Chapter I
- Organizing scouts
-- Miss Rebecca Wright
-- important information
-- Decides to move on Newtown
-- meeting General Grant
-- organization of the Union Army
-- opening of the battle of the Opequon
-- death of General Russell
-- a turning movement
-- a successful cavalry charge
-- victory
-- three loyal girls
-- appointed a Brigadier
-- General in the regular Army
-- remarks on the battle.
While occupying the ground between
Clifton and
Berryville, referred to in the last chapter of the preceding volume, I felt the need of an efficient body of scouts to collect information regarding the enemy, for the defective intelligence-establishment with which I started out from
Harper's Ferry early in August had not proved satisfactory.
I therefore began to organize my scouts on a system which I hoped would give better results than had the method hitherto pursued in the department, which was to employ on this service doubtful citizens and Confederate deserters.
If these should turn out untrustworthy, the mischief they might do us gave me grave apprehension, and I finally concluded that those of our own soldiers who should volunteer for the delicate and hazardous duty would be the most valuable material, and decided
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that they should have a battalion organization and be commanded by an officer,
Major H. K. Young, of the First Rhode Island Infantry.
These men were disguised in Confederate uniforms whenever necessary, were paid from the Secret-Service Fund in proportion to the value of the intelligence they furnished, which often stood us in good stead in checking the forays of
Gilmore,
Mosby, and other irregulars.
Beneficial results came from the plan in many other ways too, and particularly so when in a few days two of my scouts put me in the way of getting news conveyed from
Winchester.
They had learned that just outside of my lines, near
Millwood, there was living an old colored man, who had a permit from the
Confederate commander to go into
Winchester and return three times a week, for the purpose of selling vegetables to the inhabitants.
The scouts had sounded this man, and, finding him both loyal and shrewd, suggested that he might be made useful to us within the enemy's lines; and the proposal struck me as feasible, provided there could be found in
Winchester some reliable person who would be willing to co-operate and correspond with me. I asked
General Crook, who was acquainted with many of the
Union people of
Winchester, if he knew of such a person, and he recommended
a Miss Rebecca Wright, a young lady whom he had met there before the
battle of Kernstown, who, he said, was a member of the Society of Friends and the teacher of a small private school.
He knew she was faithful and loyal to the
Government, and thought she might be willing to render us assistance, but he could not be certain of this, for on account of her well-known loyalty she was under constant surveillance.
I hesitated at first, but finally deciding to try it, despatched the two scouts to the old negro's cabin, and they brought him to my headquarters late that night.
I was soon convinced of the negro's fidelity, and asking him if he was acquainted with
Miss Rebecca Wright, of
Winchester, he replied that he knew her well.
Thereupon I told him what I wished to do. and after a little persuasion he agreed to carry a letter to her on his next marketing trip.
My message was prepared by writing it on tissue paper, which was then compressed into a small pellet, and protected by wrapping it in tin-foil so that it could be safely carried in the man's mouth.
The probability of his being searched when he came to the
Confederate picket-line was not remote, and in such event he was to swallow the pellet.
The letter appealed to
Miss Wright's loyalty and patriotism, and, requested her to furnish me with information regarding the strength and condition of
Early's army.
The night before the negro started one of the scouts placed the oddlooking communication in his hands, with renewed injunctions as to secrecy and promptitude.
Early the next morning it was delivered to
Miss Wright, with an intimation that a letter of importance was enclosed in
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the tin-foil, the negro telling her at the same time that she might expect him to call for a message in reply before his return home.
At first
Miss Wright began to open the pellet nervously, but when told to be careful, and to preserve the foil as a wrapping for her answer, she proceeded slowly and carefully, and when the note appeared intact the messenger retired, remarking again that in the evening he would come for an answer.
On reading my communication
Miss Wright was much startled by the perils it involved, and hesitatingly consulted her mother, but her devoted loyalty soon silenced every other consideration, and the brave girl resolved to comply with my request, notwithstanding it might jeopardize her life.
The evening before a convalescent Confederate officer had visited her mother's house, and in conversation about the war had disclosed the fact that
Kershaw's division of infantry and
Cutshaw's battalion of artillery had started to rejoin
General Lee.
At the time
Miss Wright heard this she attached little if any importance to it, but now she perceived the value of the intelligence, and, as her first venture, determined to send it to me at once, which she did with a promise that in the future she would with great pleasure continue to transmit information by the negro messenger.
