Review of the late campaign on the Rappahannock.
General Hooker's operations at Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg — strange course of the commanding General.The following remarkable letter, which affords positive information with reference to the movements of Hooker in the battles at Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg, appeared in the New York World, of the 18th. It will be observed that the writer asserts it as a fact that Hooker had exact information of the strength of our forces, giving the location and effective strength of every regiment. The letter proceeds: By his administration of army matters since he took command, General Hooker had acquired its confidence in him. No one, there fore, doubted our success in the movement about to take place, and there never was a time when the Army of the Potomac was in more effective condition. On the 28th of April General Hooker had nothing left to desire; he had men enough and means enough; he was sustained to the fullest extent at Washington, and had the heartiest support of the army.--Information (obtained I know not how, but which General Hooker and General Butterfield insisted was reliable beyond question) furnished the exact strength of the rebel army opposite, giving the location and effective strength of every regiment. This information was furnished corps commanders — They were assured that it was obtained from sources and by means entirely reliable. According to this information the total strength of the force on the other side was 49,800 men, composed of Jackson's corps, 35,100 and two divisions of Longstreet's, numbering 14,700 men. This force was distributed along the Rappahannock, from Port Royal to United States Ford; the bulk of it, however, was below Fredericksburg. General Hooker's plan was to cross with the principal part of his army at Kelly's Ford and United States Ford, to move down upon the left of the enemy, force him to give battle outside of his entrenchments, or else fall back rapidly on Richmond. In either event the left wing of Hooker's force, consisting at first of three corps, (First, Third, and Sixth,) under Sedgwick, was to cross below Fredericksburg and vigorously pursue down the Bowling Green road and the Telegraph road, capturing, destroying, &c., &c. The main purpose, however, to be accomplished on the left, was to retain as large a force as possible in front of Sedgwick. If this purpose failed, and they detached any considerable number of troops, an attack was to be made to obtain possession of their works and of the Telegraph road, cutting off their retreat from in front of Hooker. On the morning of the 29th Sedgwick effected a crossing, sending one division of the 6th corps across two miles below Fredericksburg, and one division of the 1st corps across about one miles further down. On the following day the 3d corps (Sickles's) was detached from his command and ordered to join Gen. Hooker near Chancellorsville, crossing at United States Ford. The enemy still continued in front of our left in sufficient force to hold his works there and render an attack unadvisable, but at the same time troops were moving almost constantly from the direction of Richmond and passing towards our right. The General commanding, having been informed that these troops were doubtless reinforcements from Richmond, replied by telegraph that he hoped they were, as the greater would be our success! Up to the 2d of May matters on the left remained unchanged. On that day the 1st corps (Reynolds's) was ordered to march at once and join Gen. Hooker at Chancellorsville — There had been no general battle on the right. It seems that Hooker took position near Chancellorsville; the enemy felt his line on Saturday, and finally attacked Howard, who commanded Siegel's corps on the extreme right. A panic among the Dutchmen was the result. The stampede was checked, some of the guns captured from Howard were recovered, and the line re-established before night. In the evening of May 2d Sedgwick was ordered, first, to cross his entire corps and capture Fredericksburg and everything in it; second, to pursue the enemy by the Bowling Green road with his entire force. Hooker then stated that the enemy was flying, endeavoring to save his trains. A third, received at 11 o'clock that night, directed him to cross at Fredericksburg and march out on the plank road toward Chancellorsville until he connected with the right under Hooker, to destroy any force he might meet upon the road, and to be in the vicinity of the commanding General by daylight the following morning. In the execution of the two first he had already crossed to the Fredericksburg side.--He accordingly moved at once on the Bowling Green road and entered the town shortly before daylight, having skirmished the entire way. He found the works on the heights in rear of the city strongly occupied, but carried them splendidly by assault, losing one thousand men before it was accomplished. He then pushed on as directed, the enemy making what resistance he could at every favorable point. In the afternoon he came upon the enemy, reinforced by Wilcox's brigade from Banks's ford, and McLaws's division from the rebel main body, strongly posted on commanding ground near Salem Chapel, about half way to Chancellorsville. He attacked at once and continued the attack until dark, but failed to dislodge the enemy in front of him. During the day, May 3, Gen. Hooker had one corps, and only one, engaged for a short time in the morning; but during the rest of the day he did