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Tunnel Hill (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 4
ays rations in Dalton; to have sent the trains and engines to some place of safety beyond the Etowah; to have held our position until the arrival of Polk's Army, when a grand assault upon Sherman's left flank and rear could have been made near Tunnel Hill, by passing over the northern slope of Rocky-faced Ridge, with an Army of over seventy thousand （70,000) effectives, which might easily have been increased to seventy-five thousand (75,000) by lessening the extra duty men. This move, in my e Creek Gaps, the short line of retreat, since the railroad south of Kingston deflects greatly to the east One blow in rear of an army is always more to be feared than ten in front, and it would have required only a good roar of musketry, near Tunnel Hill, to have hastened the enemy back to the firing. I have too high a regard for General Sherman's sagacity, as a soldier, to believe that he would have moved the main body of his Army down the valley between Rocky-faced and Horn Mountains, in th
United States (United States) (search for this): chapter 4
inution occurred in casualties, and in desertions on the night of our retreat on Cassville. Hardee's Corps was the largest in the Army, and numbered about two thousand (2000) more than my corps. As previously stated, the assertions of General Wigfall as to Johnston's strength and losses may safely be regarded as correct; and General Johnston furnishes evidence of his satisfaction therewith by inserting in his Narrative the speech delivered by Wigfall in the Senate Chamber of the Confederate States. This Senator, in his estimate of the strength of Polk's Corps, Johnston's Narrative, page 591. says it amounted to less than nineteen thousand (19,000) men. Colonel Douglas West, of New Orleans, La., who was at that time Assistant Adjutant General of Polk's Corps, says on November 13th, 1869, in answer to a letter from me in regard to the strength of that corps when it joined General Johnston, We bore on the rolls an aggregate of about twenty-four thousand (24,000) present. Ge
Cleveland (Ohio, United States) (search for this): chapter 4
rd; * * * in the afternoon the Federal Army placed itself in the front of the Confederate line, its right a little south of Mill Creek Gap, and its left near the Cleveland road. General Wigfall furnishes the following information obtained from the War Office: Johnston's Narrative, page 590. It was not till the 4th of May ld but two gaps in the mountains: Mill Creek and Snake Creek. The approach of the Federal Army down the railroad from Chattanooga, in lieu of down the road from Cleveland, rendered the position the more secure, inasmuch as General Johnston would not have had a stone wall between him and his adversary, had General Sherman advanced by the latter route, where the country is open towards Cleveland. I have always thought General Sherman did not wish to accept a pitched battle, or he would have moved upon Dalton from that direction. His advance by the Chattanooga road, and, subsequently, in front of Rocky Face, convinces me that his intention was to initiate th
Fredericksburg, Va. (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 4
sburg. Prior also to the grandest struggle of the war, Ewell, Hill and Longstreet were extended along a line from the Potomac to Carlisle, Pa.; but all assembled for action before the heights of Gettysburg. An instance still more illustrative is presented when is taken into account the long distance which separated the Confederate forces eventually engaged in the battle of Chickamauga. Rosecranz was moving against Bragg, in Georgia, when Longstreet, with his corps, was ordered from Fredericksburg, Va., to report to Bragg, exactly as Polk was ordered to report to Johnston. Bragg, by manoeuvring, kept his adversary's attention till Longstreet made this long journey from Virginia, when followed the attack, which resulted in a glorious victory. It cannot, therefore, be argued with any degree of reason, when we consider these striking examples before us, that Polk's force-concentrating at a distance of about two hundred and eighty-eight miles, and being pushed rapidly forward by rail
Chattanooga (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 4
he name Rocky-faced Ridge indicates. The Confederate position was one of the strongest to be desired; it was necessary to hold but two gaps in the mountains: Mill Creek and Snake Creek. The approach of the Federal Army down the railroad from Chattanooga, in lieu of down the road from Cleveland, rendered the position the more secure, inasmuch as General Johnston would not have had a stone wall between him and his adversary, had General Sherman advanced by the latter route, where the country is open towards Cleveland. I have always thought General Sherman did not wish to accept a pitched battle, or he would have moved upon Dalton from that direction. His advance by the Chattanooga road, and, subsequently, in front of Rocky Face, convinces me that his intention was to initiate the policy of wasting our strength, which he so effectually carried out in the campaign from Dalton to Atlanta. He came to the position of all others most favorable, if our commander could have been induced t
