hide Sorting

You can sort these results in two ways:

By entity
Chronological order for dates, alphabetical order for places and people.
By position (current method)
As the entities appear in the document.

You are currently sorting in ascending order. Sort in descending order.

hide Most Frequent Entities

The entities that appear most frequently in this document are shown below.

Entity Max. Freq Min. Freq
Robert E. Lee 523 9 Browse Search
United States (United States) 340 0 Browse Search
Joe Hooker 254 0 Browse Search
Fitzhugh Lee 216 2 Browse Search
Jefferson Davis 195 7 Browse Search
Stonewall Jackson 182 0 Browse Search
George B. McClellan 170 0 Browse Search
Sedgwick 168 2 Browse Search
R. E. Lee 160 0 Browse Search
J. A. Early 149 5 Browse Search
View all entities in this document...

Browsing named entities in a specific section of Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 14. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones). Search the whole document.

Found 768 total hits in 82 results.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
R. S. Ewell (search for this): chapter 4
dly rapid advance, and was informed of the urgent necessity for completing the operations at Harper's Ferry. Jackson set to work with all his energy on the night of the 14th, and accomplished the object in view. During that night A. P. Hill, who was next the Shenandoah, was thrown forward, until some of his troops were on the right and in the rear of the Federal line of defence. Jones's division, near the Potomac, was thrown forward to attack the portion of the Federal line in its front. Ewell's division was moved forward on the turnpike between the two. During the night Colonel Crutchfield took ten guns over the Shenandoah, and established them near the foot of Loudoun Heights, so as to attack the formidable fortifications of the Federals in reverse. Colonel Lindsay Walker, and his gallant adjutant, Ham. Chamberlayne, brought up a large number of Hill's batteries to a position which a portion of Hill's infantry had gained. The greatest activity prevailed in Jackson's command d
Robert Toombs (search for this): chapter 4
was D. H. Hill. Beyond him, towards the right, was Evans and D. R. Jones's division of Longstreet's command. A part of Toombs's brigade held the bridge on the right. J. G. Walker's brigades had been sent to this flank on the 16th, but early on thgainst the Confederate right flank at the same time that his main attack was being made on their left failed of execution Toombs, with a handful of Georgians, held the bridge over the Antietam for hours against all efforts of Burnside to cross it. Nobridge, and it was taken only when Burnside had found his way across the creek at a ford below, and threatened to envelop Toombs. Though forced from his position at last, the time Toombs had gained was invaluable to the Confederates. The fighting opromptness, which cannot be too highly praised, A. P. Hill formed his men in line, and threw them upon Burnside's flank. Toombs, and the other brigades of D. R. Jones's division, gave such aid as they were able. The Confederate artillery was used w
Mansfield (search for this): chapter 4
f batteries had been sent to assist him. McClellan's plan was to throw the corps of Hooker, Mansfield, and Sumner, supported by Franklin if necessary, against the Confederate left wing, and, as sod part of D. H. Hill's brave men came to the rescue, and Hooker's corps was broken in pieces. Mansfield, who was close behind Hooker, came to his assistance, and once more ensued a struggle of the as nothing left of it but a few fragments, in no condition of themselves to renew the attack. Mansfield had fallen and Hooker had been borne wounded from the field. Now it was that McClellan threw to the attack. Sumner himself, leading Sedgwick's division, followed the track of Hooker and Mansfield and moved against Jackson's weak lines in the woods north of the Dunker church. Sumner found ion about that. Though it is plain from this that Jackson had nothing to fear from Hooker and Mansfield, the advance of Sedgwick's five or six thousand fresh men threatened to overwhelm the weak Con
Sedgwick (search for this): chapter 4
in moving to the attack. Sumner himself, leading Sedgwick's division, followed the track of Hooker and Mansf to fear from Hooker and Mansfield, the advance of Sedgwick's five or six thousand fresh men threatened to ove old division, clung tenaciously to some ground in Sedgwick's front, while Hood, in the woods near the church,nd opened the way for a crushing flank attack upon Sedgwick. In a few moments this attack was made by McLaws,n conjunction, and in twenty minutes two fifths of Sedgwick's men were hors de combat, and the remainder were olleagues held the field. When Sumner was leading Sedgwick to the attack the other two divisions of his corpsH. Anderson's division reinforced it. Sumner, when Sedgwick was being pressed, ordered French and Richardson t this time. General Palfrey, a gallant officer of Sedgwick's division, who has given us the best account so fpaign, says: The right attack spent its force when Sedgwick was repulsed. Up to that time there had been clos
Consequently D. H. Hill (search for this): chapter 4
