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The
Alleghany or Appalachian mountain chain, a hundred miles broad and a thousand miles long, extending from New York to
Alabama, naturally separated the country into two principal military divisions: that of the
East, comprising the
Atlantic Coast and the
Atlantic States; that of the
West, comprising the
Mississippi River and its tributaries, and the whole immense territory of the
Mississippi Valley.
In the
East, the line of hostility quickly established itself along the
Potomac River, with
Washington as its strategical centre; this grew partly out of the paramount necessity of defending the capital, but also largely from the fact that the line from the sea to the mountains was not more than a hundred miles long, and could therefore be occupied and observed without delay.
In the
West the distance from the mountains to the
Mississippi River was nearly ten times as great.
This alone would have retarded the definition of the military frontier; but the chief element of uncertainty and delay was furnished by the peculiar political condition of the
State of Kentucky, which of itself extends the whole distance from
Virginia to
Missouri.
It cannot perhaps be affirmed with certainty that
Governor Magoffin of
Kentucky was a secession conspirator; but his own language leaves no doubt that in opinion and expectation
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he was a disunionist.
He had remonstrated against the rash and separate movements of
South Carolina and the
Cotton States; but since their movement was made, he looked upon it as final and irrevocable, and committed himself unqualifiedly against coercing them back to obedience.
More than this, he argued that
Kentucky was no longer safe in the
Union, and declared she “will not and ought not to submit to the principles and policy avowed by the Republican party, but will resist, and resist to the death, if necessary.”
In this view, he recommended to the Legislature, which met in January under his call, the project of a “Sovereignty” State Convention, appropriations to purchase arms, and the immediate and active organization of the militia.
None of these suggestions were, however, adopted by the Legislature, which contented itself for the present by protesting against coercion as unwise and inexpedient, and recommending a call for a national convention.
While
Kentucky sentiment was deeply pro-slavery, and business and commerce bound her strongly to the
South, the patriotic example and teachings of
Henry Clay had impressed upon her people a love and reverence for the
Union higher and purer than any mere passing interest or selfish advantage.
Nevertheless, as rebellion progressed, the
State became seriously agitated and divided.
When
Sumter fell and the
President issued his call for troops,
Governor Magoffin insultingly refused compliance.
This action in turn greatly excited the people of the three Border Free States of
Ohio,
Indiana, and
Illinois, who thus beheld a not remote prospect of having civil war brought to their own doors They therefore looked immediately to the protection and control of the
Ohio River.
Their enthusiastic response to the
President's call had filled their capitals with volunteers, which
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were being armed and equipped by the
Government.
Ohio hurried off her earliest levies to
Cincinnati; those of
Indiana were sent to her several exposed river towns.
At the extreme southern point of
Illinois was the city of
Cairo, small in population and commerce, but in a military point of view the commanding centre and key of the whole western river system.
Its value was comprehended both east and west.
No sooner had the
Border Slave State Governors forwarded their disloyal refusals, than
Secretary Cameron (April 19th), by telegraph requested the
Governor of
Illinois to send a brigade of four regiments to occupy it. There was not yet that total of militia in the whole State; but within forty-eight hours an improvised expedition, numbering five hundred and ninety-five men and four six-pounders, started from
Chicago to carry out the
Secretary's orders, arriving at
Cairo on the morning of April 23d, where they were speedily reinforced to the required numbers.
Under the
Sumter bombardment, the
President's call, and
Magoffin's refusal,
Kentucky was, for the moment, simply in a hopeless bewilderment, irresolution, and conflict of opinion.
A strong minority, arrogating to itself much more than its numerical importance through noise and selfasser-tion, labored with zeal and energy for secession, but could make no substantial progress against the overwhelming undercurrent of Union sentiment; and these opposing factions, with the ultimate hope of influencing and gaining the wavering or undecided, joined somewhat unavoidably in an endeavor to commit the
State to an attitude of strict neutrality.
Governor Magoffin and his personal adherents were ready to lend their official influence to carry the
State into rebellion.
The Governor sent an agent to the
Governors of
Arkansas and
Louisiana to solicit arms; and by way of justifying the act, he made a similar application to the
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Governors of
Indiana and of
Missouri.
No substantial success, however, attended these efforts; and the
Governor's application to the banks for money also resulted, in the main, in a discouraging refusal, largely due to the dominating Union sentiment, which suspected him of treasonable designs.
A second endeavor to influence the Legislature remained equally barren.
That body, which had only adjourned on the 5th of April, was by proclamation once more called to meet in a second special session, beginning May 2d.
The Governor's message, reciting the startling events which had occurred, stigmatized the
President's defence of the
Government as “extraordinary usurpations,” the enthusiastic patriotism of the loyal States as “the frenzy of fanaticism,” and asserted with dogmatic stubbornness that “the late American Union is dissolved;” recommending, as before, a State convention, military appropriations, and organization of the militia.
He also sent a messenger to ask the
Governors of
Ohio and
Indiana to join him “in an effort to bring about a truce between the
General Government and the seceded States;” to which
Governor Morton worthily responded, “I do not recognize the right of any State to act as mediator between the
Federal Government and a rebellious State.”