Miss Wright's answer proved of more value to me than she anticipated, for it not only quieted the conflicting reports concerning
Anderson's corps, but was most important in showing positively that
Kershaw was gone, and this circumstance led, three days later, to the battle of the
Opequon, or
Winchester as it has been unofficially called.
1 Word to the effect that some of
Early's troops were under orders to return to
Petersburg, and would start back at the first favorable opportunity, had been communicated to me already from many sources, but we had not been able to ascertain the date for their departure.
Now that they had actually started, I decided to wait before offering battle until
Kershaw had gone so far as to preclude his return, feeling confident that my prudence would be justified by the improved chances of victory; and then, besides,
Mr. Stanton kept reminding me that positive success was necessary to counteract the political dissatisfaction existing in some of the
Northern States.
This course was advised
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and approved by
General Grant, but even with his powerful backing it was difficult to resist the persistent pressure of those whose Judgment, warped by their interests in the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, was often confused and misled by stories of scouts (sent out from
Washington), averring that
Kershaw and
Fitzhugh Lee had returned to
Petersburg,
Breckenridge to
southwestern Virginia, and at one time even maintaining that
Early's whole army was east of the
Blue Ridge, and its commander himself at
Gordonsville.
During the inactivity prevailing in my army for the ten days preceding
Miss Wright's communication the infantry was quiet, with the exception of
Getty's division, which made a reconnoissance to the
Opequon, and developed a heavy force of the enemy at
Edwards's Corners.
The cavalry, however, was employed a good deal in this interval skirmishing-heavily at times — to maintain a space about six miles in width between the hostile lines, for I wished to control this ground so that when I was released from the instructions of August 12 I could move my men into position for attack without the knowledge of
Early.
The most noteworthy of these mounted encounters was that of
Mclntosh's brigade, which captured the Eighth South Carolina at
Abraham's Creek September 13.
It was the evening of the 16th of September that I received from
Miss Wright the positive information that
Kershaw was in march toward
Front Royal on his way by
Chester Gap to
Richmond.
Concluding that this was my opportunity, I at once resolved to throw my whole force into
Newtown the next day, but a despatch from
General Grant directing
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me to meet him at
Charlestown, whither he was coming to consult with me, caused me to defer action until after I should see him. In our resulting interview at
Charlestown, I went over the situation very thoroughly, and pointed out with so much confidence the chances of a complete victory should I throw my army across the
Valley pike near
Newtown that he fell in with the plan at once, authorized me to resume the offensive, and to attack
Early as soon as I deemed it most propitious to do so; and although before leaving
City Point he had outlined certain operations for my army, yet he neither discussed nor disclosed his plans, my knowledge of the situation striking him as being so much more accurate than his own.
2
The interview over, I returned to my army to arrange for its movement toward
Newtown, but while busy with these preparations, a report came to me from
General Averell which showed that
Early was moving with two divisions of infantry toward
Martinsburg.
This considerably altered the state of affairs, and I now decided to change my plan and attack at once the two divisions remaining about
Winchester and
Stephenson's depot, and later, the two sent to
Martinsburg; the disjointed state of the enemy giving me an opportunity to take him in detail, unless the
Martinsburg column should be returned by forced marches.
While
General Early was in the telegraph office at
Martinsburg on the morning of the 18th, he learned of
Grant's visit to me; and anticipating activity by reason of this circumstance, he promptly proceeded to withdraw so as to get the two divisions within supporting distance of
Ramseur's, which lay across the
Berryville pike about two miles east of
Winchester, between
Abraham's Creek and Red Bud Run, so by the night of the 18th
Wharton's division, under
Breckenridge, was at
Stephenson's depot,
Rodes near there, and
Gordon's at
Bunker Hill.
At daylight of the 19th these positions of the Confederate infantry still obtained, with the cavalry of
Lomax,
Jackson, and
Johnson on the right of
Ramseur, while to the left and rear of the enemy's general line was
Fitzhugh Lee, covering from
Stephenson's depot west across the
Valley pike to Apple-pie Ridge.
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My army
3 moved at 3 o'clock that morning.
The plan was for
Torbert to advance with
Merritt's division of cavalry from
Summit Point, carry the crossings of the
Opequon at Stevens's and Lock's fords, and form a junction near
Stephenson's depot, with
Averell, who was to move south from
Darksville by the
Valley pike.
Meanwhile,
Wilson
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was to strike up the
Berryville pike, carry the
Berryville crossing of the
Opequon, charge through the gorge or cafion on the road west of the stream, and occupy the open ground at the head of this defile.
