courtesy.
The publication in this country of his dispatch to Lord Cowley, before it could have been read to the French Minister
for Foreign Affairs, was an outrageous breach of international courtesy.
Some of his lordship's enemies attribute this extraordinary proceeding to an abject desire to conciliate Mr. Adams
and his Government; a much more reasonable assumption is, that it was due to his eagerness to allay the anxiety of the Stock Exchange
and the Cotton
But it would have been very easy to attain this object by an informal publication of the purport of the dispatch; and the only conclusion we can come to is that Lord Russell is either ignorant or oblivious of diplomatic at quette.
Hanuga seria duount in mala.
The consequences of trivial discourtesies are not always trifling; and it is no light misfortune for England
that her Foreign Minister should be as careless of official decorum as of national interests.
But if the publication of the dispatch was an impertinence and a blunder what are we to say of its substance?
It does not contain the shadow of a reason for the refusal to co-operate with France
in proposing an armistice to the belligerents.
That the Federal Government
would probably return an insolent answer — or, in diplomatic phrase, would so refuse the request of the European Powers
as to make a speedy renewal of that request impossible — in the excuse of the Foreign Secretary
of a country which in a month could clear the seas of the Federal
navy, for declining to interfere, in conjunction with France
, to restore peace to America
and cotton to Lancashire
Has it come to this?
, or the English Cabinet
, afraid of the Northern States
Lord Russell might contrive so to choose his excuses as not to insult at once both his country and her ally.
However, it is plain that we are not to in the dispatch for vindication of the Ministerial policy, or an explanation of the views of the Americanizing section of the Cabinet
The only documents that do seem to express their opinions and defend their action as they would have it defended are two letters that have appeared in the Times
from the p n of a gentleman actually connected with Ministerial families, and formerly reputed to be the author of some of the bitterest and most brilliant essays that won the first place among weekly journals for the paper in which they appeared.
as it pleases him to be called, is a special pleader of no mean capacity; and if a case can be made cut for his clients, we may be sure that it is contained in the long and able articles in which he endeavors to demonstrate the wrongfulness of recognition and the impossibility of Intervention.
His first argument is directed to dispose of the precedents alleged in favor of recognition.
Those of Greece
, he affirms, are not precedents in point at all. The great Powers did not recognize the revolted subjects of the Sultan and the King
: they interfered to create Greece
, which would never have been created without their assistance.
Passing to the stronger and closer parallel afforded by the case of the Spanish
colonies, he points out that we did not recognize all of these, but only those in which Spain
had practically ceased to keep up the war, omitting all mention of Peru
, in which a Spanish army still asserted the right of the mother country.
But the presence of that army in Peru
created just the same danger to the other colonies that the presence of a Federal army of 200,000 men in Virginia
creates for Georgia
, and the Carolinas.
had been conquered, that army would have passed on to attack the other revolted possessions of Spain
, and in fact, the plan of attacking them in detail was the only one which afforded any solid chance of success.
The real equivalent, in the case of North America
, for the action we took in the matter of the Spanish
colonies, would be the recognition of the Confederate Government, waiving, as of course we should waive, the question of the frontier line.
But, says Historicus, that war had lasted as many years as the present war has lasted months.
Well, what of that?
If the Confederate States
have achieved in twenty months what it took the Spanish
colonies twenty years to accomplish, is that any reason why they should be denied the privileges to which their achievements entitle them?
It must be remembered that within the last ten years modern science has rendered war far more costly, far more destructive, far more effectual, and therefore far shorter than it was a quarter of a century before.
The Crimean war, which thoroughly humbled the pride of Russia
, and broke the heart of the Czar, did not last longer than the American
war has already lasted.
The campaign which deprived the Austrians of Lombardy
lasted but a few weeks; a few months sufficed for the conquest of Raples and Sicily
The Indian mutiny began, wrested nearly the whole of Bengal and the Northwest
from our hands, and was utterly trampled out within a twelvemonth.
