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Chapter 17: Atlanta campaign-battles about Atlanta.
July, 1864.
As before explained, on the 3d of July, by moving
McPherson's entire army from the extreme left, at the base of
Kenesaw to the right, below Olley's Creek, and stretching it down the
Nickajack toward Turner's Ferry of the
Chattahoochee, we forced
Johnston to choose between a direct assault on
Thomas's intrenched position, or to permit us to make a lodgment on his railroad below
Marietta, or even to cross the
Chattahoochee.
Of course, he chose to let go
Kenesaw and
Marietta, and fall back on an intrenched camp prepared by his orders in advance on the north and west bank of the
Chattahoochee, covering the railroad-crossing and his several pontoon-bridges.
I confess I had not learned beforehand of the existence of this strong place, in the nature of a
tete-du-pont, and had counted on striking him an effectual blow in the expected confusion of his crossing the
Chattahoochee, a broad and deep river then to his rear.
Ordering every part of the army to pursue vigorously on the morning of the 3d of July, I rode into
Marietta, just quitted by the rebel rear-guard, and was terribly angry at the cautious pursuit by
Garrard's cavalry, and even by the head of our infantry columns.
But
Johnston had in advance cleared and multiplied his roads, whereas ours had to cross at right angles from the direction of
Powder Springs toward
Marietta, producing delay and confusion.
By night Thomas's head of column ran up against a strong rear-guard intrenched at
Smyrna camp-ground.
six miles below
Marietta, and there on the next
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day we celebrated our Fourth of July, by a noisy but not a desperate battle, designed chiefly to hold the enemy there till
Generals McPherson and
Schofield could get well into position below him, near the
Chattahoochee crossings.
It was here that
General Noyes, late
Governor of
Ohio, lost his leg. I came very near being shot myself while reconnoitring in the second story of a house on our picket-line, which was struck several times by cannon-shot, and perfectly riddled with musket-balls.
During the night
Johnston drew back all his army and trains inside the
tete-du-pont at the
Chattahoochee, which proved one of the strongest pieces of field-fortification I ever saw. We closed up against it, and were promptly met by a heavy and severe fire.
Thomas was on the main road in immediate pursuit; next on his right was
Schofield; and
McPherson on the extreme right, reaching the
Chattahoochee River below Turner's Ferry.
Stoneman's cavalry was still farther to the right, along down the
Chattahoochee River as far as opposite
Sandtown ; and on that day I ordered
Garrard's division of cavalry up the river eighteen miles, to secure possession of the factories at
Roswell, as well as to hold an important bridge and ford at that place.
About three miles out from the
Chattahoochee the main road forked, the right branch following substantially the railroad, and the left one leading straight for
Atlanta,
via Paice's Ferry and
Buckhead.
We found the latter unoccupied and unguarded, and the Fourth Corps (
Howard's) reached the river at Paice's Ferry.
The right-hand road was perfectly covered by the
tete-du-pont before described, where the resistance was very severe, and for some time deceived me, for I was pushing
Thomas with orders to fiercely assault his enemy, supposing that he was merely opposing us to gain time to get his trains and troops across the
Chattahoochee; but, on personally reconnoitring, I saw the abatis and the strong redoubts, which satisfied me of the preparations that had been made by
Johnston in anticipation of this very event.
While I was with
General Jeff. C. Davis, a poor negro came out of the abatis, blanched with fright, said he had been hidden under a log all day, with a per.
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feet storm of shot, shells, and musket-balls, passing over him, till a short lull had enabled him to creep out and make himself known to our skirmishers, who in turn had sent him back to where we were.
This negro explained that he with about a thousand slaves had been at work a month or more on these very lines, which, as he explained, extended from the river about a mile above the railroad-bridge to Turner's Ferry below, being in extent from five to six miles.
Therefore, on the 5th of July we had driven our enemy to cover in the
valley of the Chattahoochee, and we held possession of the river above for eighteen miles, as far as
Roswell, and below ten miles to the mouth of the
Sweetwater.
Moreover, we held the high ground and could overlook his movements, instead of his looking down on us, as was the case at
Kenesaw.
From a hill just back of Vining's Station I could see the houses in
Atlanta, nine miles distant, and the whole intervening valley of the Chattahoochee; could observe the preparations for our reception on the other side, the camps of men and large trains of covered wagons; and supposed, as a matter of course, that
Johnston had passed the river with the bulk of his army, and that he had only left on our side a corps to cover his bridges; but in fact he had only sent across his cavalry and trains.
Between
Howard's corps at Paice's Ferry and the rest of
Thomas's army pressing up against this
tete-du-pont, was a space concealed by dense woods, in crossing which I came near riding into a detachment of the enemy's cavalry; and later in the same day
Colonel Frank Sherman, of
Chicago, then oh
General Howard's staff, did actually ride straight into the enemy's camp, supposing that our lines were continuous.
He was carried to
Atlanta, and for some time the enemy supposed they were in possession of the
commander-in-chief of the opposing army.
I knew that
Johnston would not remain long on the west bank of the
Chattahoochee, for I could easily practise on that ground to better advantage our former tactics of intrenching a moiety in his front, and with the rest of our army cross the river and threaten either his rear or the city of
Atlanta itself,
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which city was of vital importance to the existence not only of his own army, but of the
Confederacy itself.
In my dispatch of July 6th to
General Halleck, at
Washington, I state that--
Johnston (in his retreat from Kenesaw) has left two breaks in the railroad--one above Marietta and one near Vining's Station.
The former is already repaired, and Johnston's army has heard the sound of our locomotives.
The telegraph is finished to Vining's Station, and the field-wire has just reached my bivouac, and will be ready to convey this message as soon as it is written and translated into cipher.
I propose to study the crossings of the Chattahoochee, and, when all is ready, to move quickly.
As a beginning, I will keep the troops and wagons well back from the river, and only display to the enemy our picket-line, with a few field-batteries along at random.
I have already shifted Schofield to a point in our left rear, whence he can in a single move reach the Chattahoochee at a point above the railroad-bridge, where there is a ford.
At present the waters are turbid and swollen from recent rains; but if the present hot weather lasts, the water will run down very fast.
We have pontoons enough for four bridges, but, as our crossing will be resisted, we must manceuvre some.
All the regular crossing-places are covered by forts, apparently of long construction; but we shall cross in due time, and, instead of attacking Atlanta direct, or any of its forts, I propose to make a circuit, destroying all its railroads.
This is a delicate movement, and must be done with caution.
Our army is in good condition and full of confidence; but the weather is intensely hot, and a good many men have fallen with sunstroke.
The country is high and healthy, and the sanitary condition of the army is good.
At this time
Stoneman was very active on our extreme right, pretending to be searching the river below Turner's Ferry for a crossing, and was watched closely by the enemy's cavalry on the other side.
McPherson, on the right, was equally demonstrative at and near Turner's Ferry.
Thomas faced substantially the intrenched
tete-du-pont, and had his left on the
Chattahoochee River, at Paice's Ferry.
Garrard's cavalry was up at
Roswell, and
McCook's small division of cavalry was intermediate, above Soap's Creek.