induce the Federal army, if possible, to cross that range into the Hagerstown Valley, and when this army had thus gotten fairly out of the reach of Washington the Confederate commander expected to give it battle upon his own terms. And, judging from McClellan's character and movements, Lee believed he would have ample time for the reduction of Harper's Ferry and the reunion of his divided army in the neighborhood of Hagerstown before McClellan would be ready to cross the mountain. Consequently D. H. Hill and Stuart were expected to delay McClellan's march until the operations at Harper's Ferry should be completed. On the 13th of September a copy of General Lee's order, giving the proposed movements of every division in his army until it should be reunited after the capture of Harper's Ferry, fell into the hands of General McClellan at Frederick. The copy so captured was the one sent from General Lee's headquarters addressed to General D. H. Hill. How it was lost, and where, are
J. R. Cooke (search for this): chapter 4
o attack the troops in their front in order to make a diversion. After a most gallant resistance Hill was driven from the Bloody Lane. Anderson was involved in the defeat, and it looked as if the enemy was about to pierce the Confederate centre. The noble efforts of many brave men prevented this result. The artillery was managed and served with a skill and gallantry never surpassed. Fragments of commands fought with a splendid determination. As General Longstreet says, the brave Colonel J. R. Cooke showed front to the enemy when he no longer had a cartridge. Such instances of courage and gallantry as General Longstreet relates of his own staff did much to encourage our men. The manner in which Longstreet, D. H. Hill, and other officers of high rank exposed themselves contributed to the result, and though, as General Longstreet says, some ground was gained and held at this point by the Federals, the attempt to break through the centre failed. General Longstreet's article woul
R. H. Anderson (search for this): chapter 4
ll the avenues of escape in the angle between the Shenandoah and the Potomac. At the same time McLaws, with his own and Anderson's divisions, was sent into Pleasant Valley, with instructions to take Maryland Heights, and hedge in the garrison on thef the 15th. J. G. Walker was close behind him. These two reached Sharpsburg during the forenoon of the 16th. McLaws and Anderson were a day later, and arrived on the morning of the 17th after the battle had been some hours in progress. A. P. Hill we. This position was held at first by two of D. H. Hill's brigades and some fragments of the others. A little later R. H. Anderson's division reinforced it. Sumner, when Sedgwick was being pressed, ordered French and Richardson to attack the troops in their front in order to make a diversion. After a most gallant resistance Hill was driven from the Bloody Lane. Anderson was involved in the defeat, and it looked as if the enemy was about to pierce the Confederate centre. The noble efforts of
J. A. Early (search for this): chapter 4
ng to fear from Hooker and Mansfield, the advance of Sedgwick's five or six thousand fresh men threatened to overwhelm the weak Confederate line. But one brigade (Early's) of Jackson's command had not been seriously engaged. Early was instructed (in conjunction with the other forces at hand) to hold the enemy in check if possible to some ground in Sedgwick's front, while Hood, in the woods near the church, fiercely contested every inch he was forced to yield. A bold and skillful move of Early defeated and drove back some of Mansfield's men, who were pressing Hood, and opened the way for a crushing flank attack upon Sedgwick. In a few moments this attack was made by McLaws, Walker, and Early, all in conjunction, and in twenty minutes two fifths of Sedgwick's men were hors de combat, and the remainder were driven in confusion to the refuge of the Federal batteries from the line of which they had advanced. This ended the serious fighting on the Confederate left. McClellan's atta
Paris (search for this): chapter 4
a commander, and by the sensitiveness of the Federal Government in regard to Washington. This expectation was defeated by the loss of the dispatch containing General Lee's plans, and, we believe, by this alone. General Longstreet seems to think that only Virginian writers consider this dispatch of great importance. We believe that Generals Longstreet and D. H. Hill are the only two people who refuse to see the decisive importance of the lost dispatch upon the campaign. (See Swinton, Comte de Paris, Palfrey, &c.) General Lee, we know, thought it the most important factor in the campaign. It changed all his plans and, as he believed, the result. A single day of delay on McClellan's part at South Mountain would probably have rendered the battle at this barrier unnecessary. Two days delay would certainly have relieved Lee from all necessity of defending the passes, and would have rendered possible the concentration of his army anywhere in the Hagerstown Valley in time for battle.
William Allan (search for this): chapter 4
First Maryland campaign. Review of General Longstreet by Colonel W. Allan. In the Century for June, 1886, General Longstreet has an article on the Maryland campaign of 1862, which is remarkable for its ill-natured allusions to General Jackson, as well as for its partial view of the campaign and its severe and unfair criticism of General Lee's strategy. General Longstreet leads us to infer that he prevailed over Lee's hesitancy to go into Maryland at all by reminding him of his (Longstreet's) experiences in Mexico, where, on several occasions, we had to live two or three days on green corn. As Jackson's corps certainly, and Longstreet's probably, had to live on green corn for some days before the second battle of Manassas, it was hardly necessary in General Longstreet to recur to Mexican experiences in order to overcome the hesitancy of Lee. But however much Lee yielded to the influence of Longstreet in crossing the Potomac, it is evident from General Longstreet's article that
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9