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might be necessary or convenient for their several commands, for supplies or for other military purposes.--(Doc. 155.) A band of rebel guerrillas entered Florence, Ala., and burned the warehouses containing commissary and quartermaster's stores, and all the cotton in the vicinity. They also seized the United States steamer Colonna; and after taking all the money belonging to the vessel and passengers, they burned her. They next proceeded down the Tennessee River to Chickasaw, then to Waterloo and the vicinity of Eastport, and burned all the warehouses that contained cotton.--A band of about forty rebel guerrillas attacked a Union wagon-train near Pittsburgh Landing, Tenn., and captured sixty wagons laden with commissary and quartermaster's stores. An unsuccessful effort to sink the rebel ram Arkansas, lying before Vicksburgh, was made by the Union ram Queen of the West, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel A. W. Ellet. The Arkansas was hit by the Union ram, but with ver
s directly in front. Imagine all this, and a little more, and the reader can then form some idea of what occurred to General Kilpatrick's command, on Saturday night, July fourth, as it ascended the mountain to the Monterey Gap, and so across to Waterloo on the western slope. The column commenced to ascend the mountain at about dark, and arrived near the Monterey House, at the top, between nine and ten o'clock. The enemy had planted a piece of artillery near this spot, so as to command the roadcle Sam's service as they had been in the confederate service, until it was convenient to relieve them. At first the prisoners were coralled near the Monterey House. When the number had got to be large they were driven down the mountain toward Waterloo. A gang started off in this direction at about midnight — it was not prudent to wait until morning, for daylight might bring with it a retreating column of the enemy, and then all the prisoners would have been recaptured; finally, when near the
Robert Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: Volume 2., chapter 8.58 (search)
ed, should be sent rapidly to Gainesville. I also telegraphed Colonel Herman Haupt, chief of railway transportation, to direct one of the strongest divisions coming forward, and to be at Warrenton Junction on the 24th, to be put in the works at Manassas Junction. A cavalry force had been sent forward to observe the Thoroughfare Gap early on the morning of the 26th, but nothing was heard from it. General Pope's orders of the 25th disposed his troops on the line of the Rappahannock, from Waterloo to Kelly's Ford, as for an advance toward the Rapidan. Reno was ordered back to Kelly's Ford to resume communication with the forces under Burnside at Falmouth.--Editors. On the night of August 26th Jackson's advance, having passed Thoroughfare Gap, struck the Orange and Alexandria railroad at Manassas Junction, and made it plain to me that all of the reenforcements and movements of the troops promised me had altogether failed. The first information appears to have been received in
Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial Field Book of the Civil War. Volume 2., Chapter 18: Lee's invasion of Maryland, and his retreat toward Richmond. (search)
shrink from the honor and the grave responsibilities; but duty at that critical moment, and the peremptory orders of his Government, compelled him to take both, and with the spirit of the assurance, I'll try, he assumed the command on the 10th of November. At that time the Army of the Potomac was massed near Warrenton, as follows:--The First, Second, and Fifth Corps, reserve artillery, and general Headquarters, at Warrenton; Ninth Corps on the line of the Rappahannock, in the vicinity of Waterloo; the Sixth Corps at New Baltimore; the Eleventh Corps at New Baltimore, Gainesville, and Thoroughfare Gap ;--Sickles's division of the Third Corps, on the Orange and Alexandria railroad, from Manassas Junction to Warrenton Junction; Pleasanton across the Rappahannock at Amisville, Jefferson, &c., with his pickets at Hazel River, facing Longstreet, six miles from Culpepper Court-House; and Bayard at Rappahannock Station. --See McClellan's Report, page 237. Burnside's sense of the magnitu
sed to the editor of the New York Tribune, which is as follows:-- Washington, February 20, 1862. Sir:--I cannot suffer undue merit to be ascribed to my official action. The glory of our recent victories belongs to the gallant officers that fought the battles. No share of it belongs to me. Much has been recently said of military combination and organizing victory. I hear such phrases with apprehension. They commenced in infidel France with the Italian campaign, and resulted in Waterloo. Who can organize victory? Who can combine the elements of success on the battle-field? We owe our recent victories to the Spirit of the Lord, that moved our soldiers to dash into battle, and filled the hearts of our enemies with terror and dismay. The inspiration that conquered in battle was in the hearts of the soldiers, and from on high. Patriotic spirit with resolute courage in officers and men is a military combination that never failed. We may well rejoice at the recent victor
