Gen. Grant's official report
of the battles of Chattanooga, Lookout Mountain, and Missionary Ridge.
Headq'rs military division of the Miss. in the field, Chattanooga, Tenn., Dec. 24, 1863.
Col. J. C. Kelton, A. A. G., Washington, D. C.: Colonel: In pursuance of G O No. 337, War Department, of date Washington, October 16, 1863, delivered to me by the Secretary of War at Louisville, Ky, on the 18th of the same month, I assumed command of the "Military Division of the Mississippi, " comprising the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee; and telegraphed the order assuming command, together with the order of the War Department referred to, to Maj Gen A E Burnside, at Knoxville, and to Maj Gen W S Rosecrans, at Chattanooga. My action in telegraphing these orders to Chattanooga in advance of my arrival there, was induced by information furnished me by the Secretary of War of the difficulties with which the Army of the Cumberland had to contend in supplying itself over a long mountainous and almost impassable road from Stevenson, Ala, to Chattanooga, Tenn, and his fears that Gen Rosecrans would fall back to the north side of the Tennessee river. To guard farther against the possibility of the Secretary's fears, I also telegraphed to Maj Gen. Thomas on the 19th October from Louisville, to hold Chattanooga at all hazards; that I would be there as soon as possible. To which be replied on the same date, "I will hold the town till we starve." Proceeding directly to Chattanooga, I arrived there on the 23d October, and found that General Thomas had, immediately on being placed in command of the Department of the Cumberland, ordered the concentration of Maj Gen Hooker's command at Bridgeport, preparatory to Securing the river and main wagon road between that place and Brown's Ferry, immediately below Lookout Mountain. The next morning after my arrival at Chattanooga, in company with Thomas and Brig Gen. W. F. Smith Chief Engineer, I made a reconnaissance of Brown's Ferry and the hills on the south side of the river and at the mouth of Lookout Valley. After the reconnaissance the plan agreed upon was for Hooker to cross at Bridgeport to the south side of the river with all the force that could be spared from the railroad, and most on the main wagon road by way of Whitesides to Wauhatchie, in Lookout Valley. Maj Gen. J M Palmer was to proceed by the only practicable route north of the river from his position opposite Chattanooga to a point on the north bank of the river opposite Whitesides, then to cross to the south side and hold the road passed over by Hooker. In the meantime, and before the enemy could be apprised of our intention, a force under the direction of Brig Gen W F Smith, Chief Engineer, was to be thrown across the river, at or near Brown's Ferry, to seize the range of hills at the mouth of Lookout Valley, covering the Brown's ferry road, and orders were given accordingly. It was known the enemy held the north of Lookout Valley with a brigade of troops, and the road leading around the foot of the mountain from their main camp in Chattanooga Valley to Lookout Valley. Holding these advantages, he would have had little difficulty in concentrating a sufficient force to have defeated or driven him back. To remedy this the seizure of the range of hills at the mouth of Lookout Valley, and covering the Brown's Ferry road, was deemed of the highest importance. This, by the use of pontoon bridges at Chattanooga and Brown's Ferry, would secure to us by the north bank of the river across Moccasin Point, a shorter one by which to reinforce our troops in Lookout Valley, than the narrow and tortuous road around the foot of Lookout Mountain afforded the enemy for reinforcement. The force speeled for this expedition consisted of five thousand men, under command of General Smith, Chief Engineer, eighteen hundred of which, under Brig. Gen. H. B Hazen, in sixty pontoon boats, containing thirty armed men each, floated quietly from Chattanooga past the enemy's pickets, to the foot of Lookout Mountain, on the night of the 27th of October, landed on the south side of the river at Brown's Ferry, surprised the enemy's pickets stationed there, and seized the hills covering the ferry, without the loss of a man killed, and but four or five wounded. The remainder of the force, together with the materials for a bridge, were moved by the north bank of the river across Moccasin Point to Brown's Ferry, without attracting the attention of the enemy; and before day dawned the whole force was ferried to the south bank of the river, and the almost inaccessible heights rising from Lookout Valley at its outlet to the river, and below the mouth of Lookout Creek, were