Meantime, also, the railroad-construction party was hard at work, repairing the railroad up to our camp at Vining's Station.
Of course, I expected every possible resistance in crossing the
Chattahoochee River, and had made up my mind to feign on
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the right, but actually to cross over by the left.
We had already secured a crossing-place at
Roswell, but one nearer was advisable;
General Schofield had examined the river well, found a place just below the mouth of Soap's Creek which he deemed advantageous, and was instructed to effect an early crossing there, and to intrench a good position on the other side, viz., the east bank.
But, preliminary thereto, I had ordered
General Rousseau, at
Nashville, to collect, out of the scattered detachments of cavalry in
Tennessee, a force of a couple of thousand men, to rendezvous at
Decatur, Alabama, thence to make a rapid march for
Opelika, to break up the railroad-links between
Georgia and
Alabama, and then to make junction with me about
Atlanta; or, if forced, to go on to
Pensacola, or even to swing across to some of our posts in
Mississippi.
General Rousseau asked leave to command this expedition himself, to which I consented, and on the 6th of July he reported that he was all ready at
Decatur, and I gave him orders to start.
He moved promptly on the 9th, crossed the
Coosa below the “
Ten Islands” and the
Tallapoosa below “
Horseshoe Bend,” having passed through
Talladega.
He struck the railroad west of
Opelika, tore it up for twenty miles, then turned north and came to
Marietta on the 22d of July, whence he reported to me. This expedition was in the nature of a raid, and must have disturbed the enemy somewhat; but, as usual, the cavalry did not work hard, and their destruction of the railroad was soon repaired.
Rousseau, when he reported to me in person before
Atlanta, on the 23d of July, stated his entire loss to have been only twelve killed and thirty wounded. He brought in four hundred captured mules and three hundred horses, and also told me a good story.
He said he was far down in
Alabama, below
Talladega, one hot, dusty day, when the blue clothing of his men was gray with dust; he had halted his column along a road, and he in person, with his staff, had gone to the house of a planter, who met him kindly on the front-porch.
He asked for water, which was brought, and as the party sat on the porch in conversation he saw, in a stable-yard across the road, quite a number of good mules.
He remarked to the planter, “My good sir, I fear I must take
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some of your mules.”
The planter remonstrated, saying he had already contributed liberally to the
good cause; that it was only last week he had given to
General Roddy ten mules.
Rousseau replied, “Well, in this war you should be at least neutral — that is, you should be as liberal to us as to
Roddy” (a rebel cavalry general). “Well, ain't you on our side?”
“No,” said
Rousseau; “I am
General Rousseau, and all these men you see are
Yanks.”
“Great God!
is it possible?
Are these
Yanks?
Who ever supposed they would come away down here in
Alabama?”
Of course,
Rousseau took his ten mules.
Schofield effected his crossing at Soap's Creek very handsomely on the 9th, capturing the small guard that was watching the crossing.
By night he was on the high ground beyond, strongly intrenched, with two good pontoon-bridges finished, and was prepared, if necessary, for an assault by the whole Confederate army.
The same day
Garrard's cavalry also crossed over at
Roswell, drove away the cavalry-pickets, and held its ground till relieved by
Newton's division of
Howard's corps, which was sent up temporarily, till it in turn was relieved by
Dodge's corps (Sixteenth) of the Army of the Tennessee, which was the advance of the whole of that army.
That night
Johnston evacuated his trenches, crossed over the
Chattahoochee, burned the railroad-bridge and his pontoon and trestle bridges, and left us in full possession of the north or west bank — besides which, we had already secured possession of the two good crossings at
Roswell and Soap's Creek.
I have always thought
Johnston neglected his opportunity there, for he had lain comparatively idle while we got control of both banks of the river above him.
On the 13th I ordered
McPherson, with the Fifteenth Corps, to move up to
Roswell, to cross over, prepare good bridges, and to make a strong
tete-du-pont on the farther side.
Stoneman had been sent down to
Campbellton, with orders to cross over and to threaten the railroad below
Atlanta, if he could do so without too much risk; and
General Blair, with the Seventeenth Corps, was to remain at Turner's Ferry, demonstrating as much as possible, thus keeping up the feint below while we were actually
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crossing above.
Thomas was also ordered to prepare his bridges at Powers's and Paice's Ferries.
By crossing the
Chattahoochee above the railroad-bridge, we were better placed to cover our railroad and depots than below, though a movement across the river below the railroad, to the south of
Atlanta, might have been more decisive.
But we were already so far from home, and would be compelled to accept battle whenever offered, with the
Chattahoochee to
our rear, that it became imperative for me to take all prudential measures the case admitted of, and I therefore determined to pass the river above the railroad-bridge —
McPherson on the left,
Schofield in the centre, and
Thomas on the right.
On the 13th I reported to
General Halleck as follows:
All is well.
I have now accumulated stores at Allatoona and Marietta, both fortified and garrisoned points.
Have also three places at which to cross the Chattahoochee in our possession, and only await General Stoneman's return from a trip down the river, to cross the army in force and move on Atlanta.
Stoneman is now out two days, and hod orders to be back on the fourth or fifth day at furthest.
From the 10th to the 15th we were all busy in strengthening the several points for the proposed passage of the
Chattahoochee, in increasing the number and capacity of the bridges, rearranging the garrisons to our rear, and in bringing forward supplies.
On the 15th
General Stoneman got back to
Powder Springs, and was ordered to replace
General Blair at Turner's Ferry, and
Blair, with the Seventeenth Corps, was ordered up to
Roswell to join
McPherson.
On the 17th we began the general movement against
Atlanta,
Thomas crossing the
Chattahoochee at
Powers's and Paice's, by pontoon-bridges;
Schofield moving out toward
Cross Keys, and
McPherson toward
Stone Mountain.
We encountered but little opposition except by cavalry.
On the 18th all the armies moved on a general right wheel,
Thomas to
Buckhead, forming line of battle facing
Peach-Tree Creek;
Schofield was on his left, and
McPherson well over toward the railroad between
Stone Mountain
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and
Decatur, which he reached at 2 P. M. of that day, about four miles from
Stone Mountain, and seven miles east of
Decatur, and there he turned toward
Atlanta, breaking up the railroad as he progressed, his advance-guard reaching
Decatur about night, where he came into communication with
Schofield's troops, which had also reached
Decatur.
About 10 A. M. of that day (July 18th), when the armies were all in motion, one of
General Thomas's staff-officers brought me a citizen, one of our spies, who had just come out of
Atlanta, and had brought a newspaper of the same day, or of the day before, containing
Johnston's order relinquishing the command of the Confederate forces in
Atlanta, and
Hood's order assuming the command.
I immediately inquired of
General Schofield, who was his classmate at
West Point, about
Hood, as to his general character, etc., and learned that he was bold even to rashness, and courageous in the extreme; I inferred that the change of commanders meant “fight.”
Notice of this important change was at once sent to all parts of the army, and every division commander was cautioned to be always prepared for battle in any shape.
