First Olynthiac
You would, I
expect, men of
Athens, accept it as
the equivalent of a large amount of money, if it could be made clear to you what
will prove our best policy in the matters now under discussion. This then being
so, you are bound to give an eager hearing to all who offer advice. For not only
if someone comes forward with a well-considered plan, could you hear and accept
it, but also I count it part of your good fortune that more than one speaker may
be inspired with suitable suggestions on the spur of the moment, so that out of
the multitude of proposals the choice of the best should not be difficult.
[
2]
The present
crisis, Athenians, calls on you, almost with an audible voice, to take into your
own hands the control of your interests in the North, if you are really anxious
to safeguard them. But, I confess, our attitude puzzles me. My own idea would be
to vote an expedition at once, to make instant preparation for its dispatch,
thus avoiding our previous blunder, and to send ambassadors to state our
intentions and watch events.
[
3]
Our chief ground
for alarm is that this man, so unscrupulous, so quick to seize his opportunity,
now yielding a point when it suits his purpose, now threatening—and
his threats may well carry conviction—now misrepresenting us and our
failure to intervene, may divert to his own purpose and wrest from us something
of vital importance.
[
4]
And yet, men of
Athens, it is reasonable to suggest that
the very thing which makes Philip's position most redoubtable is also most
encouraging for you. For the swift and opportune movements of war he has an
immense advantage over us in the fact that he is the sole director of his own
policy, open or secret, that he unites the functions of a general, a ruler and a
treasurer, and that he is always at the head of his army; but when it comes to a
composition such as he would gladly make with
Olynthus, the tables are turned.
[
5]
The eyes of the Olynthians are opened to the fact that they are now
fighting not for glory, not for a strip of territory, but to avert the overthrow
and enslavement of their fatherland. They know how he treated those
Amphipolitans who betrayed their city and those Pydnaeans who opened their gates
to him. And a despotism, I take it, is as a rule mistrusted by free
constitutions, especially when they are near neighbors.
[
6]
I bid you grasp these facts, men of
Athens, and weigh well all the important
considerations. Make up your minds; rouse your spirits; put your heart into the
war, now or never. Pay your contributions cheerfully; serve in person; leave
nothing to chance. You have no longer the shadow of an excuse for shirking your
duty.
[
7]
It was long the common talk that the
Olynthians must be made to fight Philip; and now it has come about in the
natural course, and that too in a way that suits you admirably. For if they had
plunged into war in reliance on your advice, they would perhaps have proved
uncertain allies and only half-hearted in their resolve; but now that their
hatred of Philip is the outcome of their own grievances, it is natural that
their hostility should have a firm base in their apprehensions and their
experiences.
[
8]
Men of
Athens, you must not let slip the
opportunity that offers, nor make the blunder you have so often made before.
When we returned from the Euboean expedition
1 and Hierax and Stratocles, the envoys of
Amphipolis, mounted this platform and
bade you sail and take over their city, if we had shown the same earnestness in
our own cause as in defence of the safety of
Euboea,
Amphipolis would have been yours at once and you would have
been relieved of all your subsequent difficulties.
[
9]
Once again, when news came of the siege of
Pydna, of
Potidaea, of
Methone, of
Pagasae,
2 and of the rest of them—not to weary you
with a complete catalogue—if we had at that time shown the required
zeal in marching to the help of the first that appealed, we should have found
Philip today much more humble and accommodating. Unfortunately we always neglect
the present chance and imagine that the future will right itself, and so, men of
Athens, Philip has us to thank
for his prosperity. We have raised him to a greater height than ever king of
Macedonia reached before. Today
this opportunity comes to us from the Olynthians unsought, a fairer opportunity
than we have ever had before.
[
10]
Men of
Athens, let anyone fairly reckon up the blessings we have
received of the gods, and though much is amiss, none the less his gratitude will
be great—and rightly so: for our many losses in the war
3 may be justly
imputed to our own supineness; that we did not suffer these losses long ago and
that this opportunity of alliance affords us some compensation, if we choose to
accept it, this I for my part should put down as a signal instance of the favor
of the gods.
[
11]
I suppose it is with national as
with private wealth. If a man keeps what he gains, he is duly grateful to
fortune; if he loses it by his own imprudence, he loses along with it the sense
of gratitude. So in national affairs, those who fail to use their opportunities
aright, fail also to acknowledge the good that the gods have given; for every
advantage in the past is judged in the light of the final issue. It is therefore
our duty, men of
Athens, to keep a
careful eye on the future, that by restoring our prosperity we may efface the
discredit of the past.
[
12]
But if we leave these
men too in the lurch, Athenians, and then
Olynthus is crushed by Philip, tell me what is to prevent him
from marching henceforward just where he pleases. I wonder if any one of you in
this audience watches and notes the steps by which Philip, weak at first, has
grown so powerful. First he seized
Amphipolis, next
Pydna, then
Potidaea,
after that
Methone, lastly he
invaded
Thessaly.
[
13]
Then having settled Pherae,
Pagasae,
Magnesia, and the rest of that country to suit his purposes,
off he went to
Thrace, and there, after
evicting some of the chiefs and installing others, he fell sick. On his
recovery, he did not relapse into inactivity, but instantly assailed
Olynthus. His campaigns against Illyrians
and Paeonians and King Arybbas and any others that might be mentioned, I pass
over in silence.
[
14]
“Well,” some of you may say, “why tell us this
now?” Because, men of
Athens, I want you to know and realize two things: first, what
an expensive game it is to squander your interests one by one; and secondly, the
restless activity which is ingrained in Philip's nature, and which makes it
impossible for him ever to rest on his laurels. But if Philip adopts the
principle that he ought always to be improving his position, and you the
principle of never facing your difficulties resolutely, just reflect what is
likely to be the end of it all.
