European News.
We copy the following highly interesting article from the
London Inder:
The case for the Defendants.
Lord Russell is neither distinguished by administrative capacity nor by diplomatic courtesy.
The publication in this country of his dispatch to Lord Cowley, before it could have been read to the
French Minister for Foreign Affairs, was an outrageous breach of international courtesy.
Some of his lordship's enemies attribute this extraordinary proceeding to an abject desire to conciliate
Mr. Adams and his Government; a much more reasonable assumption is, that it was due to his eagerness to allay the anxiety of the
Stock Exchange and the
Cotton market.
But it would have been very easy to attain this object by an informal publication of the purport of the dispatch; and the only conclusion we can come to is that Lord Russell is either ignorant or oblivious of diplomatic at quette.
Hanuga seria duount in mala. The consequences of trivial discourtesies are not always trifling; and it is no light misfortune for
England that her Foreign Minister should be as careless of official decorum as of national interests.
But if the publication of the dispatch was an impertinence and a blunder what are we to say of its substance?
It does not contain the shadow of a reason for the refusal to co-operate with
France in proposing an armistice to the belligerents.
That the
Federal Government would probably return an insolent answer — or, in diplomatic phrase, would so refuse the request of the
European Powers as to make a speedy renewal of that request impossible — in the excuse of the
Foreign Secretary of a country which in a month could clear the seas of the
Federal navy, for declining to interfere, in conjunction with
France, to restore peace to
America and cotton to
Lancashire.
Has it come to this?
In
England, or the
English Cabinet, afraid of the
Northern States?
Lord Russell might contrive so to choose his excuses as not to insult at once both his country and her ally.
However, it is plain that we are not to in the dispatch for vindication of the Ministerial policy, or an explanation of the views of the Americanizing section of the
Cabinet.
The only documents that do seem to express their opinions and defend their action as they would have it defended are two letters that have appeared in the
Times from the p n of a gentleman actually connected with Ministerial families, and formerly reputed to be the author of some of the bitterest and most brilliant essays that won the first place among weekly journals for the paper in which they appeared.
Historians as it pleases him to be called, is a special pleader of no mean capacity; and if a case can be made cut for his clients, we may be sure that it is contained in the long and able articles in which he endeavors to demonstrate the wrongfulness of recognition and the impossibility of Intervention.
His first argument is directed to dispose of the precedents alleged in favor of recognition.
Those of
Greece and
Belgium, he affirms, are not precedents in point at all. The great Powers did not recognize the revolted subjects of the Sultan and the
King of
Holland: they interfered to create
Greece and
Belgium, which would never have been created without their assistance.
Passing to the stronger and closer parallel afforded by the case of the
Spanish colonies, he points out that we did not recognize all of these, but only those in which
Spain had practically ceased to keep up the war, omitting all mention of
Peru, in which a Spanish army still asserted the right of the mother country.
But the presence of that army in
Peru created just the same danger to the other colonies that the presence of a Federal army of 200,000 men in
Virginia creates for
Georgia,
Alabama, and the Carolinas.
If
Peru had been conquered, that army would have passed on to attack the other revolted possessions of
Spain, and in fact, the plan of attacking them in detail was the only one which afforded any solid chance of success.
The real equivalent, in the case of
North America, for the action we took in the matter of the
Spanish colonies, would be the recognition of the Confederate Government, waiving, as of course we should waive, the question of the frontier line.
But, says Historicus, that war had lasted as many years as the present war has lasted months.
Well, what of that?
If the
Confederate States have achieved in twenty months what it took the
Spanish colonies twenty years to accomplish, is that any reason why they should be denied the privileges to which their achievements entitle them?
It must be remembered that within the last ten years modern science has rendered war far more costly, far more destructive, far more effectual, and therefore far shorter than it was a quarter of a century before.
The Crimean war, which thoroughly humbled the pride of
Russia, and broke the heart of the Czar, did not last longer than the
American war has already lasted.
The campaign which deprived the Austrians of
Lombardy lasted but a few weeks; a few months sufficed for the conquest of Raples and
Sicily.
