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John Brown (search for this): chapter 14
nt in the public mind, without a shadow of reason or truth to justify it. Because the fanatic John Brown selected Harper's Ferry as the scene of his wild exploit, the public mind jumped to the conclusion that that spot was a natural stronghold, a Gibraltar, a Thermopylae. Now, the single mountain-line called the Blue Ridge, crossing the Potomac River at Harper's Ferry, is as far from being a mountain stronghold as a straight line of picketfence across a brook is from being a block-house. John Brown was as unsound in war as in politics. But it would seem that, even in highly civilized nations, there lingers a remnant of the savage superstition that insanity is inspiration; for strong minds caught at the suggestion that he had recognized in Harper's Ferry a negro Thermopylae. This was apparently the light in which the rebel authorities regarded the place, and its occupancy and retention was made a prime object at the beginning. Jefferson Davis himself sent Johnston, one of his be
Virginia Unionists (search for this): chapter 14
s occupation of Baltimore, and the sweeping political reaction in Maryland. But, meanwhile, the rebels had established a strong camp at Harper's Ferry, and Patterson's close attention was thus very naturally transferred to that point. The three months troops could not be used in distant undertakings. Here, however, was a worthy enterprise at the very threshold of Pennsylvania, which, successfully prosecuted, would protect Maryland, relieve the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, encourage Virginia Unionists, and recover lost prestige. Patriotic pride, political security, and military advantage seemed, to the minds of both Patterson and Scott, to present combined reasons for an early recapture of Harper's Ferry. For this purpose, Patterson, about the first of June, concentrated his available troops at Chambersburg, Pa., and on the third of that month issued an address to the regiments under his command, announcing that you will soon meet the insurgents. Orders from General Scott, how
J. E. Johnston (search for this): chapter 14
, and under date of June 13th they authorized Johnston to retire upon Winchester, after destroying eoperations against Manassas. In this interim Johnston remained in camp about Winchester, pushing hi of the enemy. But Patterson complained that Johnston outnumbered him, and clamored for reinforceme make an advance against Beauregard, and that Johnston must be defeated or detained in the Shenandoaeeping in this vicinity the command under General Johnston, who is now pretending to be engaged in fopposed to the rebel army, which, altogether, Johnston states to have been less than twelve thousandnd that he could most advantageously threaten Johnston from Charlestown. Accordingly, on July 12th,rom Martinsburg on July 15th, directly toward Johnston at Winchester, as far as Bunker Hill, within uregard's camp, at Manassas, that afternoon. Johnston himself, with another detachment, arrived at July 21st. It was these nine thousand men of Johnston's army which not merely decided, but principa[6 more...]
of his antagonist's strength. It is always deemed hazardous to change commanders on the eve of battle, and therefore the alternative was adopted of sending General Sandford to him with additional reinforcements; who, waiving his rank, should take command under Patterson, and prompt him in pushing forward the army. Sandford, accSandford, accepting the duty, reported to Patterson with four regiments from Washington, about July 10th; the column under General Stone also joined him immediately afterward, so that Patterson's army now numbered eighteen thousand two hundred according to his own estimate, or over twenty-two thousand according to the estimate of others, oppo a rapid stolen march to Manassas, which Patterson did not discover till two days afterward. Understanding fully, both from General Scott's telegrams and General Sandford's personal explanations, that an advance against Manassas Junction was in progress, which would lead to a heavy battle between McDowell and Beauregard, Patt
equests, and especially in his growing exaggeration of his antagonist's strength. It is always deemed hazardous to change commanders on the eve of battle, and therefore the alternative was adopted of sending General Sandford to him with additional reinforcements; who, waiving his rank, should take command under Patterson, and prompt him in pushing forward the army. Sandford, accepting the duty, reported to Patterson with four regiments from Washington, about July 10th; the column under General Stone also joined him immediately afterward, so that Patterson's army now numbered eighteen thousand two hundred according to his own estimate, or over twenty-two thousand according to the estimate of others, opposed to the rebel army, which, altogether, Johnston states to have been less than twelve thousand men. It would appear that at this time two impulses struggled for mastery in Patterson's mind. Apparently he was both seeking and avoiding a battle. He had called a council of war a
Fitz John Porter (search for this): chapter 14
