nd, the value of the Confederate fleet, at New Orleans, made up as it was chiefly of fast tow-boats, with elated bows, cannot be estimated alone in guns.
It was essentially a ram fleet, and, if it had been handled efficiently, might have thrown Farragut's advance into confusion.
As Commander Bartlett suggests also, the fire-rafts, with attendant tugs, might have been put to formidable use. This was shown in the case of the Hartford.
Doubtless the Confederate flotilla, however efficiently handled, would have had hard work to check such an impetuous onset as that of Farragut.
Out of a nominal total of 14 vessels (9 of them rains and 2 of them iron-clad) and 40 guns, Commander Mitchell had practically only 4 vessels and 12 guns — the: McRae, Manassas, Governor Moore, and perhaps the Stonewall Jackson.
For this Mitchell was in no way responsible.
It was due to the delays in completing the Louisiana, to the absurd organization of the River Defense Fleet, to the want of seamen, and t