secured. By 10 o'clock, A M, an excellent pontoon bridge was laid across the river at Brown's Ferry, thus securing to us the end of the desired road nearest the enemy's forces, and the shorter line over which to pass troops, if a battle became inevitable. Positions were taken up by our troops from which they could not have been driven except by vastly superior forces, and then only with great loss to the enemy. Our artillery was placed in such position as to completely command the roads leading from the enemy's main camp in Chattanooga Valley to Lookout Valley. On the 28th Hooker emerged into Lookout Valley at Wauhatchie, by the direct road from Bridgeport, by way of Whitesides to Chattanooga, with the Eleventh Army Corps, under Major Gen Howard and Geary's Division, of the Twelfth Army Corps, and proceeded to take up positions for the defence of the road from Whiteside, over which he had marched, and also the road leading from Brown's Ferry to Kelley's Ferry, throwing the left of Howard's Corps forward to Brown's Ferry. The division that started, under command of Palmer, for Whitesides, reached its destination and took up the position intended in the original plan of this movement. These movements, so successfully executed secured to us two comparatively good lines by which to obtain supplies from the terminus of the railroad at Bridgeport, namely: the main wagon road, by way of Whitesides, Wauhatchie, and Brown's Ferry, distant but twenty-eight miles, and the Kelly's Ferry and Brown's Ferry road, which, by the use of the river from Bridgeport to Kelly's Ferry, reduced the distance for wagoning to but eight miles. Up to this period our forces at Chattanooga were practically invested, the enemy's lines extending from the Tennessee river above Chattanooga to the river at and below the point at Lookout Mountain, below Chattanooga, with the south bank of the river picketed to near Bridgeport, his main force being fortified in Chattanooga Valley, at the foot of and on Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, and a brigade in Lookout Valley. True, we held possession of the country north of the river, but it was from sixty to seventy miles over the most impracticable roads to army supplies. The artillery horses and mules had become so reduced by starvation that they could not have been relied upon for moving anything. An attempt at retreat must have been with men alone, and with only such supplies as they could carry. A retreat would have been almost certain annihilation, for the enemy occupying positions within gunshot of and overlooking our very fortifications, would have unquestionably pursued retreating forces. Already more than ten thousand animals had perished in supplying half-rations to the troops by the long and tedious route from Stevenson and Bridgeport to Chattanooga over Waldron's Ridge. They could not have been supplied another week. The enemy was evidently fully apprised of our condition in Chattanooga, and of the necessity of our establishing a new and shorter line by which to obtain supplies if we would maintain our position; and so fully was he impressed with the importance of keeping from us these lines — lost to him by surprise, and in a manner he little dreamed of — that in order to regain possession of them a night attack was made by a portion of Longstreet's forces on a position of Hooker's troops (Geary's division of the 12th corns) the first night after Hooker's arrival in the Valley. The attack failed, however, and Howard's corps, which was moving to the assistance of Geary, finding that it was not required by him, carried the remaining heights held by the enemy west of Lookout Creek. This gave us quiet possession of the lines of communication heretofore described, south of the Tennessee river. Of these operations I cannot speak more particularly — the sub-reports having been sent to Washington without passing through my hands. By the use of two steamboats, one of which had been left at Chattanooga by the enemy, and fell into our hands and one that had been built by us at Bridgeport and Kelly's Ferry, we were enabled to obtain supplies with but eight miles of wagoning. The capacity of the railroad and steamboats was not sufficient, however, to supply all the wants of the army, but actual suffering was prevented. Ascertaining from scouts and deserters that Bragg was dispatching Longstreet from the front, and moving him in the direction of Knoxville, Tenn., evidently to attack Burnside, and feeling strongly the necessity for some move that would compel him to retain all his forces and recall those he had detached, directions were given for a movement against Missionary Ridge, with a view to carrying it and threatening