This was just what we wanted, viz., to fight in open ground, on any thing like equal terms, instead of being forced to run up against prepared intrenchments; but, at the same time, the enemy having
Atlanta behind him, could choose the time and place of attack, and could at pleasure mass a superior force on our weakest points.
Therefore, we had to be constantly ready for sallies.
On the 19th the three armies were converging toward
Atlanta, meeting such feeble resistance that I really thought the enemy intended to evacuate the place.
McPherson was moving astride of the railroad, near
Decatur;
Schofield along a road leading toward
Atlanta, by
Colonel Howard's house and the distillery; and
Thomas was crossing “Peach-tree” in line of battle, building bridges for nearly every division as deployed.
There was quite a gap between
Thomas and
Schofield, which I endeavored to close by drawing two of
Howard's divisions nearer
Schofield.
On the 20th I was with
General Schofield near the centre, and soon after noon heard heavy firing in front
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of
Thomas's right, which lasted an hour or so, and then ceased.
I soon learned that the enemy had made a furious sally, the blow falling on
Hooker's corps (the Twentieth), and partially on
Johnson's division of the Fourteenth, and
Newton's of the Fourth.
The troops had crossed
Peach-Tree Creek, were deployed, but at the time were resting for noon, when, without notice, the enemy came pouring out of their trenches down upon them, they became commingled, and fought in many places hand to hand.
General Thomas happened to be near the rear of
Newton's division, and got some field-batteries in a good position, on the north side of
Peach-Tree Creek, from which he directed a furious fire on a mass of the enemy, which was passing around
Newton's left and exposed flank.
After a couple of hours of hard and close conflict, the enemy retired slowly within his trenches, leaving his dead and many wounded on the field.
Johnson's and
Newton's losses were light, for they had partially covered their fronts with light parapet; but
Hooker's whole corps fought in open ground, and lost about fifteen hundred men. He reported four hundred rebel dead left on the ground, and that the rebel wounded would number four thousand; but this was conjectural, for most of them got back within their own lines.
We had, however, met successfully a bold sally, had repelled it handsomely, and were also put on our guard; and the event illustrated the future tactics of our enemy.
This sally came from the
Peach-Tree line, which
General Johnston had carefully prepared in advance, from which to fight us
outside of
Atlanta.
We then advanced our lines in compact order, close up to these finished intrenchments, overlapping them on-our left.
From various parts of our lines the houses inside of
Atlanta were plainly visible, though between us were the strong parapets, with ditch,
fraise, chevaux-de-frise, and abatis, prepared long in advance by
Colonel Jeremy F. Gilmer, formerly of the United States Engineers.
McPherson had the Fifteenth Corps astride the Augusta Railroad, and the Seventeenth deployed on its left.
Schofield was next on his right, then came
Howard's,
Hooker's, and
Palmer's corps, on the extreme right.
Each corps was deployed with strong reserves, and their trains were
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parked to their rear.
McPherson's trains were in
Decatur, guarded by a brigade commanded by
Colonel Sprague of the Sixty-third Ohio.
The Sixteenth Corps (
Dodge's) was crowded out of position on the right of McPherson's line, by the contraction of the circle of investment; and, during tile previous afternoon, the Seventeenth Corps (
Blair's) had pushed its operations on the farther side of the Augusta Railroad, so as to secure possession of a hill, known as Leggett's Hill, which
Leggett's and
Force's Divisions had carried by assault.
Giles A. Smith's division was on
Leggett's left, deployed with a weak left flank “in air,” in military phraseology.
It was in carrying this hill that
General Gresham, a great favorite, was badly wounded; and there also
Colonel Tom Reynolds, now of
Madison, Wisconsin, was shot through the leg. When the surgeons were debating the propriety of amputating it in his hearing, he begged them to spare the leg, as it was very valuable, being an “imported leg.”
He was of Irish birth, and this well-timed piece of wit saved his leg, for the surgeons thought, if he could perpetrate a joke at such a time, they would trust to his vitality to save his limb.
During the night, I had full reports from all parts of our line, most of which was partially intrenched as against a sally, and finding that
McPherson was stretching out too much on his left flank, I wrote him a note early in the morning not to extend so much by his left; for we had not troops enough to completely invest the place, and I intended to destroy utterly all parts of the Augusta Railroad to the east of
Atlanta, then to withdraw from the left flank and add to the right.
In that letter I ordered
McPherson not to extend any farther to the left, but to employ
General Dodge's corps (Sixteenth), then forced out of position, to destroy every rail and tie of the railroad, from
Decatur up to his skirmish-line, and I wanted him (
McPherson) to be ready, as soon as
General Garrard returned from
Covington (whither I had sent him), to move to the extreme right of
Thomas, so as to reach if possible the railroad below
Atlanta, viz., the
Macon road.
In the morning we found the strong line of parapet, “Peach-tree line,” to the
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front of
Schofield and
Thomas, abandoned, and our lines were advanced rapidly close up to
Atlanta.
For some moments I supposed the enemy intended to evacuate, and in person was on horseback at the head of
Schofield's troops, who had advanced in front of the
Howard House to some open ground, from which we could plainly see the whole rebel line of parapets, and I saw their men dragging up from the intervening valley, by the distillery, trees and saplings for abatis.
Our skirmishers found the enemy down in this valley, and we could see the rebel main line strongly manned, with guns in position at intervals.
Schofield was dressing forward his lines, and I could hear
Thomas farther to the right engaged, when
General McPherson and his staff rode up. We went back to the
Howard House, a double frame-building with a porch, and sat on the steps, discussing the chances of battle, and of
Hood's general character.
McPherson had also been of the same class at
West Point with
Hood,
Schofield, and
Sheridan.
We agreed that we ought to be unusually cautious and prepared at all times for sallies and for hard fighting, because
Hood, though not deemed much of a scholar, or of great mental capacity, was undoubtedly a brave, determined, and rash man; and the change of commanders at that particular crisis argued the displeasure of the Confederate Government with the cautious but prudent conduct of
General Jos. Johnston.
McPherson was in excellent spirits, well pleased at the progress of events so far, and had come over purposely to see me about the order I had given him to use
Dodge's corps to break up the railroad, saying that the night before he had gained a position on Leggett's Hill from which he could look over the rebel parapet, and see the high smoke-stack of a large foundery in
Atlanta; that before receiving my order he had diverted
Dodge's two divisions (then in motion) from the main road, along a diagonal one that led to his extreme left flank, then held by
Giles A. Smith's division (Seventeenth Corps), for the purpose of strengthening that flank; and that he had sent some intrenching-tools there, to erect some batteries from which he intended to knock down that foundery, and otherwise to damage
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the buildings inside of
Atlanta.
He said he could put all his pioneers to work, and do with them in the time indicated all I had proposed to do with
General Dodge's two divisions.
Of course I assented at once, and we walked down the road a short distance, sat down by the foot of a tree where I had my map, and on it pointed out to him
Thomas's position and his own. I then explained minutely that, after we had sufliciently broken up the
Augusta road, I wanted to shift his whole army around by the rear to
Thomas's extreme right, and hoped thus to reach the other railroad at
East Point.