Mill Creek (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 4
in person was in Dalton on the 12th. General Johnston could well have awaited the arrival of the whole of this Army, since it required so small a force to hold Mill Creek and Snake Creek Gaps, as previously stated, and practically demonstrated by General Sherman's use of them, after these mountain defiles fell into his possessionhe report that Sherman had moved with his Army down the valley beyond Rocky-faced Ridge, is not warrantable. It was only necessary to have thoroughly fortified Mill Creek and Snake Creek Gaps; collected fifteen or twenty days rations in Dalton; to have sent the trains and engines to some place of safety beyond the Etowah; to have by lessening the extra duty men. This move, in my opinion, would have culminated in an overwhelming victory; and, in the event of defeat, we had, by holding Mill Creek and Snake Creek Gaps, the short line of retreat, since the railroad south of Kingston deflects greatly to the east One blow in rear of an army is always more to
Alabama (Alabama, United States) (search for this): chapter 4
ed to bear with them the chilling intelligence that the Army is falling back; in all such instances they tarry with their friends, and many fail to report again for duty. However, the loss from this source is but small in comparison to that which accrues from the number of stragglers picked up by the enemy, and of deserters who, beholding their homes abandoned to the foe, become disheartened, and return to their families within the lines of the enemy, as was the case in North Georgia and West Alabama during General Johnston's continued retreat. The statement derived from Doctor Foard's Johnston's Narrative, page 576. return of the killed and wounded, is doubtless correct; but General Johnston's intention cannot, assuredly, be to affirm that this number, nine thousand nine hundred and seventy-two (9972), constitutes his entire loss during his campaign. According to the return of Major Falconer, his own Adjutant General, Johnston's Narrative, page 574. and to which he refers,
Doherty (Missouri, United States) (search for this): chapter 4
It cannot be asserted with any degree of reason that it was not feasible to have remained longer at Dalton, inasmuch as General Johnston had only to fortify Mill Creek and Snake Creek Gaps to insure his safety, and sufficient time to receive all the reinforcements then en route to Dalton. As further evidence of the correctn and military officers of the State, and were possessed of more pride and intelligence. They could have performed noble service in well-constructed redoubts in Mill Creek and Snake Creek Gaps; would have proved the equal of regulars in those positions, and have allowed General Johnston the grand opportunity to attack Sherman with the name Rocky-faced Ridge indicates. The Confederate position was one of the strongest to be desired; it was necessary to hold but two gaps in the mountains: Mill Creek and Snake Creek. The approach of the Federal Army down the railroad from Chattanooga, in lieu of down the road from Cleveland, rendered the position the more s
Chattahoochee River, Ga. (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 4
d seventy-two (9972), constitutes his entire loss during his campaign. According to the return of Major Falconer, his own Adjutant General, Johnston's Narrative, page 574. and to which he refers, the effective strength of the Army on the 10th of June, near Kennesaw Mountain, when about eighty miles from Dalton, and within about twenty miles of Atlanta, was fifty-nine thousand two hundred and forty-eight (59,248); whilst the return of the 10th of July shows, just after crossing the Chattahoochee river on the night of the 9th, an effective total of only fifty thousand six hundred and twenty-seven (50,627), which, subtracted from the number we had when near Kennesaw Mountain the 10th of June, demonstrates a loss of eight thousand six hundred and twenty-one (8621), less six hundred (600) of J. K. Jackson's command, sent to Savannah. Therefore, it seems impossible that this General should wish to create the impression that nine thousand nine hundred and seventy-two (9972) was his enti
Cassville (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 4
ormed the corps of the Army which he commanded. Of these, Canty's Division of about three thousand (3000) effectives reached Resaca on the 9th of May. Loring's of five thousand (5000) on the 11th; French's of four thousand (4000) joined us at Cassville on the 18th; and Quarles's brigade of twenty-two hundred (2200) at New Hope Church on the 26th. Our Army retreated from Dalton on the night of the 12th and the morning of the 13th of May, and, as just cited, Cantry's Division of three thous My recollection, however, is that you mustered twenty-one to twenty-two thousand (21,000 to 22,000) effectives at Dalton and Resaca, at which latter point some diminution occurred in casualties, and in desertions on the night of our retreat on Cassville. Hardee's Corps was the largest in the Army, and numbered about two thousand (2000) more than my corps. As previously stated, the assertions of General Wigfall as to Johnston's strength and losses may safely be regarded as correct; and G
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