hide Sorting

You can sort these results in two ways:

By entity
Chronological order for dates, alphabetical order for places and people.
By position (current method)
As the entities appear in the document.

You are currently sorting in ascending order. Sort in descending order.

hide Most Frequent Entities

The entities that appear most frequently in this document are shown below.

Entity Max. Freq Min. Freq
Stonewall Jackson 307 1 Browse Search
R. S. Ewell 243 1 Browse Search
Braxton Bragg 221 3 Browse Search
Bradley T. Johnson 192 14 Browse Search
Fitzhugh Lee 188 14 Browse Search
Gettysburg (Pennsylvania, United States) 179 1 Browse Search
Winchester, Va. (Virginia, United States) 178 0 Browse Search
R. E. Rodes 165 1 Browse Search
John B. Hood 156 2 Browse Search
James Longstreet 151 1 Browse Search
View all entities in this document...

Browsing named entities in a specific section of Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 10. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones). Search the whole document.

Found 564 total hits in 119 results.

... 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
May 31st (search for this): chapter 4.35
ence of the South was to be achieved it must be done in spite of it. To Lee's mind a simply defensive policy, resulting ultimately in a siege, promised nothing beyond a protracted struggle, with certain disaster at the end of it. He believed he could best thwart his adversary by attacking him. McClellan had, after the battle of Seven Pines, transferred the bulk of his army to the south side of the Chickahominy, where he reoccupied the ground from which Keyes and Heinzelman had been driven on May 31. This ground he covered with a network of entrenchments, and under the cover of strong works was slowly pushing his lines towards Richmond. About one-third of his army held the north side of the Chickahominy as high up as Meadow Bridge, and at the same time covered his communications with his base at West Point, on the Pamunkey. Lee determined to attack the Federal right wing, overwhelm it if possible, and destroy McClellan's communications and depots. McClellan would thus be forced to f
May 30th (search for this): chapter 4.35
to strike had come. Two of McClellan's corps lay on the south side of the Chickahominy along the Williamsburg road, their advance having been pushed as far as Seven Pines. The remainder of the Federal army was on the north side of that river. The communication between the wings was as yet imperfect, for but few of the numerous bridges McClellan was building were complete. Every advance towards Richmond by the corps on the south side separated them more and more from their supports. On May 30th Johnston concentrated twenty-three of his twenty-seven brigades, and prepared to throw them, on the morrow, against the Federal corps of Keyes and Heintzelman, which were on the south side. A terrific rain storm occurred on the night of the 30th, which by flooding the Chickahominy imperiled and finally interrupted the communication between McClellan's wings. While in this respect assisting the Confederates, it seriously interferred with their movements on the 31st, as the whole country
May 16th (search for this): chapter 4.35
movements. The new Confederate Commander at once began preparations for a renewal of the struggle. Troops that could be spared from the South were ordered to Richmond. Jackson was directed to be prepared to move to the same place from the Valley at the critical moment. (General Webb is in error in attributing this movement to Jackson himself, as he does on page 122. Jackson had been constantly instructed to keep such a movement in view, as may be seen from General Lee's letter to him of May 16.) The victories of Cross Keys and Port Republic, on June 8 and June 9, made the withdrawal of McDowell's corps from McClellan permanent, and left Jackson free to join Lee. Meantime the latter was busy in preparation. On June 11 Stuart was sent with the Confederate cavalry to reconnoiter McClellan's right and rear. This gallant cavalryman extended his reconnoissance into a raid completely around the Federal army, cutting its communications and destroying supplies as he went. This expeditio
May 21st (search for this): chapter 4.35
e Confederates; and the destruction of the iron-clad Virginia quickly gave to the Federals the command of the James river up to Drewry's Bluff. This caused Johnston to retire across the Chickahominy and take position in front of Richmond; and on May 21 the Federal army advanced to the line of the Chickahominy. So far boldness and skill in strategy had given the Confederates the advantage in the campaign, but the Federals were gathering from different directions in overwhelming force, and it l was ordered forward from Fredericksburg with a force which General Webb correctly states at 41,000 men and 100 guns (p. 85). Thus, 150,000 men were about to unite in the attack on Richmond. To meet this, Johnston had, by the official report of May 21, 53,688 men at Richmond. He called in Branch's and Anderson's brigades from Gordonsville and Fredericksburg, and Huger's three brigades from Petersburg. General Webb absurdly estimates Branch's and Anderson's brigades at 12,000 (p. 86). They ac
July 1st (search for this): chapter 4.35