Wilson's attack was to be supported by the Sixth and Nineteenth corps, which were ordered to the
Berryville crossing, and as the cavalry gained the open ground beyond the gorge, the two infantry corps, under command of
General Wright, were expected to press on after
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and occupy
Wilson's ground, who was then to shift to the south bank of
Abraham's Creek and cover my left;
Crook's two divisions, having to march from
Summit Point, were to follow the Sixth and Nineteenth corps to the
Opequon, and should they arrive before the action began, they were to be held in reserve till the proper moment
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came, and then, as a turning-column, be thrown over toward the
Valley pike, south of
Winchester.
McIntosh's brigade of
Wilson's division drove the enemy's pickets away from the
Berryville crossing at dawn, and
Wilson following rapidly through the gorge with the rest of the division, debouched from its western extremity with such suddenness as to capture a small earthwork in front of
General Ramseur's main line; and notwithstanding the Confederate infantry, on recovering from its astonishment, tried hard to dislodge them,
Wilson's troopers obstinately held the work till
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the Sixth Corps came up. I followed
Wilson to select the ground on which to form the infantry.
The Sixth Corps began to arrive about 8 o'clock, and taking up the line
Wilson had been holding, just beyond
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the head of the narrow ravine, the cavalry was transferred to the south side of
Abraham's Creek.
The Confederate line lay along some elevated ground about two miles east of
Winchester, and extended from
Abraham's Creek north across the
Berryville pike, the left being hidden in the heavy timber on Red Bud Run.
Between this line and mine, especially on my right,
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clumps of woods and patches of underbrush occurred here and there, but the undulating ground consisted mainly of open fields, many of which were covered with standing corn that had already ripened.
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Much time was lost in getting all of the Sixth and Nineteenth corps through the narrow defile,
Grover's division being greatly delayed there by a train of ammunition wagons, and it was not until late in the forenoon that the troops intended for the attack could be got into line ready to advance.
General Early was not slow to avail himself of the advantages thus offered him, and my chances of striking
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him in detail were growing less every moment, for
Gordon and
Rodes were hurrying their divisions from
Stephenson's depot acrosscountry on a line that would place
Gordon in the woods south of Red Bud Run, and bring
Rodes into the interval between
Gordon and
Ramseur.
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When the two corps had all got through the cafion they were formed with
Getty's division of the Sixth to the left of the
Berryville pike,
Rickett's division to the right of the pike, and
Russell's division in reserve in rear of the other two.
Grover's division of the Nineteenth Corps came next on the right of
Rickett's, with
Dwight to its rear in reserve, while
Crook was to begin massing near the
Opequon crossing about the time
Wright and
Emory were ready to attack.
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Just before noon the line of
Getty,
Ricketts, and
Grover moved forward, and as we advanced, the
Confederates, covered by some heavy woods on their right, slight underbrush and corn-fields along their centre, and a large body of timber on their left along the
Red Bud, opened fire from their whole front.
We gained considerable ground at first, especially on our left but the desperate resistance which the right met with demonstrated that the time we had unavoidably lost in the morning
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had been of incalculable value to
Early, for it was evident that he had been enabled already to so far concentrate his troops as to have the different divisions of his army in a connected line of battle in good shape to resist.
Getty and
Ricketts made some progress toward
Winchester in connection with
Wilson's cavalry, which was beyond the Senseny road on
Getty's left, and as they were pressing back
Ramseur's infantry and
Lomax's cavalry
Grover attacked from the right with decided effect.
Grover in a few minutes broke up
Evans's brigade of
Gordon's division, but his pursuit of
Evans destroyed the continuity of my general line, and increased an interval that had already been made by the deflection of
Ricketts to the left, in obedience to instructions that had been given him to guide his division on the
Berryville pike.
As the line pressed forward,
Ricketts observed this widening interval and endeavored to fill it with the small brigade of
Colonel Keifer, but at this juncture both
Gordon and
Rodes struck the weak spot where the right of the Sixth Corps and the left of the Nineteenth should have been in conjunction, and succeeded in checking my advance by driving back a part of
Ricketts's division, and the most of
Grover's. As these troops were retiring I ordered
Russell's reserve division to be put into action, and just as the flank of the enemy's troops in pursuit of
Grover was presented,
Upton's brigade, led in person by both
Russell and
Upton, struck it in a charge so vigorous as to drive the
Confederates back in turn to their original ground.
