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Later from the North.

The extracts below we take from Northern papers of the 24th of December, Lincoln, the 2nd, acknowledged the reception of the resignations of Seward and Chass, and, after due deliberation, came to the conclusion ‘"that the acceptance of their resignations would be incompatible with the public welfare,"’ Of the final settlement of the difficulty, the Washington correspondent of the Herald writes:

‘ The three days wonder has ended. The broken Cabinet has been repaired, the resigning Secretaries have returned to their places, the President has assumed the responsibility of the conduct of his political advisers, and the meddling Senatorial canous has been rebuked. This virtual refusal of the President to submit to the attempted dictation of the Senators who desire to arrange a Cabinet for him to suit themselves, has created no good feeling between Mr. Lincoln and the would be dictators — Although there are many here who believe that he has missed the golden opportunity of arranging the whole Cabinet so that it should conform to the public sentiment unmistakably manifested in the recent elections, yet the restoration of peace, or at least the return to the old order in the Administration, has afforded relief to those who feared that the pressure brought to bear upon Mr. Lincoln would have compelled him to adopt the unity of extreme radicalism in his Cabinet, which would unquestioned ably have created a disastrous commotion throughout all the loyal States, and probably have produced a revolution as fearful as the rebellion itself.

It is now plainly understood that there are to be no changes whatever either in the Cabinet or the military commanders, and at least for the present affairs will be conducted pretty much as heretofore.

This refusal of Mr. Lincoln to yield to the impertinent importunity of the Senatorial caucus is regarded as a manifestation on his part of more flemness and determination to act the part of the President of the United States than he has exhibited at other times when the same pressure was brought to bear upon him.

The caucus meeting.

The proceedings in the Republican caucus meeting are thus briefly narrated by the special of the Herald:

‘ Last Tuesday the Republican members of the Senate met in caucus, and, after a session of four hours, during which several Senators made fierce attacks upon Secretary Seward, making him responsible for our defeats and declaring that the country was tired of the present conduct of the was, a resolution was offered by Senator Grimes, of Iowa, declaring a want of confidence in Secretary Seward, and requesting the President to remove him. This was passed by a vote of thirteen year to eleven days. A long discussion was entered into, Senator Sumner making a lengthy speech, at tacking the foreign diplomacy of Secretary Seward Others were made by Senators Sherman, Trumbull, Wade, &c., It was charged that Seward's policy was a Fablan one--that of delay; that he had encouraged McClellan in his delays; that his idea of surrounding the rebels was delusion; that he was responsible for sending the Banks expedition away to the Cult instead of the James river. They then adjourned over to Wednesday, when, after the adjournment of the Senate, they resumed their consultations.

Senator Harris amended the resolution, to read: ‘"That, in the judgment of the Senate, a reconstruction of the Cabinet would increase the confidence of the country"’

Senator Sherman objected because this was too broad; that Secretary Chase would resign at once if that was passed.

Senator Fessenden then amended it to read: ‘"A partial reconstruction,"’ and upon that the resolution passed, and a committee of seven was formed Afterwards Senators Howard and Harris were added, making it nine.

On Thursday Senator Ring informed Mr. Seward of the action of the Senate, and he and Assistant Secretary Seward at once sent to the President their resignations. On Thursday evening the committee of nine waited on the President and laid the matter before him. No result was arrived at but speeches were made by the enemies of Mr. Seward, in which he was denounced in unmeasured terms.

The committee retired and left the matter in the hands of the President, believing that it was all right. The committee from the Senatorial caucus were invited by the President to meet him at the White House on Friday evening. On their arrival they found the whole Cabinet there excepting Secretary Seward.

The President introduced the subject and stated the object of the committee.

Secretary Chase at once stated that he did not come there to be arraigned by Senators

Senator Fessenden said he did not come there to arraign any one.

The President said they were all there on an equality, and invited an interchange of opinion.

Senator Harris stated that he was not a personal friend of Secretary Seward, though formerly a law partner, and thought there were a large number of Republicans who would rejoice at his leaving the Cabinet, while an equally large number were in favor of his remaining. He thought it would be impolitic and uncalled for, because he quietly opposed any changes.

Secretary Stanton said the resolution was evidently aimed at some one else, besides Secretary Seward. If any one supposed he was responsible for the disaster that had occurred, they were mistaken; that all the charges made against him were false; that the President knew that the charge that he was responsible for the movement on Fredericksburg was groundless; that neither he nor Gen. Halleck was responsible.

Senator Grimes made a fierce slight upon Mr. Seward.