the latter. This failure was one of the greatest blunders of the Confederate campaign. Jackson was held back by a very serious obstacle, backed by a strong and well commanded force, sufficient, perhaps, to account in an ordinary case for his failure to unite in the attack, but it is hard to avoid the belief that had he exhibited on this occasion the wonderful skill and audacity that characterized his Valley campaign, he would have crossed White Oak Swamp in spite of Franklin. Next day, July 1st, the Confederates, once more reunited, followed the retreating army to Malvern Hill, where McClellan had selected an admirable position and massed on it all of his forces and his immense artillery. Here Lee again attacked, but after a sanguinary contest, in which the Federal lines were severely tested, he was repulsed. The attack on the part of the Confederates was badly managed. Some confusion about the roads in this intricate region caused Magruder to be late in reaching the field. Co
July (search for this): chapter 4.35
shed the destruction of this army. On the 30th of June his admirable plans failed of their full results, only from the incapacity or want of energy of some of his subordinates. On the next day, at Malvern Hill, more, perhaps, might have been accomplished if he had himself used greater care and watchfulness to ensure concert of action in the attack. As it was, he completely broke up the campaign against Richmond, and having huddled up the Federal army on the banks of the James, left it to a July sun to force the speedy evacuation of the Peninsula and the withdrawal of the enemy to the front of Washington. General Lee was new to his plan and new to the army he was thenceforth to lead, and for this reason this campaign is, in some respects, inferior to those that followed, especially to the great, the almost incomparable one of 1864; but, nevertheless, it will remain an ever-enduring monument of his military audacity and skill. One of the best chapters in General Webb's book is the
May (search for this): chapter 4.35
probably refers to the force he could place in line of battle in an aggressive movement, he states McClellan's strength in May as 80,000 (p. 84), while he makes no reference to the official reports. From the latter he elsewhere (p. 181) gives McCleon special grounds is only fair when applied in the same way to both armies. Now, it is plain that McClellan had early in May 109,000 effectives. How many of these he could throw forward to fight, and how many must be kept guarding his flanks, his communications and his depots, is not the question. In answer to McClellan's urgent appeals, at the middle of May, McDowell was ordered forward from Fredericksburg with a force which General Webb correctly states at 41,000 men and 100 guns (p. 85)n General Webb greatly exaggerates the Confederate force. (P. 96--see Branch's order above referred to.) At the last of May Johnston thought the time to strike had come. Two of McClellan's corps lay on the south side of the Chickahominy along th
March 8th (search for this): chapter 4.35
ond. A main inducement to this plan was that the Federal army might by a rapid movement interpose itself between Richmond and General Johnston. With the Confederates behind the Rappahannock this last could no longer be hoped for, and General McClellan now had recourse to the alternative plan which he had kept in reserve (General Webb calls it a dernier ressort, p. 30) of making his base at Fortress Monroe and advancing thence up the Peninsula. The brilliant naval victory of the Virginia (March 8) in Hampton Roads closed the James for the time, but the Federal fleet in the lower Chesapeake was able to confine the formidable iron-clad to that river, and thus the bay and the York river up to Yorktown were open to the unmolested use of the Federal commander. By the first of April a large part of McClellan's army was at Fort Monroe and ready to go forward. The closing weeks of March and the early ones of April were anxious ones to the Confederates. McClellan's great army was eviden
March 9th (search for this): chapter 4.35
ohnston expected his adversary to move by it, and therefore prepared to fall back behind the Rappahannock so that he might be ready to oppose an advance by way of Fredericksburg as well as be within reach should McClellan choose a more southerly line of approach. Johnston continued to maintain a bold front at Manassas, and by various ruses imposed greatly exaggerated notions of his strength upon McClellan to the last moment. To the latter's great surprise he quietly evacuated Manassas on March 9th. This movement of the Confederate army somewhat deranged McClellan's plans. After long discussion, the latter had induced President Lincoln to agree to his plan of transporting the mass of his army to Urbana, on the lower Rappahannock, for an advance thence by way of West Point on Richmond. A main inducement to this plan was that the Federal army might by a rapid movement interpose itself between Richmond and General Johnston. With the Confederates behind the Rappahannock this last c
March (search for this): chapter 4.35
Fortress Monroe and advancing thence up the Peninsula. The brilliant naval victory of the Virginia (March 8) in Hampton Roads closed the James for the time, but the Federal fleet in the lower Chesapeake was able to confine the formidable iron-clad to that river, and thus the bay and the York river up to Yorktown were open to the unmolested use of the Federal commander. By the first of April a large part of McClellan's army was at Fort Monroe and ready to go forward. The closing weeks of March and the early ones of April were anxious ones to the Confederates. McClellan's great army was evidently on the move against Richmond, but from what point or points it would advance was for a time uncertain, and the utmost vigilance had to be exercised. The Confederate forces were fearfully inadequate, even when concentrated, and now they were scattered to guard many places. Early in April it became evident from the large number of troops that had landed at Fort Monroe that McClellan inten
... 6 7 8 9 10 11 12