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oard; from there, he wrote to Halleck, what the experience of many months eventually confirmed: Our troops must get below the city to be used effectually. On the 18th, he wrote: Should Banks pass Port Hudson, this force will be ready to cooperate on Vicksburg, at any time. On the 20th, he returned to Memphis, and sent word to one of his subordinates: The Mississippi river enterprise must take precedence of all others, and any side move must simply be to protect our flanks and rear. On the 22d, he said to McClernand: I hope the work of changing the channel of the Mississippi is begun; and on the same day: On the present rise, it is barely possible that the Yazoo pass might be turned to good account in aiding our enterprise. These two ideas were already prominent in his mind; they were destined to become fully developed ere long, and to be prosecuted with energy and persistency, but both to prove unsuccessful. Although so persistently and zealously followed up by Grant, he was not
and sent three gunboats to shell the water-batteries and any places where rebel troops could be rested during the night; and, at three o'clock on the morning of the 22d, the cannonade began from the land side. Every available gun was brought to bear on the works;, sharpshooters at the same time began their part of the action; and ; and the stories of Saguntum and Saragossa prove, that Vicksburg was not the only citadel which long resisted gallant and determined armies. On the night of the 22d, the troops were withdrawn from the most advanced positions reached during the assault, still retaining, however, ground that was of importance during the siege. Tns, who brought on the war which the people did not desire, were universally inclined to fight with tongue or pen, rather than with more warlike weapons. On the 22d, Grant reported to Halleck his arrival at the Mississippi, and the investment of Vicksburg. In narrating the events of the assault, he said: General McClernand's d
n the town, evidently intended for some such purpose as that spoken of in the text. This singular story excited attention, and preparations were made to render abortive any such attempt at escape as had been described. Admiral Porter was warned, the pickets were redoubled at night, and material was collected to light up the river, should a large number of boats attempt to cross. Batteries also were got ready behind the levee on the western bank, but the attempt was never made. On the 22d, positive information was received that Johnston was crossing the Big Black river, and intended marching immediately against Grant. Sherman was at once directed to assume command of the force in the rear. Troops were taken from his corps and that of McPherson, in the line of intrenchments, and added to the force which was to meet Johnston; the four divisions of Washburne and Parke were also included in this new command, which amounted to nearly half of Grant's army. Besides these, Herron
me dispatch, he said: It seems to me, now, that Mobile should be captured, the expedition starting from Lake Ponchartrain. But Halleck had other plans, and, on the 22d, he replied: efore attempting Mobile, I think it will be best to clean up a little. Johnston should be disposed of, also Price and Marmaduke, so as to hold line ofed indicates that a part of Lee's army have been sent to reenforce Bragg. This was sent to Hurlbut, in the absence of Grant; but, when it reached Vicksburg, on the 22d, Grant had returned. He still kept his bed, but instantly directed Sherman: Order at once one division of your army corps to proceed to reenforce Rosecrans, movingtil word is heard from the generalin-chief: We must make no disposition of troops that will endanger the success of Rosecrane. All of these orders were made on the 22d, the day that Halleck's dispatch arrived. His orders were received on the morning of the 22d; Osterhaus's division of Sherman's corps was then at the Big Black bri
heavy rains caused a rise in the Tennessee, and the bridges at Chattanooga and Brown's ferry were swept away; and, on the 22d, yet once more, Grant said to the commander of the Army of the Cumberland: The bridges at Brown's ferry being down to-day,thout fail. But there proved to be compensations for all this anxiety and all these postponements. On the night of the 22d, a deserter came in from the rebel army, and reported that Bragg was falling back from Missionary ridge. Grant had receivtly not intended to deceive; but he had mistaken Bragg's movements. Buckner's division had gone to join Longstreet on the 22d, and another had started, but was brought back in consequence of this attack. See General B. R. Johnson's (rebel) repor the left of the rebel line. The Eleventh corps, however, as has been seen, had been ordered to the national left, on the 22d; and Osterhaus's division was to have followed. But, when it was finally found impossible to rebuild the bridge at Brown'
e rode into Vicksburg. His army remained at Canton till the 3d of March. Smith had not started from Memphis till the 11th of February, a delay which Sherman pronounced unpardonable; he advanced only as far as West Point, and turned back on the 22d, before a force inferior to his own; his orders having been peremptory to fight any cavalry he met. His march back to Memphis was too rapid for a good effect, and he was closely followed by Forrest's cavalry, before whom he had retreated at West Pof his expedition, or to satisfy his commanders. Sherman dismissed Smith's part of the operation with these words: General Smith had not started from Memphis at all, till the 11th of February, had only reached West Point, and turned back on the 22d, the march back to Memphis being too rapid for a good effect. His losses were not reported, but were probably slight. Sherman, however, had driven the enemy out of Mississippi, destroyed the only remaining railroads in the state, the only roads
nemy's batteries. McClernand is on the left with his corps, his right having one brigade north of the railroad, the rest south of it. One division occupies the roads leading south and southeast from the city. The position is as strong by nature as can be possibly conceived of, and is well fortified. The garrison the enemy have to defend it I have no means of knowing, but their force is variously estimated at from ten to twenty thousand. I attempted to carry the place by storm on the 22d instant, but was unsuccessful. Our troops were not repulsed from any point, but simply failed to enter the works of the enemy. At several points they got up to the parapets of the enemy's works, and planted their flags on the outer slope of the embankments, where they still have them. The attack was made simultaneously by the three army corps at ten A. M. The loss on our side was not very heavy at first, but receiving repeated dispatches from Major-General McClernand, saying that he was hard p
e 18th, you had constructed a bridge across the Big Black, and had commenced the advance upon Vicksburg. On the 19th, 20th, and 21st, you continued to reconnoitre and skirmish until you had gained a near approach to the enemy's works. On the 22d, in pursuance of the order of the commander of the department, you assaulted the enemy's defences in front, at ten o'clock A. M., and within thirty minutes had made a lodg ment, and planted your colors upon two of his bastions. This partial succech, while guarding his own rights with jealous care, at all times renders justice to others. It little becomes Major-General McClernand to complain of want of cooperation on the part of other corps, in the assault on the enemy's works on the 22d ultimo, when twelve hundred and eighteen men of my command were placed hors du combat in their resolute and daring attempt to carry the positions assigned to them, and fully one-third of these from General Quimby's division, with the gallant and accom