The success of
Russell enabled me to re-establish the right of my line some little distance in advance of the position from which it started in the morning, and behind
Russell's division (now commanded by
Upton) the broken regiments of
Ricketts's division were rallied.
Dwight's division was then brought up on the right, and
Grover's men formed behind it.
The charge of
Russell was most opportune, but it cost many men in killed and wounded.
Among the former was the courageous
Russell himself, killed by a piece of shell that passed through his heart, although he had previously been struck by a bullet in the left breast, which wound, from its nature, must have proved mortal, yet of which he had not spoken.
Russell's death oppressed us all with sadness, and me particularly.
In the early days of my army life he was my captain and friend, and I was deeply indebted to him, not only for sound advice and good example, but for the inestimable service he had just performed, and sealed with his life, so it may be inferred how keenly I felt his loss.
As my lines were being rearranged, it was suggested to me to put
Crook into the battle, but so strongly had I set my heart on using him
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to take possession of the
Valley pike and cut off the enemy, that I resisted this advice, hoping that the necessity for putting him in would be obviated by the attack near
Stephenson's depot that
Torbert's cavalry was to make, and from which I was momentarily expecting to hear.
No news of
Torbert's progress came, however, so, yielding at last, I directed
Crook to take post on the right of the Nineteenth Corps and, when the action was renewed, to push his command forward as a turning column in conjunction with
Emory.
After some delay in the annoying defile,
Crook got his men up, and posting
Colonel Thoburn's division on the prolongation of the Nineteenth Corps, he formed
Colonel Duval's division to the right of
Thoburn.
Here I joined
Crook, informing him that I had just got word that
Torbert was driving the enemy in confusion along the
Martinsburg pike toward
Winchester; at the same time I directed him to attack the moment all of
Duval's men were in line.
Wright was instructed to advance in concert with
Crook, by swinging
Emory and the right of the Sixth Corps to the left together in a half-wheel.
Then leaving
Crook, I rode along the Sixth and Nineteenth corps, the open ground over which they were passing affording a rare opportunity to witness the precision with which the attack was taken up from right to left.
Crook's success began the moment he started to turn the enemy's left; and assured by the fact that
Torbert had stampeded the Confederate cavalry and thrown
Breckenridge's infantry into such disorder that it could do little to prevent the envelopment of
Gordon's left,
Crook pressed forward without even a halt.
Both
Emory and
Wright took up the fight as ordered, and as they did so I sent word to
Wilson, in the hope that he could partly perform the work originally laid out for
Crook, to push along the Senseny road and, if possible, gain the valley pike south of
Winchester.
I then returned toward my right flank, and as I reached the Nineteenth Corps the enemy was contesting the ground in its front with great obstinacy; but
Emory's dogged persistence was at length rewarded with success, just as
Crook's command emerged from the morass of Red Bud Run, and swept around
Gordon, toward the right of
Breckenridge, who, with two of
Wharton's brigades, was holding a line at right angles with the
Valley pike for the protection of the
Confederate rear.
Early had ordered these two brigades back from
Stephenson's depot in the morning, purposing to protect with them his right flank and line of retreat, but while they were
en route to this end, he was obliged to recall them to his left to meet
Crook's attack.
To confront
Torbert,
Patton's brigade of infantry and some of
Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry had been left back by
Breckenridge, but, with
Averell on the west side of the
Valley pike and
Merritt on the east,
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Torbert began to drive this opposing force toward
Winchester the moment he struck it near
Stephenson's depot, keeping it on the go till it reached the position held by
Breckenridge, where it endeavored to make a stand.
The ground which
Breckenridge was holding was open, and offered an opportunity such as seldom had been presented during the war for a mounted attack, and
Torbert was not slow to take advantage of it. The instant
Merritt's division could be formed for the charge, it went at
Breckenridge's infantry and
Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry with such momentum as to break the
Confederate left, just as
Averell was passing around it.
Merritt's brigades, led by
Custer,
Lowell, and
Devin, met from the start with pronounced success, and with sabre or pistol in hand literally rode down a battery of five guns and took about 1,200 prisoners. Almost simultaneously with this cavalry charge,
Crook struck
Breckenridge's right and
Gordon's left, forcing these divisions to give way, and as they retired,
Wright, in a vigorous attack, quickly broke
Rodes up and pressed
Ramseur so hard that the whole Confederate army fell back, contracting its lines within some breastworks which had been thrown up at a former period of the war, immediately in front of
Winchester.