While we sat there we could hear lively skirmishing going on near us (down about the distillery), and occasionally round-shot from twelve or twenty-four pound guns came through the trees in reply to those of
Schofield, and we could hear similar sounds all along down the lines of
Thomas to our right, and his own to the left; but presently the firing appeared a little more brisk (especially over about
Giles A. Smith's division), and then we heard an occasional gun back toward
Decatur.
I asked him what it meant.
We took my pocket-compass (which I always carried), and by noting the direction of the sound, we became satisfied that the firing was too far to our left rear to be explained by known facts, and he hastily called for his horse, his staff, and his orderlies.
McPherson was then in his prime (about thirty-four years old), over six feet high, and a very handsome man in every way, was universally liked, and had many noble qualities.
He had on his boots outside his pantaloons, gauntlets on his hands, had on his major-general's uniform, and wore a swordbelt, but no sword.
He hastily gathered his papers (save one, which I now possess) into a pocket-book, put it in his breast-pocket, and jumped on his horse, saying he would hurry down his line and send me back word what these sounds meant.
His
adjutant-general,
Clark,
Inspector-General Strong, and his aides,
Captains Steele and
Gile, were with him. Although the sound of musketry on our left grew in volune, I was not so much disturbed by it as by the sound of artillery back toward
Decatur.
I ordered
Schofield at once to send a brigade back to
Decatur (some five miles) and was walking up and
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down the porch of the
Howard House, listening, when one of
McPherson's staff, with his horse covered with sweat, dashed up to the porch, and reported that
General McPherson was either “killed or a prisoner.”
He explained that when they had left me a few minutes before, they had ridden rapidly across to the railroad, the sounds of battle increasing as they neared the position occupied by
General Giles A. Smith's division, and that
McPherson had sent first one, then another of his staff to bring some of the reserve brigades of the Fifteenth Corps over to the exposed left flank; that he had reached the head of
Dodge's corps (marching by the flank on the diagonal road as described), and had ordered it to hurry forward to the same point; that then, almost if not entirely alone, he had followed this road leading across the wooded valley behind the Seventeenth Corps, and had disappeared in these woods, doubtless with a sense of absolute security.
The sound of musketry was there heard, and
McPherson's horse came back, bleeding, wounded, and riderless.
I ordered the staff-officer who brought this message to return at once, to find
General Logan (the senior officer present with the Army of the Tennessee), to report the same facts to him, and to instruct him to drive back this supposed small force, which had evidently got around the Seventeenth Corps through the blind woods in rear of our left flank.
I soon dispatched one of my own staff (
McCoy, I think) to
General Logan with similar orders, telling him to refuse his left flank, and to fight the battle (holding fast to Leggett's Hill) with the Army of the Tennessee; that I would personally look to
Decatur and to the safety of his rear, and would reenforce him if he needed it. I dispatched orders to
General Thomas on our right, telling him of this strong sally, and my inference that the lines in his front had evidently been weakened by reason thereof, and that he ought to take advantage of the opportunity to make a lodgment in
Atlanta, if possible.
Meantime the sounds of the battle rose on our extreme left more and more furious, extending to the place where I stood, at the
Howard House.
Within an hour an ambulance came in (attended by
Colonels Clark and
Strong, and
Captains Steele and
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Gile), bearing
McPherson's body.
I had it carried inside of the
Howard House, and laid on a door wrenched from its hinges.
Dr. Hewitt, of the army, was there, and I asked him to examine the wound.
He opened the coat and shirt, saw where the ball had entered and where it came out, or rather lodged under the skin, and he reported that
McPherson must have died in a few seconds after being hit; that the ball had ranged upward across his body, and passed near the heart.
He was dressed just as he left me, with gauntlets and boots on, but his pocket-book was gone.
On further inquiry I learned that his body must have been in possession of the enemy some minutes, during which time it was rifled of the pocket-book, and I was much concerned lest the letter I had written him that morning should have fallen into the hands of some one who could read and understand its meaning.
Fortunately the spot in the woods where
McPherson was shot was regained by our troops in a few minutes, and the pocket-book found in the haversack of a prisoner of war captured at the time, and it and its contents were secured by one of
McPherson's staff.
While we were examining the body inside the house, the battle was progressing outside, and many shots struck the building, which I feared would take fire; so I ordered
Captains Steele and
Gile to carry the body to
Marietta.
They reached that place the same night, and, on application, I ordered his personal staff to go on and escort the body to his home, in
Clyde, Ohio, where it was received with great honor, and it is now buried in a small cemetery, close by his mother's house, which cemetery is composed in part of the family orchard, in which he used to play when a boy. The foundation is ready laid for the equestrian monument now in progress, under the auspices of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee.
The reports that came to me from all parts of the field revealed clearly what was the game of my antagonist, and the ground somewhat favored him. The railroad and wagon-road from
Decatur to
Atlanta lie along the summit, from which the waters flow, by short, steep valleys, into the “Peach-tree” and
Chattahoochee, to the west, and by other valleys, of gentler declivity, toward the east (
Ocmulgee). The ridges and level
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ground were mostly cleared, and had been cultivated as corn or cotton fields; but where the valleys were broken, they were left in a state of nature — wooded, and full of undergrowth.
McPherson's line of battle was across this railroad, along a general ridge, with a gentle but cleared valley to his front, between him and the defenses of
Atlanta; and another valley, behind him, was clear of timber in part, but to his left rear the country was heavily wooded.
Hood, during the night of July 21st, had withdrawn from his Peach-Tree line, had occupied the fortified line of
Atlanta, facing north and east, with
Stewart's-formerly
Polk's-corps and part of
Hardee's, and with
G. W. Smith's division of militia.
His own corps, and part of
Hardee's, had marched out to the road leading from
McDonough to
Decatur, and had turned so as to strike the left and rear of McPherson's line “in air.”
At the same time he had sent
Wheeler's division of cavalry against the trains parked in
Decatur.
Unluckily for us, I had sent away the whole of
Garrard's division of cavalry during the night of the 20th, with orders to proceed to
Covington, thirty miles east, to burn two important bridges across the Ulcofauhatchee and
Yellow Rivers, to tear up the railroad, to damage it as much as possible from
Stone Mountain eastward, and to be gone four days; so that
McPherson had no cavalry in hand to guard that flank.
The enemy was therefore enabled, under cover of the forest, to approach quite near before he was discovered; indeed, his skirmish-line had worked through the timber and got into the field to the rear of
Giles A. Smith's division of the Seventeenth Corps unseen, had captured
Murray's battery of regular artillery, moving through these woods entirely unguarded, and had got possession of several of the hospital camps.
The right of this rebel line struck
Dodge's troops in motion; but, fortunately, this corps (Sixteenth) had only to halt, face to the left, and was in line of battle; and this corps not only held in check the enemy, but drove him back through the woods.
About the same time this same force had struck
General Giles A. Smith's left flank, doubled it back, captured four guns in position and the party engaged in building the very battery which was the special
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object of
McPherson's visit to me, and almost enveloped the entire left flank.
The men, however, were skillful and brave, and fought for a time with their backs to
Atlanta.
