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ng itself in his complaints, requests, and especially in his growing exaggeration of his antagonist's strength. It is always deemed hazardous to change commanders on the eve of battle, and therefore the alternative was adopted of sending General Sandford to him with additional reinforcements; who, waiving his rank, should take command under Patterson, and prompt him in pushing forward the army. Sandford, accepting the duty, reported to Patterson with four regiments from Washington, about July 10th; the column under General Stone also joined him immediately afterward, so that Patterson's army now numbered eighteen thousand two hundred according to his own estimate, or over twenty-two thousand according to the estimate of others, opposed to the rebel army, which, altogether, Johnston states to have been less than twelve thousand men. It would appear that at this time two impulses struggled for mastery in Patterson's mind. Apparently he was both seeking and avoiding a battle. He
r General McClellan's arrival in the valley. The opinion was evidently based on the current rumors that McClellan would bring Western troops to join Patterson. This decided warning had its effect on the rebel authorities, and under date of June 13th they authorized Johnston to retire upon Winchester, after destroying everything at Harper's Ferry, whenever the position of the enemy shall convince you that he is about to turn your position. But they coupled the permission with another stronces which it is well believed you cannot contemplate without the most painful emotions. With Patterson on the point of moving against him, however, Johnston allowed political consequences to take care of themselves, destroyed Harper's Ferry on June 13th and 14th, and retired even before his permission was received. We are twelve miles in advance of Winchester, he reported on the 17th; my only hope from this movement is a slight delay in the enemy's advance. I believe his force to be about ei
lley of Virginia, the possession of which by the enemy will separate the eastern and western sections of the State from each other, deprive us of the agricultural resources of that fertile region, and bring in its train political consequences which it is well believed you cannot contemplate without the most painful emotions. With Patterson on the point of moving against him, however, Johnston allowed political consequences to take care of themselves, destroyed Harper's Ferry on June 13th and 14th, and retired even before his permission was received. We are twelve miles in advance of Winchester, he reported on the 17th; my only hope from this movement is a slight delay in the enemy's advance. I believe his force to be about eighteen thousand; ours is six thousand five hundred. Patterson admits that he had seventeen regiments — a force fully capable of the brilliant and important blow he had been ambitious to strike, but which he had neither the skill nor courage to direct. The s
ts could be sent, and an important diversion organized to aid him; and while thus assisting, the General also admonished him to every prudence, reminding him that his expedition was well projected, and that success in it would be an important step in the war; but, there must be no reverse. With the increase of his force, and a closer survey of his task, Patterson's own estimate of his enterprise grew in magnitude. Remember, I beseech you, he wrote to the Secretary of War, under date of June 10th, that Harper's Ferry is (as I have said from the first) the place where the first great battle will be fought, and the result will be decisive of the future. The insurgents are strongly intrenched, have an immense number of guns, and will contest every inch of ground. .... The importance of a victory at Harper's Ferry cannot be estimated. I cannot sleep for thinking about it . I beseech you, therefore, by our ancient friendship, give me the means of success. You have the means; place th
m immediately afterward, so that Patterson's army now numbered eighteen thousand two hundred according to his own estimate, or over twenty-two thousand according to the estimate of others, opposed to the rebel army, which, altogether, Johnston states to have been less than twelve thousand men. It would appear that at this time two impulses struggled for mastery in Patterson's mind. Apparently he was both seeking and avoiding a battle. He had called a council of war at Martinsburg on the 9th; and verifying the military adage that a council of war never fights, his officers had advised him that he was on a false line, and that he could most advantageously threaten Johnston from Charlestown. Accordingly, on July 12th, Patterson asked permission to transfer his forces to that line; while a dispatch from General Scott of the same date, in reply to a former letter, in substance accorded him the permission, but accompanied it with the significant reminder: Consider this suggestion wel
remained in command, Patterson's military conduct becomes the subject of criticism and controversy. It is military usage-perhaps military necessity establishes the usage — that orders and directions from superior to subordinate officers are conveyed in brief words expressing or suggesting only the objects to be accomplished, and leaving methods largely at the discretion of him who has to perform the task. Following this established usage, General Scott, by his orders and directions from July 1st to the 13th, informed Patterson that McDowell would make an advance against Beauregard, and that Johnston must be defeated or detained in the Shenandoah Valley, in order that their two armies might not unite and defeat McDowell. I telegraphed to you yesterday, was Scott's language, if not strong enough to beat the enemy early next week, make demonstrations so as to detain him in the valley of Winchester; but if he retreats in force toward Manassas, and it be too hazardous to follow him, th
s apart. Two days later he repeated his statement, his engineer reporting that to hold this post, then, either as a fortress, a point d'appui, or as a condition of the defence of the Virginia Valley, we require a force of from twelve to fifteen thousand men. Lee did not relish the alternative; he sent him two additional regiments, and wrote him that the abandonment of Harper's Ferry would be depressing to the cause of the South. But Johnston held stubbornly to his opinion, and wrote on June 6th, that, though the abandonment of Harper's Ferry might be depressing to the cause of the South, the loss of five or six thousand men would be more so. And if they remain here, he added, they must be captured or destroyed very soon after General McClellan's arrival in the valley. The opinion was evidently based on the current rumors that McClellan would bring Western troops to join Patterson. This decided warning had its effect on the rebel authorities, and under date of June 13th they a
hnston remained in camp about Winchester, pushing his picket-line close up to the Potomac, and keeping himself well informed by scouts and spies. Meanwhile the Confederate authorities, still anxious to hold the Shenandoah Valley, and having also in view a possible junction with Beauregard at Manassas, sent forward reinforcements which raised Johnston's army to the effective strength of nine thousand, besides twenty-five hundred local militia in process of organization. Toward the end of June a movement against Manassas was resolved on at Washington. As a preliminary, General Scott once more suggested a definite task to Patterson. Remain in front of the enemy, he telegraphed on June 25th, while he continues in force between Winchester and the Potomac. If you are in superior or equal force, you may cross and offer him battle. Two days later he gave further emphasis to the suggestion by saying, I had expected your crossing the river to-day in pursuit of the enemy. But Patterson
the very threshold of Pennsylvania, which, successfully prosecuted, would protect Maryland, relieve the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, encourage Virginia Unionists, and recover lost prestige. Patriotic pride, political security, and military advantage seemed, to the minds of both Patterson and Scott, to present combined reasons for an early recapture of Harper's Ferry. For this purpose, Patterson, about the first of June, concentrated his available troops at Chambersburg, Pa., and on the third of that month issued an address to the regiments under his command, announcing that you will soon meet the insurgents. Orders from General Scott, however, held him back until strong reinforcements could be sent, and an important diversion organized to aid him; and while thus assisting, the General also admonished him to every prudence, reminding him that his expedition was well projected, and that success in it would be an important step in the war; but, there must be no reverse. With th
ot be used in distant undertakings. Here, however, was a worthy enterprise at the very threshold of Pennsylvania, which, successfully prosecuted, would protect Maryland, relieve the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, encourage Virginia Unionists, and recover lost prestige. Patriotic pride, political security, and military advantage seemed, to the minds of both Patterson and Scott, to present combined reasons for an early recapture of Harper's Ferry. For this purpose, Patterson, about the first of June, concentrated his available troops at Chambersburg, Pa., and on the third of that month issued an address to the regiments under his command, announcing that you will soon meet the insurgents. Orders from General Scott, however, held him back until strong reinforcements could be sent, and an important diversion organized to aid him; and while thus assisting, the General also admonished him to every prudence, reminding him that his expedition was well projected, and that success in it wo
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