The
Unionists had a controlling majority in the Legislature, and, considering the deep agitation and serious divisions in
Kentucky, used their power with great moderation and tact, doing as much both to aid the
Government and to embarrass the conspirators as was perhaps practicable under the circumstances.
To still the prevailing neutrality clamor, the House of Representatives, on May 16th, passed resolutions declaring that
Kentucky “should, during the contest, occupy the position of strict neutrality,” and also approving
Governor Magoffin's refusal to furnish troops.
In substantial
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legislation, however, the
Governor received little aid or comfort.
His most active lieutenant in contemplated treason was
Simon B. Buckner, who about a year before had succeeded in obtaining the passage of a rather energetic militia law, under which the
Governor appointed him
Inspector-General and ranking commander in the
State.
It was his and the
Governor's project to put into the field and manipulate the State guard which this law authorized, so as to precipitate
Kentucky into rebellion.
The Legislature, ignoring the
Governor's request for a State Convention, addressed itself mainly to the task of turning the influence and support of the militia system from secession to union.
A bill was framed and became a law May 24th, authorizing a loan of one million to purchase arms and munitions, but associating a controlling Union Board of Commissioners with the
Governor to regulate its disbursement and the distribution of arms; authorizing the formation of Home Guards for local defence; and while it provided that the arms and munitions should not be used against the
United States, nor against the
Confederate States, unless to protect
Kentucky against invasion — it required that both officers and men of the Home Guards and State Guards should alike swear to support the
Constitution of the United States and of
Kentucky--the former law having required such an oath from the officers alone.
While
Kentucky was thus settling down into an attitude of official neutrality, active popular undercurrents were busy in contrary directions.
The more ardent secession leaders who raised companies to serve in the field, despairing of obtaining commissions, arms, and active duty from
Governor Magoffin, quietly departed to obtain enlistment in the various rebel camps of the
South.
On the other hand, there were many unconditional
Unionists in
Kentucky who
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openly scouted the policy of neutrality, and who from the first were eager that the
Government should begin enlistments and gather an armed force to support the
Union sentiment in the
State.
Colonels Guthrie and
Woodruff opened a recruiting office on the
Ohio side of the river, and as early as May 6th mustered two regiments into service, nominally as the First and Second Kentucky Volunteers, though in reality the men were principally from
Ohio and
Indiana.
Notwithstanding the contumacious refusals of the
Governors of the
Border Slave States,
President Lincoln was not disposed to give up those States as lost.
We have seen that, both in
Maryland and
Missouri, he authorized direct enlistments under the supervision of
United States officers.
Leading men having informed him of the actual
state of Kentucky sentiment, he, on May 7th, specially commissioned
Major Anderson, of
Fort Sumter fame, to proceed to
Cincinnati and muster into service all loyal volunteers who might offer themselves from
Kentucky and
West Virginia.
Nor was he content with such merely negative encouragement.
He felt a deep solicitude to retain
Kentucky on the
Union side.
Very soon also the leading
Kentuckians, who at the beginning had been most pertinacious to insist on neutrality, saw that it would be impossible for the
State to maintain such an utterly absurd attitude.
Mr. Lincoln, therefore, with their knowledge and consent, by the middle of May sent five thousand muskets to
Kentucky in charge of
Lieutenant William Nelson, and a committee of prominent Union leaders superintended their distribution to companies of loyal Kentucky volunteers which were being secretly formed in various parts of the
State; and since this venture proved successful, larger shipments soon followed.
As yet all this was done quietly and secretly; for an election was pending in the
State, and the Unionists wished to avoid
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the animosities which open warlike preparations would be sure to create.
The elections once over, however, further disguise was thrown off, and at the beginning of July
Lieutenant Nelson openly established “
Camp Dick Robinson” in
Central Kentucky.
Into this he quickly gathered several thousand Union volunteers already previously recruited.
Before Secessionists or neutral Conservatives were well aware of the fact, he had formed a self-sustaining military post affording a secure rallying-place and support to
Kentucky loyalists.
Governor Magoffin wrote an official letter to
President Lincoln, urging the removal of this and other Union camps from the
State; but the
President replied that the force was composed exclusively of Kentuckians defending their own homes, and that, in accordance with the evident popular sentiment of the
State, he must decline to order them away.
Under these various influences the hopes and schemes of
Governor Magoffin and his conspiring secession adherents withered and failed.
The State guard of
Buckner languished, and the loyal Home Guards grew in numbers and effective military strength.
So far it had been a contest of quiet, but very earnest political strategy, and the result was in exact conformity to the dominant popular sentiment manifested in the late elections by decisive Union majorities.
Sustained by this sentiment, the effort could not well have failed; but failure was rendered impossible, and the result greatly hastened, by the constant presence of a considerable number of Northern troops at
Cairo,
Cincinnati, and intermediate towns on the border, ready to intervene with active and decisive force, had the necessity at any time become imminent.
Meanwhile surrounding events were rapidly maturing to force
Kentucky from her neutral attitude.
Not only had
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hostilities commenced east of
the Alleghanies, but active minor campaigns, closing with somewhat important battles, had taken place on each side of
Kentucky.