They gradually fell back, compressing their own line, and gaining strength by making junction with
Leggett's division of the Seventeenth Corps, well and strongly posted on the hill.
One or two brigades of the Fifteenth Corps, ordered by
McPherson, came rapidly across the open field to the rear, from the direction of the railroad, filled up the gap from
Blair's new left to the head of
Dodge's column — now facing to the general left — thus forming a strong left flank, at right angles to the original line of battle.
The enemy attacked, boldly and repeatedly, the whole of this flank, but met an equally fierce resistance; and on that ground a bloody battle raged from little after noon till into the night.
A part of
Hood's plan of action was to sally from
Atlanta at the same moment; but this sally was not, for some reason, simultaneous, for the first attack on our extreme left flank had been checked and repulsed before the sally came from the direction of
Atlanta.
Meantime,
Colonel Sprague, in
Decatur, had got his teams harnessed up, and safely conducted his train to the rear of
Schofield's position, holding in check
Wheeler's cavalry till he had got off all his trains, with the exception of three or four wagons.
I remained near the
Howard House, receiving reports and sending orders, urging
Generals Thomas and
Schofield to take advantage of the absence from their front of so considerable a body as was evidently engaged on our left, and, if possible, to make a lodgment in
Atlanta itself; but they reported that the lines to their front, at all accessible points, were strong, by nature and by art, and were fully manned.
About 4 P. M. the expected sally came from
Atlanta, directed mainly against Leggett's Hill and along the
Decatur road.
At Leggett's Hill they were met and bloodily repulsed.
Along the railroad they were more successful.
Sweeping over a small force with two guns, they reached our main line, broke through it, and got possession of
De Gress's battery of four twenty-pound Parrotts, killing every horse, and turning the guns against us.
General Charles R. Wood's division of
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the Fifteenth Corps was on the extreme right of the Army of the Tennessee, between the railroad and the
Howard House, where he connected with
Schofield's troops.
He reported to me in person that the line on his left had been swept back, and that his connection with
General Logan, on Leggett's Hill, was broken.
I ordered him to wheel his brigades to the left, to advance in echelon, and to catch the enemy in flank.
General Schofield brought forward all his available batteries, to the number of twenty guns, to a position to the left front of the
Howard House, whence we could overlook the field of action, and directed a heavy fire over the heads of
General Wood's men against the enemy; and we saw
Wood's troops advance and encounter the enemy, who had secured possession of the old line of parapet which had been held by our men. His right crossed this parapet, which he swept back, taking it in flank; and, at the same time, the division which had been driven back along the railroad was rallied by
General Logan in person, and fought for their former ground.
These combined forces drove the enemy into
Atlanta, recovering the twenty-pound Parrott guns — but one of them was found “bursted” while in the possession of the enemy.
The two six-pounders farther in advance were, however, lost, and had been hauled back by the enemy into
Atlanta.
Poor
Captain de Gress came to me in tears, lamenting the loss of his favorite guns; when they were regained he had only a few men left, and not a single horse.
He asked an order for a reequipment, but I told him he must beg and borrow of others till he could restore his battery, now reduced to three guns.
How he did so I do not know, but in a short time he did get horses, men, and finally another gun, of the same special pattern, and served them with splendid effect till the very close of the war. This battery had also been with me from
Shiloh till that time.
The battle of July 22d is usually called the
battle of Atlanta.
It extended from the
Howard House to
General Giles A. Smith's position, about a mile beyond the Augusta Railroad, and then back toward
Decatur, the whole extent of ground being fully seven miles. In part the ground was clear and in
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part densely wooded.
I rode over the whole of it the next day, and it bore the marks of a bloody conflict.
The enemy had retired during the night inside of
Atlanta, and we remained masters of the situation outside.
I purposely allowed the Army of the Tennessee to fight this, battle almost unaided, save by demonstrations on the part of
General Schofield and
Thomas against the fortified lines to their immediate fronts, and by detaching, as described, one of
Schofield's brigades to
Decatur, because I knew that the attacking force could only be a part of
Hood's army, and that, if any assistance were rendered by either of the other armies, the Army of the Tennessee would be jealous.
Nobly did they do their work that day, and terrible was the slaughter done to our enemy, though at sad cost to ourselves, as shown by the following reports:
Yesterday morning the enemy fell back to the intrenchments proper of the city of
Atlanta, which are in a general circle, with a radius of one and a half miles, and we closed in. While we were forming our lines, and selecting positions for our batteries, the enemy appeared suddenly out of the dense woods in heavy masses on our extreme left, and struck the Seventeenth Corps (
General Blair) in flank, and was forcing it back, when the Sixteenth Corps (
General Dodge) came up and checked the movement, but the enemy's cavalry got well to our rear, and into
Decatur, and for some hours our left flank was completely enveloped.
The fight that resulted was continuous until night, with heavy loss on both sides.
The enemy took one of our batteries (
Murray's, of the
Regular Army) that was marching in its place in column in the road, unconscious of danger.
About 4 P. M. the enemy sallied against the division of
General Morgan L. Smith, of the Fifteenth Corps, which occupied an abandoned line of rifle-trench near the railroad east of the city, and forced it back some four hundred yards, leaving in his hands for the time two batteries, but the ground and batteries were immediately after recovered by the same troops reenforced.
I cannot well approximate our loss, which fell heavily on the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps, but count it as three thousand; I know that, being on the defensive, we have inflicted equally heavy loss on the enemy.
General McPherson, when arranging his troops about 11 A. M., and passing from one column to another, incautiously rode upon an ambuscade
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without apprehension, at some distance ahead of his staff and orderlies, and was shot dead.
General: I find it difficult to make prompt report of results, coupled with some data or information, without occasionally making mistakes.
McPherson's sudden death, and
Logan succeeding to the command as it were in the midst of battle, made some confusion on our extreme left; but it soon recovered and made sad havoc with the enemy, who had practised one of his favorite games of attacking our left when in motion, and before it had time to cover its weak flank.
After riding over the ground and hearing the varying statements of the actors, I directed
General Logan to make an official report of the actual result, and I herewith inclose it.
Though the number of dead rebels seems excessive, I am disposed to give full credit to the report that our loss, though only thirty-five hundred and twenty-one killed, wounded, and missing, the enemy's dead alone on the field nearly equaled that number, viz., thirty-two hundred and twenty.
Happening at that point of the line when a flag of truce was sent in to ask permission for each party to bury its dead, I gave
General Logan authority to permit a temporary truce on that flank
alone, while our labors and fighting proceeded at all others.
I also send you a copy of
General Garrard's report of the breaking of the railroad toward
Augusta.
I am now grouping my command to attack the
Macon road, and with that view will intrench a strong line of circumvallation with flanks, so as to have as large an column as possible, with all the cavalry to swing round to the south and east, to strike that road at or below
East Point.
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
General: I have the honor to report the following general summary of the result of the attack of the enemy on this army on the 22d inst.
Total loss, killed, wounded, and missing, thirty-five hundred and twenty-one, and ten pieces of artillery.
We have buried and delivered to the enemy, under a flag of truce sent in
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by them, in front of the Third Division, Seventeenth Corps, one thousand of their killed.