the enemy's communication with Longstreet, of which I informed Burnside by telegraph on the 7th November. After a thorough reconnaissance of the ground, however, it was deemed utterly impracticable to make the move until Sherman should get up, because of the inadequacy of our forces, and the condition of the animals then at Chattanooga, and I was forced to leave Burnside for the present to contend against superior forces of the enemy until the arrival of Sherman with his men and means of transportation. In the meantime reconnaissances were made and plans were matured for operations. Dispatches were sent to Sherman informing him of the movement of Longstreet, and the necessity of his immediate presence at Chattanooga. On the 14th November I telegraphed to Burnside as follows: Your dispatch and Dana's just received. Being there, you can tell better how to resist Longstreet's attack than I can direct. With your showing, you had better give up Kingston at the last moment, and save the most productive part of your possessions. Every arrangement is now made to throw Sherman's forces across the river, just at and below the mouth of Chickamauga creek, as soon as it arrives. Thomas will attack on his left at the same time, and together it is expected to carry Missionary Ridge, and from there push a force on to the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton.--Hooker will at the same time attack, and, if he can, carry, Lookout Mountain. The enemy now seems to be looking for an attack on his left flank. This favors us To further confirm this, Sherman's advance division will march direct from Whiteside to Trenton. The remainder of his force will pass over a new road just made from Whiteside to Kelly's Ferry, thus being concealed from the enemy, and leave him to suppose the whole force is going up Lookout Valley. Sherman's advance has only just reached Bridgeport.--The rear will reach there on the 16th. This will bring it to the 19th us the earliest day for making the combined movement as desired. Inform me if think you can sustain yourself until that time. I can hardly conceive of the enemy breaking through at Kingston and pushing for Kentucky. If they should, however, a new problem will be left for solution. Thomas has ordered a division of cavalry to the vicinity of Sparta. I will ascertain if they have started, and inform you. It will be entirely out of the question to send you ten thousand men, not because they cannot be spared; but how could they be fed after they get even one day east of here. U. S. Grant, Major General.
On the 15th having received from the General In-Chief a dispatch of date of the 14th, in reference to Burnside's position, the danger of his abandonment of East Tennessee, unless immediate relief was afforded, and the terrible misfortune such a result would be to our arms; and also dispatches from Mr. C A Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, and Col Wilson, of my staff, sent at the instance of Gen Burnside, informing me more fully of the condition of affairs as detailed to them by him, I telegraphed him as follows:
Chattanooga, Nov. 15, 1863.
I do not know how to impress on you the necessity of holding on to East Tennessee in strong enough terms.
According to the dispatches of Mr. Dana and Col Wilson, it would seem that you should, if pressed to do it, hold on to Knoxville and that portion of the valley which you will necessarily possess holding to that point.
Should Longstreet move his whole force across the Little Tennessee, an effort should be made to cut his pontoons on that stream, even if it sacrificed half the cavalry of the Ohio army.
By holding on and placing Longstreet between the Little Tennessee and Knoxville he should not be allowed to escape with an army capable of doing anything this winter.
I can hardly conceive of the necessity of retreating from East Tennessee.
If I did so at all, it would be after losing most of the army, and then necessity would suggest the route.
I will not attempt to lay out a line of retreat.
Kingston, looking at the map, I though of more importance than any one point in East Tennessee.
But, my attention being called more closely to it, I can see that it might be passed by, and Knoxville and the rich valley about it possessed, ignoring that place entirely.
I should not think it advisable to concentrate a force near Little Tennessee to resist the crossing, if it would be in danger of capture; but I would harass and embarrass progress in every way possible, reflecting on the fact that the Army of the Ohio is not the only army to resist the onward progress of the enemy. U S Grant, Major General.
The reconnaissance and its results preparations for the Grand attack.
