Manassas Junction.
When, at the close of April, 1861, the
Confederates were
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satisfied that the national government and the loyal people of the country were resolved to maintain the authority and integrity of the republic, they put forward extraordinary efforts to strike a deadly blow by seizing the national capital before it should be too late.
There was great enthusiasm among the young men of the
South.
They read on the telegraph bulletin-boards the call of the
President for 75,000 men, and received the announcement with derisive laughter and cheers for “Old Abe the rail-splitter.”
Few believed there would be war. One of their chroniclers avers that companies were quickly formed from among the wealthiest of the youth, and that 200,000 volunteers could have been organized within a month, if they had been called for. The enthusiasm of the young men was shared by the other sex. Banners of costly materials were made by clubs of young women and delivered to the companies with appropriate speeches—the young men on such occasions swearing that they would perish rather than desert the flag thus consecrated.
Regarding the whole matter as a lively pastime, many of these companies dressed in the most costly attire, and bore the most expensive rifles, but grave men tried to undeceive them.
Jefferson Davis wrote to a Mississippi friend, telling him that hardships and privations awaited these young men, and advising them to use the commonest materials for clothing.
He recommended all volunteers to dress
in gray-flannel coats and light-blue cotton pantaloons, for summer was approaching.
The Confederates chose as their grand rallying-place, preparatory to a march on
Washington,
Manassas Junction, a point on the Orange and Alexandria Railway, where another joined it from Manassas Gap, in the
Blue Ridge.
It is about 25 miles west from
Alexandria, and 30 miles in a direct line from
Washington, D. C. It was an admirable strategic point, as it commanded the grand southern railway route connecting
Washington and
Richmond, and another leading to the fertile Shenandoah Valley, beyond the
Blue Ridge.
General Scott had been advised to take possession of that point.
but he declined; and while the veteran soldier was preparing for a defensive campaign the opportunity was lost.
At
Manassas Junction, large numbers of Confederate troops were soon gathered under the command of
General Beauregard.
The
battle of Manassas, or the
second battle of Bull Run, was fought near the battle-ground of the first engagement at
Bull Run, Aug. 30, 1862.
Pope, after the battle of
Groveton (q. v.), found his army greatly reduced in numbers—only about 40,000.
It had failed to keep
Lee and
Jackson apart, and it was now decidedly the weaker force.
Prudence counselled a retreat to
Bull Run, or even to the defences of
Washington; but
Pope resolved to try the issue of another battle.
He
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expected rations and forage from
McClellan, at
Alexandria, but was disappointed.
When it became clear that he would receive no aid from
McClellan, he had no other alternative than to fight or surrender, so he put his line into V shape on the morning of Aug. 30.
Lee made a movement which gave
Pope the impression that the
Confederates were retreating, and the latter telegraphed to
Washington to that effect.
He ordered a pursuit.
When, at 10 A. M., an attempt was made to execute this order, a fearful state of things was developed.
The eminence near
Groveton was found to be swarming with Confederates, who, instead of retreating, had been massing under cover of the forest, in preparation for an offensive movement.
They opened a furious fire on the front of the Nationals, and at the same time made a heavy flank movement.
Porter's corps, which had been made to recoil by the first unexpected blow, rallied, and performed specially good service.
Ricketts meanwhile had hastened to the left.
By the disposition of
Reynolds's corps to meet the flank movement,
Porter's key-point had been uncovered, but the place of
Reynolds had been quickly supplied by 1,000 men under
Warren.
The battle became very severe, and for a while victory seemed to incline towards the Nationals, for
Jackson's advanced line was steadily pushed back until 5 P. M. Then
Longstreet turned the tide.
With four batteries, he poured a most destructive fire from
Jackson's right, and line after line of Nationals was swept away.
Very soon the whole of
Pope's left was put to flight, when
Jackson advanced, and
Longstreet pushed his heavy columns against
Pope's centre.
At the same time
Lee's artillery was doing fearful execution upon
Pope's disordered infantry.
Darkness alone put an end to the fearful struggle.
Although pushed back some distance, the
National left was still unbroken, and held the
Warrenton turnpike, by which alone the Nationals might safely retreat.
Pope had no other safe alternative than to fall back towards the defences of
Washington.
At 8 P. M. he issued orders to that effect, and during the night the whole army withdrew across
Bull Run to the heights of
Centreville, the troops under
Meade and
Seymour covering the movement.
The night was very dark, and
Lee, fortunately, did not pursue.