tle. The battle of Fair Oaks, or Seven Pines, as the Confederates call it, has some points of resemblance to that of Waterloo, and, like that, shows how much military movements are controlled by fortune or accident. At Waterloo, Bonaparte's attaWaterloo, Bonaparte's attack upon the British lines was delayed some hours by the rain, and consequent state of the roads. At Fair Oaks, the muddy roads held fast Huger's division, and caused the assault to be postponed four or five hours. Huger took no part in the battle, contrary to the plans which had been agreed upon: Grouchy did not appear at Waterloo, as was expected. Sumner's arrival upon the field at six is paralleled by that of Blucher at Waterloo at about the same hour. So much for the points of resemblanWaterloo at about the same hour. So much for the points of resemblance between the two battles; but in other respects that of Fair Oaks illustrates the power of fortune over war. Had Huger's corps attacked us on the left flank at the same time that Hill and Longstreet did in front, we could hardly have escaped destru
is time nearly his whole army on the Rappahannock, had abandoned the idea of forcing a passage of that river, in favor of an effort, by a long flank movement, to turn our right. To this end, Jackson was directed to take the advance, cross above Waterloo, and move around our army so as to strike the railroad in its rear; while Longstreet, following, was to menace our front and fix Pope's attention until Jackson's hazardous movement should be accomplished. Jackson moved rapidly across Aug. 25. the Rappahannock at Hinson's Mill, four miles above Waterloo, and encamped that night at Salem, behind the Bull Run Mountains, between Thoroughfare and Manassas Gaps. Starting early next morning, he passed through Thoroughfare Gap and moved south-easterly by Gainesville, where he was joined by Stuart with two cavalry brigades; striking before dark Aug. 26. the Alexandria Railroad at Bristow Station, thus placing himself directly between Pope's far superior force and his base at Alexandri
.; Maj. James Cavanagh, 69th N. Y.; and Maj. Carraher, 28th Mass. The London Times's correspondent, watching the battle from the heights, and writing front Lee's headquarters, says: To the Irish division, commanded by Gen. Meager, was principally committed the desperate task of bursting out of the town of Fredericksburg, and farming, under the withering fire of the Confederate batteries, to attack Marye's Heights, towering immediately in their front-Never at Fontenoy, Albuera, nor at Waterloo, was more undoubted courage displayed by the sons of Erin than during those six frantic dashes which they directed against the almost impregnable position of their foe. That any mortal men could have carried the position before which they were wantonly sacrificed, defended as it was, it seems to me idle for a moment to believe. But the bodies which he in dense masses within 40 yards of the muzzles of Col. Walton's guns are the best evidence what manner of men they were who pressed on to
him,and the enemy were held in check till evening, when Pleasanton withdrew across the river. Meade now, presuming the enemy in force at Culpepper Court House, pushed over Oct. 12. the 6th, 5th, and 2d corps to Brandy Station, while Buford's cavalry moved in the van to Culpepper Court House; when, on hearing from Gen. Gregg, commanding the cavalry division on our right, that the enemy had driven him back from Hazel run across the Rappahannock, and were crossing at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo in heavy force, Meade hastily drew back his army across the river and retreated Oct. 13. to Catlett's Station and thence Oct. 14. to Centerville; Gregg, with the 4th and 13th Pa. and 1st N. Y. . cavalry and 10th N. Y. infantry, being surrounded and attacked Oct. 12. near Jefferson, and routed, with a loss of 500, mainly prisoners. Our army was sharply and impudently pursued, especially by Stuart's cavalry, who gathered up quite a number of prisoners, mainly stragglers, of little
of Gen. Johnston's troops with those of Gen. Beauregard, on the 21st, decided the fortune of the day, and that if Gen. Patterson had done his duty, that unpropitious junction would have been avoided. It is the old tale of Grouchy and Blucher at Waterloo. Every Frenchman knows that if Grouchy had not been culpably negligent, Blucher would never have been able to come to the assistance of Wellington, who in that case would have been beaten hollow. The theory is very natural, since it interposesst it. In the first place, Gen. Johnston was known to have joined the main army of the rebels long before the fight on the 21st, so that the advantage thus acquired by the enemy was foreseen. It is the same as if Blucher, instead of arriving at Waterloo at 4 o'clock on the afternoon of the 18th June, 1815, had joined Wellington the day before, and Napoleon had known that he had two enemies to contend against instead of one--a circumstance which would have made all the difference. In the next p
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