Additional from the North.
We get some additional Northern intelligence from our New York files of the 17th instant:Gen Halleck's Criticisms of the Yankee campaigns of the past year — the Efficiency of his Generals.
The Yankee Commander-in-Chief, Gen. Halleck, has made a long report of the Yankee campaign of the past year, in which he most successfully lifts all blame from his own shoulders and neatly distributes it upon the backs of the commanding Generals--Nothing failed that he ordered, and nothing succeeded that he did not order. His vanity is equalled by nothing but his falsehood.--The New York Times, in commenting upon his report, says: ‘ Gen. Burnside, on his own admission, is shown to have proceeded contrary to the wishes of his superior in his march on Fredericksburg; the famous blunder of the "pontoons" is put deliberately on his shoulders, and the defeat of Fredericksburg is attributed to the failure or disobedience of Gen. Franklin in his flank attack. Gen. Hooker's unfortunate campaign is quickly placed outside of the responsibility of the General-in-Chief, from the fact that no reports were rendered to him by this officer. Gen. Dix is sharply rapped over the knuckles for his campaign against Richmond. In the battle of Gettysburg we discover, to our surprise, that an "error" of Gen. Sickles's nearly ruined us, and Gen Meade himself gets but faint praise for his victory; while the escape of Lee over the Potomac calls out some words which, though not directly asserting, imply the strongest censure of the inaction of that General. Gen. Pope is convicted of a gross blunder in his operations against the Indians. Gen Banks receives no praise, and it is intimated that Port Hudson could have been taken much earlier had we known its weakness. ’ Gen. Grant's campaign alone, in the rear of Vicksburg, is spoken of with enthusiasm, though here the great merit of that officer seems to be that he always obeyed every order from Washington, and never complained of want of reinforcements! If, by this intimation, the War Office or the General-in-Chief intend to take any of the glory of his campaign to themselves, it must be remembered that we have the honest confession of the President, over his own signature, that he never had faith in the practicability of the rear attack on Vicksburg. The review of Rosecrans's and Burnside's campaigns for the possession of Tennessee is, of course, severe and searching. If we may take their own statement, the Department were exceedingly dissatisfied with the delay of Gen. Rosecrans after the battle of Murfreesboro', and were constantly urging him forward toward Georgia. The latter, from over caution, and probably not believing that he had a sufficient number of men for so great an advance, waited month after month to strengthen his position and to organize.--General Halleck claims that he ought to have advanced during the siege of Vicksburg.--He admits that when at length he did move, his combinations were of the most remarkable and brilliant nature, forcing the enemy out of Tennessee without a battle or any especial loss on our part. The flanking and taking of Chattanooga he is forced also to admit as very efficient military movements. The telegraphic dispatches embodied in the report certainly prove that the General-in-Chief had at the time a clearer idea of the dangers to which both Rosecrans and Burnside were exposed than either of those officers.--Burnside was ordered to connect his right with Rosecrans's left, and, if possible, occupy Dalton and the passes into Georgia and North Carolina, so that the two armies might act as one body, and support each other. Rosecrans was not to advance into Georgia or Alabama at present, but to fortify his position and connect with Burnside. If his weak point — his right and the communications with Nashville — were threatened, he was to hand over Chattanooga to Burnside, and swing round to cover that flank. At the same time forces were ordered up from Memphis and other quarters to guard that side, as well as his long line of communications. Gen. Burnside, we are curtly informed, entirely disobeyed or neglected his orders, and did not connect with the Army of the Cumberland, leaving a great gap between the two armies, and exposing his outlying detachments, so that several were cut to pieces. It cannot be doubted that had the instructions of the department been strictly followed the disaster of Chickamauga would