[
15]
Seriously, is
anyone here so foolish as not to see that our negligence will transfer the war
from
Chalcidice to
Attica? Yet if that comes to pass, I am
afraid, men of
Athens, that just as
men who borrow money recklessly at high interest enjoy a temporary accommodation
only to forfeit their estates in the end, so we may find that we have paid a
heavy price for our indolence, and because we consult our own pleasure in
everything, may hereafter come to be forced to do many of the dfficult things
for which we had no liking, and may finally endanger our possessions here in
Attica itself.
[
16]
Now someone may tell
me that to find fault is easy and in any one's power, but that it needs a
statesman to expound the policy demanded by our circumstances. But I am not
unaware, men of
Athens, that if
anything goes wrong, you often vent your disappointment, not on the responsible
agents, but on those who happen to have addressed you last. I shall not,
however, consult my own safety by keeping back what I believe to be for your
true interests.
[
17]
I suggest then that the case
calls for two distinct expeditions; one military force must be dispatched to
rescue their cities for the Olynthians, and a second force, both naval and
military, to ravage Philip's territory. If you neglect either of them, I am
afraid your campaign will prove abortive.
[
18]
For
if you send a marauding expedition, he will stand on the defensive until he has
made himself master of
Olynthus,
and then he will easily march to the relief of his own territory; or if you
confine yourselves to helping
Olynthus, he will know that his base is secure and will give
close and undivided attention to his operations, until at last he overcomes the
resistance of the besieged. Our expedition, you see, must be on a large scale
and twofold.
[
19]
Such are my views on the expeditionary force. With regard to the supply of
money, you have money, men of
Athens; you have more than any other nation has for military
purposes. But you appropriate it yourselves, to suit your own pleasure. Now if
you will spend it on the campaign, you have no need of a further supply; if not,
you have—or rather, you have no supply at all.
“What!” someone will cry, “do you actually move to
use this money for military purposes?” Of course I do not.
[
20]
Only it is my opinion that we must provide soldiers
and that there must be one uniform system of pay in return for service. Your
opinion, however, is that you should, without any trouble, just appropriate the
money for your festivals.
4 Then the only alternative is a war-tax, heavy or
light, as circumstances demand. Only money we must have, and without money
nothing can be done that ought to be done. There are other proposals before you
for raising supplies; choose whichever of them you think expedient, and, while
there is yet time, grapple with the problem.
[
21]
It is worth while, however, to observe and
consider how Philip stands today. His present prospects are not so bright or
satisfactory as they seem and as a superficial observer might pronounce them;
nor would he ever have provoked this war had he thought that he would be bound
to fight himself. He hoped that on his first entry he would carry all before
him, and he finds himself completely mistaken. This unforeseen result confounds
and discourages him; and besides there is the question of
Thessaly.
[
22]
The Thessalians were always, of course, born traitors, and Philip finds them
today just what everyone has found them in the past. They have formally resolved
to demand the restitution of
Pagasae
and have hindered him from fortifying
Magnesia. I have also been informed that they will no longer
hand over to him the profits of their harbors and markets, on the ground that
this sum ought to be applied to the government of
Thessaly and not find its way into Philip's coffers. Now if he
is deprived of this source of revenue, he will be hard put to it to pay for the
maintenance of his mercenaries.
[
23]
But surely we
must assume that your Paeonian or Illyrian or any other of these tribes would
prefer freedom and independence to slavery. They are not accustomed to
acknowledge a master, and Philip is by all accounts a particularly harsh one.
And indeed that is not surprising. Undeserved success engenders folly in
unbalanced minds, and therefore it often proves harder to keep than to win
prosperity.
[
24]
Look then, Athenians, upon his
difficulties as your opportunity. Be prompt to take up the challenge. Send
embassies when necessary. Take the field in person. Rouse all the other states.
Reflect how eagerly Philip would march against you, if he had such a chance as
we have, and if the war were on our frontiers. Are you not ashamed if, having
the opportunity, you lack the courage to do to him what he would certainly do to
you if he could?
[
25]
One point more, men of
Athens. Do
not forget that you can today choose whether you must fight there or Philip must
fight here. If
Olynthus holds out,
you will fight there, to the detriment of his territory, while you enjoy in
security the land that is your home. But if Philip takes Olynthus, who is to
prevent his marching hither? The Thebans?
[
26]
It
may be an unduly harsh thing to say, but they will join heartily in the
invasion. The Phocians then? What! the men who cannot protect their own country
without your help? Any others? “But, my friend,” cries
someone, “he will not wish to attack us.” Nay, it would be a
crowning absurdity if, having the power, he should lack the will to carry out
the threat which today he utters at the risk of his reputation for sanity.
[
27]
But indeed I think you want no speech to
prove how vast is the difference between a war here and a war yonder. Why, if
you were obliged to take the field yourselves for a bare month, drawing from
Attica the necessary
supplies—I am assuming that there is no enemy in this
country—I suppose your farmers would lose more than the sum spent upon
the whole of the previous war.
5 But if war comes within
our borders, at what figure must we assess our losses? And you must add the
insolence of the enemy and the ignominy of our position, greater than any loss
in a wise man's estimation.
[
28]
It is the duty of all of you to grasp the significance
of these facts, and to send out an expedition that shall thrust back the war
into
Macedonia: it is the duty of the
well-to-do, that spending but a fraction of the wealth they so happily possess,
they may enjoy the residue in security; of our fighters, that gaining experience
of war on Philip's soil, they may prove the formidable guardians of an inviolate
fatherland; of the statesmen, that they may give a ready account of their
stewardship, for as is the issue of these events, so will be your judgement of
their policy. On every ground may that issue be prosperous!