The number of their dead in front of the Fourth Division of the same corps, including those on the ground not now occupied by our troops,
General Blair reports, will swell the number of their dead on his front to two thousand.
The number of their dead buried in front of the Fifteenth Corps, up to this hour, is three hundred and sixty, and the commanding officer reports that at least as many more are yet unburied, burying-parties being still at work.
The number of dead buried in front of the Sixteenth Corps is four hundred and twenty-two.
We have over one thousand of their wounded in our hands, the larger number of the wounded being carried off during the night, after the engagement, by them.
We captured eighteen stands of colors, and have them now. We also captured five thousand stands of arms.
The attack was made on our lines seven times, and was seven times repulsed.
Hood's and
Hardee's corps and
Wheeler's cavalry engaged us.
We have sent to the rear one thousand prisoners, including thirty-three commissioned officers of high rank.
We still occupy the field, and the troops are in fine spirits.
A detailed and full report will be furnished as soon as completed.
Recapitulation. |
Our total loss | 3,521 |
Enemy's dead, thus far reported, buried, and delivered to them | 3,220 |
Total prisoners sent North | 1,017 |
Total prisoners, wounded, in our hands | 1,000 |
Estimated loss of the enemy, at least | 10,000 |
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
On the 22d of July
General Rousseau reached
Marietta, having returned from his raid on the
Alabama road at
Opelika, and on the next day
General Garrard also returned from
Covington, both having been measurably successful.
The former was about twenty-five hundred strong, the latter about four thousand, and both reported that their horses were jaded and tired, needing shoes and rest.
Bat, about this time, I was advised by
General Grant (then investing
Richmond) that the
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rebel Government had become aroused to the critical condition of things about
Atlanta, and that I must look out for
Hood being greatly reinforced.
I therefore was resolved to push matters, and at once set about the original purpose of transferring the whole of the Army of the Tennessee to our right flank, leaving
Schofield to stretch out so as to rest his left on the
Augusta road, then torn up for thirty miles eastward; and, as auxiliary thereto, I ordered all the cavalry to be ready to pass around
Atlanta on both flanks, to break up the
Macon road at some point below, so as to cut off all supplies to the rebel army inside, and thus to force it to evacuate, or come out and fight us on equal terms.
But it first became necessary to settle the important question of who should succeed
General McPherson?
General Logan had taken command of the Army of the Tennessee by virtue of his seniority, and had done well; but I did not consider him equal to the command of three corps.
Between him and
General Blair there existed a natural rivalry.
Both were men of great courage and talent, but were politicians by nature and experience, and it may be that for this reason they were mistrusted by regular officers like
Generals Schofield,
Thomas, and myself.
It was all-important that there should exist a perfect understanding among the army commanders, and at a conference with
General George H. Thomas at the headquarters of
General Thomas J. Woods, commanding a division in the Fourth Corps, he (
Thomas) remonstrated warmly against my recommending that
General Logan should be regularly assigned to the command of the Army of the Tennessee by reason of his accidental seniority.
We discussed fully the merits and qualities of every officer of high rank in the army, and finally settled on
Major-General O. O. Howard as the best officer who was present and available for the purpose; on the 24th of July I telegraphed to
General Halleck this preference, and it was promptly ratified by the
President.
General Howard's place in command of the Fourth Corps was filled by
General Stanley, one of his division commanders, on the recommendation of
General Thomas.
All these promotions happened to fall upon West-Pointers, and doubtless
Logan
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and
Blair had some reason to believe that we intended to monopolize the higher honors of the war for the regular officers.
I remember well my own thoughts and feelings at the time, and feel sure that I was not intentionally partial to any class.
I wanted to succeed in taking
Atlanta, and needed commanders who were purely and technically soldiers, men who would obey orders and execute them promptly and on time; for I knew that we would have to execute some most delicate manoeuvres, requiring the utmost skill, nicety, and precision.
I believed that
General Howard would do all these faithfully and well, and I think the result has justified my choice.
I regarded both
Generals Logan and
Blair as “volunteers,” that looked to personal fame and glory as auxiliary and secondary to their political ambition, and not as professional soldiers.
As soon as it was known that
General Howard had been chosen to command the Army of the Tennessee,
General Hooker applied to
General Thomas to be relieved of the command of the Twentieth Corps, and
General Thomas forwarded his application to me approved and
heartily recommended.
I at once telegraphed to
General Halleck, recommending
General Slocum (then at
Vicksburg) to be his successor, because
Slocum had been displaced from the command of his corps at the time when the Eleventh and Twelfth were united and made the Twentieth.
General Hooker was offended because he was not chosen to succeed
McPherson; but his chances were not even considered; indeed, I had never been satisfied with him since his affair at the
Kulp House, and had been more than once disposed to relieve him of his corps, because of his repeated attempts to interfere with
Generals McPherson and
Schofield.
I am told that he says that
Thomas and I were jealous of him; but this is hardly probable, for we on the spot did not rate his fighting qualities as high as he did, and I am, moreover, convinced that both he and
General Butterfield went to the rear for personal reasons.
We were then two hundred and fifty miles in advance of our base, dependent on a single line of railroad for our daily food.
We had a bold, determined foe in our immediate front, strongly
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intrenched, with communication open to his rear for supplies and reenforcements, and every soldier realized that we had plenty of hard fighting ahead, and that all honors had to be fairly earned.
General Hooker, moreover, when he got back to
Cincinnati, reported (I was told) that we had run up against a rock at
Atlanta, and that the country ought to be prepared to hear of disaster from that quarter.
Until
General Slocum joined (in the latter part of August), the Twentieth Corps was commanded by
General A. S. Williams, the senior division commander present.
On the 25th of July the army, therefore, stood thus: the Army of the Tennessee (
General O. O. Howard commanding) was on the left, pretty much on the same ground it had occupied during the battle of the 22d, all ready to move rapidly by the rear to the extreme right beyond
Proctor's Creek; the Army of the Ohio (
General Schofield) was next in order, with its left flank reaching the Augusta Railroad; next in order, conforming closely with the rebel intrenchments of
Atlanta, was
General Thomas's Army of the Cumberland, in the order of — the Fourth Corps (
Stanley's), the Twentieth Corps (
Williams's), and the Fourteenth Corps (
Palmer's).
Palmer's right division (
Jefferson C. Davis's) was strongly refused along
Proctor's Creek.
This line was about five miles long, and was intrenched as against a sally about as strong as was our enemy.
The cavalry was assembled in two strong divisions; that of
McCook (including the brigade of
Harrison which had been brought in from
Opelika by
General Rousseau) numbered about thirty-five hundred effective cavalry, and was posted to our right rear, at Turner's Ferry, where we had a good pontoon-bridge; and to our left rear, at and about
Decatur, were the two cavalry divisions of
Stoneman, twenty-five hundred, and
Garrard, four thousand, united for the time and occasion under the command of
Major-General George Stoneman, a cavalry-officer of high repute.
