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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 14. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones). Search the whole document.

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Bull Run, Va. (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 25
lls, our two companies of cavalry were ordered to hasten back to that point, each trooper with an infant en croupe. But I imagine there was not a Yankee this side the Potomac who would not have been amused (or scared) at the idea of his crossing Bull Run at that crisis. In the month of October, circumstances led to my resignation and return home. Before I left, General Ewell sent for me to his quarters. Captain, said he, handing me some papers, I learn that some of the newspapers in the farhese orders to three brigades to reach them, followed by the one countermanding Ewells advance, without a thrill in every nerve— 1. Had they been duly delivered, of course the whole battle of Manassas must have been fought on the east side of Bull Run—that stream in our rear. Would the panic and rout have been more or less, or equally likely to have resulted? If they had, what would have been the finaleIf not, ditto? But— 2. Given the failures, had General Ewell not been recalled when th<
Chancellorsville (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 25
in our rear. Would the panic and rout have been more or less, or equally likely to have resulted? If they had, what would have been the finaleIf not, ditto? But— 2. Given the failures, had General Ewell not been recalled when that panic-stricken army rolled back upon itself, what would have been the effect of five thousand fresh troops attacking it in flank and rear? And may not one venture to ask, why should not that have been the plan? Was it not exactly that which saved us at Chancellorsville? And something like it at Second Manassas? In both instances, with far greater difficulty of accomplishment, and with more to discourage. Far be it from a tyro like me, to presume to criticise Johnston and Beauregard's wisdom. But surely if the latter can tickle his fancy with what would have happened if Jackson or Desaix had been in Ewell's place, or if Ewell had taken upon himself the responsibility of inaugurating that battle without orders, in the face of the fact that the chief
Centreville (Maryland, United States) (search for this): chapter 25
rders to advance. At last we did advance—if I am not mistaken, about 9 o'clock—merely in consequence of informal, but reliable information, that the order had been issued. As well as I remember, our position was some half a mile from the Union Mills ford. The road was narrow, winding and precipitous. The cavalry could only march by twos. I need not say that it required several hours for the whole brigade to get over. Three roads diverged from the ford, the centre one leading towards Centreville. We took the left one—I presume more directly towards the main body of the enemy. We proceeded perhaps a mile. I was told that the head of our column encountered the enemy's pickets. At that juncture came the order to return. We reached our original camp-ground about 3 or 4 o'clock, and took up the line of march for the battlefield, on the extreme left, hearing from time to time, as we proceeded, reports of the heavy pressure and fearful carnage upon our left. We arrived on the gro<
Joseph R. Cabell (search for this): chapter 25
men of that brigade now living, who can corroborate General Lee's testimony. I should not think it necessary to state my own vivid recollections of the occurrences of that memorable day, but that it so happened that by a circumstance which took place several months afterwards, the correspondence between Beauregard and Ewell, now published for the first time, came into my possession. There were two companies of cavalry serving with Ewell's brigade on that day—viz: the Governor's Guard, Captain Cabell, and my own, the Goochland Light Dragoons. My impression is, that the whole brigade—five thousand strong—was drawn up, ready to move, by seven o'clock in the morning. The cavalry were in the saddle, and in line, and continued so for two hours. I had opportunities of witnessing General Ewell's intense anxiety and excitement at not reciving the expected orders to advance. At last we did advance—if I am not mistaken, about 9 o'clock—merely in consequence of informal, but reliable info
Fitzhugh Lee (search for this): chapter 25
such a battle as that momentous one was intended to be, merely because the plans were communicated to him the night before, and he was directed to hold himself in readiness to move at 7 o'clock next morning, upon receipt of further orders. General Fitz. Lee's vindication of General Ewell is conclusive, by his simple statement of the facts; but not more so than General Beauregard's own letter to Ewell, written four days after the battle, beginning with: I do not attach the slightest blame to yoou did all that could have been expected of you, etc. What that same letter convicts its author of-even on the point of technical rule—this deponent saith not. There are probably scores of men of that brigade now living, who can corroborate General Lee's testimony. I should not think it necessary to state my own vivid recollections of the occurrences of that memorable day, but that it so happened that by a circumstance which took place several months afterwards, the correspondence between B
G. T. Beauregard (search for this): chapter 25
aded, General Ewell at First Manassas. I cannot conceive how General Beauregard could utter such a reflection—even entertain such a thought—asingular doctrine to come from such a master of the art of war as Beauregard, that it was the duty of a brigade commander to initiate such a be, by his simple statement of the facts; but not more so than General Beauregard's own letter to Ewell, written four days after the battle, be took place several months afterwards, the correspondence between Beauregard and Ewell, now published for the first time, came into my possessd. Have an accurate copy made of this correspondence between General Beauregard and myself, and take it with you, that you may have it in your be it from a tyro like me, to presume to criticise Johnston and Beauregard's wisdom. But surely if the latter can tickle his fancy with wha reach the battlefield in time to be of any use. All honor to General Beauregard. Doubtless, many will join me in the sentiment, that had his
T. J. Jackson (search for this): chapter 25
with far greater difficulty of accomplishment, and with more to discourage. Far be it from a tyro like me, to presume to criticise Johnston and Beauregard's wisdom. But surely if the latter can tickle his fancy with what would have happened if Jackson or Desaix had been in Ewell's place, or if Ewell had taken upon himself the responsibility of inaugurating that battle without orders, in the face of the fact that the chiefs had had a whole night in which to reverse or modify their plans, surelwhat would have been the result if he had entrusted his orders to responsible officers instead of, to use his own words, the worst set of guides and couriers I ever employed; or, when it was too late for General Ewell to render any assistance on our left, he had let him alone until the wish has begotten the thought—that with a Jackson on our right, the movement would not have balked. Better judges than I am—Jackson himself to begin with—know that there was Jackson enough in Ewell for any
George F. Harrison (search for this): chapter 25
Ewell at First Manassas. by Captain George F. Harrison. I have read, with painful surprise, in Vol. XIII Southern his-Torical papers, the article headed, General Ewell at First Manassas. I cannot conceive how General Beauregard could utter such a reflection—even entertain such a thought—as he has put on record in the Century Magazine in regard to General Ewell, damning him with the faint praise of obedience to technical orders, and plainly imputing to him blame for not moving without orders—more especially right in the teeth of his own letter of unqualified exoneration. It seems to me a most singular doctrine to come from such a master of the art of war as Beauregard, that it was the duty of a brigade commander to initiate such a battle as that momentous one was intended to be, merely because the plans were communicated to him the night before, and he was directed to hold himself in readiness to move at 7 o'clock next morning, upon receipt of further orders. General Fitz. Lee<
Ewells (search for this): chapter 25
t was verbatim et literatim as now published in the Southern his-Torical Society papers. After the war a published call was made by the Society for all such matter, and I sent this copy of the correspondence to the person indicated as the appointed recipient, possibly the present secretary. In the light of what did happen, I suppose I am not singular in saying, that I never think of the mysterious failure of these orders to three brigades to reach them, followed by the one countermanding Ewells advance, without a thrill in every nerve— 1. Had they been duly delivered, of course the whole battle of Manassas must have been fought on the east side of Bull Run—that stream in our rear. Would the panic and rout have been more or less, or equally likely to have resulted? If they had, what would have been the finaleIf not, ditto? But— 2. Given the failures, had General Ewell not been recalled when that panic-stricken army rolled back upon itself, what would have been the effect of <
R. S. Ewell (search for this): chapter 25
ecord in the Century Magazine in regard to General Ewell, damning him with the faint praise of obedrders. General Fitz. Lee's vindication of General Ewell is conclusive, by his simple statement of ore so than General Beauregard's own letter to Ewell, written four days after the battle, beginningere were two companies of cavalry serving with Ewell's brigade on that day—viz: the Governor's Guarditto? But— 2. Given the failures, had General Ewell not been recalled when that panic-strickenhave happened if Jackson or Desaix had been in Ewell's place, or if Ewell had taken upon himself thEwell had taken upon himself the responsibility of inaugurating that battle without orders, in the face of the fact that the chiefagining what would have been the effect, after Ewell did act upon the order as soon as he knew it hver employed; or, when it was too late for General Ewell to render any assistance on our left, he hs than I am—Jackson himself to begin with—know that there was Jackson enough in Ewell for any duty.[4 more.
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