not have occurred. Still it must be remembered that we have here but one side of the case. The officers so severely criticised are not permitted by military etiquette to answer. No doubt Gen. Burnside could show various satisfactory reasons for his want of concentration of which the public know nothing, and possibly Gen. Rosecrans could furnish equally plausible reasons for his six months delay. The defeat of Gen. Rosecrans's right wing is attributed primarily by Gen. Halleck to two causes — to his advancing with so wide a line, (forty miles in length,) and to a mistake of Gen. Wood's in the battle, who was ordered to strengthen another portion of the line, and did it, not by closing up, but by a march around to the rear, thus leaving a gap for the enemy's attack. Gen. Thomas's resistance on the left wing is characterized — for a wonder — with warm praise. This defence of Gen. Halleck against the imputations of the public in regard to Rosecrans's campaign ingeniously ignores the especial point of the public censure, which was that the reinforcements so hurriedly sent to the Army of the Cumberland in September, were not sent a month or two months earlier, when released from the siege of Vicksburg. We demand, naturally, of a General-in-Chief, that he should look over the whole field and not act spasmodically or sensationally. If Rosecrans was not strong enough when he entered Georgia in September, the department knew it beforehand as well as then, and ought to have supplied the needed strength. They knew that Bragg might at any time be reinforced from Virginia, and they should have provided against the contingency. They had the men on the Mississippi. Why were they scattered off over Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana? What was Arkansas to us for a moment, compared with a decisive march to Atlanta? These telegrams of Gen. Halleck do not relieve him. The earliest, ordering reinforcements, is one to Gen. Hurlbut, in Memphis, dated September 13. The fatal battle was fought in one week from that day, and of course he knew it would take weeks for Gen. Sherman's column to reach Chattanooga. The public have the right to say of the General-in- Chief, as he has said of so many of his subordinates, that here was a "fatal error, " a gigantic blunder, which has delayed our decisive campaign, even with all Grant's splendid success forced from fortune since, at least six months, and prevented the capture of Mobile and Charleston for some time to come.The assault on Knoxville--Yankee account of the gallantry of the Confederates.
The New York papers contain a long account of the assault made by a portion of Gen. Longstreet's force on Knoxville. The night had been very cold, and at dawn next morning the Confederates were seen advancing in three lines to the assault. A heavy artillery fire was immediately opened upon them. Despite the storm of canister which howled around them on came the rebel host, with brigade front, slowly pouring over the railroad cut, and anon quickening in motion as the ground presented less obstruction, until at last, emerging from the nearest timber, they broke into.The charge.
Across the open space which intervened between the timber and the fort, and which was crossed with logs and the stumps of felled trees, they now came at impetuous speed. The first check was given when the foremost of the column stumbled over a line of telegraph wire, which had been stretched through the low brush and called from stump to stump out of ordinary view. As they halted here momentarily, one falling over another, until the cause of the obstruction was discovered, our batteries in the fort had full play, and Benjamin, Buckley, and Roamer poured in their rounds quick and fast, while the infantry of Ferrero kept up a galling fire with musketry. The embrasures of the fort and the whole line of the parapet blazed at once with discharges. Still the rebels pressed on, their battle flags of red, with cross of blue, floating defiantly above their heads, over the sorried line of bayonets. Rallying over the temporary obstruction, leaping the stumps and logs, and pushing through the brush, they were within pistol-shot of the fort. Our men, during the last few minutes, had received orders to reserve their fire until each could single out his target at close range, while Benjamin treble-shotted his guns and Buckley loaded with his terrible canister.The Repulse, Rout, and Retreat.
