Progress of the War.
Yankee history of their last year's Campaign — nothing accomplished.
Senator Wade, from the joint committee of the two Houses of Congress, consisting of three members of the Senate and four members of the House of Representatives, appointed in December, 1861. with instructions to inquire into the conduct of the present war, has presented a report with the testimony taken. It is a curious history of the campaigns in which the Little Napoleon was engaged. It opens by stating the fact that while McClellan was lying in front of Manassas he declined having the army divided into army corps, saying that he could easily handle all the troops which composed it by himself. He neglected to send 4,000 troops to keep open the navigation of the Potomac, which the report says "caused the President manifest disappointment." After his army got to the Peninsula, Gen. Heintzelman received information that the rebels had only 10,000 troops at Yorktown, and the place might be taken. He advanced to make a heavy reconnaissance, but was recalled by McClellan, who "hoped that nothing had been done (by H.) to give the enemy information of the line of operation of the army." It was certain that Magruder had not more than 7,000 men, and this was confirmed by "Hon. Lemuel J. Bowden, of Williamsburg. " Notwithstanding all this McClellan determined on a siege, and here is the way it resulted: The returns in the Adjutant General's office, signed by General McClellan and his Adjutant General, show that, on the 30th of april, 1862, the forces on the Peninsula under General McClellan amounted to 112,362 present for duty. On the 1st of May the President telegraphs to General McClellan: "Your cell for Parings guns from Washington alarms me, chiefly because is argues indefinite procrastination. Is anything to be done?" On the night of the 3d and the morning of the 4th of May the enemy evacuated Yorktown without loss. One of the witnesses testifies that Gen. McClellan was very much chagrined and mortified at the evacuation, as he had made his preparations to open from his batteries on Monday, the 5th of May. The evacuation was discovered by daylight on the morning of the 4th Between ten and eleven o'clock Gen. Stonemen, with the cavalry and some light horse artillery, started in pursuit. About one o'clock Gen. Hocker, with his division, left York town with orders to support General Stoneman--Gens. Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, also moved out during the day with the whole or portions of their corps. In the battle of Williamsburg which followed, Hocker, after losing 1,700 men, was so hard pressed by the rebels that he sent Gov. Spragne for reinforcements: Gov. Sprague arrived at Yorktown about one o'clock, having been about an hour going down. He testifies that when Gen. McClellan was told the condition of affairs at the front, he remarked that he had supposed "those in front could attend to that little matter." After some time Gen. McClellan started from Yorktown. and reached the vicinity of Williamsburg about five o'clock in the afternoon. That night the enemy evacuated their position at Williamsburg. Gen. McClellan states that after he arrived on the field he was so satisfied that the enemy had been beaten. and would be compelled to evacuate their position that night or be taken at a great disadvantage, that he countermanded orders to the divisions of Richardson and Sedgwick and sent them back to Yorktown. Then came the long stay on the Chickahominy and then McClellan's heart failed him. The report says: ‘ Gen. McClellan continued calling for reinforcements, representing that the force of the enemy in his front was superior to his own. and that the force under Gen. McDowell would do more for the protection of Washington, if sent to his army, than in any other position in which it could be placed. In a letter written on the 21st of May. he asks that Gen. McDowell's corps he sent to him by water rather than by land as the more expeditions mode, and that he and his forces be explicitly placed under his orders, "in the ordinary way. " --He closes his letter by saying: ‘ I believe there is a great struggle before this army, but I am neither dismayed nor discouraged. I wish to strengthen its force as much as I can but in any event, I shall fight it with all the skill and caution and determination that I possess. And I trust that the result may either obtain for me the permanent confidence of my Government. or that it may close my career." ’ ’ The affair of Seven Pines is next given by the committee. They say: ‘ The officers engaged in that battle, who have been examined, testify that the army could have pushed right on to the city of Richmond with little resistance; that the enemy were very much broken and demoralized — throwing a way arms, clothing, etc., that might impede their