hide Matching Documents

Your search returned 12 results in 5 document sections:

the deadly struggle, and nerve themselves to meet it. But in this case the nearness of the enemy in force was not known in the national army, and there was no special preparation for the conflict. In Sherman and his campaigns, by Colonels Bowman and Irwin, it is stated (page 50), There was nothing to indicate a general attack until seven o'clock on Sunday morning, when the advance-guard of Sherman's front was forced in on his main line. Grant and his campaigns, a book compiled by Prof. Coppee, avowedly from Grant's Reports, and very prejudiced in its conclusions in favor of that general, says, At the outset our troops were shamefully surprised and easily overpowered. It is but a poor compliment to the generalship of either Grant or Sherman to believe them aware of the presence of the Confederate army in their front on the 5th. Else why was General Lew Wallace with 7,500 men kept at Crump's Landing, and Nelson and Crittenden's divisions-14,000 men-left at Savannah? Why the
The loss of the Federal army was, according to official reports, as follows: Killed.Wounded.Captured.Total. Grant's army1,4375,6792,98410,050 Buell's army2681,816882,167 Total1,7007,4958,02212,217 A reference to the Appendix will show that General Grant's aggregate loss was 11,220 instead of 10,050, giving a total loss, including Buell's, of 13,387. Buell's loss has not been verified, and was also probably larger than the official report. Swinton, in his Decisive battles, and Prof. Coppee, in his Life of Grant (page 96), put the Federal loss at 15,000. It is probable that Grant's army did not lose much more than a thousand men on Monday. If this be so, it is apparent that his losses on Sunday were some 10,000, besides thousands of fugitives, at a cost of about 6,500 Confederates. On Monday the Federal loss was only some 3,000 or 4,000, with an equal or greater loss inflicted on the Southern army. In both cases, the assailant suffered less than the defensive lines.
George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-General United States Army (ed. George Gordon Meade), chapter 6 (search)
n the control; and that it would be injurious to the army to have two heads. I see one of the newspaper men is puzzled to know what share we each have in the work, and settles it by saying Grant does the grand strategy, and I the grand tactics. Coppee in his Army Magazine says, the Army of the Potomac, directed by Grant, commanded by Meade, and led by Hancock, Sedgwick and Warren, which is a quite good distinction, and about hits the nail on the head. Headquarters army of the Potomac, 8 A.ted, but I do not see that I can do anything but bear patiently till it pleases God to let the truth be known and matters set right. I have noticed what you say about the Inquirer, but, as you observe, it is no worse than the other papers. Even Coppee, in the June number of his magazine, shows he, too, is demoralized, he having a flaming editorial notice of the wonderful genius of Grant. Now, to tell the truth, the latter has greatly disappointed me, and since this campaign I really begin to
oles, Col., II, 241. Coles, Rev., II, 151. Colfax, Col., II, 167. Colgrove, Silas, II, 98. Colladay, Samuel R., I, 384. Collamore, Senator, II, 165. Collins, Lieut., I, 266. Collis, C. H. T., II, 164. Committee on the Conduct of the War, II, 169-176, 179, 186, 188. Comstock, Cyrus B., I, 209, 210. Connor, David, I, 36, 85, 131, 187, 192. Constant, M., I, 8. Contreras, battle of, 1847, I, 196. Cooper, James H., I, 286, 289, 290, 291, 294, 295; II, 47. Coppee, II, 197, 202. Cortez, Gen., II, 152. Cos, Gen., I, 179, 180. Coster, C. R., II, 52. Couch, Darius N., I, 373, 379; II, 9, 11, 12, 16, 20, 33, 41, 61, 104, 105, 114, 128, 129, 211, 212, 216, 308, 309, 365, 366, 384. Coulburn, Gen., I, 313. Covode, John, I, 340; II, 149. Cowan, Mr., II, 254, 265. Coxe, Miss, I, 105. Coxe, Alexander Brinton, I, 316, 324, 334, 337, 339, 341, 346, 347, 355, 356. Coxe, Charles B., I, 384. Coxes, I, 9. Cozzens, Fred S., I, 245.
from 140,000 men of all arms.—Swinton's Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac. In case this plan failed, his alternative was to force him back by left-flank marches, and by this flank movement to follow him to Richmond. Grant and his Campaigns. Coppee. At eight o'clock, our artillery moved out of camp, and after advancing about four miles, parked in company with the rest of the artillery brigade and an extensive wagon train, awaiting the arrival of the infantry and its passage of the river. W Second Corps artillery took no part in this terrible battle. It may be stated as a fact, curious in the history of battles, that although there were nearly three hundred guns on the field, only about twenty were used, Grant and his Campaigns. Coppee. such being the nature of the country in which the battle was fought. After dark our position was changed a little to the right, where we remained till dawn. It was not permitted to unharness the horses that night, and we slept as we could, w