Mr. Feszenden was firm, but determined.

The meeting lasted until a late hour, and adjourned without any result being accomplished. Secretary Chase, however, tendered his resignation to the President in order to place him in a position to use his own pleasure.

Postmaster Blair, who is, next to Mr. Seward, the most objectionable man, refused to resign. In all the interviews the President defended Mr. Seward warmly, denying that he has actively interfered with the military movements, or that his policy has been detrimental to the conduct of the war.--He expressed the most unbounded confidence in Secretaries Stanton and Chase, and thought Secretary Welles had done all that could be done.

He will not remove any member, and unless they resign, and insist upon their resignations being accepted, there will be no change. The Senators have taken this step, considering it necessary for the successful prosecution of the war. They are still of that belief, and, though the matter may be smothered over to-morrow, it will only be to burst forth again with before long.

The defeat at Fredericksburg.

Burnside's official account of the late disaster at Fredericksburg is published in the Herald, and is characterized by that paper as a ‘"curious document, which evidences the generosity of the writer's nature with more force than it does his judgment as a military commander."’ We annex Burnside's account:

Headq'rs of the Army of the Potomac.

Falmouth, Dec. 19, 1862.
Major General H. W. Halleck, General in-Chief United States Army, Washington:
General: I have the honor to offer the following reasons for moving the Army of the Potomac across the Rappahannock sooner than was anticipated by the President, Secretary of War, or yourself, and for crossing at a point different from the one indicated to you at our last meeting at the President's:

During my preparations for crossing at the place I had first selected I discovered that the enemy had thrown a large portion of his force down the river and elsewhere, thus weakening his defences in front, and also thought I discovered that he did not anticipate the crossing of our whole force at Fredericksburg; and I hoped, by rapidly throwing the whole command over at that place, to separate, by a vigorous attack, the forces of the enemy on the river below from the forces behind and on the crest, in the rear of the town, in which case we could fight him with great advantage in our favor.

To do this we had to gain a height on the extreme right of the create which height commanded a new road lately made by the enemy for purposes of more rapid communication along his lines, which point gamed, his position along the crest would have been scarcely tenable and he could have been driven from them easily by an attack on his front in connection with a movement in the rear of the crest.

How near we came to accomplishing our object future reports will show. But for the fog and unexpected and unavoidable delay in building the bridges, which gave the enemy twenty-four hours more to concentrate his forces in his strong positions, we would almost certainly have succeeded, in which case the battle would have been, in my opinion, far more decisive than if we had crossed at the places first selected. As it was, we came very near success.

Falling in accomplishing the main object, we remained in order of battle two days--long enough to decide that the enemy would not come out of his strongholds to fight us with his infantry — after which we recrossed to this side of the river unmolested, without the loss of men or property.

As the day broke our long lines of troops were seen marching to their different positions as if going on parade. Not the least demoralization or disorganization existed.

To the brave officers and soldiers who accomplished the feat of thus recrossing the river in the face of the enemy I owe everything.

For the failure in the attack I am responsible, as the extreme gallantry, courage, and endurance shown by them were never exceeded and would have carried the points had it been possible.

To the families and friends of the dead I can only offer my heartfelt sympathies, but for the wounded I can offer my earnest prayers for their comfortable and final recovery.

The fact that I decided to move from Warrenton on to this line, rather against the opinion of the President, Secretary of War, and yourself, and that you left the whole movement in my hands, without giving me orders, makes me responsible.

I will visit you very soon and give you more definite information, and, finally, will send you my detailed report, in which a special acknowledgment will be made of the services of the different grand division corps and my general and staff departments of the Army of the Potomac, to whom I am so much indebted for their support and hearty cooperation.

I will add here that the movement was made earlier than you expected and after the President. Secretary, and yourself requested me not to be in haste, for the reason that we were supplied much sooner by the different staff departments than was anticipated when I last saw you.

Our killed amounts to eleven hundred and fifty-two; our wounded to a bout nine thousand, and our prisoners to about seven hundred which last have been paroled and exchanged for about the same number taken by u.

The wounded were all removed to this side of the river, and are being well cared for and the dead were all buried under a flag of truce.

The surgeons report a much larger proportion of slight wounds than usual 1,632 only being treated in hospitals.

I am glad to represent the army at the present time in good condition.

Thanking the Government for that entire support and confidence which I have always received from them, I remain, General,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. E. Burnside,
Major-Gen Com'g the Army of the Potomac.

Lincoln Refuses to accept Burnside's resignation.

Burnside arrived in Washington on the 20th and tendered his resignation, which Lincoln refused to accept. Burnside left for the Army of the Potomac on the 22d.

Another statement from Burnside.

Washington, Dec. 23.
--The following has been received at Headquarters:

Headq's Army of the Potomac, December 23, 1862.
To Major-General H. W. Halleck, General in Chief:
In my report to you of the 19th inst. the number of wounded was stated at about 9,000, and the number receiving hospital treatment at 1,680.

Both of these are wrong. On the authority of Dr. Betterman, our Medical Director, I learn the whole number of wounded is between six and seven thousand, and about one half of these are receiving treatment in hospital.

(Signed) A. E. Burnside,
Major General Commanding.

Lincoln to the Army.

Lincoln has just issued the following address to the Yankee army, in which it will be seen he attributes the recent defeat at Fredericksburg to accident:

Executive Mansion,

Washington, Dec. 22, 1862.
To the Army of the Potomac:
I have just read your Commanding General's preliminary report of the battle of Fredericksburg. Although you were not successful, the attempt was not an error, nor the failure other than an accident.

The courage with which you, in an open field, maintained the contest against an entrenched foe, and the consummate skill and success with which you crossed and recrossed the river, in the face of the enemy, show that you possess all the qualities of a great army which will yet give victory to the cause of the country and of popular government. Condoling with the mourners for the dead, and sympathizing with the severely wounded, I congratulate you that the number of both is comparatively so small.

I tender you, officers and soldiers, the thanks of the nation.

The advance upon Richmond — an amended Programme--General Burnsides march Delayed.

[From the Philadelphia Press, of Nov. 21.]

The military authorities at Washington have determined to make a diversion in a different quarter from that now occupied by the Army of the Potomac. The vastness of this army, with its present contracted lines and strong position, renders it available for operation in various directions, according to the designs of the Commander in Chief. The fast that one of our most distinguished Generals has expressed the opinion that to take Richmond now we must temporarily divert the enemy's attention from his fortified base of operations, is, we think, enough to warrant us in the belief that no immediate advance upon Richmond will be made from Fredericksburg. The approaches by water to the rebel capital are many, and so good that we scarcely know which might prove the most advantageous in case as expedition like that which failed on the Peninsula should once more be sent against Richmond.--The attractive baits to the rebel leaders, to be found at various points along the Southern coast are not alluring enough, and if coaxing will not bring the rebels out in their strength we must see what force will do. The question then occurs from what point should the force be applied, and who shall make the diversion? For such a demonstration we have a choice of three points eminently eligible; I. By way of York river, landing at West Point, 20 miles below Richmond. By way of James river, landing

on the south bank, at the moth Appomattox, about 23 miles from Richmond, ving upon Port Walfball, and threatening the rend capital from the rear, and cutting it off from railway communication with the Southern States By way of Suffolk, through Nangemond, of Wight, Southampton, and Prince George counties, along excellent roads, through a level, well plain, seizing Blandford Heights, overlooking Petersburg. This it a march of 58 miles. In the latter movement we would have the cover gunboats in the James river, if needed, and the privilege of lauding reinforcements as high up as City Point, 12 miles below Petersburg, and Coggin's Raint, miles bellow that city. Such a course of procedure as the latter was designed for the army of the Potomac last spring but was claimed to be impracticable from the fact that the Merrimac was in existence; and the James river was not in our possession. A movement of this kind now would possess all the grandeur of that mapped out for General McClellan last spring, without the great difficulties which impeded our progress, and finally rendered our efforts futile upon the Peninsular Resides this it would unshackle our weak columns on the coast, now threatened with destruction in detail and render Washington entirely have, as it was so long as McClellan prosecuted in flank movement forward the rebel capital. From Petersburg, a cavalry expedition would be necessary only to proceed West to the Burkeville Junction of the Tennessee and Danville Railroads, and destroy them both. It seems to us that if Petersburg were once in our hands, it would give us virtual possession of the entire South, and force Gen. Lee to fight his army either to extermination or submission, without any chance of retreat, or means of obtaining supplies or reinforcements from the South and Southwest. Such a magnificent diversion could now be made without weakening the Army of the Potomac, the expedition of Gen. Banks, or any other independent corps, except, perhaps, that of Gen. Foster, in North and it would have the effect to give us a serious of decisive victories, which would put an end to the rebellion before the enlistment of our ‘ "nine months volunteers"’ is out. This, or some other similar diversion, should be made at once, to render the capture of Richmond by Burnside certain.

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