The Indian mutiny began, wrested nearly the whole of Bengal and the
Northwest from our hands, and was utterly trampled out within a twelvemonth.
Two years of such a war as that which the
Federal Government is waging against the
Confederate States are of far more account than twenty years of such a war as
Spain waged against her revolted colonies; and to have sustained the burdens, the losses, the perils of such a war, is to have established a better title to independence than ever was established by any nation that ever yet drew the sword for national existence.
Historicus next brings forward a precedent of his own adverse to recognition.
He says that when the
Government of Louis XVI.
made a treaty of commerce with the
Government of our revolted colonies,
Great Britain that act, involving as it did the recognition of the revolt, an act of hostility, and made it the ground for a declaration of war. Further, he asserts that the
King of
France knew that he was committing a hostile act, in as much as he made a secret treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with the
Congress.
Of course such treaties are never really secret.
Great Britain knew that
France was preparing for war; she knew that
France had all along given aid and comfort to her enemies, and she chose her own time to strike, not because the considered the recognition of the colonies a
casus but because that recognition was the symptom and signal of a conspiracy which had been long at work, and which she was undeniably entitled to punish by force of arms.
But a later case most foolishly by the Ministerial advocate, disposes of all argument on this point.
The American Government recognized (or rather offered to recognize) the short-lived Republic of
Hungary.
This was says Historicus, a breach of international law — an act of hostility against Austria Be it so. But the
American Government and
American affirm that it was not so; and by their own rations and by their own act they are estopped from all complaint if any European Power shall tomorrow recognize the
Government at Richmond Say, if on January 1st, 1861,
England had recognized
South Carolina, we cannot see how, on its own showing, the
Federal Government could have claimed a right to remonstrate.
As to the pretended difficulty of knowing what to recognize no one is better aware than this ingenious plunder that it is merely a pretence.
We do not recognize Territories, but Governments, we should recognize not ‘"the
South"’ but the
Confederate States of America; and we should recognize them not by defining their frontiers, but by accrediting an Ambassador to their
President.
Conscious that in his first letter, written before the announcement of the
French proposals by the Opposition journals, he had combination recognition by argument which told in favor of intervention, the eloquent defender of the Ministry again took up his pen to show that
Europe, warned by what happened in the cases of
Greece and
Belgium should be careful not to interfere in
America.
We liberated
Greece at the cost of a war with
Turkey.--But why?
Because we interfered unfairly and violently; because our first act was an act of hostility to the Sultan; because we did not interfere till he was on the point of crushing out the insurrection; and because one of the intervening Powers was actually at war with the Porto on her own account, and for sinister purposed of her own. Now, the
North is not on the point of conquering the
South; we should not begin our interference by blockading New York or burning the Federal fleet; we should diate with the most earnest desire to deal fairly by both parties, and without any sinister interest on the part of any
European power.
And a war with the
North would not in three years inflict on us as much suffering as we now endure in three months from the consequences of that which we call peace.
At present the
North makes war on us, and we do not defend ourselves.
Again, when we had freed
Greece she remained for years in a state of anarchy.
But what has that to do with
America?
There is no fear of anarchy in the
South.
Each of the
Confederate States has a Government of its own, which has, ever since its first existence in the
Union, administered its affairs and preserved its internal peace, and which performs its functions at present as vigorously and efficiently as ever; while the
Confederate Power is as strong as any Federal Government ever can be in the love of the people and the confidence of the States.
There is about as much danger of anarchy in the
South England in the
North peace is the only chance of averting anarchy.
But in the case of
Belgium we intervened very unsuccessfully, and we had to take unarms in to bring about a peace.
And why?
Because, when we had arranged terms of peace the Belgium refused them; and instead of enforcing obedience the Powers divided,
England and
France supporting
Belgium, and the other three Powers ending by
Holland and their joint award.
‘"
Holland defied the five Powers."’ No such thing; she defied
Belgium, and defeated the Belgians over and over but when
England and
France interfered, though she had
Russia,
Austria, and
Prussia on her side, she withdrew from the contest.
We do not expect from
Mr. Lincoln the singular good sense and moderation which distinguish the Princes of the
House of Orange.
