Named Entity Results
Jubal Anderson Early, Ruth Hairston Early, Lieutenant General Jubal A. Early , C. S. A.

Front Royal road, being joined that day by the 13th Virginia Regiment. General Ewell, who had preceded me with Rodes' and Johnson's divisions, had that day been engaged with a heavy force which came through Manassas Gap, which he moved out to meet, near the Gap, as he was moving past Front Royal, and he sent at night to inform me that he would retire up the Luray Valley for the purpose of crossing at Thornton's Gap, and to order me to cross to the Valley pike so as to move up by the way of New Market, and across from there to Madison Court-House, as the enemy was in very heavy force in Manassas Gap. The Shenandoah was then high and a pontoon bridge had been laid near Front Royal below the forks, which he ordered to be taken up during the night, and to be transported up the Valley pike under my protection. Accordingly I moved by the way of Cedarville next day to get the pontoon train, and then crossed to the Valley pike, following the route taken by General Jackson's corps the fal

arch, from straggling, exhaustion, and sickness. My own division had been reduced from 7,226, its strength when it left Culpeper, to 5,611 when I crossed the Potomac, those numbers representing the strength in officers and men, and not muskets. A sw his army into Loudoun, while General Lee prepared to intercept his march by crossing his army over the Blue Ridge into Culpeper. It having been ascertained that a force had moved from Cumberland in Maryland to the mouth of Back Creek west of Mar the road from Liberty Mills to Culpeper Court-House, and the next day I crossed the Robinson just above its mouth into Culpeper and then the Rapidan at the railroad station, and encamped near Pisgah Church about four miles from the station, the othlue Ridge through Chester Gap, and while Meade was moving his army up into Manassas Gap to attack Ewell, they moved into Culpeper and waited until Meade's army had moved to the vicinity of Warrenton and the Rappahannock and halted without indicating

we took position on the south and southeast of Hagerstown to await his attack-Longstreet's corps being on the right, Ewell's on the left and Hill in the centre, and our line covering the road to the Potomac at Williamsport and Falling Waters, a few miles below, where a pontoon bridge was being constructed in the place of one previously destroyed by the enemy's cavalry. The advance of the enemy resulted in a sharp engagement between a portion of our cavalry and a part of his troops on the Boonsboro road. In the position near Hagerstown, my division was posted across the Cumberland road on the southwest of the town, but on the next day it was moved further to the right so as to rest its right on the Hagerstown and Williamsport road, where it remained until just before dark on the 12th. In the meantime Meade's army, now reinforced by some twelve or fifteen thousand fresh troops, according to his own statement, had moved up and taken position in our front, but did not attack. T

emy. My own division was buoyant and defiant, for it felt that it had sustained no defeat, and though diminished in numbers it was as ready to fight the enemy as at Gettysburg. As night was setting in, on the 12th, my division was taken out of the line and moved to the right, to the rear of Hill's position, for the purpose of supporting his corps, in front of which a very large force of the enemy had accumulated. In this position it remained during the 13th, but no attack was made. The Potomac had been very much swollen by the previous rains, and after subsiding a little was again threatened with another rise from a rain that commenced on the 13th, and it was therefore determined to recross that river so as not to have an impassable stream at our back, when we had but one bridge and that not yet fully completed, and which, being laid on pontoons, hastily constructed by our pioneer and engineer parties, was liable to be washed away. Accordingly our army commenced retiring afte

avalry to occupy the county of Culpeper. This was the close of all the operations resulting from the campaign into Pennsylvania. There have been various opinions as to the utility of this campaign into Pennsylvania. Undoubtedly we did not acPennsylvania. Undoubtedly we did not accomplish all that we desired, but still I cannot regard the campaign in the light of a failure. If we had remained on the Rappahannock confronting Hooker's army, we would have been compelled to fight one or more battles, and perhaps a series of thee previous summer by a Federal army, and no crops of any consequence had been made in all that region. By moving into Pennsylvania, we transferred the theatre of the war for a time into the enemy's country. Our army was supplied from that country ahe two armies to the upper waters of the Rappahannock and the Rapidan was a decided advantage to us. The campaign into Pennsylvania certainly defeated any further attempt to move against Richmond that summer and postponed the war over into the next y

