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General Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations During the Civil War, Chapter 1 (search)
owds assembled at all the railroad-stations the appearance of great enthusiasm for the war against subjugation-so much as to give me the impression that all of the population fit for military service might have been brought into the field, if the Confederate Government could have furnished them with arms and ammunition-which, unfortunately, it had not provided. That government depended for arms, for the war then imminent, mainly upon those found in the arsenals at Fayetteville, Charleston, Augusta, Mount Vernon, and Baton Rouge; United States muskets and rifles of discarded pattern, the number supposed to be about seventy-five thousand; above forty thousand muskets belonging to the State of Virginia in course of rapid conversion from flint to percussion lock by Governor Letcher's orders; and twenty thousand lately procured for the State of Georgia, by Governor Brown. I reached Harper's Ferry soon after noon of the 23d of May, accompanied by Colonel E. Kirby Smith, Afterward lie
General Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations During the Civil War, Chapter 10 (search)
at the collection of the additional field-transportation will require a good deal of time. None can be obtained within the limits of my authority. There has been an unnecessary accumulation of bread-stuffs and corn at Mobile-six months supply for a much larger force than Major-General Maury's. Half of it will spoil during the summer, if left in Mobile. It would be economical, therefore, as well as convenient, to transfer that portion of it to this army. Lieutenant-Colonel Cole, at Augusta, informs me that the artillery-horses required will be furnished by the 1st of May. Besides the foregoing, other reasons for opposing the plan of operations explained by General Bragg, were committed to Colonel Sale, to be delivered orally-such as: That the interior positions belonged to the enemy, instead of being held by us as was supposed by the military authorities in Richmond; for the Federal army at Knoxville, equally distant from Chattanooga and Dalton, was exactly between Longst
General Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations During the Civil War, Chapter 12 (search)
Charlotte; and two thousand, under command of Major-General Cheatham, were between Newberry and Augusta, also marching toward Charlotte. The troops of the department, under Lieutenant-General Hardee the third, following it, under Major. General Cheathamn, was between the place last named and Augusta. The remaining troops of that army were corning through Georgia in little parties, or individually, unaided by the Government; most of them were united at Augusta afterward, by Lieutenant-General Lee, and conducted by him to the army near Smithfield, N. C. That spirited soldier, although stirough Georgia in detachments, to rejoin their corps. Most of them were united into one body in Augusta, by Lieutenant-General S. D. Lee. Many, indeed the greater number of these veterans, were unart had been thought destitute. Early in March, when the wagons of the Army of Tennessee reached Augusta, their number was so large compared with that of the troops, that the officer in charge of them
General Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations During the Civil War, Report of Hon. L. T. Wigfall in the Senate of the Confederate States, march 18, 1865. (search)
position was as weak as described by General Hood, why did Sherman not attempt to carry it by assault? The place, in my judgment, could not have been taken either by assault or investment. What are the facts General Sherman first seized the Augusta road, and held it for six weeks to no purpose. To seize the Macon road he had to let go that to Augusta, which could have supplied our army. In making that movement, he exposed his flank to attack, which blunder was not taken advantage of. HisAugusta, which could have supplied our army. In making that movement, he exposed his flank to attack, which blunder was not taken advantage of. His movement was concealed by a curtain of cavalry, and was probably not known to General Hood in time. A large portion of his cavalry under Wheeler was in Sherman's rear, operating on his line of communications. To avoid any such contre-temps, General Johnston kept his cavalry in hand to watch the movement of the enemy and avoid being outflanked. But I do not propose to discuss General Hood's campaign, which he says was without fault. My purpose is simply to correct errors into which, in my j