flight. Gen. McClellan seems to have contemplated an immediate movement upon Richmond, for the day after the battle, June 2d, he writes to the Secretary of War: "The enemy attacked in force and with great spirit yesterday morning, but are everywhere most signally repulsed, with great loss. Our troops charged frequently on both days, and uniformly broke the enemy. The result is, that our left is with in four miles of Richmond. I only wait for the river to fall to cross, with the rest of the force, and make a general attack. Should I find them holding firm in a very strong position, I may wait for what troops I can bring up from Fortress Monroe. But the morals of my troops is now such that I can venture much. I do not fear for odds against me. The victory is complete, and all credit is due to the gallantry of our officers and men." ’ The movement was not made, however. as Gen. McClellan states, because of the high stage of water and the bad roads. The deception practised on the young Napoleon about sending Confederate troops from Richmond to reinforce Jackson, is thus described: On the 18th of June Gen. McClellan telegraphs to the Secretary of War that he has received information from deserters to the effect that troops have left Richmond to reinforce Jackson; that the movement commenced on the 15th, and that if reinforcements have gone to Jackson they are probably not loss than 10,000 men; that he cannot vouch for the truth of the statement, but that it seems pretty certain that it is believed in Richmond and among the rebel troops. To this the President replies on the same day, that the information is corroborated by a dispatch from General King at Fredericksburg, and remarks; --"It this is true, it is as good as a reinforcement to you of an equal force." On the same day Gen. McClellan telegraphs to the President-- "A general engagement may take place at any hour. An advance by us involves a battle more or less decisive. The enemy exhibit at every point a readiness to meet us. They certainly have great numbers and extensive works. If ten or fifteen thousand men have left Richmond to reinforce Jackson, it illustrates their strength and confidence. After to-morrow we shall fight the rebel army as soon as Providence will permit. We shall await only a favorable condition of the earth and sky, and the completion of some necessary preliminaries." The returns of Gen. McClellan to the Adjutant. General's office give the following as the strength of the army on the Peninsula on the 20th of June Present for duty, 115.102; special duty, kick, and in arrest. 14,225; absent, 29,511--total, 126,838. On the 24th and 25th of June Gen. McClellan telegraphs the Secretary of War that he is informed by describers and contrabands that Jackson is contemplating an attack upon his right and rear. As this dispatch of Gen. McClellan, and the one of the President in reply, are dated immediately previous to the "seven days battle," they are given here in full. Received 8:50 P. M. McClellan's, June 25, 6.15 P. M.
I have just returned from the field, and find your dispatch in regard to Jackson. Several contrabands, just in, give information concerning the supposition that Jackson's advance is at or near Hanover Court House, and that Beauregard arrived with strong reinforcements in Richmond yesterday. I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The rebel force is stated at 200,000, including Jackson and Beauregard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds if these reports be true; but this army will do all in the power of men to hold their position and repulse any at tack. I regret my great inferiority of numbers; but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent repeatedly the necessity of reinforcements; that this was the decisive point, and that all the available means of the Government should be concentrated here. I will do all that a General can do with the splendid Army I have the honor to command; and, if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least did with it and share its fate. But if the result of the action, which will occur to-morrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrown on my shoulders — it must rest where it belongs. Since I commenced this I have received additional intelligence confirming the supposition in regard to Jackson's movements and Beauregard. I shall probably be attacked to-morrow, and now go to the other side of the Chickahominy to arrange for the defence on that side. I feel that there is no use in my again asking for reinforcements.
Geo. B. McClellan, Major General.
Hon, E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.
The auteur of the President is as follows:
Washington, June 26, 1862.
Hon, E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.
The auteur of the President is as follows:
Washington, June 26, 1862.
