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1862 AD (search for this): chapter 1
land, either with the view of penetrating Pennsylvania or of manoeuvring towards Washington. It was by this line that Lee issued upon the soil of the loyal States on the occasion of both the Confederate invasions—to wit, the Maryland invasion of 1862, and the Pennsylvania invasion of 1863. This circumstance compelled, throughout the war, the constant presence of a considerable army to guard the debotuche of this great valley and the passes of the Blue Ridge; and the Shenandoah region was the ust be taken with the limitations that belong to it. The most important of these lines are the Peninsula between the York and James rivers, and the route by the south side of the James. The former was adopted by General McClellan in the spring of 1862, and the latter was eventually taken up by General Grant in the summer of 1864, after having, in a remarkable campaign, crossed every possible line of operation against Richmond. But it is manifest that Richmond could be operated against from the
U. S. Grant (search for this): chapter 1
opening of the war, Beauregard formed his array along Bull Run, to when, almost four years thereafter, Lee disputed with Grant the passage of the Chickahominy, and compelled the Union commander to seek a new base south of the James. The mountain James. The former was adopted by General McClellan in the spring of 1862, and the latter was eventually taken up by General Grant in the summer of 1864, after having, in a remarkable campaign, crossed every possible line of operation against Richmf all strategic combinations to the protection of Washington. Saving the time when McClellan moved to the Peninsula, and Grant swung across the James River, the Army of the Potomac was never allowed to uncover Washington. Now, in the former case, nd, in the latter instance, a small raiding column, detached by way of the Shenandoah Valley into Maryland, compelled General Grant to part with two of his corps to protect the national capital, and, for the time, almost suspended active operations
Robert E. Lee (search for this): chapter 1
hich they used to great advantage, from the time when, at the opening of the war, Beauregard formed his array along Bull Run, to when, almost four years thereafter, Lee disputed with Grant the passage of the Chickahominy, and compelled the Union commander to seek a new base south of the James. The mountain system of Virginia is ving northward to cross the Potomac into Maryland, either with the view of penetrating Pennsylvania or of manoeuvring towards Washington. It was by this line that Lee issued upon the soil of the loyal States on the occasion of both the Confederate invasions—to wit, the Maryland invasion of 1862, and the Pennsylvania invasion of 1he Peninsula, and Grant swung across the James River, the Army of the Potomac was never allowed to uncover Washington. Now, in the former case, the first menace by Lee foreshadowing a northward movement caused the withdrawal of the army from the Peninsula; and, in the latter instance, a small raiding column, detached by way of the
Abraham Lincoln (search for this): chapter 1
e betwixt those points of mighty opposites, the North and the South,—names which, hitherto of no more than political import, now assumed the new and dread significance of belligerent Powers. Thus, by her will and by fate, Virginia became the Flanders of the war. And already, from the moment the events in Charleston harbor made war flagrant, armed men, in troops and battalions, hurried forward, from the North and from the South, to her borders. An equal fire animated both sections. President Lincoln called for seventy-five thousand men; Mr. Davis, for a hundred thousand,—armies of a proportion never before seen on the Western continent. Yet such was the spontaneous alacrity with which on each side the summons was obeyed, that within the space of a few weeks, these limits were greatly overpassed, and an additional call for a half million men on the part of the North, and a levy en masse on the part of the South, met a like response. Then by that new agent of transport that has wr
1864 AD (search for this): chapter 1
he whole Virginia seaboard gave many other secondary bases and lines of operation, free from the objections above mentioned. This is undoubtedly true; yet the statement must be taken with the limitations that belong to it. The most important of these lines are the Peninsula between the York and James rivers, and the route by the south side of the James. The former was adopted by General McClellan in the spring of 1862, and the latter was eventually taken up by General Grant in the summer of 1864, after having, in a remarkable campaign, crossed every possible line of operation against Richmond. But it is manifest that Richmond could be operated against from the coast only by an army that was in condition to leave Washington out of the question. The secession of Virginia made the Potomac the dividing line between two warring powers; and the unfortunate location of the national capital on the banks of that river, and on an exposed frontier, profoundly affected the character of militar
Caesar (search for this): chapter 1
