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selves, were also infatuated with the belief, until the very last moment, that in case they should secede they would be sustained by a large portion if not the whole Democratic party of the North. They vainly imagined that this party, which had maintained their constitutional rights whilst they remained in the Union, would sustain them in rebellion after they had gone out of it. In this delusion they were also greatly encouraged by sympathy and support from influential and widely circulated Anti-Republican journals in the North, and especially in the city of New York. It was in vain, therefore, that the late President warned them, as he often did, against this delusion. It was in vain he assured them that the first cannon fired against either Fort Moultrie or Fort Sumter would arouse the indignant spirit of the North—would heal all political divisions amongst the Northern people, and would unite them as one man in support of a war rendered inevitable by such an act of rebellion
e says that, From a knowledge of our Southern population it is my solemn conviction that there is some danger of an early act of rashness preliminary to secession, viz., the seizure of some or all of the following posts:—Forts Jackson and St. Philip, in the Mississippi, below New Orleans, both without garrisons; Fort Morgan, below Mobile, without a garrison; Forts Pickens and McRea, Pensacola harbor, with an insufficient garrison for one; Fort Pulaski, below Savannah, without a garrison; Forts Moultrie and Sumter, Charleston harbor, the former with an insufficient garrison, and the latter without any; and Fort Monroe, Hampton Roads, without a sufficient garrison. In my opinion all these works should be immediately so garrisoned as to make any attempt to take any one of them by surprise or coup de main ridiculous. It was his duty, as commanding general, to accompany this recommendation with a practicable plan for garrisoning these forts, stating the number of troops necessary for th
a feeble force of United States troops to Fort Moultrie at this critical conjuncture. Had collish, South Carolina would not dare to attack Fort Moultrie. This conviction did not spring from any r cause. If, after all, she should attack Fort Moultrie, this act would have met their universal cjutant-General Buell to Major Anderson, at Fort Moultrie, with instructions how he should act in hithree, to remove it at his discretion from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter, whenever he should have tat's] arguments for immediately reenforcing Fort Moultrie, and sending a garrison to Fort Sumter, ththe commanding officer (Major Anderson) of Fort Moultrie to hold the forts (Moultrie and Sumter) aghad been for some time ready to proceed to Fort Moultrie, dependent on no other contingency than thecember), or some time later, been sent to Forts Moultrie and Sumter, both would now have been in th nullification, had sent reenforcements to Fort Moultrie to prevent its seizure by the nullifiers a[1 more...]
ir arrival in Washington Major Anderson's removal from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter the President's interview with the commr Anderson had, on Christmas night, secretly dismantled Fort Moultrie; had spiked his cannon, had burnt his gun-carriages, anuse he had believed Major Anderson to be in security at Fort Moultrie; and this more especially whilst the commissioners appor Anderson might be restored to his former position at Fort Moultrie, upon a guarantee from the State that neither it nor th had, on the day after Major Anderson's removal, seized Fort Moultrie, Castle Pinckney, the custom house, and post office, anns but a few days before that the removal was made from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter. This appears from the letter of Major the State designed to proceed to a hostile act (against Fort Moultrie), the very contingency on which the Secretary had not o it is evident now, from the action of the commander at Fort Moultrie, that the solemn pledges of this Government have been v
in the Mississippi, below New Orleans, both without garrisons; Fort Morgan, below Mobile, without a garrison; Forts Pickens and McRee, Pensacola harbor, with an insufficient garrison for one; Fort Pulaski, below Savannah, without a garrison; Forts Moultrie and Sumter, Charleston harbor, the former with an insufficient garrison, and the latter without any; and Fort Monroe, Hampton Roads, without a sufficient garrison. In my opinion all these works should be immediately so garrisoned as to make g off (say) of Texas, or of all the Atlantic States, from the Potomac south, was not within the scope of General Scott's provisional remedies. It is his opinion that instructions should be given, at once, to the commanders of the Barancas, Forts Moultrie and Monroe, to be on their guard against surprises and coups de main. As to regular approaches nothing can be said or done, at this time, without volunteers. There is one (regular) company at Boston, one here (at the Narrows), one at Pitts
James Buchanan, Buchanan's administration on the eve of the rebellion, Message of the President of the United States, of the 8th of January, 1861. (search)
e of the State authorities, as much as it was my own, to avoid the fatal consequences which must eventually follow a military collision. And here I deem it proper to submit, for your information, copies of a communication, dated December 28, 1860, addressed to me by R. W. Barnwell, J. H. Adams, and J. L. Orr, Commissioners from South Carolina, with the accompanying documents, and copies of my answer thereto, dated December 31. In further explanation of Major Anderson's removal from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter, it is proper to state that, after my answer to the South Carolina Commissioners, the War Department received a letter from that gallant officer, dated December 27, 1860, the day after this movement, from which the following is an extract: I will add, as my opinion, that many things convinced me that the authorities of the State designed to proceed to a hostile act [evidently referring to the orders dated December 11, of the late Secretary of War]. Under this impression