Progress of the war.
The army Dictating to the people.
The Cincinnati
Enquirer, and with good reason, seems weary of the war. It is full of matter, and every line of it — editorial, communications, and quotations from other papers — breathes weariness of the war, desire for peace, and bitter repugnance to the
Lincoln Administration and the Republican party.
The leading article is an indignant reply to certain sentiments which have lately been credited as emanations from
Generals Milroy and
Rosecrans.
We allow the
Enquirer to state what they are:
By the voice of these officers the army is made to bear the appearance of threatening the people.
In the name of the army these
Generals Colonels,
Captains, and Surgeons, assume to tell the people what sentiments they must entertain, to what opinions they must subscribe, what views they must hold touching public affairs and the condition of the country; and furthermore, to lift over them the rod of the military power in case they fall to obey.
Gen. Roscrans--a gentleman certainly of no known political sagacity or experience, who has never distinguished himself in the councils of his country or in the assemblies of his fellow citizens — does not hesitate to tell the people of
Ohio that he who is in favor of "peace on any terms" is "fit only to be a slave" and that he who gives utterance to a peace sentiment is "a traitor to his country, who deserves the scorn and contempt of all honorable men." And
Gen. Milroy informed the people of
Indiana that when "we"--the army--"have crushed armed treason at the
South, and restored the sovereignty of our Government over these misguided States, we will, upon our return, while our hands are in, also exterminate treason at the
North, by arms, if need be, and seal by the blood of traitors, wherever found, the permanent peace of our country and the perpetuity of free Government to all future generations."--Another military gentleman — Col
Streight, of the 51st Indiana--declares that "the are thick in
Indiana,
Illinois, and
Kentucky, and we must strike them before they strike us; this rattlesnake treason must be crushed now."
Banks's order about "Systematic" negro labor
in Louisiana.
The following order has been issued by
N. P. Banks at New Orleans:
Headq'rs Department of the Gulf, New Orleans, Feb. 16, 1863.
The accompanying order and circulars, relating to the immediate employment of negroes, will explain a system of labor that has been suggested and adopted for the present year.
The Provost Marshals are authorized and directed to receive and record the assent of planters or other persons thereto, and when such written consent is given, officers and soldiers, and especially the chaplains of the army, and all other persons acting under the authority of the
United States, are requested to assist as far as practicable, without violence, in inducing the return of negroes and their families to the plantations where they have been accustomed to labor.
Without regular employment many thousands of negroes must perish during the year.
More than sixty thousand dollars were applied to the support of dependent and destitute persons in the month of January.
The support of many thousands of unemployed negroes will increase the burden to such extent as to make it impracticable to continue the charity.
The immediate cultivation of corn, sugar, cotton, and other products, is imperatively demanded upon every consideration of public interest, and for this no other labor is now available.
On the plantations they will have secured to them by the officers of the
Government sufficient and wholesome food, clothing, kind treatment, and a share of the crop they produce.
The compensation may seem small, but in view of the pecuniary advances that must be made and the risks that attend industry in a period of war, it is not inadequate.
Those who are not thus engaged will be employed on the public works or in the Quartermaster's Department, without pay, except their food and clothing, medical attendance, and such instruction and care as may be furnished to them and their women and children.
In view of all the facts, and after must anxious consideration, the commanding General believes it to be the best system of labor that can now be adopted, and, assuming the entire responsibility of the act, he calls upon the
commanding Generals and all officers of the
Government to assist in its immediate execution.
The West and the East.
The old fend between the
East and the
West is manifesting itself in the Northern Congress.
A Washington letter says:
‘
In the
House to day
Mr. Washburns, of
Illinois, moved that inasmuch as Eastern men had refused to vote for the
Illinois ship canal as a means of defence for the
Northwest that the appropriation of eight hundred thousand dollars for fortifications in
Maine be stricken out of a pending bill.
The
Maine delegation became very wrathy, and declared that the
State would remain in the
Union whether they got their appropriation or not.
’
Transportation expenses.
A letter from the
Secretary of War in answer to a House resolution of January 19, shows that there has been paid for transportation since the rebellion commenced to the roads connecting this city with New York, $2,922,918. viz: To the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, $1,213,630;
Camden and
Amboy $518,575.
New Jersey, $877,911;
Philadelphia,
Wilmington, and
Baltimore, $202,392; Northern Central, 209,751;
Pennsylvania Central, $292,427;
New Jersey Central, $189,632, and about $3,000 to expresses on the same route.
In addition there has been paid $123,673 to the
New Jersey Central, which is not designated as exclusively for transportation over the
New York line.
There are claims by the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore railroad for $36,119 not yet adjusted.
The coming attack on Charleston — the
Chances of taking it.
A correspondent of the New York
Herald, writing about the coming attack on
Charleston, says that
Congressman and others are bringing a great pressure to bear upon the authorities to make an immediate attack on this "
Sebastopol of
America."He admits that the defences of
Charleston are much stronger than those around
Richmond against which the "Union forces have been led in vain."The ships, he thinks, are the main if not the only hope of a successful attack.
Of them he says:
‘
It is safe to assume that one-half or two-thirds will be crippled before the walls of
Sumter are passed; and then what other batteries await them?
Wooden vessels cannot go up to the city, and we must rely upon iron clads to open the way to our victorious flag.
And this brings me to the question which I desire briefly to consider: How many Iron-clads are necessary to reduce the city of
Charleston?
Many, and I doubt not a vast majority of the public, who have not investigated the subject in all its bearings, seem to think that three or four Monitors will be sufficient for the successful accomplishment of the work.
If none were injured, or run aground, or become disabled in any way, perhaps three would be sufficient; but unfortunately, everything made by human hands is imperfect in one way or other, and liable to become deranged, and its success impaired, if not entirely destroyed, by come unforeseen contingency over which we have no control.