Your three dispatches of yesterday in relation to the affair, ending with the statement that you completely succeeded in making your point, are very gratifying. The later one, of a quarter past six P. M., suggesting the probability of your being overwhelmed by 900,000 men, and talking of whom. the responsibility will belong, pains me very much. I give you all I can and act on the presumption that you will do the best you can with what you have; while you continue, ungenerously I think, to assume that I could give you more if I would.-- I have omitted, I shall omit, no opportunity to send you reinforcements whenever I possibly can.
Then we have a history of the seven days fighting, and the following statement as to how the falling back was managed: It would appear, from all the information your committee can obtain, that the battles were fought, the troops handled now dispositions made and old ones changed. entirely by the corps commanders, without directions from the Commanding General He would pick the troops in the morning then leave the field and seek the position for the next day, giving no directions until the close of the day's fighting, when the troops would be ordered to fall back during the night to the now position selected by him. In that manner the army reached the James river. After getting to Harrison's Landing McClellan applied for 50,000 reinforcements to enable him to resume active operations General Halke's, when he visited the army, informed Gen. McClellan that the Government could furnish him only 20,000 additional troops. Gen. McClellan consented to renew operations with that number of reinforcements, and General Halleck left with that understanding. But the day that he left Gen. McClellan wrote to him. asking for 15,000 or 20,000 troops from the Western army, in addition to those promised to him urging very strongly that they should be brought here temporarily, to be returned to the West after Richmond should have been taken. As this could not be done, the order was given for the withdrawal of the army, as rapidly as possible, in order to cooperate with the forces under General Pope, then in the presence of a superior force of the enemy. Here is McClellan's testimony when examined as to why he did not pursue Lee after the battle of Sharpsburg (or Antietam) The next morning (the 18th) I found that our loss had been so great. and there was so much disorganization in some of the commands, that I did not consider it proper to renew the attack that day, especially as I was sure of the arrival that day of two fresh divisions, amounting to about fifteen thousand men. As an instance of the condition of some of the troops that morning I happen to recollect the returns of the first corps--Gen. Hooker's — made the morning of the 18th, by which there were about 3,500 men reported present for duty. Four days after that the returns of the same corps showed 13,500. I had arranged, however, to renew the attack at daybreak on the 19th, but I learned some time during the night or early in the morning that the enemy had abandoned his position. It after wards proved that he moved with great rapidity. and, not being encumbered by we gone, was enabled to get his troops across the river before we could do him any serious injury. I think that taking into consideration what the troops had gone through. we got as much out of them in this Antietam campaigns as human endurance would bear. The committee give the first correct history of the "resignation" of Burnside. It appears that after the battle at Fredericksburg he issued "Order No. S." dismissing some officers from the service, and sentencing some deserters to be that. --This order Lincoln refused to approve: Thereupon Gen. Burnside again insisted that his resignation be accepted. This the President declined to do and, after some urging, Gen. Burnside consented to take a leave of absence for thirty days, with the understanding that at the end of that time he should be assigned to duty, as he deemed it improper to hold a commission as Major General and receive his pay without rendering service therefore. Gen. Burnside objected to the wording of the order which relieved him from his command and which stated that it was at his own request, as being unjust to him and unfounded in act but upon the representation that any other order would do injury to the cause, he contented to let it remain as it then read. The committee came to the conclusion that during last spring. summer, and winter, the "Union" armies did literally nothing, and wind up their report with the following work which remains to be done: We now see clearly what we have to do We must obtain uninterrupted control of the Mississippi. We must reach. those great railroad orderlies the one herding on the Atlantic seaboard, the other stretching through the Virginia and Tennessee valleys to the West and South We must, as soon as possible take the few fortified seaports remaining in possession of the rebels; and then we shall have virtually disarmed the rebellion, out it off from all external sources of food and arms, and have surrounded it by forces which can press upon it from any quarter, at the same time severing into isolated portions the rebel territory and destroying their means of intercommunication by which alone they have hitherto been enabled to meet us in force wherever we have presented ourselves. and by which alone they have been able to feed and supply their armies.
