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f the battle, I have the honor to report: 1. The movements of the Twenty-first army corps, from the time of its crossing the Tennessee River, terminating on the nineteenth ultimo, when the battle of Chickamauga opened. August 31.--My command, stationed in Sequatchie Valley, at Pikeville, Dunlap's, Thurman, respectively, excepting General Wagner's brigade, First division, opposite Chattanooga, and General Hazen at Hoe's Tavern, the latter fifteen miles north of Wagner, and both in Tennessee Valley. My command has been thus stationed since the nineteenth of August, having left Manchester, Tennessee, on the sixteenth of August, crossing the mountains at three different points, in obedience to orders from Department Headquarters, at half-past 12 A. M. of the sixteenth. At a quarter-past two P. A. I received your orders of the thirtieth, dated thirty minutes past twelve P. M., to move my entire command, except the brigades of Generals Hazen and Wagner, as soon as practicable, down
Doc. 185.-operations in Tennessee Valley. General Hazen's report. headquarters Second brigade, Second division, twenty-First army corps, Chattanooga, October 8, 1863. Lieutenant-Colonel C. Goddard, A. A. G., Headquarters Department Cumberland: in obedience to orders received at Poe's Tavern, September third, 1863, from headquarters of the department, I assumed command of all the troops in the Tennessee Valley, embracing Wagner's and my own brigade of infantry, Minty's brigade of cavalry, and Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry, in all between six and seven thousand men, with orders to keep these forces well in hand, to closely watch the movements of the enemy at all the crossings of the Tennessee River, make such dispositions of the force as should lead the enemy to believe that the valley was occupied by a large force, and to cross ourselves and occupy Chattanooga at the earliest opportunity. The forces were scattered from Kingston to Williams's Island, a distance of
William Tecumseh Sherman, Memoirs of General William T. Sherman ., volume 1, chapter 15 (search)
f the objects aimed at by General Rosecrans and General Burnside's movement into East Tennessee, and of the measures directed to be taken to attain these objects. It has been the constant desire of the government, from the beginning of the war, to rescue the loyal inhabitants of East Tennessee from the hands of the rebels, who fully appreciated the importance of continuing their hold upon that country. In addition to the large amount of agricultural products drawn from the upper valley of the Tennessee, they also obtained iron and other materials from the vicinity of Chattanooga. The possession of East Tennessee would cut off one of their most important railroad communications, and threaten their manufactories at Rome, Atlanta, etc. When General Buell was ordered into East Tennessee in the summer of 1862, Chattanooga was comparatively unprotected; but Bragg reached there before Buell, and, by threatening his communications, forced him to retreat on Nashville and Louisville. A
Doc. 43.-operations in Tennessee Valley. Major-General Hazen's report. see Brown's Ferry, Georgia. headquarters Second brigade, Second division, Twenty-First army corps, Chattanooga, Oct. 8, 1863. Lieutenant-Colonel C. Goddard, A. A. General, Headquarters Dept. Cumb.: In obedience to orders received at Poe's Tavern, September third, 1863, from Headquarters of the Department, I assumed command of all the troops in the Tennessee Valley, embracing Wagner's and my own brigade of infantry, Minty's brigade of cavalry, and Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry — in all between six and seven thousand men — with orders to keep these forces well in hand, to closely watch the movements of the enemy at all the crossings of the Tennessee River, make such dispositions of the force as should lead the enemy to believe that the valley was occupied by a large force, and to cross ourselves and occupy Chattanooga at the earliest opportunity. The forces were scattered from Kingston to Wi
i more vital. While fully recognizing the importance and necessity of operations in the valley of the Mississippi, Tennessee, and Cumberland rivers, and of coast expeditions, I always held the eastern line to be the true theatre of decisive operations. If I had been retained in chief command, untrammelled as to time and means, I should, in the early spring of 1862, have pushed with all energy the operations against Wilmington, Charleston, and New Orleans, as well as in the Mississippi, Tennessee, and Cumberland valleys, and against the Knoxville and Lynchburg Railroad, via Cumberland Gap, and early in May have thrown the Army of the Potomac to the James river with a strength of over 150,000 for duty. I intended to transport by water to Urbana, on the lower Rappahannock, four divisions of infantry with their batteries, the regular infantry, one bridge-train, a few squadrons of cavalry, and a small number of wagons; with them to push by a forced march to the vicinity of West Point,