Two years of such a war as that which the Federal Government
is waging against the Confederate States
are of far more account than twenty years of such a war as Spain
waged against her revolted colonies; and to have sustained the burdens, the losses, the perils of such a war, is to have established a better title to independence than ever was established by any nation that ever yet drew the sword for national existence.
Historicus next brings forward a precedent of his own adverse to recognition.
He says that when the Government
of Louis XVI.
made a treaty of commerce with the Government
of our revolted colonies, Great Britain
that act, involving as it did the recognition of the revolt, an act of hostility, and made it the ground for a declaration of war. Further, he asserts that the King
knew that he was committing a hostile act, in as much as he made a secret treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with the Congress
Of course such treaties are never really secret.
knew that France
was preparing for war; she knew that France
had all along given aid and comfort to her enemies, and she chose her own time to strike, not because the considered the recognition of the colonies a casus
but because that recognition was the symptom and signal of a conspiracy which had been long at work, and which she was undeniably entitled to punish by force of arms.
But a later case most foolishly by the Ministerial advocate, disposes of all argument on this point.
The American Government recognized (or rather offered to recognize) the short-lived Republic of Hungary
This was says Historicus, a breach of international law — an act of hostility against Austria Be it so. But the American Government
affirm that it was not so; and by their own rations and by their own act they are estopped from all complaint if any European Power shall tomorrow recognize the Government
at Richmond Say, if on January 1st, 1861, England
had recognized South Carolina
, we cannot see how, on its own showing, the Federal Government
could have claimed a right to remonstrate.
As to the pretended difficulty of knowing what to recognize no one is better aware than this ingenious plunder that it is merely a pretence.
We do not recognize Territories, but Governments, we should recognize not ‘"the South
"’ but the Confederate States of America
; and we should recognize them not by defining their frontiers, but by accrediting an Ambassador to their President
Conscious that in his first letter, written before the announcement of the French
proposals by the Opposition journals, he had combination recognition by argument which told in favor of intervention, the eloquent defender of the Ministry again took up his pen to show that Europe
, warned by what happened in the cases of Greece
should be careful not to interfere in America
We liberated Greece
at the cost of a war with Turkey
Because we interfered unfairly and violently; because our first act was an act of hostility to the Sultan; because we did not interfere till he was on the point of crushing out the insurrection; and because one of the intervening Powers was actually at war with the Porto on her own account, and for sinister purposed of her own. Now, the North
is not on the point of conquering the South
; we should not begin our interference by blockading New York or burning the Federal fleet; we should diate with the most earnest desire to deal fairly by both parties, and without any sinister interest on the part of any European
And a war with the North
would not in three years inflict on us as much suffering as we now endure in three months from the consequences of that which we call peace.
At present the North
makes war on us, and we do not defend ourselves.
Again, when we had freed Greece
she remained for years in a state of anarchy.
But what has that to do with America
There is no fear of anarchy in the South
Each of the Confederate States
has a Government of its own, which has, ever since its first existence in the Union
, administered its affairs and preserved its internal peace, and which performs its functions at present as vigorously and efficiently as ever; while the Confederate Power
is as strong as any Federal Government ever can be in the love of the people and the confidence of the States.
There is about as much danger of anarchy in the South England
in the North
peace is the only chance of averting anarchy.
But in the case of Belgium
we intervened very unsuccessfully, and we had to take unarms in to bring about a peace.
Because, when we had arranged terms of peace the Belgium refused them; and instead of enforcing obedience the Powers divided, England
, and the other three Powers ending by Holland
and their joint award.
defied the five Powers."’ No such thing; she defied Belgium
, and defeated the Belgians over and over but when England
interfered, though she had Russia
, and Prussia
on her side, she withdrew from the contest.