Eastward the rebels were driven out of
West Virginia with disaster during July; while, to the west, a serious invasion of
Missouri was checked in August by the hardy, though over-daring courage of
Lyon, who threw back a combined rebel column moving from
Arkansas northward, unfortunately at the costly sacrifice of his own life.
Unlooked — for success at
Bull Run had greatly encouraged the rebellion, but it felt the menace of growing danger in the
West.
Fremont had been sent to
St. Louis, and, with a just pride in his former fame, the whole Northwest was eager to respond to his summons, and follow his lead in a grand and irresistible expedition down the
Mississippi River in the coming autumn, which should open the
Father of Waters to the Union flag and sever the territory of the
Confederacy — a cherished plan of
General Scott.
The rebel
General Pillow-somewhat wordy, but exceedingly active, and as yet the principal military authority in
Tennessee-had long been warning
Jefferson Davis to prepare against such an enterprise.
He had been working with great energy to fortify
Memphis, and, by the middle of May, reported that he would soon have twenty pieces in battery.
But at the same time he prophesied that “an effort will be made to effect a lodgment at
Columbus, fortify that place, and, with a strong invading column, turn my works, attack them in reverse, crush my supporting force, capture the guns, and open the river.
The northern portion of
Tennessee is unfavorable, from the extent of open country.”
He said he had asked
Governor Magoffin for permission to fortify
Columbus, adding: “If he should withhold his consent, my present impression is that I shall go forward and
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occupy the work upon the ground of its necessity for protecting
Tennessee.”
But
Jefferson Davis had too great hopes of
Kentucky to create enmity by forcing her neutrality, and
Pillow's scheme was necessarily postponed.
As the autumn approached, however,
Kentucky was clearly lost to the “Confederates.”
Of the members of Congress chosen at the election held June 20th, nine out of ten were loyal.
At the general election held on the first Monday of August, the Unionists gained three-fourths of the members of each branch of the Legislature.
Meanwhile the danger of a great
Mississippi expedition from the
North grew formidable.
The
lower Mississippi flows generally between level shores, and offers few points where the stream may be effectually obstructed by fortifications.
It was, therefore, desirable to secure all that were available, and the
Richmond authorities now resolved to seize and hold
Columbus, notwithstanding the fact that it lay in “neutral”
Kentucky.
Since July 4th the defence of the
Mississippi River had been specially entrusted to
General Leonidas Polk, formerly a bishop in the Protestant Episcopal Church, but who, since the outbreak of the rebellion, preferred to utilize his early
West Point education, by laying aside his clerical functions and accepting a major-general's commission in the
Confederate service.
On September 5th he began moving his forces northward, violating the neutrality of
Kentucky by occupying the town of
Hickman, on the
Mississippi, within that State.
The movement did not pass unobserved; the
Union commander at
Cairo had, with equal vigilance, been studying the possibilities of the river system in his neighborhood.
On the following day,
Brigadier-General Grant proceeded, with two gunboats and an infantry force, to take possession of the town of
Paducah, at the confluence of the
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Cumberland and
Tennessee Rivers with the
Ohio — a movement which bore important fruit a few months later.
General Polk, on his part still marching northward, reached and occupied
Columbus, on the
Mississippi, on September 7th.
Having hastily procured the endorsement of this step from
Jefferson Davis,
General Polk, on the 9th, formally notified
Governor Magoffin of his presence in
Kentucky.
By this time also, the Unionists of the
State had completed and compacted their organization and authority, and demonstrated their strength and predominance.
A new military department, consisting of
Kentucky and
Tennessee, and named the Department of the Cumberland, was, on August 15th, created at
Washington and placed under the command of
General Anderson, and since September 1st that officer had made
Louisville his headquarters.
On the other hand,
Buckner had abandoned his professed neutrality and his militia command, and formally entered the rebel service as a brigadier-general.
Stationing himself just within
Tennessee, south of
Middle Kentucky, he was collecting the rebel members of his State guard for a hostile expedition against the homes of his former friends and neighbors.
Another rebel force gathering under
Zollicoffer, in
East Tennessee, was watching its opportunity to advance into
Kentucky through
Cumberland Gap.
Under these threatening aspects
Governor Magoffin communicated to the Legislature, then in session,
General Polk's announcement of his arrival at
Columbus.
The altogether illogical and false role of
Kentucky neutrality was necessarily at an end. The Legislature, by express resolutions under date of September 14th, instructed the
Governor to demand the unconditional withdrawal of the rebel forces from
Kentucky, while other resolutions called on
General Anderson to enter at once upon the active defence of his native State.
A
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little later,
Kentucky still further and finally identified herself with the loyal
North.
Enlistment under the
Confederate flag was by law declared a misdemeanor, and the invasion of
Kentucky by Confederate soldiers a felony, and heavy punishments were prescribed for both offences.
And since the Home Guards had only been organized for local protection, the Legislature now formally authorized the enlistment of forty thousand volunteers to “repel invasion,” providing that they should be mustered into the service of the
United States, and co-operate with the armies of the
Union.