The
Washington correspondent of the New York
Times, writing to that paper on the 21st inst., gives the following facts relative to the attitudes of the naval and land commander at
Charleston:
People are deceived when they the temporary full of operations before
Charleston is the result of a difference of opinion between the army and navy commanders.
Nothing could be wider of the mark.
It is only the importance of individuals, who in their eager desire ave
Charleston in our possession, have been compelled to witness a necessarily slow, but thus for prosperous siege, that has led them to assign cause for a delay, the nature of which must be, for prudential reasons, withheld from them.
It is of no use to deny that so far as the cooperation of the navy and army is concerned the relation is as firm as the military situation can possibly make it.
Admiral Dahlgren will probably take the next forward step, which he has intimated his intention to do as soon as his fleet can be placed in proper condition.
The understanding between the
Government and
Admiral Dahlgren and the
Government and
Gen. Gillmore is a point which deserves attention.
The war records clearly set forth the plan of operations to be pursued by both commanders either singly or in conjunction.
The plan itself was conceived for the most part by
Gen. Gillmore.
The lamented
Admiral Foote was present at the council to which the plan was submitted, as were also
General Halleck and
Assistant Secretary Fox.
Those gentlemen, in fact, were members of the council.
In that document
General Gillmore plainly indicates what he is able to do and will do. His views were fully endorsed by the members of the Board, all agreeing at the time that if he succeeded in his designs the navy would find it a comparatively easy task to ascend the harbor of
Charleston.
That plan, so far as it relates to
General Gillmore's operations, embraced — firstly, the occupation of the southern portion of
Morris Island; secondly, the capture of
Wagner and
Gregg; thirty, the reduction of
Sumter.
With the reduction of
Sumter the navy was to advance.
The course marked out for
Gen. Gillmore was not adhered to in the particular of capturing
Wagner and
Gregg before demolishing
Sumter, it becoming apparent to him, after the unsuccessful assault of
Wagner on the 18th of July, that it would be feasible to reduce
Sumter over the heads of
Wagner and
Gregg.
He was induced to adopt that course more readily from the fact that the fall of
Sumter was the principal object aimed at by the expedition.
So by destroying
Sumter before capturing the works on
Morris island Gen. Gillmore offered to the navy an opportunity of greatly accelerating their movements.
The archives unmistakably indicate that
Sumter was considered by the army and navy authorities at
Washington to be the chief obstacle in the way of our reaching
Charleston.
On the 23d of August
Sumter was demolished, and is admitted to have been by the War Department.
According to the terms of the plan drawn up, then was the time for the navy to attempt a passage up the harbor.
The attempt was not made, and why not I do not propose to decide.
Several days later a second bombardment of
Sumter by
Gen. Gillmore, at the suggestion of
Admiral Dahlgren, did not elicit a single reply, and proved, beyond all doubt, that the fort did not contain one mounted gun that could be used.
Letters from
Secretary Stanton,
General Halleck, and other officials, which have been read by my informant, complimenting
Gen. Gillmore on the complete success of his enterprise, have been forwarded to him: and, if it be necessary to adduce further evidence of the demolition of
Sumter, I will state that
Gen. Gillmore's commission of
Major General dates from the 23d of August, the day on which he claims to have achieved his victory.
Private letters reecived here from officers of the fleet say that
Admiral Dahlgren has not delayed his movements because he believes
Sumter able to resist the iron-clads, but for other reasons, with which the
Admiral, and not the
General, has more particularly to deal.
It is believed the
Admiral will renew operations as soon as the fleet is in perfect fighting trim.