My plan of action was to move the Army of the Tennessee to the right rapidly and boldly against the railroad below
Atlanta, and at the same time to send all the cavalry around by the right and left to make a lodgment on the
Macon road about
Jonesboroa.
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All the orders were given, and the morning of tile 27th was fixed for commencing the movement.
On the 26th I received from
General Stoneman a note asking permission (after having accomplished his orders to break up the railroad at
Jonesboroa) to go on to
Macon to rescue our prisoners of war known to be held there, and then to push on to
Andersonville, where was the great depot of Union prisoners, in which were penned at one time as many as twenty-three thousand of our men, badly fed and harshly treated.
I wrote him an answer consenting substantially to his proposition, only modifying it by requiring him to send back
General Garrard's division to its position on our left flank after he had broken up the railroad at
Jonesboroa.
Promptly, and on time, all got off, and
General Dodge's corps (the Sixteenth, of the Army of the Tennessee) reached its position across
Proctor's Creek the same evening, and early the next morning (the 28th)
Blair's corps (the Seventeenth) deployed on his right, both corps covering their front with the usual parapet; the Fifteenth Corps (
General Logan's) came up that morning on the right of
Blair, strongly refused, and began to prepare the usual cover.
As
General Jeff. C. Davis's division was, as it were, left out of line, I ordered it on the evening before to march down toward Turner's Ferry, and then to take a road laid down on our maps which led from there toward
East Point, ready to engage any enemy that might attack our general right flank, after the same manner as had been done to the left flank on the 22d.
Personally on the morning of the 28th I followed the movement, and rode to the extreme right, where we could hear some skirmishing and an occasional cannon-shot.
As we approached the ground held by the Fifteenth Corps, a cannon-ball passed over my shoulder and killed the horse of an orderly behind; and seeing that this gun enfiladed the road by which we were riding, we turned out of it and rode down into a valley, where we left our horses and walked up to the hill held by
Morgan L. Smith's division of the Fifteenth Corps.
Near a house I met
Generals Howard and
Logan, who explained that there was an intrenched battery to their front, with the appearance of a strong infantry support.
I then walked up to the ridge, where I found General
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Morgan L. Smith.
His men were deployed and engaged in rolling logs and fence-rails, preparing a hasty cover.
From this ridge we could overlook the open fields near a meeting-house known as “Ezra Church,” close by the Poor-House.
We could see the fresh earth of a parapet covering some guns (that fired an occasional shot), and there was also an appearance of activity beyond.
General Smith was in the act of sending forward a regiment from his right flank to feel the position of the enemy, when I explained to him and to
Generals Logan and
Howard that they must look out for
General Jeff. C. Davis's division, which was coming up from the direction of Turner's Ferry.
As the skirmish-fire warmed up along the front of
Blair's corps, as well as along the Fifteenth Corps (
Logan's), I became convinced that
Hood designed to attack this right flank, to prevent, if possible, the extension of our line in that direction.
I regained my horse, and rode rapidly back to see that
Davis's division had been dispatched as ordered.
I found
General Davis in person, who was unwell, and had sent his division that morning early, under the command of his senior brigadier,
Morgan; but, as I attached great importance to the movement, he mounted his horse, and rode away to overtake and to hurry forward the movement, so as to come up on the left rear of the enemy, during the expected battle.
By this time the sound of cannon and musketry denoted a severe battle as in progress, which began seriously at 11 1/2 A. M., and ended substantially by 4 P. M. It was a fierce attack by the enemy on our extreme right flank, well posted and. partially covered.
The most authentic account of the battle is given by
General Logan, who commanded the Fifteenth Corps, in his official report to the
Adjutant-General of the Army of the Tennessee, thus:
Colonel: I have the honor to report that, in pursuance of orders, I
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moved my command into position on the right of the Seventeenth Corps, which was the extreme right of the army in the field, during the night of the 27th and morning of the 28th; and, while advancing in line of battle to a more favorable position, we were met by the rebel infantry of
Hardee's and
Lee's corps, who made a determined and desperate attack on us at 11 1/2 A. M. of the 28th (yesterday).
My lines were only protected by logs and rails, hastily thrown up in front of them.
The first onset was received and checked, and the battle commenced and lasted until about three o'clock in the evening.
During that time six successive charges were made, which were six times gallantly repulsed, each time with fearful loss to the enemy.
Later in the evening my lines were several times assaulted vigorously, but each time with like result.
The worst of the fighting occurred on
General Harrow's and
Morgan L. Smith's fronts, which formed the centre and right of the corps.
The troops could not have displayed greater courage, nor greater determination not to give ground; had they shown less, they would have been driven from their position.
Brigadier-Generals C. R. Woods,
Harrow, and
Morgan L. Smith, division commanders, are entitled to equal credit for gallant conduct and skill in repelling the assault.
My thanks are due to
Major-Generals Blair and
Dodge for sending me reenforcements at a time when they were much.
needed.
My losses were fifty killed, four hundred and forty-nine wounded, and seventy-three missing: aggregate, five hundred and seventy-two.
The division of
General Harrow captured five battle-flags.
There were about fifteen hundred or two thousand muskets left on the ground.
One hundred and six prisoners were captured, exclusive of seventy-three wounded, who were sent to our hospital, and are being cared for by our surgeons.
Five hundred and sixty-five rebels have up to this time been buried, and about two hundred are supposed to be yet unburied.
A large number of their wounded were undoubtedly carried away in the night, as the enemy did not withdraw till near daylight.
The enemy's loss could not have been less than six or seven thousand men.
A more detailed report will hereafter be made.
I am, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
General Howard, in transmitting this report, added:
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I wish to express my high gratification with the conduct of the troops engaged.
I never saw better conduct in battle.
General Logan, though ill and much worn out, was indefatigable, and the success of the day is as much attributable to him as to any one man.
This was, of course, the first fight in which
General Howard had commanded the Army of the Tennessee, and he evidently aimed to reconcile
General Logan in his disappointment, and to gain the heart of his army, to which he was a stranger.
He very properly left
General Logan to fight his own corps, but exposed himself freely; and, after the firing had ceased, in the afternoon he walked the lines; the men, as reported to me, gathered about him in the most affectionate way, and he at once gained their respect and confidence.
To this fact I at the time attached much importance, for it put me at ease as to the future conduct of that most important army.
At no instant of time did I feel the least uneasiness about the result on the 28th, but wanted to reap fuller results, hoping that
Davis's division would come up at the instant of defeat, and catch the enemy in flank; but the woods were dense, the roads obscure, and as usual this division got on the wrong road, and did not come into position until about dark.
In like manner, I thought that
Hood had greatly weakened his main lines inside of
Atlanta, and accordingly sent repeated orders to
Schofield and
Thomas to make an attempt to break in; but both reported that they found the parapets very strong and full manned.
Our men were unusually encouraged by this day's work, for they realized that we could compel
Hood to come out from behind his fortified lines to attack us at a disadvantage.
In conversation with me, the soldiers of the Fifteenth Corps, with whom I was on the most familiar terms, spoke of the affair of the 28th as the easiest thing in the world; that, in fact, it was a common slaughter of the enemy; they pointed out where the rebel lines had been, and how they themselves had fired deliberately, had shot down their antagonists, whose bodies still lay unburied, and marked plainly their lines of battle, which must have halted within easy musket-range of
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our men, who were partially protected by their improvised line of logs and fence-rails.
