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x years hence, wrote a weak and theatrical letter to the newspapers, dated Within hearing of the enemy's guns, and declaring: I am not either a candidate, nor do I desire to be a candidate, for any civil office in the gift of the people or Executive. There was actually a controversy between different States as to the location of the capital of a Government, the existence of which they could not understand was yet imperilled by war. The controversy went so far that the city council of Nashville, Tennessee, appropriated $750,000 for a residence for the President of the Southern Confederacy, as an inducement to remove the capital there. It is remarkable that the statesmen of Richmond did not observe the singular temper of the authorities at Washington, .on the news of their defeat at Manassas. On the very day that Washington was crowded with fugitives from the routed army, the Federal Congress legislated calmly and patiently throughout; and the House of Representatives, passed unanim
dvance with his gunboats and transports upon Nashville, Buell, the other Federal commander, was preat was enabled to come up with supplies from Nashville. With the channel of communication closed, made its way with supplies for the army from Nashville some days previous. Time permitted, howevero an attack in the rear, and held the key to Nashville. A large force of Federals had been colletill more important river, and the avenue to Nashville; but nothing stood in the way of the enemy sortant post. He had determined to fight for Nashville at Donelson; and he had given the best part on awaited the result of the battle opposite Nashville. At dawn of the 16th of February he receiveltered circumstances. The General said that Nashville was utterly indefensible; that the army woull the Legislature together elsewhere than at Nashville. Gen. Johnston retreated with his army towaort Donelson and the arrival of the enemy in Nashville. We shall complete this chapter by a brie[9 more...]
war, and it was now simply giving proof of its Anaconda plan, and realizing the natural result of those immense preparations it had made by sea and land, to confound its adversary. The rebukes which were now being administered to the vaingloriousness of the South were neither few nor light. The Confederates had been worsted in almost every engagement that had occurred since the fall of 1861. There had come disaster after disaster, culminating in the fall of Donelson, the occupation of Nashville, the breaking of our centre, the falling back on all sides, the realization of invasion, the imminence of perils which no one dared to name. No one who lived in Richmond during the war can ever forget these gloomy, miserable days. In the midst of them was to occur the ceremony of the inauguration of the Permanent Government of the Confederate States. It was only a difference of name between two governments, one called Provisional and the other Permanent; for Mr. Davis had been unanimo
Chapter 14: The New line of Confederate defence south of Nashville. its objects. co-operation of Johnston and Beauregard. capture of Island no.10 by the enemy. Gen. Polk's evacuationentration of Confederate forces at Corinth. Grant's lines at Pittsburg. Buell advancing from Nashville. design of the Confederates to attack before the junction of these forces. unfortunate loss Beauregard for the defence of the Valley of the Mississippi, on a line of operations south of Nashville. The line extending from Columbus, by way of Forts Henry and Donelson, had been lost. The dinessee to the enemy; and it had become necessary to re-organize a new line of defence south of Nashville, the object of which would be to protect the railroad system of the Southwest, and to ensure t the army under Gen. Buell, then known to be advancing for that purpose, by rapid marches from Nashville. The great object was to anticipate the junction of the enemy's armies, then near at hand; an
t Mumfordsville. Bragg's whole army between Nashville and Louisville. his splendid opportunity. atur to Bridgeport, Alabama, from Decatur to Nashville, and from Nashville to Stevenson, with largeNashville to Stevenson, with large detached commands at McMinnville and Cumberland Gap. Having crossed the river at Chattanooga, thercept Gen. Buell, now rapidly moving towards Nashville, or to move towards the right, so as to secuoads and good turnpikes, had concentrated in Nashville, and was strongly fortified. With a heavy dagg's whole army was now on the road between Nashville and Louisville — the road by i which Bull woet Buell in the field, and force him back to Nashville. He adopted neither course. After the succ west, the second between Cumberland Gap and Nashville by Kirby Smith's march to the same point frowith serried ranks, in front of the enemy at Nashville; better organized, better disciplined, bettepublic. It is true that the country between Nashville and Chattanooga was re-occupied by the Confe[2 more...]
the lines in Tennessee and Mississippi. Rosecrans' advance from Nashville. conflicting statements of his force. position of Gen. Bragg's ns on the Western theatre of the war, left Gen. Bragg in front of Nashville. The bulk of his army had gone into camp at Murfreesboro, while mand of Gen. Rosecrans, maintained itself with some difficulty at Nashville and on the line of the Cumberland. It was only a portion of the termined to seize the opportunity for attack, and to advance from Nashville. He prepared to force the passage of Stone River north of Murfret of our infantry, and covered all approaches within ten miles of Nashville. It was thus impossible that any movement of the enemy could taks formed on the east bank of the river, its left resting near the Nashville road, and its right extending towards the Lebanon pike. On thelast, the streams of fugitives and stragglers passing towards the Nashville road, and making their way in the greatest disorder through the c
the river above Chattanooga, so as to make ourselves sufficiently felt on the enemy's rear, as to force his evacuation of Chattanooga-indeed, force him back upon Nashville, and, if we should find our transportation inadequate for a continuance of this movement, to follow up the railroad to Knoxville, destroy Burnside, and from there threaten the enemy's railroad communication in rear of Nashville. The reasons which induced Gen. Bragg to decline this plan of campaign were detailed in a report to the War Department at Richmond, in which he wrote: The suggestion of a movement by our right, immediately after the battle, to the north of the Tennessee, and thence upon Nashville, requires notice only because it will find a place on the files of the Department. Such a movement was utterly impossible for want of transportation. Nearly half our army consisted of reinforcements just before the battle, without a wagon or an artillery horse, and nearly, if not quite, a third of the artillery
ma, where he rejoined his trains, to make his fatal march towards Nashville. Sherman waited some time at Gaylesville, until he became fullsea. His calculation was a plain and precise one. Gen. Thomas, at Nashville, could collect troops from the whole Department of the Mississip-garrisons from the surrounding country, while Thomas remained at Nashville. Schofield fearing that his position was about to be flanked, abat if he should escape at Franklin, he would gain his works about Nashville. The nature of the position was such as to render it inexpedient Battle of Nashville. The next morning Gen. Hood advanced upon Nashville, where Schofield had retreated, and where Thomas lay with his maie enemy's communications, he would have forced Thomas to evacuate Nashville, and fall back towards Kentucky. This was the great fear of Gen.but as it was, Thomas' great error in resting upon his victory at Nashville enabled a defeated Confederate army to construct bridges of timbe
ral atrocity: yet it was done. The men who contracted the disease were removed to a hospital about a mile off, but the plague was already introduced, and continued to prevail. For a period of more than twelve months the disease was constantly in the camp, yet our prisoners during all this time were continually brought to it, and subjected to certain infection. Neither do we find evidences of amendment on the part of our enemies, notwithstanding the boasts of the sanitary commission. At Nashville, prisoners recently captured from General Hood's army, even when sick and wounded, have been cruelly deprived of all nourishment suited to their condition; and other prisoners from he same army have been carried into the infected Camps Douglas and Chase. Many of the soldiers of General Hood's army were frost-bitten by being kept day and night in an exposed condition before they were put into Camp Douglas. Their sufferings are truthfully depicted in the evidence. At Alton and Camp Mort