nothing. Sedgwick's guns were thundering in his ears, the very rattle of the musketry reached him; he knew that Sedgwick was coming to his relief, that the enemy were sending heavy reinforcements from his front to resist Sedgwick's advance, yet he never fired a gun to encourage him, although on the night of the 3d (Sunday) Sedgwick was within five miles of his lines. From 10 o'clock on Sunday until we recrossed the river he remained in his entrenchments idle. On Monday morning a force of the enemy from below Fredericksburg reoccupied the heights, cutting off Sedgwick's communications with the town and threatening his flank and rear. The force Sedgwick had failed to dislodge the day before was still in position at Salem Chapel. He formed line of battle to the front and rear and repulsed an attack from the direction of Fredericksburg, intended to cut him off from Banks's ford, which was now his only line of retreat. Hooker sent word that he had contracted his lines and was safe; he hoped the enemy would attack him; that Sedgwick must not attack, but must look to the safety of his corps, falling back upon Fredericksburg or recrossing the river at Banks's ford. Sedgwick remained all day in his position fighting more or less, his line forming three sides of a square, or nearly so, his extreme left resting on the river about midway between Banks's ford and Fredericksburg. Reinforcements were constantly coming to the enemy from Hooker's front, and in the afternoon Lee arrived in person. A desperate attack was immediately made upon the left of Sedgwick's line by McLaws's, Anderson's, and Early's divisions in echelon of battalions and in column. This assault, one of the most formidable and determined of the war, was handsomely checked by Howe, who held his own until nightfall. During the night the corps fell back upon Banks's Ford, and took position there, as directed by General Hooker, who telegraphed that it was of vital importance for Sedgwick to hold some position on the right bank until the next day. Before morning he ordered Sedgwick across the river. As soon as the crossing was made the order was countermanded! It was too late to go back, and the corps went into camp on the left bank.--The following day the main body crossed and returned to their old camps, having lost more men and material than McClellan did in the seven days, and so ended the first (and I trust the last) campaign under "Fighting Joe." The feeling in the army is one of bitter disappointment and intense disgust. Among the officers of the regular army not one of any position has the slightest confidence in Hooker. Not even a plausible explanation of the strange conduct of the Commanding General has been furnished. No one can tell why he did not attack on Friday morning with his whole force. It was evident from papers captured at Chancellorsville that he had surprised Lee, and that up to that time no provision had been made to resist him. He had three corps on the ground and two others, Couch's and Sickles's, on the march to join him. No one can explain why he did not attack with every available man when he heard Sedgwick's guns on Sunday afternoon. No one has yet attempted to account for his inactivity on Monday when he knew that Sedgwick was pressed by overwhelming numbers in front, flank, and rear.--The fight of Monday afternoon was within six miles of Hooker's lines, yet he never fired a gun. Lastly, no one can tell why he recrossed the river! He went over there to fight, and came back without a battle. He selected the ground and chose the time. The weather could not have been better adapted to military operations, and there seemed to be nothing but his own indecision to defeat him. You can well imagine, without my going into details, what the feeling is in the army. The desire for McClellan's return, which has never abated since his departure, has now become more outspoken than ever. Men talk of it as possible, probable, certain; and rumors of every description constantly prevail. It is taken for granted that there must be a change. For my part, I fear that if there is, it will not be the right one. Meanwhile Hooker talks boldly of further movements and another crossing. He is in this position: Another failure no matter how disastrous, cannot place him personally in a worse position than he now occupies. A lucky venture may restore his fallen fortunes. He has everything to gain, nothing to lose, by another effort, no matter how rash. Under the circumstances, it is easy to foretell what course a man of his character and training will adopt. Unless something is done, and that speedily, to restrain him he will send his army to destruction. The President has been here, and, as usual, is infatuated, believing everything is well. The only hope is that by exposing the facts the radicals or semi radicals may, in order to save themselves, do something to save the old Army of the Potomac from another awful sacrifice. Confidential agents from New York are now with the army to ascertain the state of feeling. One of them, a prominent Tribune man, spent a couple of days with the army and went away much astonished. It is stated that, after a long interview with the General commanding one of the corps, he asked, "In case Hooker is relieved, who is the proper man to command the army?" The General answered emphatically, "George B. McClellan" The other replied, "But he is, of course, out of the question; can't you name some one else?" The General answered, "Yes, Wm. B. Franklin, and aside from these two men I know of no one fit to lead this army."