We do not expect from Mr. Lincoln
the singular good sense and moderation which distinguish the Princes of the House of Orange
But so far as precedents go, those just discussed establish the right of intervention beyond dispute, while they prove nothing either against the possibility of effecting by mediation a pacific settlement, nor against the wisdom of interference in such a case as the present.
The Confederates are not Gr or Belgians; they are neither savages nor coward.
They have shown their ability and resolution to maintain their own independence.
They combat the North
almost on equal terms.
It is, then, conceivable that the North
, it called upon to submit the quarrel to European
arbitration would provoke England
to throw their swords into the scale?
In there the smallest pretence for fearing that the South
would not be able to manage her own affairs in time of peace — that she would become a Greece or a Mexico?
What excuse is there for the pusillanimity which shrinks from all attempts to check American and relieve English wretched for the audacity which isolates England From Europe
and leaves France
, affronted and deserted, to take her own course?
neglect in such a case the which greatness imposes, is to abnegate the rank of a great Power, and to forfeit our rightful and necessary influence in the councils of the world.
But, we are told, no common basis of action could be found on which England
Because the question of slavery would come in. On the contrary, the question of slavery cannot possibly come to, unless the mediating Powers were insane enough to try to reconstruct the Union
They would have no more to do with slavery in the South
than with Free love, Morn and other abominations in the North
Wh interfered in the Greek quarrel, did we take any of Turkish polygamy, or of the loat vices which defile Greek Christianity?
When we interfered in Belgium
did we consider Belgian Catholicism or Dutch Protestantism?
If slavery be the worst of human crimes, its existence in the South
does not concern England
If it be a Divine gift and blessing, it is one with which we have nothing to do. The domestic institutions of the two nations between which mediation is proposed are nothing to the mediators.
Their difference affords a reason for separation, and that is all. Mediation is required only to put a stop to hostilities, to secure the freedom of natural highways, and to draw a frontier line.
About the first two points no difference of opinion could well arise.
Where is the difficulty of arranging a basis of agreement on the third which could be jointly recommended by England
, and Russia
The presence of a few Federal garrisons on Southern soil does not affect the question, as may be clearly seen by the precedents of Greece
There are two or three distinct principles on which a frontier line might be drawn.
We might recognize the acts of individual States, and confine the Southern Confederacy to those which have actually and formally become members thereof--Virginia
, and the States south of them, with the territory of New Mexico
Or we might recognize the sovereign rights of the people, and allow Missouri
, and Delaware
to decide their own fate Tuscany
, the Legations, and the Duchies.
Or we might undertake ourselves to draw a frontier line, giving to the North
these districts which are Northern by sympathy, and to the South
those which desire to be Southern.
There could be few cases in which it would be easier to decide on a common basis of action; few in which the power of the mediators to enforce their decimation could be less doubtful.
The South is ready to accept any fair terms of peace; if the North
should reject them, she would become powerless for aggression as soon as the mediating Powers deprived her of the command of the sea. France
then, can, if they will, induce the belligerents to make peace; they have a clear right to do so; and those who prevent them from doing so take on themselves the whole responsibility of the protraction of the war — are answerable for every life that is lost by the sword in America
by famine or fever in Lancashire
We cannot omit to notice a very absurd inference drawn by Historicus from a passage which he extracts from our columns.
We said, that so far from peace bringing down the price of cotton, ‘"holders may probably realize higher prices from the unusual demand."’ If peace is not to give us cheap cotton, says the Ministerial advocate, why should we desire it?
Because, if it do not give us cheap cotton it will be through the sudden creation of such a demand for calicoes that the manufacturers will be able to buy cotton dear, and yet work their mills and employ their work-people at a profit.--What is required is, not that cotton should be cheap, but that there should be a sufficiency to supply the mills at such a price as will leave a margin of profit when it is worked into calico.
Does it matter to Lancashire
whether cotton costs 6d. a lb. and calico sells for 8d., or whether cotton costs 18d. a lb. and calico sells for 2d., so long as there is a demand at those prices for all the calico which the Lancashire mills