this withdrawal of the enemy. I believe it is designed for a decoy, wrote Fitz John Porter, Chief of Staff, to Cadwalader, second in command. There may be a deep-laot to deceive us. The whole affair is to me a riddle, wrote Cadwalader back to Porter. Advancing with a painful overcaution, as if Johnston were the invader, a partas led into his fatal error mainly by the influence of his chief-of-staff, Fitz John Porter. His senior aid-de-camp, in his testimony before the Committee on the Cont went so far that his order was written by his assistant adjutant-general, Colonel Porter. It was very much against the wishes of Colonel Porter, and he asked GenerColonel Porter, and he asked General Patterson if he would send for Colonel Abercrombie and Colonel Thomas, and consult them on the movement. General Patterson replied: No, sir; for I know they willder all circumstances. That was the day before we left Bunker Hill. Then Colonel Porter asked to have Colonel Abercrombie and Colonel Thomas sent for and consulted
Abercrombie (search for this): chapter 14
s intrenchments? Answer. Yes, sir; it went so far that his order was written by his assistant adjutant-general, Colonel Porter. It was very much against the wishes of Colonel Porter, and he asked General Patterson if he would send for Colonel Abercrombie and Colonel Thomas, and consult them on the movement. General Patterson replied: No, sir; for I know they will attempt to dissuade me from it, and I have made up my mind to fight Johnston under all circumstances. That was the day before we left Bunker Hill. Then Colonel Porter asked to have Colonel Abercrombie and Colonel Thomas sent for and consulted as to the best manner to carry out his wishes. He consented, and they came, and after half an hour they dissuaded him from it. With his intentions thus changed, Patterson late that night ordered a retrograde movement; and the next day, July 17th, his army marched to Charlestown-nominally as a flank movement, but practically in retreat, since it about doubled the distance
Answer. Yes, sir; it went so far that his order was written by his assistant adjutant-general, Colonel Porter. It was very much against the wishes of Colonel Porter, and he asked General Patterson if he would send for Colonel Abercrombie and Colonel Thomas, and consult them on the movement. General Patterson replied: No, sir; for I know they will attempt to dissuade me from it, and I have made up my mind to fight Johnston under all circumstances. That was the day before we left Bunker Hill. Then Colonel Porter asked to have Colonel Abercrombie and Colonel Thomas sent for and consulted as to the best manner to carry out his wishes. He consented, and they came, and after half an hour they dissuaded him from it. With his intentions thus changed, Patterson late that night ordered a retrograde movement; and the next day, July 17th, his army marched to Charlestown-nominally as a flank movement, but practically in retreat, since it about doubled the distance between himself and the
Cadwalader (search for this): chapter 14
lroad bridge and spiking his heavy guns, and had retreated upon Winchester. Patterson and his officers were greatly mystified by this withdrawal of the enemy. I believe it is designed for a decoy, wrote Fitz John Porter, Chief of Staff, to Cadwalader, second in command. There may be a deep-laid plot to deceive us. The whole affair is to me a riddle, wrote Cadwalader back to Porter. Advancing with a painful overcaution, as if Johnston were the invader, a part of the army crossed the PotomCadwalader back to Porter. Advancing with a painful overcaution, as if Johnston were the invader, a part of the army crossed the Potomac on the 16th of June. Finding the rumor of the evacuation true, Patterson took sufficient courage to report a victory. They have fled, and in confusion, he wrote. Their retreat is as demoralizing as a defeat; and, as the leaders will never be caught, more beneficial to our cause. Harper's Ferry has been retaken without firing a gun. What movement, if any, in pursuit of the enemy, do you propose to make, consequent on the evacuation of Harper's Ferry? asked General Scott by telegraph
Robert Patterson (search for this): chapter 14
guns, and had retreated upon Winchester. Patterson and his officers were greatly mystified by te river to-day in pursuit of the enemy. But Patterson complained that Johnston outnumbered him, ang the short time he yet remained in command, Patterson's military conduct becomes the subject of crections from July 1st to the 13th, informed Patterson that McDowell would make an advance against ed to depend alone on the customary orders. Patterson's former indecision and hesitancy had creates time two impulses struggled for mastery in Patterson's mind. Apparently he was both seeking and patience began to give way, and he now sent Patterson two prompting telegrams, which ought to haveavy battle between McDowell and Beauregard, Patterson had moved from Martinsburg on July 15th, diromas, and consult them on the movement. General Patterson replied: No, sir; for I know they will om it. With his intentions thus changed, Patterson late that night ordered a retrograde movemen[31 more...]
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