eneral Government, upon principle, has no right to interfere with anything other than that general class of things that does concern the whole.
I have said that at all times.
I have said as illustrations, that I do, not believe in the right of Illinois to interfere with the cranberry laws of Indiana, the, oyster laws of Virginia, or the liquor laws of Maine.
I have said these things over and over again, and I repeat them here as my sentiments.
How is it, then, that Judge Douglas infers, because I hope to see slavery put where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, that I am in favor of Illinois going over and interfering with the cranberry laws of Indiana?
What can authorize him to draw any such inference?
I suppose there might be one thing that at least enabled him to draw such an inference that would not be true with me or many others, that is, because he looks upon all this matter of slavery as an exceedingly little thing —