Capt. Calvin D. Cowles , 23d U. S. Infantry, Major George B. Davis , U. S. Army, Leslie J. Perry, Joseph W. Kirkley, The Official Military Atlas of the Civil War, Index. (search)
Outlines of the walls 35 II, 211 Sycamore Church, Va.: Affair, Aug. 9, 1864 42 i, 841 Tennessee: Brown's Ferry 31 i, 83 Carter's Raid 20 i, 97, 100 Chattanooga-Ringgold Campaign 31 II, 515 Chickamauga Campaign 30 III, 120a, 262a, 264a, 443 Dandridge 32 i, 133 Duck River 45 i, 605 Franklin 23 i, 225; 45 i, 240 Harrison's Ferry 30 III, 120a Knoxville Campaign 31 i, 493, 507 Nashville 45 i, 408 Sequatchie and Tennessee Valleys 30 IV, 310 Shiloh 10 i, 177, 183 Stone's River Campaign 20 i, 313, 564, 916, 922 Wauhatchie 31 i, 212, 232 Waynesborough and vicinity 45 i, 966 Wheeler and Roddey's Raid 30 II, 674 Tennessee, Department of: Hospitals 30 IV, 737 Tennessee River: Reopening, Oct. 26-29, 1863 31 i, 83, 212, 232 Texas: Sabine Pass Expedition 26 i, 291, 296 Torpedoes: Charleston Harbor, S. C.14, 950, 951 For use against U. S.S. New Ironside
must inevitably make the former take to the mountain-passes by every available road, to get to his supplies. The whole campaign which followed could hardly be better deascribed than it was thus mapped out in advance. Sherman would have been here before this, but for high water in Elk river, driving him some thirty miles up that river, to cross. On the same day, he again telegraphed to Burnside: Can you hold the line from Knoxville to Clinton, for seven days? If so, I think the whole Tennessee valley can be secured from present danger. And again, at ten o'clock that night: It is of the most vital importance that East Tennessee should be held. Take immediate steps to that end. Evacuate Kingston, if you think best. As I said in a previous dispatch, I think seven days more will enable us to make such movements as to make the whole valley secure, if you hold on that time. On the 15th, he said again: I do not know how to impress on you the necessity of holding on to East Tennessee, i
ity were soon manifest in the organization and increased efficiency of his command. On July 17th, Bragg, about to move to Chattanooga from Tupelo, ordered General Armstrong to advance toward Decatur, Ala., to cover the transfer of the army. With portions of the squadrons and companies of Webb, Barteau, McCulloch, Hill, Sanders, Roddey and Newsom he attacked the enemy at Courtland, Ala., July 25th, and won a brilliant victory, taking 133 prisoners and gaining possession of the fertile Tennessee valley from Decatur to Tuscumbia. His continued successes brought him the warm congratulations of General Bragg. In August, 1862, he was sent with about 2,000 cavalry to make a demonstration in west Tennessee in co-operation with Bragg, and preparatory to Price's advance. He crossed the Hatchie river, passed between Jackson and Bolivar, destroyed bridges and trestles on the Memphis & Charleston railroad, drove the Federals into Bolivar, August 30th, and on his return defeated their infantry
e, he contented to let it remain as it then read. The committee came to the conclusion that during last spring. summer, and winter, the "Union" armies did literally nothing, and wind up their report with the following work which remains to be done: We now see clearly what we have to do We must obtain uninterrupted control of the Mississippi. We must reach. those great railroad orderlies the one herding on the Atlantic seaboard, the other stretching through the Virginia and Tennessee valleys to the West and South We must, as soon as possible take the few fortified seaports remaining in possession of the rebels; and then we shall have virtually disarmed the rebellion, out it off from all external sources of food and arms, and have surrounded it by forces which can press upon it from any quarter, at the same time severing into isolated portions the rebel territory and destroying their means of intercommunication by which alone they have hitherto been enabled to meet us in fo
direction until to-day. Since midnight the very gates of heaven seem to be opened, and the rain is pouring down in incessant torrents. If the roads be not rendered impracticable by it, we will in all probability see the one hundred and twenty pontoons the enemy have built at Chickamauga Station put to use before long, somewhere between here and Knoxville. It would certainly be the best move they could make. It would give their army once more the benefit of the crops of the rich valley of the Tennessee. It would throw it between Rosecrans's and Burnside's, and compel the latter to beat a hasty retreat to Kentucky to escape annihilation. And lastly, it would force this army to abandon Chattanooga and hunt up the enemy for battle north of the Tennessee. A last element of uncertainty as to the duration of our occupation of Chattanooga is formed by our precarious lines of communications. We have had three bridges across the Tennessee. Two of these were rendered impracticable
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