All bore willing testimony to the courage and spirit of the foe, who, though repeatedly repulsed, came back with increased determination some six or more times.
The next morning the Fifteenth Corps wheeled forward to the left over the battle-field of the day before, and
Davis's division still farther prolonged the line, which reached nearly to the ever-to-be-remembered “Sandtown road.”
Then, by further thinning out
Thomas's line, which was well intrenched, I drew another division of
Palmer's corps (
Baird's) around to the right, to further strengthen that flank.
I was impatient to hear from the cavalry raid, then four days out, and was watching for its effect, ready to make a bold push for the possession of
East Point.
General Garrard's division returned to
Decatur on the 31st, and reported that
General Stone, man had posted him at
Flat Rock, while he (
Stoneman) went on. The month of July therefore closed with our infantry line strongly intrenched, but drawn out from the
Augusta road on the left to the
Sandtown road on the right, a distance of full ten measured miles.
The enemy, though evidently somewhat intimidated by the results of their defeats on the 22d and 28th, still presented a bold front at all points, with fortified lines that defied a direct assault.
Our railroad was done to the rear of our camps,
Colonel W. W. Wright having reconstructed the bridge across the
Chattahoochee in six days; and our garrisons and detachments to the rear had so effectually guarded the railroad that the trains from
Nashville arrived daily, and our substantial wants were well supplied.
The month, though hot in the extreme, had been one of constant conflict, without intermission, and on four several occasions — viz., July 4th, 20th, 22d, and 28th--these affairs had amounted to real battles, with casualty lists by the thousands.
Assuming the correctness of the rebel
surgeon Foard's report, on page 577 of
Johnston's “Narrative,” commencing with July 4th and terminating with July 31st, we have:
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Corps. | Killed. | Wounded. | Total. |
Hardee's | 523 | 2,774 | 3,297 |
Lee's | 351 | 2,408 | 2,759 |
Stewart's | 436 | 2,141 | 2,577 |
Wheeler's Cavalry | 29 | 156 | 185 |
Engineers | 2 | 21 | 23 |
Total | 1,341 | 7,500 | 8,841 |
To these I add as prisoners, at least | 2,000 |
Aggregate loss of the enemy in July, 1864 | 10,841 |
Our losses, as compiled from the official returns for July, 1864, are:
Army of the Cumberland.
Corps. | Killed and Missing. | Wounded. | Total. |
Fourth | 116 | 432 | 548 |
Fourteenth | 317 | 1,084 | 1,401 |
Twentieth | 541 | 1,480 | 2,021 |
Total, Army of the Cumberland | 974 | 2,996 | 3,970 |
Army of the Tennessee.
Corps. | Killed and Missing. | Wounded. | Total. |
Fifteenth | 590 | 797 | 1,387 |
Sixteenth | 289 | 721 | 1,010 |
Seventeenth | 1,361 | 1,203 | 2,564 |
Total, Army of the Tennessee | 2,240 | 2,721 | 4,961 |
Army of the Ohio
Corps. | Killed and Missing. | Wounded. | Total. |
Twenty-third | 95 | 167 | 262 |
Cavalry | 495 | 31 | 526 |
Total, Army of the Ohio | 590 | 198 | 788 |
Aggregate loss for July | 3,804 | 5,915 | 9,719 |
In this table the column of “killed and missing” embraces the prisoners that fell into the hands of the enemy, mostly lost in the Seventeenth Corps, on the 22d of July, and does not
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embrace the losses in the cavalry divisions of
Garrard and
McCook, which, however, were small for July.
In all other respects the statement is absolutely correct.
I am satisfied, however, that
Surgeon Foard could not have been in possession of data sufficiently accurate to enable him to report the losses in actual battle of men who never saw the hospital.
During the whole campaign I had rendered to me tri-monthly statements of “effective strength,” from which I carefully eliminated the figures not essential for my conduct, so that at all times I knew the exact fighting-strength of each corps, division, and brigade, of the whole army, and also endeavored to bear in mind our losses both on the several fields of battle and by sickness, and well remember that I always estimated that during the month of July we had inflicted heavier loss on the enemy than we had sustained ourselves, and the above figures prove it conclusively.
Before closing this chapter, I must record one or two minor events that occurred about this time, that may prove of interest.
On the 24th of July I received a dispatch from
Inspector-General James A. Hardie, then on duty at the War Department in
Washington, to the effect that
Generals Osterhaus and
Alvan P. Hovey had been appointed major-generals.
Both of these had begun the campaign with us in command of divisions, but had gone to the rear — the former by reason of sickness, and the latter dissatisfied with
General Schofield and myself about the composition of his division of the Twenty-third Corps.
Both were esteemed as first-class officers, who had gained special distinction in the
Vicksburg campaign.
But up to that time, when the newspapers announced daily promotions elsewhere, no prominent officers serving with me had been advanced a peg, and I felt hurt.
I answered
Hardie on the 25th, in a dispatch which has been made public, closing with this language: “If the rear be the post of honor, then we had better all change front on
Washington.”
To my amazement, in a few days I received from
President Lincoln himself an answer, in which he caught me fairly.
I have not preserved a copy of that dispatch, and suppose it was burned up in the
Chicago fire; but it
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was characteristic of
Mr. Lincoln, and was dated the 26th or 27th day of July, contained unequivocal expressions of respect for those who were fighting hard and unselfishly, offering us a full share of the honors and rewards of the war, and saying that, in the cases of
Hovey and
Osterhaus, he was influenced mainly by the recommendations of
Generals Grant and
Sherman.
On the 27th I replied direct, apologizing somewhat for my message to
General Hardie, saying that I did not suppose such messages ever reached him personally, explaining that
General Grant's and
Sherman's recommendations for
Hovey and
Osterhaus had been made when the events of the
Vicksburg campaign were fresh with us, and that my dispatch of the 25th to
General Hardie had reflected chiefly the feelings of the officers then present with me before
Atlanta.
The result of all this, however, was good, for another dispatch from
General Hardie, of the 28th, called on me to nominate eight colonels for promotion as brigadier-generals.
I at once sent a circular note to the army-commanders to nominate two colonels from the Army of the Ohio and three from each of the others; and the result was, that o.n the 29th of July I telegraphed the names of--
Colonel William Gross, Thirty-sixth Indiana;
Colonel Charles C. Walcutt, Forty-sixth Ohio;
Colonel James W. Riley, One Hundred and Fourth Ohio;
Colonel L. P. Bradley, Fifty-first Illinois;
Colonel J. W. Sprague, Sixty-third Ohio;
Colonel Joseph A. Cooper, Sixth East Tennessee;
Colonel John T. Croxton, Fourth Kentucky;
Colonel William W. Belklap, Fifteenth Iowa.
These were promptly appointed brigadier-generals, were already in command of brigades or divisions; and I doubt if eight promotions were ever made fairer, or were more honestly earned.
during the whole war.