It would be absurd to say that the
Monitors are not to be reckoned in the same category, and it is the wisest; the safest course to accept all these contingencies as highly probable and likely to occur and thereby determine the success or failure of our under taking.
In the first place these Monitors must go into
Charleston harbor alone and through the channel, which is not now perfectly known — a channel which is covered by a thousand heavy guns.
No pilot whose experience was gained before the war would undertake to safely convey a vessel up to the city unless he could feel his way with the lead.
No buoys mark the channel, and its frequent shifting have rendered useless all the marks by which the pilot formerly kept the proper channel.
To suppose, under these circumstances, that all the
Monitors would escape the shoals and middle grounds that abound in
Charleston harbor would be absurd.
One might get ashore and serve as a buoy for the others, and so on, until two or three, or indeed all, would be hard and fast from the entrance of the channel to the city, helpless and worse than look to We can offered to lose several if they are sunk in action, and safely out of the rebel power; but we cannot afford to leave a single one on the where the rebels may capture her patch up her shot holes, and send her out against us. Two of them would be very apt to terminate our possession of the soil of
South Carolina.
The rebels with one or two Monitors would be nearly as well off as we are; and who could tell when the affair would end?
No! If we are not entirely demented, no attack will be made on
Charleston with less than six or eight Monitors.
Certainly with not less than six, and with as many more as can be sent there.
When we are sure of victory, let us go ahead; but let not affairs be hastened that we may come out of a disastrous attack shorn of our peculiar strength.--We can afford to wait a little for success.
Three Monitors can, it is thought, when safely past
Sumter and Monitris, capture the city.
To get three through we must expect to lose an equal number on the way up. That is not too great an estimate, I am convinced.
Besides, we shall find work for them in aiding each other when ashore, and in preventing the unfortunate ones from falling into the enemy's hands.
I have but hinted at some of the difficulties to be overcome; but a moment's consideration of these will satisfy any one that it would be folly to attempt the great work of capturing the strongest place in
America with a few Monitors.
We must have six or eight, I repeat, when we make the attack, or our attack, or our success, will not be so complete as we could wish.
I have written the above for the sole purpose of curbing, if possible the impatience of the public
North.
I do not pretend to know the plans of the
Admiral here, and know nothing of the force to be used in any movement, nor do I know that he has any design of attacking
Charleston; but I presume he is as anxious to make an effort in that direction as we are to witness it. When he does attack, it will be a successful one, I am confident, and we can well afford to wait the opportune hour, without impatience or giving ourselves unnecessary trouble.
’
The army of the Potomac--its demoralized
condition.
The
Washington correspondent of the Missouri
Democrat is of the opinion that the great Yankee Army of the Potomac, about which we have heard so much, is now hopelessly demoralized.
The reasons for this opinion are given at considerable length, but we have only room for the following:
‘
The apparent invincibility — at least the power of the rebel army in
Virginia — is due solely to the compactness and rigidity of its organization, coupled with the fact that
Lee is the supreme will that moves it. No interference comes from
Richmond, no fire in the rear is permitted or offered.
But, with our army, the caprice of civilians and the whims of military pretenders so curse its efforts, that it has come to that pass that hardly any military man, with a soldier's honor, can be found who is willing to sacrifice himself upon the tempting guillotine.
In all this of military effort, the soldiers discover their old intruding enemy, which they dread more than the rebel batteries.--They are reading men; they scan closely every daily paper; they understand the whole case as thoroughly as the man at home by his fireside.
In fact, they know the cause better than he; no special pleading can mislead them, and no sophistry blind them to the facts, as they know them.--And here we are driven to one of the causes for the failure of
Burnside, order than, and separate from the immediate interference of the
Government with his plans, but which is the immediate result of the action of the
Government.
Less than three months ago, when
Gen. Burnside took command of that army, he found it the most thoroughly organized, compact, and wieldy body of men the world had ever soon.
No man knowing its then condition now presumes or desires to question the fact that no such magnificent and perfectly machine-like army of volunteer men ever marched forth to battle as was that; its officers thoroughly imbued with the spirit, and heartily acquiescing in the plans of their leader — the soldiers almost worshipping their commander, and enthusiastic for action beyond a parallel in history.--Less than ninety days have passed, and
Gen. Burnside, a gallant soldier, whom everybody loves and honors, attempts to move that splendid army of but yesterday, and it absolutely falls to places in his hands, and only the storms of Heaven save it from destruction.
’
The writer then goes on to say that the army wants
McClellan but it would be in the highest degree impolitic in
Lincoln to appoint him, as it would be a virtual surrender to the Democracy.
He says:
‘
Such is the blind infatuation of these men for
McClellan that I am fully convinced that no other commander can accomplish anything against a powerful and wary foe with that army.
So that the future with it is reduced to this: either their choice of commander must be given them, or this army must be detached and sent to different fields of duty; and of the two I think the
Government will choose the latter alternative.
I believe the breach is irreparable between the Administration and McClellan.
By suffering himself to be made the pet, if not the tool of the
Democratic opponents of the war, he has broken down the last bridge over which he might have otherwise returned to the head of the army.
Slowness may have been his error as a commander, but his present position, in view of the state of his country is his crime.
Consequently, I think the Army of the Potomac will cease to exist, and will be transferred to new and different positions.
The most probable disposition of it seems this: to make
Washington secure by an impregnable garrison, and transfer the remainder to
North Carolina, and make it the acting invading army of the
Southern Atlantic States; and it is believed by many that
General Fremont will be at the head of the latter department.
I confess that I attach more than ordinary credence to this much discussed and warmly urged programme.
’