of Ewell's corps, and then in the afternoon moved off slowly in rear of the army and all the trains, Gordon, followed by White's battalion, bringing up my rear. On arriving in sight of Fairfield, which is situated near the eastern base of South Mountain on a wide low plain or valley surrounded by commanding hills, I found the wagon trains blocked up at the village. While waiting for the road to be cleared of the wagons in front, Colonel White sent me information that a force of the enemy wa whose division was to constitute the rear guard that day, relieved my skirmishers in front, his division being formed in line just at the base of the mountain, and I moved past him to take the front of the corps; when, pursuing the road over South Mountain past Monterey Springs, I descended to the western base near Waynesboro, and bivouacked a little beyond the town, covering it on the north and west with my brigades. The other corps were found already on this side near the base of the mountai

Longstreet's and Hill's corps had preceded Ewell's corps across the Blue Ridge through Chester Gap, and while Meade was moving his army up into Manassas Gap to attack Ewell, they moved into Culpeper and waited until Meade's army had moved to the vicinity of Warrenton and the Rappahannock and halted without indicating any purpose to advance further; when, after a body of the enemy's cavalry had been driven back, these two corps moved to the south of the Rapidan and took position near Orange Court-House, leaving Stuart's cavalry to occupy the county of Culpeper. This was the close of all the operations resulting from the campaign into Pennsylvania. There have been various opinions as to the utility of this campaign into Pennsylvania. Undoubtedly we did not accomplish all that we desired, but still I cannot regard the campaign in the light of a failure. If we had remained on the Rappahannock confronting Hooker's army, we would have been compelled to fight one or more battles

Chapter 25: retreat to Virginia. During the night of July 3rd, Ewell's corps was withdrawn from its position in and to the left of Gettysburg, and moved to the right, to the Cashtown road, where it took position on Seminary Hill, the other corps retaining their positions. My brigades were withdrawn from Gettysburg to the new position at two o'clock in the morning of the 4th and were formed in line in rear of Seminary Hill, Rodes' and Johnson's divisions occupying the front line on the crSeminary Hill, Rodes' and Johnson's divisions occupying the front line on the crest of the hill across the road. During the battle our line had encircled that of the enemy, thus extending our army, which was much smaller than his own, over a very long line. We remained in position confronting the enemy during the whole of the 4th, being subjected in the afternoon to a very heavy shower of rain. The enemy showed no disposition to come out, but hugged his defences on the hills very closely. General Lee sent a flag of truce on the morning of this day to General M

y destroyed by the enemy's cavalry. The advance of the enemy resulted in a sharp engagement between a portion of our cavalry and a part of his troops on the Boonsboro road. In the position near Hagerstown, my division was posted across the Cumberland road on the southwest of the town, but on the next day it was moved further to the right so as to rest its right on the Hagerstown and Williamsport road, where it remained until just before dark on the 12th. In the meantime Meade's army, now rfor crossing the Potomac below Harper's Ferry, and threw his army into Loudoun, while General Lee prepared to intercept his march by crossing his army over the Blue Ridge into Culpeper. It having been ascertained that a force had moved from Cumberland in Maryland to the mouth of Back Creek west of Martinsburg, on the afternoon of the 20th, my division was ordered to move across North Mountain and then down Back Creek for the purpose of intercepting that force, while another division should h

for the purpose of crossing the Blue Ridge, and next day (the 22nd) I marched to Bunker Hill. On the 23rd I passed through Winchester to the Opequon on the Front Royal road, being joined that day by the 13th Virginia Regiment. General Ewell, who had preceded me with Rodes' and Johnson's divisions, had that day been engaged with a heavy force which came through Manassas Gap, which he moved out to meet, near the Gap, as he was moving past Front Royal, and he sent at night to inform me that he would retire up the Luray Valley for the purpose of crossing at Thornton's Gap, and to order me to cross to the Valley pike so as to move up by the way of New Markets from there to Madison Court-House, as the enemy was in very heavy force in Manassas Gap. The Shenandoah was then high and a pontoon bridge had been laid near Front Royal below the forks, which he ordered to be taken up during the night, and to be transported up the Valley pike under my protection. Accordingly I moved by the