And now together all launched forth. The effect was terrific. Broken in their line, a few of the more desperate of the rebels sprang into the ditch, clambered up the glacis, and almost side by side with the flag of the Union planted the banner of treason. But, confused, panic-stricken, the rear of the column gave way and retreated down the hill others, again, afraid to advance or retire in the face of what was certain death, and appalled by the heaps of slain which strewed the field, threw down their arms and surrendered. The most desperate — and a gallant band they were — remained fast by their officers, who valiantly kept the lead to the very fort itself, and following them as they jumped into the ditch, attempted to scale the glacis, each to receive his death wound as his head appeared above the parapet. A captain, in words which would sound oddly at so thrilling a moment, and in more forcible than polite, demanded the surrender of the garrison as he pushed his body through one of the embrasures and faced the very muzzle of the cannon. His answer was the discharge of the piece, when, rent limb from limb, his Mansfield corpse, or what was left of it, was hurled outward into the air. His comrades, still lurking around the corners of the trench, essaying by every means to get within the work, were now subjected to the fire of hand-grenades, which Lieut. Benjamin extemporized by cutting short his which he lit, when he tossed the shells over the edge of the parapet. Baffled at every point, and finding themselves unsupported by the rest of the charging column, they surrendered, and were hanted within the fort, though not until the trench was piled with the dead and dying. As the main body gave way and fell back the carnage among them was fearful. Their disordered line at length disappeared within the timber, while a wild huzza went up from our victorious boys. A few straggling shots around the angle of the fort and in the trenches, mingled with the heartrending means of the wounded and dying, and the fight was over. The grand assault had been made and repulsed; the storming party which had advanced so lately in all the pride and confidence of veterans had met an enemy their equal at least, and was now a scattered mob in the woods beyond. In short, Knoxville was still ours!A truce — Burial of the dead.
And now, how sudden the transformation of man from send to The agonizing cries of the mounded and dying called out the better feelings of humanity and on the very spot where an hour before the combatants were struggling in deadly strife, they now commingled in the offices of charity. The wounded in the trenches were first relieved by Capt. Swinscoe and Lieut. Benjamin, who went to their immediate assistance with canteens of water and liquor. The trench presented a ghastly sight, with the mangled bodies and pools of blood, while the field beyond was strewn with the same terrible objects. Cols. Bowen and Babcock, of Gen. Potter's staff, soon after made their appearance with a formal flag of truce, and passed out upon the Kingston or London road, until hailed by the enemy's skirmish line. They were met, after a brief delay, by Col. Serrell, of Gen. Longstreet's staff, when a cessation of hostilities was agreed upon, to last until 5 P. M., to permit the return of the dead who were lying along our lines, and the exchange of the wounded. The following is a copy of the letter which led to the establishment of the truce: Headquarters, Ninth Army Corps,
Knoxville, East Tennessee, Nov. 29, 1863.
Major General McLaws, or other Officers Commanding Confederate Forces on Kingston Road:--
General — Under instructions from Major Gen. Burnside, commanding the Army of the Ohio, I address you this communication for the purpose of offering a cessation of hostilities for sufficient time to arrange for the removal of your wounded lying in front of my lines.
Lieutenant Colonel Bowan, A. A G., the bearer of this communication, is authorized to make such arrangements for this purpose as may be agreed upon. Knoxville, East Tennessee, Nov. 29, 1863.
Major General McLaws, or other Officers Commanding Confederate Forces on Kingston Road:--
Your obedient servant.
Robert B Potter.,
Brigadier General Commanding.
The ambulances from both sides now met on the neutral ground, and the dead were carried back to the rebel line, where they were buried by their late comrades.
The officers commingled, from Generals down to Lieutenants, and so also did the soldiers, until their officers ordered them back to their respective places.
Nearly a hundred of the rebel wounded had been carried into the city and cared for at the hospital of the Ninth corps.
By direction of Dr. Wilder our ambulances, with some of those of the rebels driven by Union soldiers, went back into the city, obtained such of the wounded as were not fit to be held as prisoners of war, and delivered them on the dividing line, where our ambulances — drivers being exchanged in turn — went within the rebel line and obtained our wounded.
So much delay ensued in doing all this that the truce was extended beyond seven o'clock, the opposing officers still remaining together, chatting in the most agreeable manner upon every topic which suggested itself.
Finally the last wounded Union soldier was obtained, the last ambulance returned within our works, the officers of the contending army who had mutually found and greeted many old friends and classmates, shook hands with the utmost cordiality and parted.
In a few minutes the firing of the pickets indicated the resumption of hostilities.
It may be well.
Robert B Potter.,
Brigadier General Commanding.