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Robert Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: Volume 2., Iuka and Corinth. (search)
ttle of Corinth, Miss., which is often confounded in public memory with our advance, under Halleck, from Pittsburg Landing in April and May, 1862, was fought on the 3d and 4th of October, of that year, between the combined forces of Generals Earl Van Dorn and Sterling Price of the Confederacy, and the Union divisions of Generals Dred Stanley to move in close to town near the middle line of works, called the Halleck line, and to wait for further developments. An order dated 1:30 A. M., October 3d, had set all the troops in motion. The impression that the enemy might find it better to strike a point on our line of communication and compel us to get out omainly in reserve on the extreme left, looking toward the Kossuth road. Thus in front of those wooded western approaches, the Union troops, on the morning of October 3d, waited for what might happen, wholly ignorant of what Van Dorn was doing at Chewalla, ten miles away through thick forests. Of this General Van Dorn says:
Robert Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: Volume 2., The battle of Corinth. (search)
ttle of Corinth, Miss., which is often confounded in public memory with our advance, under Halleck, from Pittsburg Landing in April and May, 1862, was fought on the 3d and 4th of October, of that year, between the combined forces of Generals Earl Van Dorn and Sterling Price of the Confederacy, and the Union divisions of Generals Dred Stanley to move in close to town near the middle line of works, called the Halleck line, and to wait for further developments. An order dated 1:30 A. M., October 3d, had set all the troops in motion. The impression that the enemy might find it better to strike a point on our line of communication and compel us to get out omainly in reserve on the extreme left, looking toward the Kossuth road. Thus in front of those wooded western approaches, the Union troops, on the morning of October 3d, waited for what might happen, wholly ignorant of what Van Dorn was doing at Chewalla, ten miles away through thick forests. Of this General Van Dorn says: