hide Sorting

You can sort these results in two ways:

By entity
Chronological order for dates, alphabetical order for places and people.
By position (current method)
As the entities appear in the document.

You are currently sorting in ascending order. Sort in descending order.

hide Most Frequent Entities

The entities that appear most frequently in this document are shown below.

Entity Max. Freq Min. Freq
Napoleon 378 0 Browse Search
France (France) 164 0 Browse Search
Austria (Austria) 120 0 Browse Search
Europe 90 0 Browse Search
England (United Kingdom) 64 0 Browse Search
Ulm 52 0 Browse Search
Moreau 50 4 Browse Search
Preussen 46 0 Browse Search
Dresden (Saxony, Germany) 42 0 Browse Search
Ney 39 3 Browse Search
View all entities in this document...

Browsing named entities in a specific section of Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.). Search the whole document.

Found 363 total hits in 110 results.

... 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Genoa (Italy) (search for this): chapter 5
peared to him more sure than all the strategical; he preferred a certain half success to the chance of a victory which would have been decisive, but exposed to greater hazards. In the same campaign, the passage of the Po by Napoleon offered another example of the strategic importance which is attached to the choice of the point of passage; the army of reserve, after the combat of the ,Chiusella, could march by the left of the Po to Turin, or pass the river at Crescentino and march direct to Genoa; Napoleon preferred to pass the Ticino, to enter Milan, to unite there with Moncey, who came with twenty thousand men by the St. Gothard, then to pass the Po at Placentia, persuaded that he would more surely precede Melas upon that point, than if he changed direction too soon upon his line of retreat. The passage of the Danube at Donanwerth and Ingolstadt, in 1805, was an operation nearly of the same kind; the direction chosen became the first cause of the destruction of the army of Mack.
Ney (search for this): chapter 5
ce, in order to prevent the troops dispersing for marauding. It is well to place with the rear guard a chief gifted with a grea sangfroid, and officers of the staff who could reconnoitre in advance the favorable points where the rear guard might make a stand in order to suspend the march of the enemy, to the end of placing there the reserve of the rear guard with artillery. The qualities which distinguish a good general of a rear guard are not common, especially in southern armies. Marshal Ney was the most perfect type which one could desire of this kind; the Russian army is favored in this respect, for the general spirit of its troops is necessarily partaken by the chiefs. It is necessary to relieve successively the echelon in such a manner as never to allow them to be pressed too closely. The cavalry being able to rally rapidly on the main body, it will be comprehended that good masses of this arm facilitate much a slow and methodical retreat and give also the means of wel
Wellington (search for this): chapter 5
s of the hostile columns. We shall return for the rest to these rules:-- Retreats are of divers kinds, according to the motive which determines them. You retreat voluntarily before having fought, in order to lead the enemy upon a point less advantageous for him than that where he is found; it is a prudent manoeuvre rather than a retreat. It was thus that Napoleon retired, in 1805, from Wischan upon Brunn, in order to lead the allies upon the point which suited him. It was thus that Wellington retreated from Quatre-Bras upon Waterloo. Finally, it was what I proposed to do before the attack of Dresden, when we had been in formed of the arrival of Napoleon. I represented the necesssity of a march upon Dippodiswalde for choosing an advantageous field of battle, this idea was confounded with a retreat, and a chivalrous point of honor prevented a retrograde movement without fighting, which would neverthe less have avoided the catastrophe of the following day, (26th Aug., 1813.)
Valenciennes (search for this): chapter 5
ntage for that power, if it knew how to profit by it. France is equally very proper for this kind of war, especially when there does not exist in the country two political parties which may aspire to the possession of the capitol, and render its occupation decisive for the enemy. If the latter penetrate by the Alps, the French can act upon the Rhone and Saone, turning on the frontier to the Moselle on the one side, or to Provence on the other. If it penetrate by Strasburg, Mayence or Valenciennes, it is the same; the occupation of Paris would be impossible, or at least hazardous, so long as a French army intact should remain based upon its girdle of strong places. It is, for the rest, the same for all countries having double fronts of operations. In all these calculations I suppose the forces nearly equal, if the invading army is twice as strong, then it may follow with the half of its troops that which retires parallelly, and carry the other half upon the capital; but with eq
Ulm (search for this): chapter 5
tself, is a tactical operation, but the determination of the point where it ought to be made, is connected with the grand operations which embrace the whole theatre of war. The passage of the Rhine by General Moreau in 1800, of which we have already spoken, may still serve as an example for causing to be appreciated this assertion. Napoleon, more skillful in strategy than his lieutenant, wished him to pass in mass at Schaffhausen to take in reverse the whole army of Kray, to anticipate it at Ulm, to cut it off from Austria, and to drive it back upon the Maine. Moreau, who had already a tete de pont at Basle, preferred to pass more commodiously upon the front of the enemy, to turning his extreme left, the tactical advantage appeared to him more sure than all the strategical; he preferred a certain half success to the chance of a victory which would have been decisive, but exposed to greater hazards. In the same campaign, the passage of the Po by Napoleon offered another example of t
Sebastian (search for this): chapter 5
cily; the expedition of Alexander to Asia Minor; those of Caesar to England and to Africa; those of Germanicus to the mouths of the Elbe; the Crusades; the expeditions of the people of the north to England, to France, and even to Italy? Since the invention of cannon, the too celebrated Armada of Philip II was the only colossal enterprise until that which Napoleon formed against England in 1803. All the other expeditions beyond the sea were partial operations; those of Charles V, and of Sebastian of Portugal, upon the Coast of Africa; several descents, like those of the French upon the United States of America, upon Egypt and St. Domingo; those of the English upon Egypt, Holland, Copenhagen, Antwerp, Philadelphia, all enter into the same category. I do not speak of the project of Hoche against Ireland, for it did not succeed, and it shows all the difficulty of these kinds of enterprises. The large armies which the great States keep up at this day, does not admit of their being
Germanicus (search for this): chapter 5
g notice of the principal expeditions beyond the sea; if space permits, I will reproduce it at the end of this volume. Who does not recall the great armaments of the Prussians in the Black Sea, the Basphorus and the Archipelago? Those innumerable armies of Xerxes and Darius, transported to Thrace, to Greece; the numerous expeditions of the Carthagenians and the Romans, to Spain and to Sicily; the expedition of Alexander to Asia Minor; those of Caesar to England and to Africa; those of Germanicus to the mouths of the Elbe; the Crusades; the expeditions of the people of the north to England, to France, and even to Italy? Since the invention of cannon, the too celebrated Armada of Philip II was the only colossal enterprise until that which Napoleon formed against England in 1803. All the other expeditions beyond the sea were partial operations; those of Charles V, and of Sebastian of Portugal, upon the Coast of Africa; several descents, like those of the French upon the United St
Murat (search for this): chapter 5
extraordinary. The retreat of Laccmbe from the Engadine to Altorf, and that of MacDonald by Pontremoli, after the defeat of the Trobbia, were as well as that of Suwaroff from the Muttenthal to Coire. glorious feats of arms, but partial and of short duration. That which the Russian army executed, without allowing itself to be broken, from the Nieman to Moscow, in a space of two hundred and forty leagues, before an enemy like Napoleon, and a cavalry like that which the active and audacious Murat conducted, can certainly be placed above all the others. Doubtless it was facilitated by a multitude of circumstances, but that detracts nothing from its merit, if not as regards the strategic talent of the chiefs who directed the first period of it, at least as respects the steadiness and the admirable firmness of the body of troops which executed it. Finally, although the retreat from Moscow was for Napoleon a bloody catastrophe, it cannot be denied that it was glorious for him and for
Moreau (search for this): chapter 5
h embrace the whole theatre of war. The passage of the Rhine by General Moreau in 1800, of which we have already spoken, may still serve as an, to cut it off from Austria, and to drive it back upon the Maine. Moreau, who had already a tete de pont at Basle, preferred to pass more cotent of the same front of operations, as occurred to Jourdan and to Moreau in 1796. If we gain by it on one side the advantage of having in nrevent the enemy from overwhelming them separately. If Jourdan and Moreau had followed this maxim, and had united at Donanwert instead of movwell directed, but could not count among distant retreats. That of Moreau, in 1796, exalted by party spirit, was honorable, without being extic direction of his retreat that Germany owed its safety? Finally, Moreau, who had marched upon an immense development by isolated divisions,ds of the enemy, as the Arch-Duke Charles did in 1796 at Neresheim, Moreau at Biberach and Kleber at Ukerath. Such a manoeuvre almost always
Charles (search for this): chapter 5
only of his army shall have crossed. It is necessary to do like the Duke of Vendorle at Cassano, and as did the Arch-Duke Charles on a larger scale at Essling in 1809--a memorable example, which cannot be too strongly recommended, although the conqrte directed himself afterwards upon the rear of the left, and destroyed it at Bassano and at Mantua. When the Arch-Duke Charles yielded to the first efforts of the two French armies in 1796, would he have saved Germany by an excentric manoeceuvreper in this case to halt from time to time and to fall unexpectedly upon the advanced guards of the enemy, as the Arch-Duke Charles did in 1796 at Neresheim, Moreau at Biberach and Kleber at Ukerath. Such a manoeuvre almost always succeeds by the su, in 1796, near Neuweied upon the Rhine, where they came near compromising the army of the Sambre and Mense. The Arch-Duke Charles did as much in 1809 at the famous passage at Essling. He broke the bridge of the Danube, and brought Napoleon to the
... 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11