known as Old River, and on the left still another, much narrower, but too deep to be forded, known as Chickasaw Bayou.
All the island was densely wooded, except Johnson's plantation, immediately on the bank of the Yazoo, and a series of old cotton-fields along Chickasaw Bayou.
There was a road from Johnson's plantation directly Johnson's plantation directly to Vicksburg, but it crossed numerous bayous and deep swamps by bridges, which had been destroyed; and this road debouched on level ground at the foot of the Vicksburg bluff, opposite strong forts well prepared and defended by heavy artillery.
On this road I directed General A. J. Smith's division, not so much by way of a direct alumns: Steele's above the mouth of Chickasaw Bayou; Morgan, with Blair's brigade of Steele's division, below the same bayou; Morgan L. Smith on the main road from Johnson's plantation to Vicksburg, with orders to bear to his left, so as to strike the bayou about a mile south of where Morgan was ordered to cross it; and A. J. Smith'
ached Catoosa platform, near Ringgold.
about two o'clock in the afternoon of the 19th of September.
As soon as our horses came up, about four o'clock, I started with Colonel Sorrel and Colonel Manning of my staff to find the headquarters of the Commanding General.
We missed our way and did not report until near eleven o'clock at night. * * * * As soon as the day of the 20th had dawned, I rode to the front to find my troops.
The line was arranged from right to left as follows: Stewart's, Johnson's, Hinman's, and Preston's divisions, Hood's division (of which only three brigades were up), was in rear of Jackson, Kenshaw's and Humphries' brigades.
McLaws' division was ordered forward from Ringgold the night before, but did not get up. General McLaws had not arrived from Richmond.
The impression sought to be created that Rosecrans' army was driven off the field is erroneous.
Soon after four o'clock of the second day, General Thomas having received notice from General Rosecrans
He and Breckinridge looked over them, and, after some side conversation, lie handed one of the papers to me. It was in Reagan's handwriting, and began with a long preamble and terms, so general and verbose that I said they were inadmissible.
Then recalling the conversation of Mr. Lincoln at City Point, I sat down at the table and wrote off the terms, which, I thought, concisely expressed his views and wishes, and explained that I was willing to submit these terms to the new President, Mr. Johnson, provided that both armies should remain in statu quo until the truce therein declared should expire.
I had full faith that General Johnston would religiously respect the truce, which he did; and that I would be the gainer, for, in the few days it would take to send the papers to Washington and receive an answer, I could finish the railroad up to Raleigh, and be the better prepared for a long chase.
Neither Mr. Breckinridge nor General Johnston wrote one word of that paper.
I wrote i
t officers on Sherman's terms.
General Sherman, in his Memoirs, returns with increased violence to his old attack upon Secretary Stanton, and attempts to hold him chiefly responsible for a course in regard to the Sherman-Johnston terms, which at the time was approved by the President, General Grant, General Halleck, every member of the Cabinet, and by the loyal North.
He attempts to convey the impression that Mr. Stanton exceeded his authority in the matter, by the statement that President Johnson, and nearly all the members of the Cabinet assured him, after his arrival in Washington, that they knew nothing of Mr. Stanton's publications setting forth the nature of his terms and the reasons of the Cabinet for rejecting them.
This is an attempt to escape upon a technicality.
The President, and every member of the Cabinet, had united in rejecting the terms on the grounds which Mr. Stanton made known.
It is doubtless true that none of them, except Mr. Stanton, knew that these rea