But so far as precedents go, those just discussed establish the right of intervention beyond dispute, while they prove nothing either against the possibility of effecting by mediation a pacific settlement, nor against the wisdom of interference in such a case as the present.
The Confederates are not Gr or Belgians; they are neither savages nor coward.
They have shown their ability and resolution to maintain their own independence.
They combat the
North almost on equal terms.
It is, then, conceivable that the
North, it called upon to submit the quarrel to
European arbitration would provoke
England and
France to throw their swords into the scale?
In there the smallest pretence for fearing that the
South would not be able to manage her own affairs in time of peace — that she would become a Greece or a Mexico?
What excuse is there for the pusillanimity which shrinks from all attempts to check American and relieve English wretched for the audacity which isolates England From
Europe and leaves
France, affronted and deserted, to take her own course?
neglect in such a case the which greatness imposes, is to abnegate the rank of a great Power, and to forfeit our rightful and necessary influence in the councils of the world.
But, we are told, no common basis of action could be found on which
England and
France could agree.
Why not?
Because the question of slavery would come in. On the contrary, the question of slavery cannot possibly come to, unless the mediating Powers were insane enough to try to reconstruct the
Union.
They would have no more to do with slavery in the
South than with Free love, Morn and other abominations in the
North Wh interfered in the Greek quarrel, did we take any of Turkish polygamy, or of the loat vices which defile Greek Christianity?
When we interfered in
Belgium did we consider Belgian Catholicism or Dutch Protestantism?
If slavery be the worst of human crimes, its existence in the
South does not concern
England.
If it be a Divine gift and blessing, it is one with which we have nothing to do. The domestic institutions of the two nations between which mediation is proposed are nothing to the mediators.
Their difference affords a reason for separation, and that is all. Mediation is required only to put a stop to hostilities, to secure the freedom of natural highways, and to draw a frontier line.
About the first two points no difference of opinion could well arise.
Where is the difficulty of arranging a basis of agreement on the third which could be jointly recommended by
England,
France, and
Russia?
The presence of a few Federal garrisons on Southern soil does not affect the question, as may be clearly seen by the precedents of
Greece and
Belgium.
There are two or three distinct principles on which a frontier line might be drawn.
We might recognize the acts of individual States, and confine the Southern Confederacy to those which have actually and formally become members thereof--
Virginia,
Tennessee,
Arkansas, and the States south of them, with the territory of
New Mexico.
Or we might recognize the sovereign rights of the people, and allow
Missouri,
Kentucky,
Maryland, and
Delaware to decide their own fate
Tuscany, the Legations, and the Duchies.
Or we might undertake ourselves to draw a frontier line, giving to the
North these districts which are Northern by sympathy, and to the
South those which desire to be Southern.
There could be few cases in which it would be easier to decide on a common basis of action; few in which the power of the mediators to enforce their decimation could be less doubtful.
The South is ready to accept any fair terms of peace; if the
North should reject them, she would become powerless for aggression as soon as the mediating Powers deprived her of the command of the sea.
France and
England then, can, if they will, induce the belligerents to make peace; they have a clear right to do so; and those who prevent them from doing so take on themselves the whole responsibility of the protraction of the war — are answerable for every life that is lost by the sword in
America by famine or fever in
Lancashire.
We cannot omit to notice a very absurd inference drawn by Historicus from a passage which he extracts from our columns.
We said, that so far from peace bringing down the price of cotton, ‘"holders may probably realize higher prices from the unusual demand."’ If peace is not to give us cheap cotton, says the Ministerial advocate, why should we desire it?
Because, if it do not give us cheap cotton it will be through the sudden creation of such a demand for calicoes that the manufacturers will be able to buy cotton dear, and yet work their mills and employ their work-people at a profit.--What is required is, not that cotton should be cheap, but that there should be a sufficiency to supply the mills at such a price as will leave a margin of profit when it is worked into calico.
Does it matter to
Lancashire whether cotton costs 6d. a lb. and calico sells for 8d., or whether cotton costs 18d. a lb. and calico sells for 2d., so long as there is a demand at those prices for all the calico which the
Lancashire mills can produce?