sence to become the central figure and cynosure of men's eyes Napoleon, in an outburst of haughty eloquence, exclaims that in the great armies of history the Commander was every thing. It was not, says he, the Roman army that conquered Gaul, but Caesar; it was not the Carthaginian army that made Rome tremble at her gates, but Hannibal; it was not the Macedonian army that marched to the Indus, but Alexander; it was not the Prussian army that defended Prussia for seven years against the three moslargely depends. There are two maxims that forcibly set forth the bearing of the commissariat on wars of invasion: the first is the saying of Frederick the Great, that an army, like a serpent, moves on its belly; the second is the declaration of Caesar, that war must support war. The former of these maxims asserts the absolute dependence of military operations on the means of feeding the operating army; the latter, that this dependence should be simplified by drawing supplies from the country
1863 AD (search for this): chapter 1
of the Shenandoah. This valley, from its direction north and south, and its peculiar topographical relations, is an eminently aggressive line for a hostile force moving northward to cross the Potomac into Maryland, either with the view of penetrating Pennsylvania or of manoeuvring towards Washington. It was by this line that Lee issued upon the soil of the loyal States on the occasion of both the Confederate invasions—to wit, the Maryland invasion of 1862, and the Pennsylvania invasion of 1863. This circumstance compelled, throughout the war, the constant presence of a considerable army to guard the debotuche of this great valley and the passes of the Blue Ridge; and the Shenandoah region was the scene of a series of operations having an intimate relation with those of the main theatre, which in general terms may be defined as the territory between the Blue Ridge and the Chesapeake, and between the Potomac and the James. This region has, as its characteristic feature, a dense f
Hannibal (search for this): chapter 1
ma there will be no other hero than the Army of the Potomac itself; for it would seem that in this war of the People it was decreed there should arise no imperial presence to become the central figure and cynosure of men's eyes Napoleon, in an outburst of haughty eloquence, exclaims that in the great armies of history the Commander was every thing. It was not, says he, the Roman army that conquered Gaul, but Caesar; it was not the Carthaginian army that made Rome tremble at her gates, but Hannibal; it was not the Macedonian army that marched to the Indus, but Alexander; it was not the Prussian army that defended Prussia for seven years against the three most powerful States of Europe, but Frederick. This proud apotheosis has no application for the Army of the Potomac. And one must think —seeing it never had a great, and generally had mediocre commanders—it was that it might be said, that whatever it won it owed not to genius, but bought with its blood. I must now add, that it wo
Napoleon (search for this): chapter 1
n. Of this drama there will be no other hero than the Army of the Potomac itself; for it would seem that in this war of the People it was decreed there should arise no imperial presence to become the central figure and cynosure of men's eyes Napoleon, in an outburst of haughty eloquence, exclaims that in the great armies of history the Commander was every thing. It was not, says he, the Roman army that conquered Gaul, but Caesar; it was not the Carthaginian army that made Rome tremble at hets belly, the actual condition did not permit of carrying out the admonition to make war support war. In the densely populated countries of Europe, it is easy, from the resources of the country, to subsist an army of a hundred thousand men; and Napoleon, while operating in the basins of the Rhine and Danube, and in the rich granaries of Belgium, Italy, and Swabia, constantly supported by requisitions much greater numbers. But in proportion as the population becomes thin, the productive forces
Americans (search for this): chapter 1
ring itself on the one side or the other. But the former supposition is excluded by the palpable evidence, notorious to all the world, of a long bead-roll of bloody battles, and the terrible aggregate of losses sustained, in this conflict of Americans with Americans. It results therefore that we must seek in the alternative the explanation of a historic fact seemingly so unaccountable. I shall briefly set forth some of the leading elements that enter into this problem as it stands relateAmericans. It results therefore that we must seek in the alternative the explanation of a historic fact seemingly so unaccountable. I shall briefly set forth some of the leading elements that enter into this problem as it stands related to the theatre of operations in Virginia and the conditions of warfare upon that theatre. A proper appreciation of these conditions will help to explain the many bloody but indecisive battles that characterized the Virginia campaigns, and must modify the conclusions of those who, from a distance, vainly seek to apply the principles and precedents of European warfare to a region having hardly one mentionable element in common. From the Potomac, as base, to Richmond, on the left bank of th
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