Here
Early tried hard to stem the tide, but soon
Torbert's cavalry began passing around his left flank, and as
Crook,
Emory, and
Wright attacked in front, panic took possession of the enemy, his troops, now fugitives and stragglers, seeking escape into and through
Winchester.
When this second break occurred, the Sixth and Nineteenth corps were moved over toward the
Millwood pike to help
Wilson on the left, but the day was so far spent that they could render him no assistance, and
Ramseur's division, which had maintained some organization, was in such tolerable shape as to check him. Meanwhile
Torbert passed around to the west of
Winchester to join
Wilson, but was unable to do so till after dark.
Crook's command pursued the enemy through the town to
Mill Creek, I going along.
Just after entering the town
Crook and I met, in the main street, three young girls, who gave us the most hearty reception.
One of these young women was a
Miss Griffith, the other two Miss Jennie and
Miss Susie Meredith.
During the day they had been watching the battle from the roof of the Meredith residence, with tears and lamentations, they said, in the morning when misfortune appeared to have overtaken the
Union troops, but with unbounded exultation when, later, the tide set in against the
Confederates.
Our presence was, to them, an assurance of victory, and their delight being irrepressible, they indulged in the most unguarded manifestations and expressions.
When cautioned by
Crook, who knew them well, and reminded that the valley had hitherto
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been a race-course-one day in the possession of friends, and the next of enemies-and warned of the dangers they were incurring by such demonstrations, they assured him that they had no further fears of that kind now, adding that
Early's army was so demoralized by the defeat it had just sustained that it would never be in condition to enter
Winchester again.
As soon as we had succeeded in calming the excited girls a little I expressed a desire to find some place where I could write a telegram to
General Grant informing him of the result of the battle, and
General Crook conducted me to the home of
Miss Wright, where I met for the first time the woman who had contributed so much to our success, and on a desk in her school-room wrote the despatch announcing that we had sent
Early's army whirling up the valley.
My losses in the battle of the
Opequon were heavy, amounting to about 4,500 killed, wounded, and missing. Among the killed was
General Russell, commanding a division, and the wounded included
Generals Upton,
Mclntosh and
Chapman, and
colonels Duval and
Sharpe.
The Confederate loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners about equaled mine,
General Rodes being of the killed, while
Generals Fitzhugh Lee and
York were severely wounded.
We captured five pieces of artillery and nine battle-flags.
The restoration of the lower valley — from the
Potomac to
Strasburg — to the control of the
Union forces caused great rejoicing in the
North, and relieved the Administration from further solicitude for the safety of the
Maryland and
Pennsylvania borders.
The President's appreciation of the victory was expressed in a despatch so like
Mr. Lincoln that I give a
fac-simile of it to the reader.
This he supplemented by promoting me to the grade of brigadier-general in the regular army, and assigning me to the permanent command of the
Middle Military Department, and following that came warm congratulations from
Mr. Stanton and from
Generals Grant,
Sherman, and
Meade.
The battle was not fought out on the plan in accordance with which marching orders were issued to my troops, for I then hoped to take
Early in detail, and with
Crook's force cut off his retreat.
I adhered to this purpose during the early start of the contest, but was obliged to abandon the idea because of unavoidable delays by which I was prevented from getting the Sixth and Nineteenth corps through the narrow defile and into position early enough to destroy
Ramseur while still isolated.
So much delay had not been anticipated, and this loss of time was taken advantage of by the enemy to recall the troops diverted to
Bunker Hill and
Martinsburg on the 17th, thus enabling him to bring them all to the support of
Ramseur before I could strike with effect.
My idea was to attack
Ramseur and
Wharton, successively, at a very
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have just heard of your great victory.
God bless you all, officers and men — strongly inclined to come up and see you.
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early hour and before they could get succor, but I was not in condition to do it till nearly noon, by which time
Gordon and
Rodes had been enabled to get upon the ground at a point from which, as I advanced, they enfiladed my right flank, and gave it such a repulse that to re-form this part of my line I was obliged to recall the left from some of the ground it had gained.
It was during this reorganization of my lines that I changed my plan as to
Crook, and moved him from my left to my right.
This I did with great reluctance, for I hoped to destroy
Early's army entirely if
Crook continued on his original line of march toward the
Valley pike, south of
Winchester; and although the ultimate results did, in a measure vindicate the change, yet I have always thought that by adhering to the original plan we might have captured the bulk of
Early's army.
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