Browsing named entities in Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 3. You can also browse the collection for March 25th or search for March 25th in all documents.

Your search returned 5 results in 3 document sections:

: I do not want to hurry you, and besides fully appreciate the necessity of having your horses well shod and well rested before starting again on another long march. But there is now such a possibility, if not probability, of Lee and Johnston attempting to unite, that I feel extremely desirous not only of cutting the lines of communication between them, but of having a large and properly commanded cavalry force ready to act in case such an attempt is made. I think that by Saturday next [March 25th], you had better start, even if you have to stop here, to finish shoeing up. This new movement of Sheridan was of extreme importance to the national armies both in Virginia and North Carolina. Lee was at this very time conferring with Johnston in regard to the union of their commands, and all of Johnston's manoeuvres were made with a view to facilitate this result. Johnston's Military Narrative. Sheridan's movement was intended to prevent it. On the 22nd of March, Grant said to Sher
e Valley, which joined Lee for his last campaign, and all the troops, regular and local, in Richmond. He calculates that, in the attack on Fort Steadman on the 25th of March, Lee lost from 2,500 to 3,000 men, and that during the month of March about 3,000 rebels deserted. Thus, on the 31st of March, says Taylor, Lee had only 33,00 entirely from his base, and move around to the right and rear of Lee, and thus for ever terminate all communication between him and Johnston's army. On the 25th of March, however, Lee made an attack upon the right of Meade's line, in front of the Ninth corps. The point selected was a fort a little more than half a mile from thnown as Fort Steadman, and the opposing lines were not more than a hundred and fifty yards apart, the pickets only fifty yards. At half-past 4 on the morning of March 25th, long before dawn, the rebels moved against Parke's line east of Fort Steadman, with Gordon's corps, reinforced by Bushrod Johnson's division. Parke's Report
rd that even the rebel government was yet apprised of the calamity at Five Forks. Lee's whole conduct at this crisis was that of a man whose faculties were beginning to give way amid the wreck of his cause and the crash of his army tumbling into ruins around him. On the morning of the 2nd of April, the assault was made by Wright and Parke; Ord and Humphreys at first waiting to ascertain the result on the right of the line. Wright had assembled his troops at the point where, on the 25th of March, he had carried the rebel entrenched picket line, in front of his old left. This was within striking distance of the enemy's main entrenchments. The national line here turned to the south, so that the Sixth corps faced both north and west, and fronted towards the Boydton road. The command was formed in three divisions, the centre somewhat in advance, and the other two right and left in front respectively, in order to be ready to move promptly in either direction. Five batteries acco