Previous reconnaissances, made first by Brigadier General W F Smith, Chief Engineer, and afterwards by Thomas, Sherman, and myself, in company with him, of the country opposite Chattanooga and north of the Tennessee river, extending as far east as the mouth of the North Chickamauga, and also of the mouth of the South Chickamauga and the north end of Missionary Ridge, so far as the same could be made from the north bank of the river without exciting suspicious on the part of the enemy, showed good roads from Brown's Ferry up the river and back of the first range of hills opposite Chattanooga, and out of view of the enemy's positions. Troops crossing the bridge at Brown's Ferry could be seen and their numbers estimated by the enemy; but, not seeing anything further of them as they passed up in the rear of these hills, he would necessarily be at a loss to know whether they were moving to Knoxville or held on the north side of the river for future operations at Chattanooga. It also showed that the north end of Missionary Ridge was imperfectly guarded, and that the banks of the river, from the mouth of South Chickamauga creek westward to this main line in front of Chattanooga, was watched only by a small cavalry picket. This determined the plan of operations indicated in my dispatch of the 14th to Burnside. Upon further consideration — the great object being to mass all the force possible against one given point — namely, Missionary Ridge, converging towards the north end of it — it was deemed best to change the original plan, so far as it contemplated Hooker's attack on Lookout Mountain, which would give us Howard's corps of his command to aid in this purpose; and on the 18th the following instructions were given Thomas: All preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's position on Missionary Ridge by Saturday at daylight. Not being provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the mountain and other places, such definite instructions cannot be given as might be desirable. However, the general plan, you understand, is for Sherman, with the force brought with him, strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a crossing of the Tennessee river, just below the mouth of Chickamauga; his crossing to be protected by artillery from the heights on the north bank of the river (to be located by your chief of artillery,) and to secure the heights from the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel, before the enemy can concentrate against him. You will co-operate with Sherman. The troops in Chattanooga Valley should be well concentrated on your left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend fortifications on the right and centre, and a movable column of one division in readiness to move wherever ordered. This division should show itself as threateningly as possible on the most practicable line for making an attack up the valley. Your effort than will be to form a juncture with Sherman, making your advance well towards the northern end of Missionary Ridge, and moving as near, simultaneously with him, as possible. The juncture once formed and the ridge carried, communications will be at once established between the two armies by roads on the south bank of the river. Further movements will then depend on those of the enemy.--Lookout Valley will be easily held, I think, by Geary's division and what troops you may still have there belonging to the old Army of the Cumberland. Howard's corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at Chattanooga or with Sherman. It should be marched on Friday night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower down than the first pontoon bridge, and there held in readiness for such orders as may become necessary. All these troops will be provided with two days cooked rations, in haversacks, and one hundred rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantry soldier. Special care should be taken by all officers to see that ammunition is not wasted or unnecessarily fired away. You will call on the Engineer Department for such preparations as you may deem necessary for carrying your infantry and artillery over the creek. U S Grant, Major General.
Gen Sherman's instructions and movements.
A copy of these instructions was furnished Sherman, with the following communication: Enclosed herewith I send you a copy of instructions to Major Gen Thomas. You having been over the ground in person, and having heard the whole matter discussed, further instructions will not be necessary for you. It is particularly desirable that a force should be got through to the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton, and Longstreet thus cut off from communication with the South; but, being confronted by a large force here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how this is to be effected until the result of our first effort is known. I will add, however, what is not shown in my instructions to Thomas, that a brigade of cavalry has been ordered here, which, if it arrives in time, will be thrown across the Tennessee above Chickamauga, and may be able to make the trip to Cleveland or thereabouts. U S Grant, Major General.
Sherman's forces were moved from Bridgeport by way of Whiteside--one division threatening the enemy's left flank in the direction of Trenton, crossing at Brown's Ferry, up the north bank of the Tennessee, to near the mouth of South Chickamauga, where they were kept concealed from the enemy until they were ready to force a crossing.--Pontoons for throwing a bridge across the river were built and placed in North Chickamauga, near its mouth, a few miles further up, without attracting the attention of the enemy. It was expected we would be able to effect the crossing on the 21st of November; but, owing to heavy rains, Sherman was unable to get up until the afternoon of the 23d, and then only with Gens Morgan's, L. Smith's, John E Smith's, and Hugh Ewing's divisions of the 15th corps, under command of Major Gen Frank P Blair, of his army. The pontoon bridge at Brown's Ferry having been broken up by the drift consequent upon the rise in the river and rafts sent down by the enemy, the other division (Osterhans's) was detained on the south side, and was on the night of the 23d ordered, unless it could get across by eight o'clock the next morning, to report to Hooker, who was instructed in this event to attack Lookout Mountain, as contemplated in the original plan.
